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 Morimichi Watanabe (1926-2012)
Dedication
We dedicate this volume to the memory of Morimichi Watanabe (1926–2012). 
In virtue of his scholarship and organizational skills, Mori was the dean of 
Cusanus studies in America. His research centered on Cusanus from his first 
book, The Political Ideas of Nicholas of Cusa, with Special Reference to De concor-
dantia catholica (Droz, 1963), up to his last, Nicholas of Cusa: A Companion to 
His Life and His Times (Ashgate, 2011). Mori also guided the American Cusanus 
Society as its President for twenty-five years (1983–2008), and remained active 
as President Emeritus and editor of the Society’s Newsletter until his death. 
For his vision and persuasive leadership, Mori was affectionately known as the 
Society’s Shogun—a title that he resisted, but that would not go away because 
the evidence was simply too strong. under his leadership, the Society grew from 
an informal group sponsoring Cusanus sessions at the International Congress 
on Medieval Studies in Kalamazoo into an organization with an internationally 
prized Newsletter, a vigorous publication program, and biennial conferences at 
the Lutheran Theological Seminary at Gettysburg. The 2012 Gettysburg confer-
ence on “Christian-Muslim Dialogue in the Late Middle Ages” was also dedi-
cated to Mori. Both the conference and this book continue his life-long work 
as a scholar and the guiding genius of the American Cusanus Society. Indeed, 
our book witnesses to this legacy by publishing Mori’s article “Cusanus, Islam, 
and Religious Tolerance” at the start of Part I. This is especially fitting since 
Mori was thinking and writing about these issues long before the rest of us. 
As he notes with characteristic modesty, the article revisits the themes of a 
paper he presented at the landmark 1964 Cusanus conference in Bressanone, 
though he hopes that he has “gained more insight into the subject since that 
time.” The article leaves no doubt on this score. Mori wrote it for the 2003 
meeting of the Japanese Cusanus Society, and later translated it into English. It 
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Foreword by Thomas E. Burman: 
Nicholas of Cusa and Peter the Venerable’s Request
As the late Morimichi Watanabe points out later in this volume, Nicholas 
of Cusa wrote his remarkable Cribratio Alkorani, The Sifting of the Qurʾan, in 
1460–1461 at the request of his close friend, Pope Pius II (1458–1464). Yet I want 
to suggest here, at the beginning of a collection of essays about Cusanus and 
Islam, that we might just as well consider the Cribratio as the response to an 
invitation sent out more than three hundred years earlier, an invitation that 
had remained as of yet unfulfilled. For as a kind of preface to his well-known 
twelfth-century Latin anthology of Islamic texts, Peter the Venerable included 
a copy of a letter about the project that he had sent to Bernard of Clairvaux. 
After describing how he had located the various translators and organized their 
work, and after explaining that he had undertaken this project to insure that 
Christians recognize that Islam is the ‘feces of all the heresies,’ Peter writes that
I have notified you [Bernard] in particular about all this in order . . . 
to inspire your magnificence of learning—which God has uniquely 
bestowed on you in our days—to write against such a pernicious sect.1
This request tells us a great deal about Bernard’s standing in Latin Christendom 
in the mid-twelfth century, but is otherwise a rather curious business—or so 
I have long thought. Peter had gone through all the trouble to arrange for fine 
linguists to translate Arabic texts into Latin, including the Qurʾan and a well-
informed Arab-Christian apologetic work directed at Islam, and had done so in 
Spain since he knew that such translators and such texts could only be found 
there, but then turned immediately to a northern European abbot and asked 
him to write against Islam using the materials that he had made available in his 
1 “Hoc ego de hoc precipuo errore errorum de hac faece universarum heresum, in quam 
omnium diabolicarum sectarum quae ab ipso Saluatoris aduentu ortae sunt reliquiae con-
fluxerunt, facere volui, ut sicut ejus letali peste dimidius pene orbis infectus agnoscitur, ita 
quam exsecrandus et conculcandus detecta ejus stulticia et turpitudine a nescientibus 
agnoscatur. . . . Specialiter autem uobis haec omnia notificaui, ut et tanto amico studia nostra 
communicarem, et ad scribendum contra tam perniciosum errorem, illam uestram quam 
nostris diebus Deus uobis singulariter contulit doctrinae magnificentiam animarem.” 
(Peter the Venerable, “Epistola Petris Cluniacensis ad Bernardum Claraevallis,” in Peter the 
Venerable and Islam, ed. James Kritzeck (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton university Press, 1964), 
212–14 at 213).
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influential anthology. Bernard was a towering intellect, to be sure, well known 
for his defense of orthodoxy, but why exactly approach him and not someone 
with much more immediate knowledge of Islam, such as one of the translators 
he had hired, or, say, Dominicus Gundassalinus, the Spanish Christian philoso-
pher and Arabic-to-Latin translator? Moreover, what is equally intriguing is 
Bernard’s complete disinterest in Peter’s invitation: he never wrote anything 
remotely like a systematic refutation of Islam.
Peter’s request, however, went unanswered not only in his own lifetime, but 
also, one might argue, for many generations thereafter. For indeed, Bernard’s 
response to Peter’s invitation foreshadowed that of nearly all the great think-
ers—all those who were seen by contemporaries to have had ‘magnificence of 
learning’ bestowed upon them—of the later medieval Latin-Christian world. 
They similarly refused to take up the invitation to write against the ‘perni-
cious sect’ of Islam, until we arrive at the second half of the fifteenth century, 
with Nicholas of Cusa’s lengthy writings on Islam. Indeed, if we page through 
the recently published volumes of the massive Christian-Muslim Relations: A 
Bibliographical History,2 we can’t help but notice that most of the great scho-
lastic thinkers—Abelard, Hugh of St. Victor, Peter Lombard, Albert the Great, 
Bonaventure, Duns Scotus, Ockham—are entirely absent. Important, indeed 
seminal, Latin treatises against Islam were being composed in the thirteenth 
and early fourteenth centuries, but they were the work of quirky, marginal, 
and often marginalized figures whom nobody considered the leading intel-
lects of the age—men such as Ramon Martí, a brilliant Semitic linguist from 
Spain who wrote two short, learned works against Islam, but then turned his 
back on the ‘Islamic question’ and dedicated the bulk of his scholarly work 
to combating Judaism. Another such figure was his fellow Iberian, Raymond 
Lull, who was well aware that he seemed a crackpot (phantasticus) in his own 
time, despite his immense labors to learn Arabic and develop a complex phil-
osophical system designed to convert Muslims (and everyone else) to prop-
erly reformed Latin Christianity.3 Richard Southern may have been correct in 
his argument that the purpose of the scholastic movement was to restore 
and systematize all knowledge for the purpose of reforming Christendom 
and defending it against its enemies, but for mainstream, northern scholastic 
thinkers in the high and later Middle Ages this did not mean actually writ-
2 David Thomas et al., eds., Christian-Muslim Relations: A Bibliographical History, 4 volumes 
published to date (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2009–). Hereafter, CMR.
3 For the extensive bibliography on Martí and Lull, see respectively CMR 4, 381–90, 703–17. 
For Lull’s frank self-assessment on the eve of the Council of Vienne in 1311, see his Phantasticus 
or Liber disputationis Petri et Raimundi, CCCM 78, 1–30.
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ing against the religion of Islam, as Peter the Venerable had asked Bernard of 
Clairvaux to do.4
Now it is true that a few scholastic thinkers do show up in the pages of the 
Christian-Muslim Relations bibliography. William of Auvergne (d. 1249) wrote 
against Islam in his De legibus, but the four relevant chapters hardly represent 
the sustained response that Peter seemed to have had in mind. Roger Bacon (d. 
after 1292), of course, also had much to say here and there about Muhammad 
and Islam in the Opus maius. Apart from them, however, scholastic authors 
did not find the refutation of Islamic belief and practice a compelling topic.5 
Indeed, the closest thing to what Peter the Venerable was requesting—a well-
informed refutation of Islam by a leading northern European thinker—were 
his own two works on the subject.6
Of course, many have seen Thomas Aquinas’ immense Summa contra gen-
tiles as a treatise against Islam. This idea goes back to about a generation after 
his death, when the story began to circulate that Ramon de Penyafort, one-time 
master general of Aquinas’ Dominican order, had asked him to write a manual 
for missionaries to Islam, to which Aquinas responded with his summa against 
whatever he meant by ‘gentiles’. For many centuries this notion was widely 
accepted, and it has its defenders still. Yet on this issue, one must side with the 
series of modern scholars (including most prominently the late Dominican, 
René-Antoine Gauthier) who have argued that this certainly could not have 
been the case.7 Not only is the evidence for Penyafort’s request suspect, but, as 
a whole, the Summa contra gentiles contains nothing that recommends it as a 
guidebook for real missionaries talking to real Muslims. Aquinas only mentions 
Islam nine times in the entire work, and only a brief paragraph (1.6) says any-
thing remotely substantive about the religion. Here he sneers at Muhammad 
for attracting followers with promises of a carnal paradise, and claims that yes, 
Muhammad preached some true things, but only mixed together with fables 
and utterly false doctrines. Most importantly, however, having made utterly 
4 Richard Southern, Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe, vol. 1: Foundations 
(Oxford, UK-Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell, 1995), 4.
5 On William and Roger Bacon see CMR 4, 288–94, 457–70.
6 On which see CMR 3 [Dominique Iogna-Prat and John Tolan, “Peter of Cluny,” in Christian-
Muslim Relations. A Bibliographical History, General Editor David Thomas (Leiden: Brill 
Online, 2013). Accessed 28 May, 2013, http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/christian- 
muslim-relations/peter-of-cluny-COM_24376].
7 He discusses this issue at a number of points in his many works, but comprehensively pres-
ents his views in his Somme contre les gentils: Introduction (Paris: Éditions universitaires, 
1993), passim, esp. 119–30. Here I take a position very different from John Tolan’s in his article 
about Aquinas in CMR 4, 521–29.
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clear a few paragraphs earlier (1.2) that his audience in writing the Summa con-
tra gentiles was to be learned sages (sapientes), he pointedly asserts in the same 
short passage that Islam contained none: non aliqui sapientes, in rebus divinis 
et humanis excercitati, a principio crediderunt: sed homines bestiales in desertis 
morantes, omnis doctrinae divinae prorsus ignari.8
Moreover, though Aquinas suggests that he had read the Qurʾan, which cir-
culated in Latin within his own order,9 there is absolutely nothing in this work 
to suggest that he had actually done so. Indeed, Aquinas hardly thought at all 
about the religion that Muhammad preached. The fact that he was comfortable 
repeating overused Latin-Christian insults against Islam, as well as polemical 
arguments that he must have known were feeble, suggests that, as Gauthier 
put it, the problem of Islam “did not interest him at all.” What Aquinas held up 
for careful, exacting criticism in the Summa contra gentiles was not “the errors 
of Muslim theologians . . . [but] their philosophy.”10
It is true that Aquinas engaged with Islam in one other work, the brief De 
rationibus fidei, which consists of the great Dominican’s responses to ques-
tions sent to him by a contemporary confrere living in the Crusader States and 
known only as the ‘Cantor of Antioch.’ As Gabriel Said Reynolds has made clear, 
the questions that the cantor sent Aquinas are themselves precisely the sort of 
questions that real Muslims in the Middle East asked Christians.11 But since 
one of the key sources for De rationibus fidei is none other than the Summa 
contra gentiles, we will not be surprised to find that Aquinas answers these 
legitimate Muslim questions with ideas developed largely in response to Arab-
Aristotelian philosophy, rather than Islamic beliefs.12 Furthermore, it is striking 
that later readers did not see this work as a treatise actually meant to convert 
8 Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 13: Summa 
contra gentiles 1.6 (Romae: Ex typographia polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1882), 17.
9 “Nulla etiam divina oracula praecedentium prophetarum ei testimonium perhibent: 
quin potius quasi omnia veteris et novi testamenti documenta fabulosa narratione dep-
ravat, ut patet eius legem inspicienti” (ibid). On the circulation of the Qurʾan among the 
Dominicans, see Thomas E. Burman, Reading the Qurʾan in Latin Christendom, 1140–1560 
(Philadelphia: university of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 91–98, and id., “How an Italian 
Friar Read his Arabic Qurʾan,” Dante Studies 125 (2007): 93–109.
10 René-Antoine Gauthier, O.P., Somme contre les gentils: Introduction (Paris: Èditions 
universitaires, 1993), 126–27.
11 Gabriel [Said] Reynolds, “Saint Thomas’ Islamic Challenge: Reflections on the Antiochene 
Questions,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 12 (2001): 161–89.
12 Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 40, pars b-c: De 
rationibus fidei (Romae: ad Santae Sabinae, 1968). On its connections with the Summa 
contra gentiles, see Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1: The Person 
and His Work, rev. ed., trans., Robert Royal (Washington, DC: The Catholic university of 
America Press, 2005), 124–25, 351–52.
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Muslims: none of the seventy-seven extant manuscripts (with the exception 
of one: Oviedo, Biblioteca del Cabildo, MS 24) are grouped together with any 
of the polemical and apologetic works of Ramon Martí, William of Tripoli, or 
Riccoldo da Monte di Croce, the three Dominican specialists in Arabic and the 
study of Islam whose works truly interrogated Islam and its holy book.13
What is true for Aquinas is true, I suggest, of scholastic philosophers and 
theologians in general in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. While 
there are plenty of signs that Islam was on the minds of Latin Christians—
the Qurʾan, for example, circulated widely in two different Latin translations 
that were both read closely, as the frequent annotations in their margins sug-
gest14—we nevertheless have little evidence of the leading schoolmen bother-
ing with it. We can think of a variety of possible reasons for this: the university 
curriculum had no place for the investigation of Islam; unlike Jews, Muslims 
lived outside of Latin Christendom, Spain aside, and certainly far from the cen-
ters of the scholastic movement in France, Germany, and England; and unlike 
Judaism, Islam did not figure in the Bible, so there was no permanent exegeti-
cal need to think about it. For whatever reasons—whether some combination 
of the above or others—scholastic philosophers and theologians were remark-
ably uninterested in Islam. Other than those marginal figures like Raymond 
Lull, those in the Latin world who wrote about Islam in this period were over-
whelmingly travelers and historians.15
It is striking in this connection to note that things were quite different in the 
Islamic world, where Christianity was often a central concern of precisely those 
scholars endowed with ‘magnificence of learning.’ The prodigious poet, jurist, 
and philosopher Ibn Ḥazm of Cordoba (d. 1064), “one of the greatest thinkers of 
Arabo-Muslim civilization,” as the Encyclopaedia of Islam puts it, famously and 
relentlessly exposed the contradictions that he found in the Judeo-Christian 
scriptures in his exhaustive work on the great variety of Islamic sects and 
other religions with which he was acquainted.16 For example, in Matthew 10, he 
argues, we find Jesus saying that he did not come bringing peace, but the sword 
13 In the Oviedo manuscript it appears alongside Riccoldo’s Contra legem Saracenorum. See 
J. M. Mérigoux, “L’ouvrage d’un Frère Prêcheur Florentin en Orient à la Fin du XIIIe Siècle. 
Le Contra Legem Saracenorum de Riccoldo da Monte di Croce,” Memorie domenicane 
17 (1986): 35–36.
14 See Burman, Reading the Qurʾan in Latin Christendom, 1140–1560, passim.
15 See, for example, CMR 4, 295–306 (Jacques de Vitry), 373–80 (William of Rubruck), and 
718–23 (Jean de Joinville).
16 “Ibn Ḥazm,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed. (Leiden: Brill Online), accessed 22 May, 
2013, http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/ibn-hazm-
COM_0325. On his life and works see, most recently, Camilla Adang, Maribel Fierro, 
and Sabine Schmidtke, eds., Ibn Ḥazm of Cordoba: The Life and Works of a Controversial 
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of division, while in John 12 Jesus says that he has arrived not to judge and 
punish, but to save humankind. This and other obvious contrarieties, Ibn Ḥazm 
concludes, cannot be ascribed to Jesus but “to the four iniquitous men who 
wrote these corrupted, altered gospels.”17 This eleventh-century attack on the 
Christian gospels runs to some eighty pages, but it pales in comparison with 
the book-length refutations of Christianity that Arab-Muslim scholars wrote 
in the age of Aquinas. For example, another Andalusī scholar known usually 
as the Imām al-Qurṭubī, who died in the generation before Aquinas, responded 
to two short, Mozarabic works in defense of Christianity with a treatise, just 
under five hundred pages long in a modern edition, called Information about 
the Corruption and Delusions of the Religion of the Christians.18
Another brief Arab-Christian treatise of the late twelfth or early thirteenth 
century, Bishop Paul of Antioch’s Letter to a Muslim Friend, together with a 
slightly later reworking of it, collectively provoked no less than three sustained 
attacks on Christianity, written between the mid-twelfth and early thirteenth 
centuries.19 The last of these, The Correct Answer to those who have Changed 
the Religion of Christ, weighs in at more than a thousand pages in an edition 
from the mid-1960s, and more than two thousand in a critical edition from 
three decades later.20 Its author, Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328), moreover, was 
a combative and profoundly influential scholar who came to be known as 
the Shaykh of Islam, and was as significant an intellectual in his lifetime and 
thereafter as Aquinas was to Christendom. Indeed, the editors of a recent col-
lection of essays on him note: “Today, few figures from the medieval Islamic 
Thinker (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2012), whose editors characterize him as “one of the most 
brilliant minds produced by al-Andalus (xii).” 
17 Muḥammad Ibrāhim̄ Naṣr and ʻAbd al-Raḥmān ʻumayrah, eds., Al-fiṣal fī al-milal wa-al-
ahwāʾ wa-l-niḥal, 5 vols (Jiddah: Sharikat Maktabāt ̒ ukāẓ, 1982). On his attack on the Bible 
see in particular Martin-Samuel Behloul, “The Testimony of Reason and the Historical 
Reality: Ibn Ḥazm’s Refutations of Christianity,” in Ibn Ḥazm of Cordoba, ed., Adang et al., 
457–83.
18 Aḥmad Hijāzī al-Saqqā, ed., al-Iʿlām bi-mā fī dīn al-naṣārá min al-fasād wa-awhām 
wa-iẓhār maḥāsin dīn al-islām wa-ithbāt nubuwwat nabīnā Muḥammad ʿalayhi al-ṣalāt 
wa-al-salām (Cairo: Dār al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1980). On this work see CMR 4, 391–94.
19 See CMR 4, 78–82, 583–87, 769–72.
20 On this work, see David Thomas, “Apologetic and Polemic in the Letter from Cyprus and 
Ibn Taymiyyah’s Jawāb al-ṣaḥīḥ li-man baddala dīn al-Masīḥ,” in Ibn Taymiyya and His 
Times, eds., Yossef Rapoport and Shahab Ahmed (Karachi: Oxford university Press, 2010), 
247–65, and CMR 4, 824–44. English readers are fortunate to have Thomas F. Michel’s 
excellent translation and introduction: A Muslim Theologian’s Response to Christianity. 
Ibn Taymiyya’s Al-jawab al-sahih (Del Mar, New York: Caravan Books, 1984). 
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period can claim such a hold on modern Islamic discourses.”21 Moreover, 
the Correct Answer is only the longest of a number of different works that 
Ibn Taymiyyah wrote on Christianity.22 Even al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), ‘the Proof of 
Islam,’ whose works have shaped Islamic belief and thought more than anyone 
else’s, felt obliged to read the Gospels carefully and write a lengthy treatise 
entitled The Fitting Refutation of the Divinity of Jesus through what is Evident 
in the Gospel.23
Furthermore, it stands to reason that Christianity was of greater concern to 
Muslim thinkers of ‘magnificent learning’ than Islam was to Latin-Christian 
intellectuals. Just as Christian scholars could never simply ignore Judaism 
because their Bible was peopled with Jews and, for the most part, written by 
them, Muslim scholars similarly could never pretend that Christianity was 
irrelevant because the Qurʾan spoke so frequently about them—often nega-
tively, but sometimes quite positively—and the Sharia required that Christians 
be protected within the House of Islam. As a result, there were long discus-
sions in medieval Qurʾanic commentaries, for example, about which particu-
lar Christian groups the Qurʾan spoke about in the many different verses that 
mentioned them.24 Moreover, Christians were still a massive proportion of 
the population of most Islamic regimes throughout the pre-modern period. 
Christianity was, therefore, impossible for Muslim scholars to ignore. In later 
medieval northern Europe, on the other hand, Latin-Christian thinkers could 
still manage to behave as if Islamic religious belief hardly existed—or at least, 
hardly mattered. Those who read the Qurʾan closely and wrote with real knowl-
edge about Islam were overwhelmingly not the influential scholars of their age 
(or any age, for that matter), and what they wrote is of quite modest dimen-
sion—dozens of pages at best, not multiple hundreds.
Whether or not the Turkish conquest of Constantinople was the only rea-
son for the remarkable change in the second half of the fifteenth century, it 
certainly marks it emphatically. Suddenly we find intellectuals such as Aeneus 
21 Youssef Rapoport and Shahab Ahmed, “Introduction: Ibn Taymiyya and His Times,” in Ibn 
Taymiyyah and his Times, 3–20 at 4.
22 See CMR 4, 824–78.
23 See CMR 3 [Maha El Kaisy-Friemuth, “Al-Ghazālī,” in Christian-Muslim Relations. A 
Bibliographical History, General Editor David Thomas (Leiden: Brill Online, 2013). 
Reference. university of Tennessee. Accessed 28 May, 2013, http://referenceworks.
brillonline.com/entries/christian-muslim-relations/al-ghazali-COM_24677]. While 
doubts have been expressed about the attribution of this work to al-Ghazālī, recent 
scholarship tends to trust it and to insist that if it is not his work, then it is the work of 
someone in his circle. 
24 See Jane Dammen McAuliffe, Qurʾānic Christians: An Analysis of Classical and Modern 
Exegesis (Cambridge-New York: Cambridge university Press, 1991), passim.
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Silvius Piccolomini (later Pope Pius II) and Juan de Segovia writing extensive 
treatises against Islam. Most notably, however, we find Cardinal Cusanus com-
piling his massive Cribratio Alkorani, in which he painstakingly sifted through 
the same Latin Qurʾan (Robert of Ketton’s mid-twelfth-century version) that 
Peter the Venerable had offered to send to a disinterested Bernard of Clairvaux 
three hundred years earlier, and which the leading lights of Latin-Christian 
thought had ignored for so long.25 Leaving aside Raymond Lull’s massive and 
sui generis oeuvre on Islam, the Cribratio is really the first Latin-Christian work 
of a scale similar to Imām al-Qurṭubī’s Information about the Corruption and 
Delusions of the Religion of the Christians or Ibn Taymiyyah’s The Correct Answer 
to those who have Changed the Religion of Christ, and it is certainly the first work 
by a northern European of great significance to Latin-Christian thought that 
responds to Islam at real length.26 What I think is certain is that the Cribratio 
has a far greater claim to fulfilling Peter the Venerable’s centuries-old request 
than anything that came before it.
That this is so tells us a great deal about the place of Islam in the intellectual 
culture of the high Middle Ages, where it was a pressing concern to many in 
this period, but not to the leading lights of scholastic thought. Moreover, it 
illustrates the central importance of Cardinal Cusanus in the broader history of 
European reflection on Islam. Hence, the essays in this volume will probe the 
many dimensions of Cusanus’ engagement with the religion of the prophet, 
as well as explore its connections with broader intellectual trends in Europe. 
Collectively, they will assist enormously in resolving the puzzle of Peter the 
Venerable’s three-hundred-year wait.
25 Reinhold F. Glei and Markus Köhler, eds., Pius II. Papa, Epistola ad Mahumetem: Einleitung, 
kritische Edition, Übersetzung (Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2001). ulli Roth, ed., 
Johanes von Segovia, De gladio divini spiritus in corda mittendo Sarracenorum: Edition und 
deutsche Übersetzung mit Einleitung und Erläuterungen, 2 vols. (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 
Verlag, 2012).
26 Ludwig Hagemann, ed., Nicolai de Cusa opera omnia iussu et auctoritate Academiae 
litterarum heidelbergensis ad codicum fidem edita, vol 8: Cribratio alkorani (Leipzig: 
Meiner, 1932–). 
Editors’ Introduction
This volume is the product of papers read at the 2012 conference of the 
American Cusanus Society and the International Seminar on Pre-Reformation 
Theology of Gettysburg Lutheran Seminary. The conference is held every two 
years at the Seminary in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Our 2012 theme, “Christian-
Muslim Dialogue in the Late Middle Ages,” hearkens back to the very first 
Gettysburg Conference in 1986.1 At that time, our fledgling society focused on 
Nicholas of Cusa’s De pace fidei (On the Peace of Faith) in a new translation by 
H. Lawrence Bond and with a concordance by James Biechler, which was pub-
lished in 1990.2 Thus began the Society’s publication program. With the 2012 
conference and this book, we return once again to De pace fidei, but in new 
ways. Our focus is narrower and our textual base wider. Our conference theme 
this time was not world religions in general, but more specifically Christian-
Muslim relations of the late medieval period. Our book’s subtitle sharpens this 
theme by including the interrelated notions of polemic and dialogue, both of 
which played a role in medieval interreligious conversations. Finally, the essays 
in this volume consider not only De pace fidei, but also Cusanus’s Cribratio 
Alkorani (Sifting the Qurʾan), along with other Muslim and Christian texts, 
among them the Qurʾan, Ibn alʿArabi’s Jesus Bezel, and the writings of John 
of Segovia.
Why do we return to Christian-Muslim dialogue now? Two reasons come 
to mind. The first reflects the American Cusanus Society’s own history. Of 
the Society’s early members, only James Biechler has worked intensively on 
Cusanus and Islam.3 In recent years, however, a vigorous new crop of scholars 
has emerged and taken the stage in the Society’s sessions at the International 
Medieval Congress in Kalamazoo, and in Thomas Izbicki’s panels with the 
Renaissance Society of America. The scope and quality of these sessions 
led us to the 2012 Gettysburg conference, and their participants are well 
1 See Gerald Christianson, “First Regional Conference: A Recollection,” American Cusanus 
Society Newsletter 4/1 (March, 1987): 2–3.
2 James E. Biechler and H. Lawrence Bond, Nicholas of Cusa on Interreligious Harmony: Text, 
Concordance and Translation of De pace fidei (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990).
3 See James E. Biechler, “Interreligious Dialogue,” in Introducing Nicholas of Cusa: A Guide to 
a Renaissance Man, ed. C. M. Bellitto, T. M. Izbicki, and G. Christianson (New York: Paulist 
Press, 2004), 270–296. See also Biechler, “Three Manuscripts on Islam from the Library of 
Nicholas of Cusa,” Manuscripta 27 (1983): 91–100.
© Levy et al., 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004274761_002 
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
2 editorsʼ introduction
represented in this volume: Marica Costigliolo, Rita George-Tvrtković, and 
Joshua Hollmann. But this volume also includes essays from a wider circle of 
experienced scholars who discuss Muslim responses to Christianity, as well as 
responses to Islam by Cusanus and other medieval Christian writers.
The second reason for our theme concerns a broader history. Sometimes 
horrific events remind thoughtful people of the need for conversation and 
dialogue. In the wake of September 11, 2001, it serves us well to recall some 
Christian responses to the 1453 conquest of Constantinople by Mehmet II and 
his Ottoman forces. This event lent urgency to what Richard Southern called 
‘a moment of vision’ when several Latin Christians saw Islam in a “larger, 
clearer, and more lifelike [way] than at any previous moment, or any later 
period for several centuries at least.”4 Among these visionaries were Nicholas 
of Cusa and John of Segovia, who corresponded about a conference that would 
lead to peace via reasoned conversation rather than a new crusade. Segovia 
intensified his efforts on a new translation of the Qurʾan as a basis for discus-
sion, and Cusanus wrote the dialogue De pace fidei, seeking ‘a single easy har-
mony’ among religions that would bring ‘a lasting peace.’5 Enlightened as these 
efforts were, from our perspective they look conflicted, since conversion to 
Christianity remained a key aim for the proposed conference and translation, 
and Nicholas himself died while travelling to join Pope Pius II launch another 
crusade. For better or worse, neither the conference nor the crusade happened.
September 11 may be stimulating a new ‘moment of vision’ today. The 
attacks on the Twin Towers and Pentagon provoked a range of responses: the 
‘War on Terror’, real wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, barrages of propaganda of 
every kind and from every quarter, an increase in Islamophobia, academic 
and policy debates about ‘Islam and the West’, and—most relevant for our 
purposes—renewed, energized dialogues between Muslims and Christians. 
These conversations range from local, informal meetings to academic confer-
ences and gatherings of policy makers. At their best, they clear the air of stere-
otypes and simplistic notions like Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’,6 
4 R. W. Southern, Western Views of the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1962), 103.
5 Cusanus, De pace fidei, ch. 1, n. 1, in Biechler and Bond, Interreligious Harmony, 5.
6 Following 9/11, Huntington’s earlier book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of 
the World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), became the focus for intense debate. 
Huntington wrote: “The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. 
It is Islam. . . . The problem for Islam is not the CIA or the U.S. Department of Defense. It 
is the West . . .” (217–218). For critiques, see Edward W. Said, “The Clash of Ignorance,” The 
Nation, October 22, 2001, http://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance?page=full, 
downloaded 8/25/2012, and Morimichi Watanabe, “Cusanus, Islam, and Religious Tolerance” 
in this volume.
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while sharing a simple, practical goal: to live together in peace. The point is not 
to gloss over differences and disagreements, but, in Anthony Appiah’s phrase, 
‘to get used to one another’ as we come to recognize both our differences and 
our common ground.7 This project is hardly new, as it also marked the conviven-
cia of medieval Spain under Muslim rule,8 and—more to the point—it recalls 
Cusanus’s dream in De pace fidei. We hope that this volume, which focuses on 
Nicholas’s writings on Islam and explores their wider historical contexts, will 
contribute to lively scholarly dialogue today.
Yet we must also address another difficult question. When we first 
announced the conference’s theme of “Christian-Muslim Dialogue in the Late 
Middle Ages,” one colleague quipped, “Was there any?” For many, the answer 
is “No.” The historian of Arabic philosophy, Rémi Brague, cautions against pro-
jecting our dream of interreligious dialogue and tolerance onto the Middle 
Ages, and writes: “In the Middle Ages, true dialogues between Islam and 
Christianity were extremely rare, and, if we mean by that such dialogues as we 
think desirable, simply nonexistent.” John Tolan’s book Saracens, which pro-
vides an overview of the complicated history of medieval Christian-Muslim 
relations, bears out Brague’s observation to a certain extent.9 But while rela-
tions varied greatly across time and place, polemics do seem to have domi-
nated, and a dialogue like De pace fidei appears “more a literary genre than a 
reality.”10 Indeed, De pace fidei is no stenographic record of an interfaith sum-
mit meeting, but rather a dream vision, describing a conversation in a heav-
enly council where the Almighty God presides. But is not Nicholas’s dream of 
peace among religions and nations more like ours than Brague allows? We may 
also question Brague’s standards for ‘true dialogue’—that is, according to our 
standards—and ask the question differently: what did dialogue look like in the 
7 Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism (New York: Norton, 2006), 85. See Mahmoud 
Ayoub, “Christian-Muslim Dialogue: Goals and Obstacles,” in Ayoub, A Muslim View of 
Christianity: Essays on Dialogue, ed. I. A. Omar (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2007), 64–69.
8 There is a voluminous literature on Christian-Muslim-Jewish relations in medieval 
Spain. Here is just a sampling: Olivia Remie Constable, ed., Medieval Iberia: Readings 
from Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Sources (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 
2011); Thomas E. Burman, Religious Polemic and the Intellectual History of the Mozarabs, 
c. 1050–1200 (Leiden: Brill, 1994); Lucy Pick, Conflict and Coexistence: Archbishop Rodrigo 
and the Muslims and Jews of Medieval Spain (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2004); and María Rosa Menocal, The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and 
Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain (Boston: Little, Brown, 2002).
9 John Tolan, Saracens (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
10 Rémi Brague, The Legend of the Middle Ages, trans. L. G. Cochrane (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2009), 202. 
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Middle Ages?11 At the level of daily life, we can safely assume that Muslims 
and Christians talked to each other in areas where they lived together for 
centuries—the eastern Mediterranean, North Africa, Spain, Sicily, the Balkans, 
etc. Similarly, commerce required travel, so that Turkish merchants estab-
lished their own centers in Venice, Ragusa, and elsewhere. Interestingly, in 
corresponding with John of Segovia, Cusanus suggests that merchants and lay 
people—not clerics and theologians—should participate in their proposed 
conference of Muslims and Christians. Missionaries also travelled, and the 
Dominicans Riccoldo da Montecroce and William of Tripoli not only wrote 
polemical works against Islam, but also praised the moral integrity of the 
Muslim communities where they lived.12
Sacred texts, their translations, and commentaries open other levels of 
engagement and dialogue. One of the authors in this volume, Asma Afsaruddin, 
emphasizes that the Qurʾan “usually refers to itself as confirming prior 
revelations”—the Hebrew and Christian Bibles—rather than superseding 
them, as triumphalist commentators later claimed.13 But even in claiming the 
Qurʾan to be the final revelation that renders the Bible obsolete, these Muslim 
commentators acknowledge its biblical background. Either way, the issue 
concerns a complex textual history, where interpreters—depending on their 
points of view—often considered the Bible or the Qurʾan to be riddled with 
distortions and corruptions. For example, as Sandra Keating discusses in this 
volume, Muslim critics like Ibn Ḥazm regularly identify falsifications (tahrif ) 
in Biblical manuscripts, and Cusanus similarly blames Muhammad’s Jewish 
11 It is beyond the scope of this introduction to provide an overview of medieval Christian-
Muslim relations, or to outline questions of genre, audience and manuscript tradition; 
we leave this to the articles that follow. For such an overview, see John Tolan’s Saracens, 
or Norman Daniel’s classic Islam and the West: The Making of an Image (Edinburgh: 
University of Edinburgh Press, 1962). For a comprehensive list of primary texts related 
to medieval Christian-Muslim relations, see the magisterial: David Thomas et al., eds., 
Christian-Muslim Relations: A Bibliographical History, 5 volumes (Leiden: Brill, 2009–2013).
12 See Rita George-Tvrtković, “After the Fall: Riccoldo da Montecroce and Nicholas of 
Cusa on Religious Diversity,” Theological Studies 73 (2012): 641–662; George-Tvrtković, 
A Christian Pilgrim in Medieval Iraq: Riccoldo da Montecruce’s Encounter with Islam 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2012); and Thomas F. O’Meara, “The Theology and Times of William 
of Tripoli, O.P.: A Different View of Islam,” Theological Studies 69 (2006): 80–98.
13 Asma Afsaruddin, “Finding Common Ground: ‘Mutual Knowing,’ Moderation and the 
Fostering of Religious Pluralism,” in Learned Ignorance: Intellectual Humility among Jews, 
Christians, and Muslims, ed. James L. Heft, Reuven Firestone, and Omid Safi (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 77. See also her essay in this volume, “The Messiah ‘Isa, Son 
of Mary: Jesus in the Islamic Tradition.”
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advisors for introducing errors into the Qurʾan.14 Translation and interpreta-
tion further complicate these hermeneutical issues. As Thomas Burman, the 
author of our preface, has documented in his earlier writings, close study and 
translation of the Qurʾan lead to the ‘slippages’ that occur in Latin translations 
of the Qurʾan:
The gradual and unaware transformation of purpose that extensive 
engagement with a text sometimes brings an insensible shifting of prag-
matic, polemical interest in the text into a ‘drive for completeness’ and 
systematic coverage.15
Marica Costigliolo, another author in this volume, finds this slippage in 
Cusanus’s Cribratio Alcorani, where his polemical intent led him to undertake 
“an out-and-out textual comparison between the Christian tradition and the 
Qurʾanic text.”16 She thus considers the Cribratio a ‘dialogic work,’ and describes 
“the medieval dialogue [as] a sort of exegetical commentary on the text.”17 In 
this respect, dialogue becomes less a matter of face-to-face conversation than a 
hermeneutical affair, as polemicists, translators, and interpreters address each 
other through their readings of the Qurʾan and Bible. Traditions of reading and 
interpretation thicken as Muslim and Christian commentators use and criti-
cize their predecessors’ works. In addition, theologians and mystics take these 
exegetical discussions in new directions, as when Ibn ʿArabi develops his novel 
Christology. The outcome resembles a maze of postmodern hypertexts within 
which medieval authors and we ourselves must find our way.
We therefore suggest that this hermeneutical view of medieval dialogue pro-
vides a useful framework for this volume of essays, which considers Christian-
Muslim conversations by reading an assortment of texts, from the Qurʾan to 
Cusanus to Ignatius of Loyola. In the process, we inevitably continue this dia-
logue among ourselves as we consider these texts’ implications for Christian-
Muslim relations today.
14 Nicholas of Cusa, “Cribratio Alkorani,” in Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia, ed. L. Hagemann, 
vol. VIII (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986), n. 11.
15 Thomas Burman, Reading the Qu’rān in Latin Christendom, 1140–1560 (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 75.
16 Marica Costigliolo, “Qurʾanic Sources of Nicholas of Cusa,” Mediaevistik 24 (2001): 237. See 
also Costigliolo, “Perspectives on Islam in Italy and Byzantium in the Middle Ages and 
Renaissance” in this volume.
17 Costigliolo, “Qurʾanic Sources,” 228.
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This volume is divided into three sections. Part I centers on Nicholas 
of Cusa’s engagement with Islam, especially in the texts De pace fidei and 
Cribratio Alkorani. The essays place these works within Cusanus’s career and 
trace their connections to his other writings on Islam, as well as to his well-
known treatise, De docta ignorantia. They also highlight Nicholas’s Christology, 
Trinitarian theology, and his irenic formula: ‘one religion in a variety of rites 
(una religio in varietate rituum).’ Part II, “Historical Perspectives,” considers 
the medieval Christian context out of which Cusanus wrote. Jesse D. Mann 
translates and analyzes a text by Juan de Segovia, who corresponded with 
Nicholas about Islam. Other essays take a wider view. Rita George-Tvrtković 
compares Cusanus’s views of Muslim and Jewish religious practices or ‘rites’ 
with those of Alan of Lille and Riccoldo da Montecroce. Marica Costigliolo 
places Nicholas’s work within the broad panorama of Latin and Byzantine 
perspectives on Islam, and Paul Richard Blum contrasts Raymond Lull’s and 
Ignatius of Loyola’s personal encounters with Muslims. By presenting a vari-
ety of medieval Muslim responses to Christianity, Part III marks an essential 
feature of the Gettysburg conference and this book. For if we are to take seri-
ously dialogue and polemic between Christianity and Islam, we cannot limit 
ourselves to Christian views of Islam. We must consider Muslim perspectives 
as well. Here, Asma Afsaruddin and Robert J. Dobie discuss Muslim accounts 
of Jesus—‘Isa ibn Maryam—from the Qurʾan and the Islamic tradition up to 
the Sufi theologian, Ibn ʿArabi. Sandra Toenies Keating and Tamara Albertini 
survey critical views of Christianity and its sacred texts, and the interpretive 
strategies that drive these Muslim critiques.
To conclude, a collaborative book like ours incurs many debts, but here we 
can acknowledge only a few. Because the book stems from the 2012 Gettysburg 
conference, we thank the Gettysburg Lutheran Seminary for their gracious 
hospitality, and the Community of Christ in the City for their grant in memory 
of Fr. Richard John Neuhaus, whose generosity over the years as chair of the 
Arthur Carl Piepkorn Fund helped make these conferences possible. We thank 
the St. Nicholas Hospital in Kues and its librarian, Marco Broesch, for provid-
ing the perfect cover illustration for this book: the opening leaf of De pace 
fidei from the manuscript of Cusanus’s works that he himself commissioned. 
We are also grateful to Christopher Bellitto for introducing this book project 
to Brill, and to Arjan van Dijk and Ivo Romein for skillfully guiding us through 
the editorial process. But most of all, we thank our authors. Not only are they 
colleagues, friends, and exemplary scholars, but their timely cooperation has 





Cusanus, Islam, and Religious Tolerance1
Morimichi Watanabe
Recently, it has become an urgent issue for us to consider the relationship 
between Christianity and Islam more seriously. This question, however, has 
existed since the seventh century, when Islam became a serious problem for 
Western Europe, resulting in numerous crusades between the twelfth and fif-
teenth century. As a medievalist who has for many years been studying one of 
the most prominent theologians, philosophers, and legalists of the fifteenth 
century, Nicolaus Cusanus (1401–1464), I wish to explore his ideas on religious 
tolerance, as expressed in his writings as well as in the activities throughout 
his life.
 Cusanus and Islam
Cusanus must have had a great interest in Islam, even early in his career. This 
interest is already evident in his sermon given in Koblenz, Germany, in 1428 or 
1430. In his Sermo I, the first part, De nominibus Dei, Cusanus mentions that in 
Turkey and among the Saracens, God’s name, ‘olla ubacber,’ meant great and 
just God (“in Turkia et Saracenia ‘olla ubacber,’ id est ‘iustus deus magnus’ ”).2 
Also during 1433 and 1437, when he was attending the Council of Basel (1431–
1449), Cusanus obtained the Latin translation of the Qurʾan, and thus read 
and studied it, together with his close friend Juan de Segovia (c. 1400–1456), a 
Spaniard who is known for his keen interest in and knowledge about Islam.3 
The aforementioned Latin translation of the Qurʾan had been completed by an 
Englishman, Robert of Ketton (Robertus Ketenensis, fl. 1136–1157),4 under the 
1 Editors’ note: Professor Watanabe presented the first version of this article at the 2003 meet-
ing of the Japanese Cusanus Society. In 2006 he revised and translated it into English. We 
thank his wife, Dr. Kiyomi Watanabe, for permitting us to publish this article.
2 Sermo I, n. 5 in Nicolai de Cusa Opera omnia XVI (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1970). Hereafter this 
edition will be cited as ‘h’ followed by volume number.
3 Cribratio Alkorani, Preface, n. 2; h VIII; Jasper Hopkins, trans., Nicholas of Cusa’s De pace fidei 
and Cribratio Alkorani (Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning Press, 1990), 75.
4 The birthplace of this mathematician and astronomer is said to be: Ketton-Kettenensis, 
Reading-Retinensis, Chester-Castrensis, etc. He went to Spain and studied astronomy and 
© Morimichi Watanabe, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004274761_003 
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auspices of Peter the Venerable, the abbot of Cluny (1122–1156). The book is 
a part of the Toledo Collection (Collectio Toletana), which survives in Cusa’s 
personal collection at the library of the St. Nicholas Hospital, established by 
Nicholas himself in Bernkastel-Kues, the town of his birth (Cod. Cus. 108).5
In the preface to his book Cribratio Alkorani (The Sifting of the Qurʾan), 
Cusanus wrote the following account: while he was visiting Constantinople 
in 1437 he found an Arabic manuscript of the Qurʾan which was owned by a 
Franciscan friar living at the Holy Cross church. Cusanus was also able to con-
sult the same Latin translation of the Qurʾan that he had previously obtained 
in Basel.6
The conquest of Constantinople by the Turks on May 29, 1453, must have 
been a shocking event for Cusanus, as for many other Europeans.7 Cusanus’s 
famous book, De pace fidei (On the Peaceful Unity of Faith), completed in 
September 1453, can be considered as one of his responses to that catastrophe. 
As this work clearly shows, Cusanus was not only concerned with Islam, but 
also with Judaism, Hinduism, and other religions and nations. To discuss unity 
and peace among various religions, De pace fidei includes the following inter-
locutors: Greek, Italian, Arab, Indian, Chaldean, Jew, Scythian, Frenchman, 
Persian, Syrian, Spaniard, Turk, German, Tartar, Armenian, Bohemian, and 
Englishman.8 Cusanus included many nations and religions in the narrative’s 
conversation, even Indians and Tartars (Mongols) from the East, though it is 
regrettable that he did not mention Buddhists.9
The general tone of De pace fidei is very peaceful and harmonious. It is clear 
that Cusanus took an attitude that sought harmony and tried to find a basic, 
common theme among the various world religions. Accordingly, Cusanus 
argued that although there are many differences in the rites (ritus) of various 
religions, their basic principles are “the one faith, una religio.”10 Therefore, he 
 mathematics in Arabic in Toledo and other towns. He translated the Qurʾan into Latin at 
the request of Peter the Venerable in 1142.
5 J. Marx. Verzeichnis der Handschriften Sammlung des Hospitals zu Kues bei Bernkastel 
a./Mosel (Trier: Selbstverlag des Hospitals, 1905), 106–108; James E. Biechler, “Three 
Manuscripts from the Library of Nicholas of Cusa,” Manuscripta XXVII (July 1983): 92.
6 Cribratio Alkorani, Preface, n. 2; Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa, 75. 
7 Erich Meuthen “Der Fall von Konstantinopel und der lateinische Westen,” Historische 
Zeitschrift 237 (1983): 1–35.
8 For Cusanus’s opinion on Tartars, see Kazuhiko Yamaki, “Shinko no Heiwa (De pace 
fidei),” Bunka Ronshu 23 (September, 2003): 1–21.
9 K. Yamaki, trans., Shinko no Heiwa, (De pace fidei), 582. According to Cusanus, Buddhists 
were “idol worshipping Indians” (Yamaki, 597–598).
10 De pace fidei, I, n. 6; Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa, 35.
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concluded that religions must seek harmony and mutual help through discus-
sions and reciprocal understanding, rather than choosing to compete or reject 
each other. Such was the interpretation of Cusanus’s idea and consequent pro-
posal: ‘one religion in a variety of rites, una religio in rituum varietate.’11
The idea that many religions can co-exist—that is, the concept of religious 
pluralism—had been widely accepted in Europe; it was particularly popular 
among the scholars of the post-Enlightenment period.12 One of the best exam-
ples is seen in the book published in 1787 by Johann Salomo Semler (1725–
1791), Des Kardinals Nikolaus von Cusa Dialogus von der Übereinstimmung 
oder Einheit des Glaubens.13 Growing up in pietistic surroundings as the son 
of a Lutheran pastor, Semler entered the University of Halle at age seventeen, 
where he became the disciple, the assistant, and finally the literary executor 
of the rationalistic Professor Sigmund Jacob Baumgarten (1706–1757). In 1752 
Semler became a professor of theology in Halle. His numerous writings, said 
to number about two hundred and eighty-two, indicate his interest in theol-
ogy, Church history, classical languages, logic, mathematics, and other areas. 
One of the first German theologians to apply the historical-critical method 
to the study of the Biblical canon and text, Semler, as ‘frommer Aufklärer’, 
became the leader of ‘Neologie’, the second phase of the Protestant theology 
of the Enlightenment (c. 1740–1780). His book on Cusanus reflects this kind of 
approach to theology and Church history.14
In this connection, I may be permitted to recall my own experience many 
years ago. In 1964, I was invited to an International Congress that was held at 
Bressanone (Brixen), Italy, to celebrate the passage of five hundred years since 
the death of Cusanus. At the Congress, I was given the chance to present a 
11 Among many studies on this concept, the famous ones are: Michael Seidlmayer, “Una 
religio in rituum varietate: Zur Religionsauffassung des Nikolaus von Cues,” Archiv für 
Kulturgeschichte 36 (1954): 145–207; and Bruno Decker, “Nikolaus von Kues und der Friede 
unter der Religionen,” in Humanismus, Mystik und Kunst in der Welt des Mittelalters, ed. 
Josef Koch (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1959), pp. 94–121.
12 Decker, “Nikolaus von Kues,” 111–112, 118.
13 Johann Salomo Semler, Des Kardinals Nikolaus von Cusa Dialogus von der Übereinstimmung 
oder Einheit des Glaubens (Leipzig: 1787).
14 On Semler’s life and ideas, see Werner Raupp, “Johann Salomo Semler,” Biographisch-
Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon XIV (1998): 1444–1473; Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th 
ed. (1911), 631. For a helpful study of four leaders of the nineteenth-century German 
Awakening, see David Crowner and Gerald Christianson, ed., trans. and intro., Spirituality 
of the German Awakening (New York: Paulist Press, 2004).
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paper entitled “Nicholas of Cusa and the Idea of Religious Tolerance.”15 The 
presiding officer of the meeting was Prof. Raymond Klibansky (1905–2005), 
one of the leading authorities in this field; I was then a young fellow who had 
just received a Ph.D. degree. I still remember the fright and thrill during my 
presentation in front of so many distinguished scholars. Though my paper was 
a rather immature product, I emphasized two points: 1) In order to understand 
Cusanus’s De pace fidei, it is necessary not only to study its content but also 
to consider the background of the period; and 2) in support of some scholars’ 
interpretations, I argued that Cusanus’s attitude on the relationship between 
Christianity and other religions was not based on completely relativistic views 
of religious tolerance. Forty years later I am again discussing a similar subject. 
Hopefully I have gained more insight into the subject since then.
After writing De pace fidei in 1453, Cusanus had to face another and bigger 
challenge in dealing with Islam. At the request of his close friend, Pope Pius II 
(1458–1464), Cusanus wrote Cribratio Alkorani, The Sifting of the Koran, between 
1460–1461.16 In its preface, Nicholas describes the books and manuscripts 
that he used to write the work. Those books are still kept in the library of the 
St. Nicholas Hospital, mentioned above as Cod. Cus. 107 and Cod. Cus. 108.17 The 
preface also reports that he had urged Dionysius the Carthusian (1402–1471) 
to write a book against Islam, and that Dionysius consequently wrote a volu-
minous work entitled Against the Infidelity of Mohammed (Contra Perfidiam 
Machometi),18 which was dedicated to Pope Nicholas V (1447–1455).19 Cusanus 
also mentions that he had consulted the following books: Against the Law of 
Saracens (Contra Legem Saracenorum), by the Dominican friar Ricoldus de 
Monte Crucis (c. 1243–1320);20 On the Basis of Faith written to Cantor of Antioch 
(De Rationibus Fidei ad Cantorem Antiochenum), by Thomas Aquinas;21 and 
15 This paper was later published as: Morimichi Watanabe, “Nicholas of Cusa and the Idea 
of Tolerance,” in Nicolò Cusano agli inizi del mondo moderno (Firenze: G. S. Sansoni, 
1970), 409–418; and reprinted in Watanabe, Concord and Reform, ed. T. M. Izbicki and 
G. Christianson (Aldershot: Ashgate/Variorum, 2001), 217–226.
16 Cribratio Alkorani, h VIII, ed. Ludwig Hagemann (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1996).
17 Cf. Note 4.
18 Cribratio Alkorani, Prologue, n. 4.
19 Cod. Cus 107, fol. 1r–193v; Ludwig Hagemann, Christentum Contra Islam (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1999), 72.
20 Cod. Cus. 107, fol. 194r–232v; Hagemann, Christentum, 50, 55, 60–61. For Ricoldus de Monte 
Crucis, see Ludwig Hagemann, Der Kur’an in Verständnis und Kritik bei Nikolaus von Kues: 
Ein Beitrag zur Erhellung islamisch-christlicher Geschichte (Frankfurt: Verlag Josef Knecht, 
1976), 56–57. 
21 Hagemann, Christentum, 51–54; Hagemann, Der Kur’an, 67–68.
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Against Basic Errors on Mohammed’s Unfaithfulness (Contra Principales Errores 
Perfidi Mohameti), by Juan de Torquemada.22
There is no doubt that Cribratio Alkorani is much more critical of Islam 
compared to the harmonious attitude shown in De pace fidei. In the first book 
of Cribratio the emphasis is mostly on the oneness of God and, therefore, no 
strong criticism of Islam is set forth. However, in the latter part of the work, 
particularly in Chapter 19 of Book II, which is entitled “An Invective against the 
Qurʾan,” very severe criticisms are presented.23
In this connection I wish to cite a similar change in attitude toward Islam by 
Ramon Llull (1232–1316), who greatly influenced Cusanus. Llull was, in his early 
career, very much interested in Islam, making a great effort to study Arabic 
as well as the Qurʾan. Llull’s earlier works include his more irenic Book of the 
Gentile and Three Wise Men. However, in his later years Llull changed his atti-
tude and developed a very strong criticism against Islam. This eventually led to 
Llull’s activities that were based not on peaceful conversation and persuasion, 
but on more forceful and aggressive debates.24
There are many reasons why Cusanus, who at first adopted a very peaceful 
and cooperative attitude toward many religions, including Islam, later changed 
and became very critical of Islam. First, more serious and deeper studies of 
Islam may have brought a deeper understanding of the Qurʾan and a clearer 
revelation of the nature of Islam, thus exposing its weaknesses and mistakes, 
or its anti-Christian doctrines.25 The Qurʾan denies Jesus Christ as Son of God 
several times. It also denies not only the death of Christ on the Cross,26 but also 
the Trinity, a most fundamental doctrine in Christianity.27
Second, there were changes in Cusanus’s life and in his position within the 
Catholic Church. Since 1458 he resided in Rome, the center of the Catholic 
Church, and in 1459 he temporarily became a representative of Pope Pius II, 
who was at the Congress of Mantua (1459–1460); the holder of such a post had 
to defend the existing system of Christendom. The responsibilities of this posi-
tion must have made Cusanus more sensitive to and critical of Islam; thus, 
he tried to defend Christianity against the attack on the Catholic Church and 
22 Hagemann, Christentum, 72; Hagemann, Der Kur’an, 68.
23 Cribratio Alkorani, II, 19, nn. 154–158, Invectio Contra Alkoranum; Hopkins, Nicholas of 
Cusa, 146–149.
24 Hagemann, Christentum, 63–67.
25 For example, see the following verses of the Qurʾan, Suras 5:66, 9:30–31, etc.
26 Sura 4: 157–158.
27 Sura 4: 171.
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Christian world.28 It should be remembered that Pope Pius II wrote his famous 
letter to the Ottoman sultan Mehmet II (1451–1481) in 1461, proudly stressing 
the strength of the Christian world.29
Third, Cusanus had a deep friendship with Pope Pius II, and desired to help 
him in his great effort to organize the crusade against the Turks, for which the 
pope had made a declaration at the Congress of Mantua. This is clearly shown 
in the beginning sentence of the Cribratio Alkorani, which Cusanus dedicated 
to Pope Pius II:
O, most holy Pope, accept this book composed with zealous faith by 
your humble servant. Accept it so that when .  .  . you show .  .  .  that the 
Mohammedan sect (which has arisen from this heresy [the Nestorian 
heresy]) is in error and is to be repudiated, you may readily have at hand 
certain basic points needful to know.30
Fourth, the Latin translation of the Qurʾan, which had been completed by 
Robert of Ketton in 1143, contained several errors, and thus Cusanus could have 
misunderstood parts of the Qurʾan.31
 Cusanus and Pia interpretatio
In Cribratio Alkorani Cusanus proposes a “generous, or sympathetic interpre-
tation, pia interpretatio”32 of the Qurʾan, hoping to apply this interpretation 
to understand the Muslim holy book. However, according to L. Hagemann, 
“it should be understood that such an interpretation of the Qurʾan by Cusanus 
is nothing but a generous, harmonious and friendly attitude toward Islam, 
though standing firm at the basis of Christianity.”33 As he did with his well-
28 Hagemann, Christentum, 6–63.
29 Giuseppe Toffanin, Lettera a Maometto II (Naples: Pironti, 1953); Albert R. Baca, ed., 
Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini: Epistola ad Mahomatem II (New York: Peter Lang, 1989).
30 Cribratio Alkorani, n. 1; Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa, 75. Here Cusanus understands Islam as 
“Mohammad’s sect.” Hagemann, Christentum, 71. 
31 For the faults in the Latin translation of the Koran by Robertus, see Thomas E. Berman, 
“Tafsir and Translation,” Speculum 75/3 (July 1998): 703–732. Cf. James E. Biechler, 
“Nicholas of Cusa and Muhammad: A Fifteenth Century Encounter,” The Downside Review 
101 (January 1983): 55.
32 Biechler, “Nicholas of Cusa and Muhammad,” 55–56; Hagemann, Christentum, 69.
33 Hagemann, Christentum, 69.
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known revelation of the forgery of ‘Emperor Constantine’s donation’ in De 
concordantia catholica (1433/34),34 Cusanus must have employed meticulous 
attention in studying the Qurʾan, as well. His enthusiasm for a literal, interpre-
tative, and humanistic approach is clearly seen in his Cribratio Alkorani.35
The phrase ‘pia interpretatio’ appears four times in Book II of Cribratio.36 
Cusanus’s own marginal notes, added to the Latin translation of the Qurʾan 
that still exists in the St. Nicholas Hospital Library in Bernkastel-Kues, show 
that he must have written such notes three times. The first notes were proba-
bly written in 1433, at the time of the Council of Basel. The second notes were 
written in 1453, before the publication of his De pace fidei, and the third were 
in 1460–1461, during the writing of Cribratio Alkorani.37 Cusanus was almost 
sixty years old when he wrote the last footnotes, which was when he read the 
Qurʾan most seriously. His notes are short, but they reveal his enthusiasm and 
meticulous attention to his study.38
In order to write Cribratio Alkorani, Cusanus studied the Qurʾan intensely 
but ignored those Qurʾanic verses that were problematic for Christians, such 
as the polygamy of Mohammed and his supposedly unethical lifestyle, as well 
as the erotic pleasures given at entering paradise, where one meets beautiful 
ladies with sparkling eyes.39 He also suggested ignoring those parts that were 
related to the Jewish or Nestorian faiths. Cusanus recommended that, in the 
Qurʾan, one should pay attention only to the teachings that are more agreeable 
to the Christian gospel and harmonious with the writings of the New and Old 
Testaments. In his letter to John of Segovia (1454) he wrote: “We must always 
strive to make that authoritative book for the Muslims applicable to us.”40 Thus, it 
is easy to understand why Cusanus wrote the following in the Cribratio Alkorani:
Now, my intention is as follows: having presupposed the Gospel of Christ, 
to analyze the book of Muhammad and to show that even in it there are 
34 Morimichi Watanabe, The Political Ideas of Nicholas of Cusa, with Special Reference to his 
De concordantia catholica (Genève: Librairie Droz, 1963), 145–156.
35 Biechler, “Three Manuscripts,” 96, 100. Cf. R. W. Southern, Western Views of Islam in the 
Middle Ages (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 93–94.
36 Cribratio Alkorani II, 1, n. 86; II, 12, n. 119; II, 13, n. 124; and II, 19, n. 154; Hopkins, Nicholas of 
Cusa, 115, 129, 132, and 147; Hagemann, Christentum, 69.
37 Biechler, “Three Manuscripts,” 93, 95. 
38 Biechler, “Three Manuscripts,” 95. 
39 Suras 44:54, 52:20, 55:56, 72, and elsewhere. Cf. Biechler, “Nicholas of Cusa and 
Muhammad,” 53, 55; Hagemann, Christentum, 61.
40 Biechler, “Nicholas of Cusa and Muhammad,” 53; Hagemann, Christentum, 69.
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contained those teachings through which the Gospel would be altogether 
confirmed, were it in need of confirmation, and that wherever the Koran 
disagrees with Christ, this disagreement has resulted from Muhammad’s 
ignorance.41
This attitude of Cusanus in interpreting the Qurʾan shows that he recognized 
the significance of Christianity, but also found a similar doctrine in the teach-
ings of Islam. Accordingly, Hagemann says that Cusanus believed that he 
“could find even in the Qurʾan, the gospel’s principle.”42
In 1464 Pope Pius II was at the port of Ancona in Italy. Although he had made 
a strong request to the kings of many countries to participate in a crusade, only 
a few vessels had come, and the Pope was greatly disappointed. Cusanus left 
Rome on July 3, traveling to Ancona to participate in the crusade for the Pope. 
However, he fell ill along the way and died at Todi on August 11. Three days later 
Pope Pius II also passed away in Ancona. I wonder what Cusanus would have 
done had he arrived in Ancona. Could he willingly support the crusade, though 
he had always believed in peace? If so, how would he have convinced himself 
to take such a position? Many questions remain unanswered; in history, ironic 
turns of events often occur.
 The Clash of Civilizations
Professor Samuel P. Huntington of Harvard University published his article, 
“The Clash of Civilizations,” in Foreign Affairs in 1993. Here, he wrote that world 
politics is now in a new age: it is no longer the age of ideology and econom-
ics as before, but now struggles center upon culture. Thus, world politics is 
governed by the clash of civilizations. The idea was further extended in his 
book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996), which 
evoked a great response.43
Huntington suggests that, although the famous historian Arnold Joseph 
Toynbee (1889–1975) proposed in A Study of History (12 volumes, 1934-61) that 
there were twenty-one major civilizations, at present only seven or eight among 
those twenty-one still exist. These are: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, 
Hindu, Slavic/Orthodox, Latin American, and, possibly, African civilizations. 
41 Cribratio Alkorani, Prologue, n. 10; Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa, 78–79. 
42 Hagemann, Christentum, 78.
43 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1996).
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Whether or not such classification by Huntington is correct is not a question 
this essay can address. The real question for me is whether or not it is more 
appropriate and important to discuss present and future world politics on the 
basis of religion, rather than culture and civilization. This is because religion 
certainly lies at the base of civilization. I wonder why such an approach was 
not clearly taken by Huntington, though I suppose that it may be too problem-
atic and may lead to too much struggle and fear among people. Aside from the 
question of whether Confucianism can be considered a religion, it is possible 
to divide Huntington’s classification into Christian, Jewish, Islamic, and Hindu 
religions.
It is particularly clear that the relationship between Christianity and Islam 
has played an important role not only in European history, but also in present 
world politics.
We must remember that, throughout the medieval period and up to the 
present, many historical events brought about a big influence on the relation-
ship between Christianity and Islam. One can recall some major events, such 
as the First Crusade beginning in 1095 and ending with the Eighth in 1291, the 
fall of Constantinople in 1453, the rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire (1299–
1923), etc. It is unnecessary to point out that the current problems and unrest 
in the Near East are based on struggles between Christian and/or Jewish and 
Islamic countries. (As mentioned before, Cusanus did not have much knowl-
edge of Buddhism, and, of course, this religion may not be classified as mono-
theistic.)44 However, there is no doubt that Cusanus, as a great thinker, made a 
serious effort to reach a clear understanding of the relationships between the 
Jewish, Christian, and Islamic faiths.
Just before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Professor Bernard 
Lewis of Princeton University published a book entitled What Went Wrong, 
which criticizes Islamic countries. In the book, Lewis writes: “In the Muslim’s 
own perception, Islam itself was indeed coterminous with civilization, and 
beyond its borders there were only barbarians and infidels.”45 If faithful 
Muslims did take such a proud and arrogant attitude as Lewis suggests, it is 
understandable why there have been so many struggles between the Islamic, 
Jewish, and Christian religions. As a result, according to Hagemann, history has 
become “the history of aggression and suspicion.”46
44 Cf. Note 9. 
45 Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle 
East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3. 
46 Hagemann, Christentum, ix. 
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Going back to Cusanus’s solution toward Islam and the problems he faced, 
we recall that he emphasized mutual discussion without using military power. 
However, due to many conditions and problems in his time, it seems Cusanus 
eventually became inclined to support a crusade, as was already discussed. 
Regardless of his action (to help Pope Pius II in his crusade), though, Cusanus 
did not give up his peaceful and sympathetic attitude towards Islam, and tried 
also to interpret the Qurʾan from the most favorable point of view. Although 
Cribratio Alkorani has been studied by many scholars in the past, in comparison 
with Cusanus’s earlier books—such as De concordantia catholica (1433–34), De 
docta ignorantia (1440), and De conjecturis (1442)—Cribratio has received much 
attention only in recent years. As Volume VIII of the authoritative Heidelberg 
edition of Cusanus’s Opera omnia, Cribratio Alkorani was published in 1986, 
with Hagemann as its editor. To those ‘ecumenists’ who were encouraged by 
the ‘religious tolerance’ expressed in Cusanus’s De pace fidei, Cribratio may be 
disappointing. From the latter work one may get an impression that Islamic 
people are uneducated, ignorant, and idol worshippers—a view simply based 
on the old image of Arabs. The great Christian scholar on Islam, Georges C. 
Anawati, even said that it is better not to show Cribratio Alkorani to Muslims.47
The theology of Cusanus, however, is ‘a theology that is meant to con-
tinue dialogue’ (theologia sermocinalis). This means that one cannot lose 
hope of reaching an understanding and peace between the various religions. 
As mentioned before,48 in Cod. Cus. 107, which Cusanus had used for writ-
ing his Cribratio, he made a long footnote on ‘the essence of love (De essentia 
amoris).’49 There, he wrote: “Please note that love brings harmony and peace. 
As love is bigger, the larger concordance (harmony) is accomplished.” The 
same discussion on the essence of love is also present in his Cribratio.50
47 Georges C. Anawati, “Nicolas de Cues et le problème de l’Islam,” in Nicolò Cusano agli del 
mondo moderno (Firenze: Sansoni, 1970), 141–175, 179.
48 Cf. Note 4.
49 Biechler, “Three Manuscripts,” 97.
50 “Nota amor unit. Et quanto maior et perfectior quanto magis unit,” in Adnotatio de essentia 
amoris (Cod. Cus. 107, fol. 21), cited in Biechler, “Three Manuscripts,” 100. In Cusanus’s 
Cribratio Alkorani (II, n. 104), the following description is present: “Quoniam autem amor 
unit, amor perfectissimus, qui maior esse nequit neque minor, cum sit substantialis, 
maxime unit. Video igtur in essentia ipsius amoris unientis unitatem. Quomodo enim 
esset unus uniens amor sine unitate?” 
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 Conclusion
Presently there are about 1.6 billion Muslims in the world. They are not only 
in the Near East, but also in South and Southeast Asia, Europe, Africa, and the 
Americas. Among the forty-four countries in which the majority of the pop-
ulation is Muslim, there are great differences regarding their political stand 
on Islam. Some countries officially declare themselves to be Islamic coun-
tries, such as Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. In others, Islam 
is described as a ‘national religion,’ for example in Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, 
Iraq, and Malaysia. Others, moreover, have a constitution that does not men-
tion Islam, such as Albania, Lebanon, Syria, Indonesia, and Sudan. Finally, 
some countries claim to be ‘secular states,’ such as Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and 
Turkey.
In Cusanus’s period, as in the present age (though problems differ), the 
clash between Christian countries in Western Europe and Islamic countries 
in the Middle East was a great concern. However, there are others who argue 
that present-day struggles may not be those between Christian and Islamic 
countries. In a book called No god but God, a young Iranian scholar, Reza 
Aslan, claims that in the future, the problem of the world will not be a struggle 
between Western European and Islamic countries. Rather, he claims, a more 
important problem is the intolerance and continuous fighting between Islamic 
countries and their people.51
Under such a state of the world as it is today, it may be argued that a reli-
gious concordance (harmony) based on ‘discussion’ and ‘unity based on love’ is 
ineffective and impossible. Even Cusanus appeared to have lost his confidence 
in this idea, due to the many hindrances he faced during his lifetime. On the 
other hand, when one takes a long view of human history, one can say that the 
very approach taken by Cusanus is the most hopeful and the best approach 
to solving important problems for mankind. As stated in the Bible: “Love is 
patient” (I Corinthians 13:4).
51 Reza Aslan, No god but God: The Origins, Evolution and Future of Islam (New York: Random 
House, 2005). 
A Critical Survey of Cusanus’s Writings on Islam
Walter Andreas Euler
Cusanus authored three writings mainly dealing with Islam: De pace fidei, 
dating from September 1453, the letter addressed to John of Segovia from 
December 29, 1454, and Cribratio Alkorani, 1460/61. All three of these writings 
date from the second period of his career, after he had been appointed cardinal 
and bishop.
Yet Nicholas of Cusa had shown interest in Islam long before that. In his first 
preface to Cribratio Alkorani, Nicholas invokes his earlier endeavors to gain an 
understanding of Islam, referring to the Council of Basel, where he had been 
active from 1432 to 1437, and his journey to Constantinople in 1437. He claims 
to have acquired the Latin translation of the Qurʾan by Robert of Ketton in 
Basel, and to have gone to Constantinople to search for further copies of the 
Qurʾan. He stresses that Franciscan friars showed him an Arabic Qurʾan there.1 
Hence, if we want to believe him—and there is no reason to do otherwise—
Nicholas had already been studying the Qurʾan for 17–20 years by the time 
he wrote De pace fidei. “I have always sought, with all that is in my power, to 
 
 
1 Prol. I, Opera omnia Nicolai de Cusa (= h) VIII, n. 2: “As best I could, I made a careful attempt 
to understand the book-of-law of the Arabs—[a book] which I obtained at Basel in the trans-
lation commissioned for us by Peter, Abbot of Cluny. [I obtained it] together with a debate 
among those noble Arabs, [wherein] one of them, a follower of Muhammad, attempted to 
win over another of them—who, being eminent among the Arabs and quite learned, showed 
that the Christian faith, which he zealously observed, ought rather to be accepted. There 
were also [contained therein] certain other works on the origins of Muhammad, his twelve 
successors in the kingdom, and on his Doctrinae ad centum questiones. I left the book with 
Master John of Segovia and journeyed to Constantinople, where among the Minorites who 
were living at [the Church of] the Holy Cross, I found the Koran in Arabic. These brothers, as 
best they knew how, explained it to me in regard to certain of its points. But in Pera, at the 
Convent of St. Dominicus, [I found a copy of the Koran that] was translated in the [same] 
manner as [the one] I had left behind in Basel. I inquired whether any of the Greeks had 
written against these foolish errors. And I learned only that John of Damascus, who lived a 
little after the beginning of that sect, had written the very few things which were on hand 
there.” Translated in Jasper Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa’s De pace fidei and Cribratio Alkorani: 
Translation and Analysis (Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning Press, 1990), 75. Hereafter cited as 
Hopkins, Cusa’s De pace fidei and Cribratio.
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understand the book of the law of the Arabs (= Qurʾan),” says Cusanus in the 
opening pages of his Cribratio.2
Furthermore, alongside his Latin version of the Qurʾan, translated by Robert 
of Ketton by order of Petrus Venerabilis in 1143 (Cod. Cus. 108 in the library of 
the St. Nicholas Hospital in Bernkastel-Kues), Cusanus might have also been in 
the possession of the Arabic original. The St. Nicholas Hospital disposed of an 
Arabic Qurʾan that was sold in 1823/24.3
The American scholar James E. Biechler has written a remarkable essay 
entitled “Three Manuscripts on Islam from the library of Nicholas of Cusa,”4 
analyzing in detail the marginal notes in the Latin Qurʾan of Nicholas of Cusa. 
Judging from the changes in his writing, Biechler comes to the conclusion 
that Cusanus must have studied the Qurʾan thoroughly at least three times 
in his life: at the time of the Council of Basel in the first half of the 1430s, at 
the time of the composition of De pace fidei, and finally, when he was writing 
Cribratio Alkorani.
 De pace fidei: An Inclusive Approach to Islam
Let us first take a look at De pace fidei. Nicholas’s well-known plea, expressed in 
the introduction, sounds peculiar, a little bit wan and feeble against the tragic 
historical background of the conquest of Constantinople by the Turks. He 
writes: May God stop the horribly widespread persecution caused by religious 
differences, “ob diversum ritum religionum.”5 One would normally expect a car-
dinal and bishop of the fifteenth century to explicitly name the responsible 
people and to formulate his plea in a correspondingly glaring way, for example:
May God stop the Muslim Turks and punish them with all his might for 
their crimes against the poor Byzantine Christians, although they them-
selves are more or less to blame for their fate. Therefore, they deserve a 
certain kind of chastisement because they have disgracefully broken off 
2 Hopkins, Cusa’s De pace fidei and Cribratio, 75.
3 See the discussion by Hermann J. Hallauer concerning the paper of Anton Schall: “Die 
Sichtung des Christlichen im Koran,” Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-
Gesellschaft 9 (1971): 89.
4 This article was published in the periodical Manuscripta 27 (1983): 91–100.
5 De pace fidei, ch. 1, h VII, 3, lines 3–8: “Fuit ex hiis, quae apud Constantinopolim proxime saevis-
sime acta per Turkorum regem divulgabantur, quidam vir zelo Dei accensus, qui loca illarum 
regionum aliquando viderat, ut pluribus gemitibus oraret omnium creatorem quod persecu-
tionem, quae ob diversum ritum religionum plus solito saevit, sua pietate moderaretur.”
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the union with the Latins, but their guilt is by far less severe than that of 
the Turks.
All this is analogously expressed in the sermon that the cardinal and prince-
bishop Nicholas of Cusa delivered in Neustift, near Brixen, on August 24, 1456. 
It is sermon CCXL.6 The occasion was a procession to celebrate the victory 
over the Turks near Belgrade on July 22, 1456. In that sermon, Cusanus calls 
the Turks a scourge, a flagellum—an image also found in his letter to John of 
Segovia from December 29, 14547—which is meant to wake up the somnolent 
Christians. And he adds:
God will prove to be the loyal guardian of us Christians if we, filled with 
faith, seek refuge in him, knowing that we will undoubtedly be saved8 if 
we trust in his protection, willingly and with all our heart.9
The reason Nicholas does not express any anti-Islamic ideas or announce 
an intellectual crusade plan in the introduction of De pace fidei, contrary to 
Sermon CCXL, is very simple. Islam, the religion of those who have invaded 
and conquered Constantinople, was meant to be integrated into the con-
cordance of religions, which the cardinal became aware of after long days of 
contemplation. Thus, his argumentation in the introduction is already quite 
revealing. It shows ‘in nuce’ the theological conception concerning Islam that 
would develop throughout the work. All further explanations confirm that 
first impression. It becomes clear that Cusanus does not consider Islam to be 
hopelessly corrupted, anti-Christian, and demoniacal, but instead finds that 
it contains a true and sane core that needs to be carefully exposed first. His 
6 Sermo CCXL, h XIX, n. 3–4.
7 Epistola ad Ioannem de Segobia, h VII, 100, lines 16–25: “Nam pluries tepiditate Ecclesiam 
subintrante excitata sunt flagella. Venerunt Romam aliquando Sarraceni et Ecclesiam 
sancti Petri depraederunt; excitata dormiens Ecclesia ad Dominum habuit refugium. Odit 
Deus tepiditatem, quia Deus zelotes. Unde, si occasiones tollerentur quare contra nos sed 
pro nostra salute et decore Ecclesiae Christus ista permittit, esset infallibile remedium. Ego 
firmissime credo non ad mortem sed vitam, non ad suppressionem sed exaltationem fidei 
persecutionem permitti. Ecclesia hoc proprium habet quod sub persecutione splendescit.” 
8 Here, Nicholas alludes not only to the eternal salvation, but also to the rescue from the threat 
of the Turks. 
9 Sermo CCXL, h XIX, n. 5: “Haec est dies boni nuntii, in quo recepimus plures litteras huius 
miraculosae victoriae. Quapropter convenimus, ut laudemus Deum, qui mirabili ordine 
memoriam crucis renovavit, agente hoc per flagellum, quo somnolenti excitaremur ac quod 
invocemus eum, qui ostendit se pium protectorem, quando tota fide ad ipsum recurrimus, 
scientes quia indubie salvi erimus, si ex toto corde nos suae tuitione commendaverimus.”
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program could be described as ‘inclusion instead of exclusion’—inclusion and 
pro-Christian interpretation instead of exclusion and condemnation. Nicholas 
of Cusa consistently pursues this approach in his writing about peace in faith. 
Therefore, throughout his work there is not a single sentence, not a single 
thought condemning Islam as a fundamentally anti-Christian religious system.
How does this inclusion of Islam into the concept of De pace fidei work in 
detail? Cusanus simply calls the Muslims ʿArabs’—in Latin, ‘arabes.’ Every 
time that key term occurs, Nicholas invokes genuine Islamic concepts, which 
he seeks to link with his Christian views, the foundation of ‘una religio,’ the 
only true religion. The substance of the topics he thereby invokes can also 
be found in his letter to John of Segovia from December 29, 1454.10 Moreover, 
Cusanus’ argumentation is maieutic and manuductory. Maieutics is the art of 
midwifery attributed to Socrates in Plato’s dialogues, allowing his interlocutors 
to gain insight into the philosophy step by step. ‘Manuductio,’ hand guidance, 
is a term used by Nicholas of Cusa in his Cribratio Alkorani.11 It implies that all 
non-Christians, Muslims in particular, should be taken by the hand to intro-
duce them to the Christian faith.
In chapter IX of De pace fidei, Cusanus points out that fertility is a part of 
God’s nature.12 He explains that perfection and divinity do not remain isolated; 
they are not sterile but procreate, because God—equally in accordance with 
the opinions expressed in the Qurʾan13—is spirit, rationality, and will. That is 
love in the Christian understanding. God as a spirit is aware of himself and 
therefore actively conceives the concept, the word of himself. The connection 
of both begets the will that originates from self-awareness.
According to Nicholas of Cusa, this insight is adequately represented by 
the Christian doctrine of the holy trinity, which in itself preserves the princi-
ple of divine unity. He is convinced that the criticism of the dogma of trinity 
expressed by Jews and Muslims is nothing but a misunderstanding, where the 
concept of the divine trinity is misinterpreted to be a tritheism, a belief in three 
Gods, and hence a variation of polytheism. In reality, however, Christians, Jews, 
and Muslims agree in this point, as all of them value the one and only true God 
as constructive force. Consequently, the quarrel is superfluous and senseless, 
10 Cf. h VII, 97, lines 22–100, line 10.
11 The term ‘manuductio’ can be found in the second book of Cribratio Alkorani in the 
headings of chapters 5–7 and 10, which treat different aspects of the theology of the holy 
trinity; cf. h VIII, n. 99: “Manuductio ex his quae in mundo sunt, ut videatur deus trinus”; 
n. 101: “Manuductio de intellectuali trinitate ad divinam”; n. 103: “Manuductio eiusdem 
per amorem”; n. 111: “Iterum ex tribus personis manuductio.” 
12 Cf. h VII, 26, lines 11–28, line 4.
13 Cusanus refers to Sura 4:171, among others.
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caused by terms that generate different meanings. Furthermore, technically 
speaking Jews as well as Muslims do already believe in the holy trinity without 
being aware of it.
Concerning the hypostatic union of God and man in the person of Christ, 
Nicholas of Cusa not only aims at elucidating misunderstandings as to the 
use of the term, as he did with the concept of the holy trinity. Rather, he tries 
to dig deeper, in order to find a Christian foundation in the Qurʾan.14 This 
‘crypto-Christian’ factor is constituted by appreciative statements the Qurʾan 
makes about Jesus the Islamic prophet, as found in Cusanus’s Latin transla-
tion of the Qurʾan. Such statements include: he was born by the Virgin Mary 
(Sura 3:47 and 19:20); he could work marvellous miracles, for instance raising 
the dead and making birds out of clay (Sura 3:49 and 5:110); he was the Messiah, 
the word and the spirit of God (Sura 4:171, among others); and finally, he 
was the face of all peoples and the highest being in the world.15 With exception 
of the last two notions, Jesus as ‘the face of all peoples’ and the highest being 
in the world, which were mistranslations in the Latin version of the Qurʾan 
used by Cusanus,16 all other statements are authentic. Yet, though they can 
indeed be found in the Qurʾan, they cannot always be interpreted from a 
Christian point of view.17
Nicholas of Cusa considers these statements about Jesus as maximal state-
ments, setting the Nazarene apart from all other humans. Cusanus extensively 
develops this approach in his oeuvre De docta ignorantia (1440). In the first 
three chapters of the third book, he speculatively develops the idea that the 
highest individual of a species necessarily exceeds the limitations of the spe-
cies. Applied to the human being as the highest of creatures, this means that 
the highest human is more than a mere human—he is God. Already in De docta 
ignorantia this consideration serves to explain and highlight the hypostatic 
union in Christ, without referring to the Holy Scripture.18 He then transfers this 
to the dialogue with Islam in De pace  fidei as follows: if the Qurʾan uses ‘maxi-
mal’ statements about Jesus of Nazareth, these statements imply that Jesus was 
more than a saint, more than an exceptionally gifted man through the grace 
of God, and that he must therefore be intimately joined to the divine nature. 
Cusanus frequently illustrates this point with the image of human nature as 
14 Cf. h VII, 37, lines 9–39, line 15.
15 Cf. ch. 13 of De pace fidei, h VII, 40, lines 15–16: “facies omnium gentium et altissimus.”
16 Cf. Adnotatio 24: h VII, 80.
17 Cf. inter alia, Claus Schedl, Muhammad und Jesus. Die christologisch relevanten Texte des 
Korans (Vienna: Herder, 1978).
18 Cf. Rudolf Haubst, Die Christologie des Nikolaus von Kues (Freiburg: Herder, 1956), 143–172.
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iron being pulled up by the divine magnet. Hence, in Christian terms, Jesus can 
be considered the son of God.
The cardinal does not say that the Qurʾan teaches the hypostatic union in 
the person of Christ, but that the Muslims are ‘facilius,’ or more easily con-
verted to the Christian faith, because the Qurʾan gives clear hints that have just 
been neglected by the Muslims thus far. Nicholas of Cusa, as Christian inter-
preter of the Qurʾan, discloses the hermeneutical key to the decryption of the 
Qurʾan, without forgetting the Muslims’ fear that the notion of Christ being the 
son of God may threaten the divine unity.
Chapter XIV of De pace fidei treats the death of Christ on the cross.19 From 
his Latin translation of the Qurʾan, Cusanus was well aware that it categorically 
denies the crucifixion of Christ (Sura 4:157), though he realized the denial is 
meant to do Jesus honor (‘ad reverentiam’). This aspect is of crucial importance 
for his argumentation. Cusanus ardently seeks to show that the ‘mors turpis-
sima crucis’ (the ignominious death on the cross) only harmed Christ’s honor 
at a first glance because the Muslims believe that such a death is not worthy of 
a true prophet. In fact, this makes it evidently clear that Jesus was only bound 
to God in truth and allegiance, and therefore deserves to be honored as the 
highest of all men.20 Furthermore, this shows that by taking a closer look at 
the ‘gloria crucis,’ or the glory of the cross, Muslims will come to acknowledge 
and respect it too. Cusanus’s thoughts on the subject can be summarised as 
follows: the Muslims are doubtlessly wrong in denying the death of Jesus on 
the cross, but—and here the notion of inclusion becomes obvious—they are 
wrong because of good motives, because they want to pay honor to Jesus of 
Nazareth. Thus, Nicholas believes that their mistake can be reversed.
In sermon CCXL, Nicholas of Cusa identifies the vision of paradise in the 
Qurʾan as the element of complete reversal of the message of the Gospel, 
done by the devil—with Mohammed working as his tool—to seduce prim-
itive, animalistic humans.21 Thus, the sermon claims that the vision of par-
adise in the Qurʾan proves two things: it exposes the hand of the devil, as 
well as the intellectual inferiority of the Muslims. In chapter XV of De pace 
fidei, however, Cusanus introduces Mohammed as an intelligent pedagogue 
of the people, who succeeds in dissuading his addressees from polytheism 
19 Cf. h VII, 44, lines 4–46, line 7.
20 Cf. Walter Andreas Euler, “Does Nicholas Cusanus Have a Theology of the Cross?,” The 
Journal of Religion 80 (2000): 405–420; Euler, “Oboedire est vivere: Obedience and Freedom 
According to the Brixen Sermons of Nicholas of Cusa,” in Nicholas of Cusa on the Self and 
Self-Consciousness, ed. Walter Andreas Euler, Ylva Gustafsson and Iris Wikström (Åbo-
Turku: Åbo Akademi University Press, 2010), 25–38.
21 Cf. Sermo CCXL, h XIX, n. 2, lines 19–32.
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by evoking a land of milk and honey in his vision of paradise.22 Hence, 
Cusanus manages an inclusion of Islam by implying—similar to the Islamic 
philosopher Avicenna—that the Qurʾan says something different from what it 
explicitly states.
 Cusanus and Segovia: Questioning Inclusion
I have tried to characterize the theological approach of Nicholas of Cusa in De 
pace fidei regarding Islam by highlighting the notion of inclusion. This notion, 
however, leads to many questions. It can be seen as a legitimate inclusion of 
Islam or a sort of integration, but it can also be perceived as a problematic 
interpretation inspired by specifically Christian values that are alien, some-
times even contrary, to those of Islam.
After a while, Cusanus himself realised that his pro-Christian, inclusive 
interpretation entangles Islam in a certain one-sided interpretation. However, 
it is unknown as to when he came to this awareness. I suspect that he was 
still absolutely convinced that the Qurʾan could be interpreted in a crypto- 
Christian way at the time he was writing De pace fidei. Nonetheless, it becomes 
obvious from an interesting remark in his letter to John of Segovia from 
December 29, 1454, that he had experienced a change of mind in the fifteen 
months that lay between De pace fidei and that letter.
The critical attitude of John of Segovia concerning Islam, expressed in his 
letter to Cusanus on December 2, 1454, might be a reason for this change. 
Concerning the content, Cusanus’s argumentation in the letter to John of 
Segovia is still absolutely in line with the ideas of De pace fidei. Not without 
reason does Nicholas of Cusa point to that work, stating that he would send the 
book to the Spanish scholar once a copy became available.23 Yet, the follow-
ing statement can be found after some considerations concerning the Islamic 
vision of paradise:
It seems as if we are obliged to keep trying to interpret that book [the 
Qurʾan], so important to them, as being commissioned for our sake. For 
we find things in it that are useful to us; and we will interpret all the oth-
ers which are contrary through the first ones.24
22 Cf. h VII, 47, lines 5–50, line 2.
23 Cf. Epistola, h VII, 97, lines 2–4.
24 Epistola, h VII, 99, lines 22–25: “Unde videtur quod semper ad hoc conandum sit quod 
liber iste, qui apud eos est in auctoritate, pro nobis allegetur. Nam reperimus in eo talia 
quae serviunt nobis; et alia quae contrariantur, glosabimus per illa.”
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This statement is the first literary proof that Cusanus had become aware of the 
Qurʾan’s ambivalence concerning the Christian faith. Nevertheless, he remains 
convinced that the pro-Christian essence of the Qurʾan is far more substan-
tial than the conflicting elements, and that a corresponding interpretation of 
Islam is therefore hermeneutically valid.
 Cribratio Alkorani and the Ambivalence of Islam
Much happened during the years between the letter to John of Segovia and the 
composition of Cribratio Alkorani. According to Sermo CCXL, the victory over 
the Turks near Belgrade in the summer of 1456 seems to have raised Cusanus’s 
hope that the expansion of Islam might be stopped and that, with God’s help, 
everything would turn out fine for Christendom. That short moment of eupho-
ria, however, did not last long. The sermon makes clear that Nicholas of Cusa 
supported the military resistance to the expansion of the Turks. He considered 
it as a legitimate resistance and not as an aggression, contradictory to Christ’s 
commandment, as he points out in his letter to John of Segovia.25
Cribratio Alkorani, an utterly complex and manifold opus, is one of the most 
important works of Nicholas of Cusa in the last years of his life. Contrary to 
De pace fidei, Cribratio Alkorani does not show a clear goal in its discussion 
with Islam. Although the inclusive, pro-Christian interpretation of Islam is 
extensively represented, it is consistently thwarted by anti-Christian interpre-
tations. Accordingly, Cusanus argues that due to ‘pia interpretatione’ (or pious, 
Christian interpretations), the Qurʾan could be considered as a ‘secret Gospel,’26 
yet it is the product of a debauchee who cared only for glory, might, and wealth. 
Following the older Christian apologetic, Cusanus claims that Mohammed 
died as a heretical Christian,27 and stresses that Mohammed’s knowledge of 
25 Epistola, h VII, 97, lines 5–11: “Assentio igitur rationibus vestris fundatissimis tam in iure 
divino quam humano; quia si iuxta doctrinam Christi processerimus, non errabimus, sed 
spiritus eius loquetur in nobis, cui non poterunt omnes adversarii Christi resistere; sed 
si invasionis gladio aggressionem eligerimus, formidare habemus ne gladio pugnantes 
gladio pereamus. Unde sola defensio sine periculo est Christiano.”
26 Cusanus uses the phrase ‘pia interpretatio’ only in the second book of Cribratio Alkorani: 
II, 1 (h VIII, n. 86, lines 4–6); II, 12 (h VIII, n. 119, lines 1–2); II, 13 (h VIII, n. 124, lines 3–4); 
II, 19 (h VIII, n. 154, lines 8–9); cf. Tom Kerger, “Die cusanische Sichtung des Korans,” in 
Cusanus und der Islam, ed. Walter Andreas Euler and Tom Kerger (Trier: Paulinus, 2010), 
95–102. 
27 Cf. Prol. II, h VIII, n. 11: “That noble Arab Christian whom I previously mentioned, reports 
the following: Sergius, a monk evicted from his monastery, journeyed to Mecca. There 
he found two groups of people, [viz.,] idolaters and Jews; and there he preached the 
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the truth was contaminated by ignorance (‘ignorantia’) and perverse inten-
tions (‘perversitas intentionis’).28 Moreover, he contends that ‘tres astutissimi 
Judaei’ (three extremely sly Jews) had added anti-Christian amendments to the 
Qurʾan,29 resulting in an even further alienation from Christianity.
Thus, in Cribratio Alkorani Cusanus considers the holy book of the Muslims 
to be a book containing contradictory tendencies with regard to its content, 
as well as a ‘confusissimus liber’ concerning its form. He regards the Qurʾan 
as being a highly abstruse creation because every single chapter has to be 
analyzed separately, as the different Suras were not coherently connected with 
Christian faith as Nestorius held it, [doing so] in order to regain favor with his [monastic] 
brothers, [who were also] of the sect of Nestorius. And he succeeded in converting all the 
idolaters to his own faith. Among these was Muhammad, who, having been converted 
from idolatry, died a Nestorian Christian. But three very clever Jews attached themselves 
to Muhammad in order to turn him aside, lest he become perfect; and they induced him 
to various evils. But after Muhammad’s death, when all [the idolaters] returned to their 
own [respective] sect, these [three] Jews approached Alis—son of Abitalip—to whom 
Muhammad had sent his collection [of precepts], and persuaded him to elevate himself 
unto a prophet, even as Muhammad too [had elevated himself]. And with regard to 
Muhammad’s book they added and deleted what they wanted to.” Hopkins, Cusa’s De pace 
fidei and Cribratio, 79.
28 Prol. I, h VIII, n. 9–10: “But Jesus, the son of the Virgin Mary and the Christ who was 
foretold by Moses and the Prophets to be coming, did come and did reveal most 
perfectly—according to the testimony even of Muhammad—the oft-mentioned way, for 
He was ignorant of nothing. Therefore, it is certain that anyone who follows Christ and 
His way will attain unto an understanding of the desired Good. Hence, if Muhammad in 
any respect disagrees with Christ, then it follows either that he does so out of ignorance, 
because he did not know Christ and did not understand Him, or that there is perverse 
intent, because he did not intend to lead men to that goal-of-rest to which Christ showed 
the way but rather sought his own glory under the guise of that goal. A comparison of the 
law of Christ with the law of Muhammad will teach [us] that both of these [alternatives] 
must be believed to be true. I believe that the following must be maintained: viz., that 
ignorance was the cause of [Muhammad’s] error and malevolence. For no one who is 
acquainted with Christ disagrees with Him or detracts from Him. Now, my intention is as 
follows: having presupposed the Gospel of Christ, to analyze the book of Muhammad and 
to show that even in it there are contained those [teachings] through which the Gospel 
would be altogether confirmed, were it in need of confirmation, and that wherever [the 
Koran] disagrees [with Christ], this [disagreement] has resulted from Muhammad’s 
ignorance and, following [thereupon], from his perverse intent. For whereas Christ sought 
not His own glory but the glory of God the Father and the salvation of men, Muhammad 
sought not the glory of God and the salvation of men but rather his own glory.” Hopkins, 
Cusa’s De pace fidei and Cribratio, 78–79.
29 Cf. Prol. II, h VIII, n. 11 (see note 27).
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each other. Nicholas of Cusa says forthrightly at the end of his second preface 
that he did not succeed in discerning a clear order in the Qurʾan, and that was 
why his interpretations of the text were also rather confused.30
With respect to the evaluation of Islam, Cribratio Alkorani ends with an odd 
result, which can be paraphrased as follows: the Qurʾan exhibits ‘inclusion and 
exclusion,’ with pro- and anti-Christian assessments simultaneously and in 
equal measure. This result has led many scholars to ignore the Cribratio, and 
on the whole, the work does not offer a satisfactory solution for dialogue with 
Islam in religious and political terms. It is therefore not surprising that Pope 
Pius II hardly referred to the work of his cardinal when he was writing his polit-
ically motivated letter to the Turkish Sultan Mehmed II.
Yet, from the perspective of Christian theology, Cribratio clearly shows a 
deepened awareness of an underlying problem. The main difficulty for any 
Christian interpreter is the ambivalence of Islam, which displays both pro- and 
anti-Christian sides at the same time, as it is grounded in biblical transmis-
sions on the one hand, but on the other hand categorically rejects the most 
important elements of the Christian faith: the notions of incarnation and 
divine trinity.
In this respect, an interesting development can be witnessed in Cusanus’s 
writings. He ignores the anti-Christian side of Islam in De pace fidei, and pre-
sents it instead as a misunderstanding. Then, in his letter to John of Segovia, 
he implies that he is aware of the ambivalence (visible in his remark about the 
hermeneutic of the Qurʾan), and finally he discusses it extensively in Cribratio 
Alkorani. It is clear that the uniformity of his interpretation of Islam and the 
Qurʾan suffers from this very ambivalence. However, according to Cusanus’s 
insight, the Janus face of Islam no longer allows for a uniform interpretation 
from a Christian point of view.
30 h VIII, n. 16.
Una Religio in Rituum Varietate: Religious 
Pluralism, the Qurʾan, and Nicholas of Cusa
Pim Valkenberg
This essay will focus on the possible origins of just five words. These words, 
however, might have been the most famous words that Nicholas of Cusa ever 
wrote during his long career: ‘una religio in rituum varietate.’ In the history of the 
interpretation of these words, much effort has been made to explain them by 
connecting them to Western philosophical or Christian theological concepts. 
Yet efforts to elucidate the idea of ‘one religion in a variety of rites’ by Nicholas 
of Cusa’s own metaphysics have not been successful, as Thomas McTighe has 
shown.1 This essay will therefore interpret Nicholas of Cusa’s famous words by 
taking seriously the historical context in which Cusanus wrote them, namely, 
Christianity’s encounter with Islam. Consequently, the bulk of this chapter will 
retrace the historical sources of the words ‘one religion in a variety of rites’ in 
the Qurʾan, as well as its subsequent interpretation by Muslim scholars.
Because this new approach, centered on the Islamic sources of Nicholas’s 
famous formula, is not unrelated to contemporary debates about his role in the 
encounter between Christianity and Islam, it may be good to start with a few 
remarks about Nicholas of Cusa’s role in the contemporary Christian theology 
of religions. In his recent book Allah: A Christian Response, Miroslav Volf uses 
Nicholas of Cusa as a model of a positive approach to Islam.2 He points out that 
Nicholas was one of the few Christian theologians who preferred to react to the 
Fall of Constantinople in 1453 with words rather than weapons. Exchanging 
letters with his friend John of Segovia, Nicholas developed the idea of organ-
izing a sort of interfaith conference, and his work De pace fidei (‘On the Peace 
of Faith’), written almost immediately after the conquest of Constantinople, 
may be seen as a blueprint for such a conference. Even though Volf is care-
ful not to take Nicholas of Cusa out of his historical context, it is easy to see 
how the words ‘one religion in a variety of rites’ tend to be explained as a 
 
 
1 See Thomas McTighe, “Nicholas of Cusa’s Unity-Metaphysics and the Formula Religio Una in 
Rituum Varietate,” in Nicholas of Cusa in Search of God and Wisdom, ed. Gerald Christianson 
and Thomas M. Izbicki (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 161–72. 
2 See Miroslav Volf, Allah: A Christian Response (New York: HarperOne, 2011), chapter two, 
“A Catholic Cardinal and the One God of All,” 40–59. 
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foreshadowing of the pluralist approach in the present-day Christian theology 
of religions, according to which the different religious traditions are limited 
expressions of one universal faith.3 Associating Nicholas with a contemporary 
form of religious pluralism that is most famously represented by John Hick or 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith also explains why theologians who are critical of such 
a pluralist approach also find Cusanus’s words quite ambiguous.4 Both pro-
ponents and critics of Nicholas of Cusa in the theology of religions, however, 
agree that the idea of ‘one religion in a variety of rites’ can easily be interpreted 
in a pluralistic way. Yet research into the sources of these words will show that 
they convey a different form of pluralism. They go back to an annotation that 
Nicholas made in his personal copy of the so-called Toledan Collection, con-
taining Latin translations of the Qurʾan and a number of other Islamic writings. 
His annotation, fides una—ritus diversus (‘one faith—different rites’), indeed 
reflects a specific Islamic—or rather, Qurʾanic—way of looking at religious 
plurality. This chapter will explain the connection between Nicholas of Cusa 
and an Islamic view of religious pluralism in two parts. The first part considers 
the two works related to Islam in which Nicholas of Cusa writes about this idea 
of ‘one religion in a variety of rites,’ and the second part is concerned with his 
sources in the Qurʾan and the history of its interpretation in the Islamic world 
as it came to be known in the Latin West.
 Nicholas of Cusa and the Fall of Constantinople
Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464) served the Church as a diplomat and Cardinal, 
and was involved in attempts to reunite the Western (Latin) and the Eastern 
(Greek) Church. In order to facilitate the negotiations for reunification, 
Nicholas visited Constantinople sixteen years prior to its conquest by the 
Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II in 1453. The knowledge of Islam that he gained dur-
ing his stay in Constantinople, and more specifically the Latin translations that 
he gathered during his travels, would help him later to express his theological 
reflections on the Fall of Constantinople.
The first reflection, De pace fidei, written shortly after the fall, contained a 
fervent plea for peace between religions. In this fictitious dialogue between 
3 I have recently explored this aspect further in my article “One Faith—Different Rites: 
Nicholas of Cusa’s New Awareness of Religious Pluralism,” in Understanding Religious 
Pluralism: Perspectives from Religious Studies and Theology, ed. Peter C. Phan and Jonathan 
Ray (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, to be published in 2014). 
4 See Karl J. Becker and Ilaria Morali, eds., Catholic Engagement with World Religions: A 
Comprehensive Study (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 2010). 
32 valkenberg
representatives of many religions and cultures, Nicholas tests the possibility 
for a peaceful agreement. He introduces the notion of a utopian or eschato-
logical ideal: how would the world be if all humans could know their Creator 
in one faith? What if they could recognize their differences as grounded in 
the same divine law or religion? Cusanus’s literary fiction takes the form of a 
council, with which he was familiar as he had been present at the Council of 
Basel (1431). Yet Cusanus’s fictitious meeting is not limited to Christians; its 
modern equivalent would be the League of Nations or the United Nations, 
with a large number of representatives of different nations. In religious terms, 
one could even think of the World Parliament of Religions in an eschatologi-
cal setting, presided by the Word, by Christ himself. Cusanus introduces his 
fiction as follows:
After the brutal deeds recently committed by the Turkish ruler at 
Constantinople were reported to a certain man, who had once seen the 
sites of those regions, he was inflamed by a zeal for God; with many sighs 
he implored the Creator of all things that in his mercy he restrain the 
persecution, raging more than ever because of different religious rites.5
This man, in whom we might well recognize Cusanus himself, seems to be 
convinced that violence between religions can be overcome if religious practi-
tioners would realize that their religious rites are in fact varieties of one basic 
faith: una religio in rituum varietate. In the imaginary story of De pace fidei, the 
King of heaven and earth receives a number of messengers who bring stories 
of religious strife and oppression. One of these messengers asks the heavenly 
King to manifest His face so that the enmity will end, and so all people will 
know that “there is only one religion in the variety of rites.”6 This is the utopian 
ideal for Nicholas of Cusa: if only God would reveal Godself we would be able 
to acknowledge that we worship the same God in a variety of rites, and in that 
case all enmities between religions would cease. Here we come across a fun-
5 De pace fidei 1, 1: “Fuit ex hiis, quae apud Constantinopolim proxime saevissime acta per 
Turkorum regem divulgabantur, quidam vir zelo Dei accensus, qui loca illarum regionum ali-
quando viderat, ut pluribus gemitibus oraret omnium creatorem quod persecutionem, quae 
ob diversum ritum religionum plus solito saevit, sua pietate moderaretur.” Latin text repro-
duced from the Heidelberg critical edition, and English translation by H. Lawrence Bond 
in: Nicholas of Cusa on Interreligious Harmony. Text, Concordance and Translation of De Pace 
Fidei, ed. James E. Biechler and H. Lawrence Bond (Lewiston, N.Y.: The Edwin Mellen Press, 
1990), 3; hereafter cited as ‘trans. Bond.’ 
6 De pace fidei 1, 6: “Si sic facere dignaberis, cessabit gladius et odii livor, et quaeque mala; et 
cognoscent omnes quomodo non est nisi religio una in rituum varietate”; trans. Bond, 7. 
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damental notion in the work of Nicholas the philosopher: the idea of learned 
ignorance. We know that ultimately we do not know God, and that we only 
know how God is worshipped in a variety of rites. But Nicholas is enough of a 
(church-)politician to add a healthy dose of realism here, and therefore adds:
But if perhaps this difference of rites cannot be removed or if it is not 
expedient to do so in order that the diversity may contribute to devo-
tion . . . at any rate, just as you are one, there should be one religion and 
one veneration of worship.7
As the editors of De pace fidei have noted, this is a clear allusion to a famous 
text from the Qurʾan, which we will encounter again in the Cribratio Alkorani.8
In the debates between the representatives of the different nations, Nicholas 
of Cusa immediately broaches this theme of the unity and harmony of reli-
gions by letting the oldest representative, a Greek (clearly a reference to the 
importance of Greek philosophy), address this problem:
We give praises to our God whose mercy is above all his works; he alone 
is able to cause so great a diversity of religions to be brought into one 
concordant peace [. . .] Therefore, we beseech you now to instruct us how 
this unity of religion could be introduced by us.9
After the Greek and an Italian, the third representative entering the discus-
sion (presided by none other than the Word) is an Arab, who agrees with the 
others that all human beings by nature desire Wisdom. When he asserts that 
this Wisdom is the one God, the Word agrees and says: “Therefore, for all those 
who are of sound understanding there is one religion and worship, which is 
presupposed in all the diversity of the rites.”10 Here the Word gives the formula 
7 De pace fidei, “Quod si forte haec differentia rituum tolli non poterit aut non expedit, ut 
diversitas sit devotionis adauctio, quando quaelibet regio suis ceremoniis quasi tibi regi 
gratioribus vigilantiorem operam impendet: saltem ut sicut tu unus es, una sit religio et 
unus latriae cultus”; trans. Bond.
8 See notes 12 and 13 in Biechler and Bond, Nicholas of Cusa on Interreligious Harmony, 
222–23. 
9 De pace fidei, 4, 10: “Laudes Deo nostro dicimus, cuius misericordia super omnia opera 
eius, qui solus potens est efficere quod in unam concordantem pacem tanta religionum 
diversitas conducatur . . . Oramus tamen nunc instrui, quo modo haec per nos religionis 
unitas possit introduci”; trans. Bond, 11. 
10 De pace fidei, 6, 16: “Una est igitur religio et cultus omnium intellectu vigentium, quae 
in omni diversitate rituum praesupponitur”; trans. Bond, 15. See also James E. Biechler, 
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in a somewhat elaborate form: “una est igitur religio et cultus . . . quae in omni 
diversitate rituum praesupponitur.” It is interesting to note that in these texts 
Nicholas of Cusa uses both the singular una religio and the plural diversitas 
religionum so that the word can be an equivalent of the one faith (fides) or wor-
ship (cultus) on the one hand, and of the multitude of rites (ritus) on the other. 
It would be interesting to further investigate this particular—and possibly 
unprecedented—use of the word religio as both a normative and eschatologi-
cal ideal and as a description of existing plurality, since it seems to foreshadow 
much later conceptions of pluralism in the philosophy and theology of reli-
gions.11 Yet the introduction of a normative notion of orthodox faith to which 
all religions will be led in the first intervention by the incarnate Word seems 
to suggest otherwise: “Since truth is one and since it is not possible that it not 
be understood by every free intellect, all diversity of religions will be led to one 
orthodox faith.”12 As we will see later, this tension between one orthodox faith 
and the multiplicity of religious rites corresponds to the tension in the Qurʾan 
between the one divine law or religion revealed by God, and the many rites and 
customs brought by the prophets to the different nations. With this, we turn to 
the second major text that Nicholas of Cusa devoted to Islam.
While De pace fidei captures Nicholas’s first reflection on the Fall of 
Constantinople, he came back to this event seven years later with a more elab-
orate theological reflection, in which he once again used the same idea about 
the variety of rites and the one faith. Having read the Qurʾan in its Latin trans-
lation, he wanted to help Pope Pius II give a more theological answer to the 
Fall of Constantinople in the form of a letter to Sultan Mehmet, the Conqueror 
(al-Fatih) of Constantinople. Nicholas hoped that his Christian interpretation 
of the Qurʾan would show that it in fact supports Christian claims about Jesus 
Christ, and might consequently convince the Sultan that he should convert to 
Christianity. In order to substantiate his proposal for a papal letter to the Sultan, 
Cusanus wrote a long theological treatise. This work, the Cribratio Alkorani or 
“Sifting of the Qurʾan,” is often seen as representing a much more polemical 
approach to Islam than the peaceful setting of De pace fidei.13 The literary form 
“A New Face toward Islam: Nicholas of Cusa and John of Segovia,” in Nicholas of Cusa in 
Search of God and Wisdom, ed. Gerald Christianson and Thomas M. Izbicki (Leiden: Brill, 
1991), 185–202, here 197.
11 This is what makes Nicholas of Cusa’s use of the term ambiguous, according to the editors 
of Catholic Engagement with World Religions. 
12 De pace fidei, 3, 8: “Quae [= veritas] cum sit una, et non possit non capi per omnem liberum 
intellectum, perducetur omnis religionum diversitas in unam fidem orthodoxam”; trans. 
Bond, 10.
13 See, among others, Norman Daniel, Islam and the West: the Making of an Image (1st ed. 
1960; reprinted Oxford: Oneworld, 1993), 307.
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of this work differs as well, as Sifting of the Qurʾan endeavors to approach the 
holy book of Islam with the mindset of a Christian theologian. However, in this 
work we come across the same words—‘una religio in rituum varietate’—once 
again, which might indicate that the same form of pluralism is operative here 
as well. More importantly, Nicholas expressly identifies these words as pertain-
ing to a specific Islamic way of looking at the plurality of messengers, and at 
the guidance given by God to humankind. Thus, it is this Islamic view on the 
history of prophecy and revelation that is behind Nicholas’s familiar phrase: 
‘one religion in a variety of rites.’
At the beginning of the first book of the Cribratio Alkorani, Nicholas explains 
this Islamic point of view on religious plurality as follows:
[Followers of Muhammad] also say that God sent to all nations indige-
nous messengers and that [through them] He admonished these nations 
regarding what they had to believe and had to do in order to be num-
bered, on the day of judgment, among those who are good and in order to 
attain unto the Paradise full of joy. [.  .  .] Accordingly [followers of 
Muhammad] conclude that if the variety of laws and of rites is found to 
be present in the identity-of-faith that is exhorted within the various 
nations by the messengers of God, then indeed this [kind of diversity] 
cannot at all prevent one who is obedient from obtaining a fitting reward 
at the hands of the most gracious and most just Judge.14
Again, we meet here an eschatological vision of interreligious harmony, but 
this time the diversity is not to be overcome until God speaks the truth in the 
final judgment, since this variety is meant to teach humankind how to believe 
and to act faithfully. In a formula that sounds much like the famous words from 
De pace fidei, Cusanus has the Muslims say that the one faith can be found in 
the variety of laws and rituals prescribed by the prophets of God to the various 
nations, though it is intended as a hidden guidance that will be fully uncov-
ered by God on the Day of Judgment.15 In the meantime, diversity serves as an 
incitement to do good, and in this way arrive at eternal bliss.
14 Cribratio Alkorani I, 2, n. 27; Latin text in Nicolai de Cusa Cribratio Alkorani (Opera omnia, 
vol. VIII), ed. Ludwig Hagemann (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1986), 27–28; translation in 
Jasper Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa’s De pace fidei and Cribratio alkorani: Translation and 
Analysis (Minneapolis: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 1994), 88.
15 Cribratio Alkorani I, 2, n. 27: “Quare concludunt, quod, si varietas legum vel rituum in 
identitate fidei in variis gentibus per dei nuntios praecepta reperiatur, hoc quidem 
oboedienti nequaquam, quominus apud piissimum atque iustissimum iudicem 
condignum praemium assequatur, obese poterit.” 
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At this place in the Cribratio Alkorani, Nicholas of Cusa summarizes what 
Muslims have to say about the Qurʾan: it is a book that came down from 
heaven and tells about the unity of God and the plurality of books and proph-
ets; thus, the Qurʾan confirms the various messengers and books given by God 
before. And indeed, one can find a number of texts in the Qurʾan that confirm 
Cusanus’s summary here. A rather famous text from Surat al-Maʿida (Qurʾan 
5:48), often mentioned by Muslims as an important source for thinking about 
religious pluralism,16 seems to correspond quite well with what Nicholas has 
his Muslim interlocutors say:
We have assigned a law (shirʿah) and a path (minhaj) to each of you. If 
God had so willed, He would have made you one community (ummatan 
wahidatan) but He wanted to test you through that which He has given 
you, so race to do good: you will all return to God and He will make clear 
to you the matters you differed about.17
Hence, the basic view on religious differences in the Qurʾan is that God sent 
different messengers to different nations with their own rites and beliefs in 
order that they emulate one another in doing good, and God will in the end 
pass judgment over their differences.
 Sources for ‘One Faith—Different Rites’
Yet it would be quite a stretch to assert that Nicholas of Cusa received the 
inspiration for his idea about the God-given meaningfulness of religious plu-
rality from the Qurʾan. In order to make this assertion plausible, we need to 
go back from Nicholas of Cusa in the fifteenth century to Peter the Venerable 
and Hermann of Dalmatia in the twelfth century—one of the first encounters 
between the world of Islam and the world of the Latin West. From there, we 
16 See Muhammad Shafiq and Mohammed Abu-Nimer, “The Qurʾanic Perspectives of 
Interfaith Dialogue,” in Interfaith Dialogue: A Guide for Muslims (Herndon, VA: The 
International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2007), 49–84; Reza Shah-Kazemi, The Other 
in the Light of the One: the Universality of the Qurʾan and Interfaith Dialogue (Cambridge: 
Islamic Texts Society, 2006). Some reflections also in Pim Valkenberg, Sharing Lights on 
the Way to God: Muslim-Christian Dialogue and Theology in the Context of Abrahamic 
Partnership (Amsterdam-New York: Editions Rodopi, 2006), 152–62.
17 Qurʾan 5:48 in the interpretation by M. A. S. Abdel Haleem, The Qurʾan: English 
Translation and Parallel Arabic Text (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 117. I added a 
transliteration of the most important Arabic words in this text.
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need to go back even further to ʿAbdallah ibn Salām, believed to be an early 
Jewish convert to Islam in the seventh century, and finally, we will come to 
none other than Prophet Muhammad himself, in conversation with ʿAbdallah 
ibn Salām.
We begin with Nicholas of Cusa and his copy of the Qurʾan. In the introduc-
tion to the Cribratio Alkorani, Nicholas states that he made quite an effort to 
obtain a good Latin translation of the Qurʾan.18 Since he could not read Arabic 
and his efforts to commission a Latin translation failed, in the end he had to set-
tle for the twelfth-century translation by Robert of Ketton. This work was part 
of the so-called Toledan Collection, a number of translations commissioned 
by Peter the Venerable, Abbot of Cluny, in Toledo around 1140.19 Interestingly, 
Peter’s translation project was inspired by the same idea as Nicholas’ De pace 
fidei: to prefer the battle of words over the battle of arms—the Crusades—as 
reaction to the emerging political power of Islam.20 The Toledan collection 
was for a long time the main instrument for the Christian West to become 
acquainted with the world of Islam. Thus, it has been reprinted many times 
since its first printing in 1543 by the Reformed theologian Theodor Buchmann 
(or Bibliander) in Basel, with introductory essays by Martin Luther and Philipp 
Melanchthon.21 Writing a century before that though, Nicholas of Cusa used 
a manuscript copy of the collection, which can still be consulted today since 
it has been preserved in his own personal library as Codex Cusanus 108. James 
Biechler has made a careful study of this manuscript and has ventured the 
hypothesis that Nicholas studied the Qurʾan and other writings associated 
with it, making notes in the margin of these works at least three times.22 The 
first notes date from the period in which Nicholas worked as a young canon 
18 Cribratio Alkorani, prologue, nn. 2–4; translation in Hopkins, 75–76.
19 See James Kritzeck, Peter the Venerable and Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1964).
20 Kritzeck, Peter the Venerable and Islam, 21. For a similar comparison, see Rita George-
Tvrtković, “After the Fall: Riccoldo da Montecroce and Nicholas of Cusa on Religious 
Diversity,” Theological Studies 73 (2012): 641–62. 
21 Kritzeck, Peter the Venerable and Islam, viii. A somewhat later edition from 1550 is 
reproduced on the internet by the Bibliothèque Nationale de France: gallica.bnf.fr. The first 
part of the title in Latin is: Machumetis Saracenorum principis ejusque successorum vitae, 
doctrina, ac ipse Alcoran. The text was reprinted by Les Mondes Humanistes (GRAC–UMR 
5037) in 2010. 
22 See James E. Biechler, “Three Manuscripts on Islam from the Library of Nicholas of Cusa,” 
Manuscripta 27 (1983): 91–100. 
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lawyer in Basel.23 The second series of notes is connected with the compo-
sition of De pace fidei in 1453, while the last series of notes is related to the 
meticulous preparation of the Cribratio Alkorani in 1460–61. One of the notes 
in the second series is of particular interest, since it seems to indicate the ori-
gins of the famous words, ‘religio una in rituum varietate.’ It is a note, together 
with a hand pointer, on fol. 25 of Codex Cusanus 108, which reads: “fides una, 
ritus diversus.”24 Now, the work that inspired Nicholas to write this note was 
not the Latin translation of the Qurʾan by Robert of Ketton, but rather an 
obscure Islamic treatise that formed part of the Toledan Collection, entitled 
Lex sive Doctrina Machumet (Law or Teaching of Muhammad) and translated 
by Hermann of Dalmatia in 1143.25
It is next to this text on the teaching of Muhammad that Nicholas of Cusa 
wrote ‘fides una, ritus diversus.’ Biechler comes to the conclusion that
Cusanus’s note seems to be the root of his principle ‘religio una in rituum 
varietate’ expressing his theoretical solution to the problem of the world 
religions: there is really only one religion existing in a variety of rites 
or forms.26
Ludwig Hagemann, the German medievalist and editor of the Cribratio 
Alkorani, is even more outspoken about the importance of this marginal note, 
claiming: it is of great importance and without a doubt shows the source and 
origin of the phrase ‘religio una in rituum varietate.’27 The emphasis on Muslim 
sources in Hagemann’s remark makes sense if one links the discussion about 
the origins of the famous phrase ‘una religio in rituum varietate’ to the history of 
its reception in the twentieth century. Various scholars have connected these 
words instead with neo-Platonic and other philosophical backgrounds, as well 
23 For biographical information, see Erich Meuthen, Nicholas of Cusa: A Sketch for a 
Biography, trans. D. Crowner and G. Christianson (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2010). 
24 Biechler, “Three Manuscripts,” p. 94; Biechler, “Interreligious Dialogue,” in Introducing 
Nicholas of Cusa: A Guide to a Renaissance Man, ed. C. Bellitto, T. Izbicki and 
G. Christianson (New York-Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 2004), 270–96, here 279. 
25 See Guillaume Frédéric Pijper, Het boek der duizend vragen (Leiden: Brill, 1924), 4.
26 Biechler, “Three Manuscripts,” 94–95. 
27 Cribratio Alkorani 223, in note 77 on the text quoted earlier, I, 2, n. 27: “Verba ‘fides 
una, ritus diversus’ a Nicolao in margine adscripta magni ad illam Nicolai sententiam 
‘religio una in rituum varietate’ (De pace 1 n.6) momenti sunt. Si quaeremus, quibus e 
fontibus ea doctrina hausta sit, dubium non potest esse, quin Doctrina fons et origo illius 
sententiae sit. . . .”
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as with Catholic and other forms of ecclesiology.28 Against this tradition, I 
agree with Hagemann that a reference to Islamic sources makes much more 
sense if the formula is used by Nicholas in both De pace fidei and Cribratio 
Alkorani, and if it is used in the latter book in an explicit reference to what 
defenders of the Qurʾan say. Yet the marginal note in itself does not necessarily 
indicate that Nicholas derived the formula from the Doctrina Machumet; he 
might simply have recognized a formula that he had met before as a student of 
canon law or conciliar history, as Erich Meuthen observes in a note on the his-
torical sources of the formula.29 Yet Biechler’s remark on the threefold series 
of notes in Cusanus’s copy of the Toledan Collection suggests an even more 
interesting possibility, namely, that Nicholas noticed the formula for the first 
time in several sources when he was a student and young practitioner of canon 
law, but that this knowledge was activated when he went through the Collectio 
Toletana for the second time, looking for a solution to the problem of religious 
plurality occasioned by the Fall of Constantinople.
In any case, the presence of the hand pointer and the marginal note makes 
a strong case for an Islamic notion of unity-in-plurality behind the formula 
‘one faith, different rites,’ which would have such a lasting influence through 
its rephrasing in De pace fidei. In order to see what exactly this Islamic notion 
of unity-in-plurality might be, we need to look at the Arabic text that was trans-
lated by Hermann of Dalmatia, one of the assistants of Peter the Venerable 
in the 1140s. The work is known in its Arabic original as the Kitāb al-masāʾil, 
or “Book of questions,” attributed to ʿAbdallah ibn Salām. The genre of this 
book is well known in early Islamic apologetics: a group of Jews (or Christians) 
comes to Prophet Muhammad and poses him some questions whose answers, 
according to their tradition, are known only to a true prophet. It is the goal of 
apologetic works such as these to show that the Jews in the text converted to 
Islam because Muhammad, being a true prophet, knew all the right answers, 
28 For two good examples, see Maurice de Gandillac, “Una religio in rituum varietate,” 
in Nikolaus von Kues als Promotor der Ökumene, ed. R. Haubst, Mitteilungen und 
Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft, 9 (1971): 92–105; Michael Seidlmayer, 
“ ‘Una religio in rituum varietate’: zur Religionsauffassung des Nikolaus von Cues,” Archiv 
für Kulturgeschichte 36 (1954): 145–207. 
29 See Erich Meuthen, “Der Dialogus concludens Amedistarum errorem ex gestis et doctrina 
concilii Basiliensis,” Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft 8 
(1970): 11–114, here 58–62. During the conference of the American Cusanus Society in 
Gettysburg in October 2012, Walter Euler remarked that Cusanus seems to use the formula 
about the one religion and the many rites already in his conversation with Bohemian 
(Hussite) representatives to the Council of Basel. See Meuthen, Nicholas of Cusa, 38–39. 
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thereby suggesting that Jews who are confronted with this apology should 
do the same.
Even though the name of ʿAbdallah ibn Salām is mentioned quite a few 
times in early Islamic sources, we do not currently possess a reliable Arabic 
text attributed to him. The reason is that the genre of the ‘questions’ lends 
itself to additions and changes, since later copyists and editors tended to add 
their own questions as well. Therefore, the Latin text translated by Hermann 
of Dalmatia is often considered to be the most reliable textual basis of this 
work.30 In this paper, I will first look at the significance of ʿAbdallah ibn Salām 
in early Islamic sources; next, I will look at the Latin text that Nicholas of Cusa 
used; and finally, I will compare that text to a later—and unreliable—Arabic 
text version in order to see what exactly the Arabic terms could have been that 
occasioned Nicholas to write his note ‘fides una—ritus diversus,’ later reformu-
lated as ‘religio una in rituum varietate.’
ʿAbdallah ibn Salām is one of the few Jews who are looked upon favorably 
in early Islamic sources. The earliest source that mentions him is probably Ibn 
Ishaq’s biography of Prophet Muhammad, written about two centuries after 
the death of the Prophet. In this biography (as handed down in the later ver-
sion by Ibn Hisham), Ibn Ishaq mentions ʿAbdallah ibn Salām, together with 
three other Jews, as rabbis who came to the true faith of Islam. Ibn Ishaq men-
tions this example as an explanation of the following verses in surah Al Imran 
(3:113–114):
They are not all alike; of the scripture folk there is an upright community 
who read God’s verses in the night season prostrating themselves. They 
believe in God and the last day and enjoin good conduct and forbid evil 
and vie with one another in good works. They are the righteous.31
A little before that, Ibn Ishaq had told the conversion story of ʿAbdallah ibn 
Salām in the following words:
I was told the story of ʿAbdullah b. Salām, a learned rabbi, by one of his 
family. He said: ‘When I heard about the apostle I knew by his descrip-
30 Pijper, Het boek der duizend vragen, 40. Kritzeck, Peter the Venerable and Islam, 73–74, 
describes a manuscript (MS 1162 of the Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal) that he believes to be 
the original Toledan Collection, written in Spain before 1150 and bound in Cluny shortly 
thereafter. 
31 Quoted according to the English translation by A. Guillaume in The Life of Muhammad: 
A Translation of Ishaq’s Sīrat Rasūl Allāh (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 
1955), 262.
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tion, name, and the time at which he appeared that he was the one we 
were waiting for, and I rejoiced greatly thereat, though I kept silent about 
it until the apostle came to Medina. When he stayed in Qubā’ among the 
b. ‘Amr b. ‘Auf a man came with the news while I was working at the top 
of a palm-tree and my aunt Khālida b.al-Hārith was sitting below. When I 
heard the news I cried Allah Akbar and my aunt said: “Good gracious, if 
you had heard that Moses b. Imrān had come you could not have made 
more fuss!” “Indeed, aunt,” I said, “he is the brother of Moses and follows 
his religion, being sent with the same mission.” She asked, “Is he really the 
prophet who we have been told will be sent at this very time?” and she 
accepted my assurance that he was. Straightway I went to the apostle and 
became a Muslim, and when I returned to my house I ordered my family 
to do the same.
I concealed the matter from the Jews and then went to the apostle and 
said, “The Jews are a nation of liars and I wish you would take me into one 
of your houses and hide me from them. Then ask them about me so that 
they may tell you the position I hold among them before they know that 
I have become a Muslim. For if they know it beforehand, they will utter 
slanderous lies against me.” The prophet housed me; the Jews came; and 
the apostle asked them about my standing among them. They said: “He is 
our chief and the son of our chief; our rabbi, and our learned man.” When 
they said this, I emerged and said: “O Jews, fear God and accept what He 
has sent you. For by God you know that he is the apostle of God. You will 
find him described in your Torah and even named. I testify that he is the 
apostle of God, I believe in him, I hold him to be true, and I acknowledge 
him.” They accused me of lying and reviled me. Then I reminded the 
apostle that I had said that they would do this, for they were a treacher-
ous, lying and evil people. I publicly proclaimed my conversion and my 
household and my aunt Khālida followed suit.’32
This rather long story teaches us three things about the relationship between 
the first Muslims and the Jewish community. First, the story functions as part 
of the anti-Jewish polemics in Medina, where a large majority of the important 
Jewish population was not ready to accept Muhammad as a prophet. In this 
context, the Qurʾan and early Islamic tradition argue that most Jews are not 
to be trusted, in part because they do not read their own Scriptures properly. 
Second, as the text just quoted from the Qurʾan mentions, there is a minor-
ity among the Jews who do know how to read the Scriptures and the signs 
of the times. They are the upright and the just ones, but they are of course 
32 Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad, 240–41. 
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also the ones who convert to Islam. Thus, ʿAbdallah ibn Salām is portrayed 
as a leader of this community: he is the most learned scholar, and is able to 
read the announcement of the future prophet in the Jewish Scriptures. Finally, 
ʿAbdallah ibn Salām is portrayed as someone who does not need to be con-
vinced, as he just goes to Muhammad and converts to Islam. In fact, as later 
Muslims would say, he does not convert but he reverts to his true nature ( fitra) 
as muslim, someone who submits himself freely and willingly to God.
This final characteristic, viz. that ʿAbdallah ibn Salām immediately converts 
without further questions, changes in subsequent traditions. The later tradi-
tions about the ‘questions’ posed by Ibn Salām to the Prophet have their ori-
gin in a hadith (a traditional story about Muhammad and his first followers) 
transmitted by Bukhari in the context of the stories of the prophets, in which 
the story about Ibn Salām serves to highlight the prophethood of Muhammad. 
Bukhari recounts:
Narrated Anas: when ʿAbdullah ibn Salam heard of the arrival of the 
Prophet at Al-Madina, he came to him and said: “I am going to ask you 
about three things which nobody knows except a Prophet: (1) What is the 
first portent of the Hour? (2) What will be the first meal taken by the 
people of Paradise? (3) Why does a child resemble its father, and why 
does it resemble its maternal uncle?” Allah’s messenger said: “Jibrael 
(Gabriel) has just now told me of their answers.” ʿAbdullah said: “He, from 
amongst all the angels, is the enemy of the Jews.” Allah’s Messenger said: 
“The first portent of the Hour will be a fire that will collect the people 
from the east to the west; the first meal of the people of Paradise will be 
extra lobe (caudate lobe) of fish-liver. As for the resemblance of the child 
to its parents: If a man has sexual intercourse with his wife and gets dis-
charge first, the child will resemble the father, and if the woman gets dis-
charge first, the child will resemble her. On that, ʿAbdullah bin Salam 
said: “I testify that you are the Messenger of Allah.” ʿAbdullah bin Salam 
further said: “O Allah’s Messenger! The Jews are liars, and if they should 
come to know about my conversion to Islam before you ask them (about 
me), they would tell a lie about me.” The Jews came to Allah’s Messenger 
and ʿAbdullah went inside the house. Allah’s Messenger asked (the Jews) 
“What kind of man is ʿAbdullah bin Salam amongst you?” They replied, 
“He is the most learned person amongst us, and the best amongst us, and 
the son of the best amongst us.” Allah’s Messenger said: “What do you 
think if he embraces Islam?” The Jews said: “May Allah save him from it.” 
Then ʿAbdullah bin Salam came out in front of them saying, “I testify that 
La ilaha ill-Allah (none has the right to be worshipped but Allah) and 
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Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah.” Thereupon they said, “He is the 
most wicked among us, and the son of the most wicked among us,” and 
continued talking badly of him.33
A new element in this hadith is the enmity between the Jews and Jibrīl or 
Gabriel, the angel that functions as an important messenger of God and medi-
ator of God’s revelation in Islam and Christianity. Ibn Kathīr, who uses sto-
ries from the hadith collections many times to interpret the Qurʾan, uses this 
particular story to explain the meaning of the Qurʾanic verse: “Whoever is an 
enemy to Jibrīl, because he has brought it [the Qurʾan] down to your heart.”34 
Yet this new element serves to underline the common point in the two stories, 
which is the trustworthiness of ʿAbdallah ibn Salām in contrast to the moral 
depravity of most other Jews. ʿAbdallah ibn Salām is so noteworthy precisely 
because he represents an exceptional case of a trustworthy Jew who converts 
to Islam. This same point is made in an English translation of the Qurʾan pub-
lished by the same publishing house from Saudi Arabia, where the reference 
to ʿAbdallah ibn Salām is even translated into the text, with a footnote that 
gives the text just quoted from Bukhari.35 Hence, it is clear that in a traditional 
Islamic reading of the Qurʾan, ʿAbdallah ibn Salām is well known as one of 
the few Jews who converted to Islam because he believed in the prophethood 
of Muhammad. Consequently, according to another tradition, Ibn Salām is 
praised by Muhammad as one of the ‘men of paradise.’36
33 Quoted with some omissions from Summarized Sahîh Al-Bukhâri Arabic-English, 
translated by Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan (Riyadh: Darussalam, 1996/1417), no. 1400, 
658–59 (no. 4:546 in the original Sahîh Bukhâri). 
34 See Tafsir ibn Kathir, abridged, vol. I (Riyadh: Darussalam, 2003), 305, with reference to 
Qurʾan 2:97. 
35 In this translation, Qurʾan 5:66 goes as follows: “And if only they had acted according to 
the Taurāt (Torah), the Injīl (Gospel), and what has (now) been sent down to them from 
their Lord (the Qurʾān), they would surely, have gotten provision from above them and 
from underneath their feet. There are from among them people who are on the right 
course (i.e. they act on the Revelation and believe in Prophet Muhammad . . . as ʿAbdallah 
bin Salam . . .), but many of them do evil deeds.” Quoted from Dr. Muhammad Muhsin 
Khan and Dr. Muhammad Taqi-ud-Din Al-Hilali, Interpretation of the Meanings of the 
Noble Qur’ân in the English Language (Riyadh: Darussalam, 1996), 165–66. 
36 The tradition is in the collection by Muslim. For the reference, see Ronit Ricci, “A Jew on 
Java, a Model Malay Rabbi and a Tamil Torah Scholar: Representations of Abdullah Ibnu 
Salam in the Book of One Thousand Questions,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, series 
3/18 (2008): 481–95. 
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The importance of ʿAbdallah Ibn Salām for early Islamic apologetics comes 
into focus by a remark often repeated in early Muslim sources, namely, that 
Jews seldom convert to Islam while Christians convert—or, as Muslims 
would say, revert—to Islam more frequently. The traditionalist Ibn Kathir, for 
instance, explains in reference to Qurʾan 3:199: “There are, certainly, among the 
People of the Scripture, those who believe in Allah and in that which has been 
revealed to them, humbling themselves before Allah”: “These qualities exist 
in some of the Jews, but only a few of them. For instance, less than ten Jewish 
rabbis embraced the Islamic faith, such as ʿAbdullāh ibn Salām. Many among 
the Christians, on the other hand, embraced the Islamic faith.”37
Sometimes ʿAbdallah ibn Salām is mentioned by name with reference to 
places where the Qurʾan talks about some of the People of the Book who 
accepted the revelation brought to Muhammad. For instance, Al-Wāhidi, in his 
Asbāb al-Nuzūl (the traditional work on the “Occasions of the Revelations”), 
connects ʿAbdallah with the following verse: “Those unto whom We gave the 
Scripture recognize (this revelation) as they recognize their sons” (Qurʾan 
2:146). Furthermore, he states:
This was revealed about the believers of the People of the Book: ʿAbd 
Allah ibn Salam and his companions . . . Said ʿAbd Allah ibn Salam: ‘I knew 
Allah’s Messenger . . . better than I knew my son.’38
Other reports tell how ʿAbdallah still observed the customs of the Torah after 
becoming a Muslim, so that he is mentioned as an authority about a number 
of Jewish customs, the so-called Isra’iliyyāt.39
Because of Ibn Salām’s important function as one of the few people who 
connected the values, customs, and expectations of Judaism with the religion 
of Islam in a positive way, his name was associated with a much later literary 
tradition in which the questions he posed to Muhammad became the nucleus 
of an extended series of questions that were to show the truth of the Islamic 
37 Tafsīr ibn Kathir, abridged, II (Riyadh: Darussalam, 2003), 358. 
38 See Mokrane Guezzou, trans., Al-Wāhidī’s Asbāb al-Nuzūl, Great Commentaries on the 
Holy Qurʾan, vol. III (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2008), 18. 
39 Other places where ʿAbdallah is mentioned as one of the believers from the People of the 
Book are Qurʾan 3:113 and 4:136. See Al Wahidi, Asbāb al-Nuzūl, 56 and 88. For the tafsīr 
concerning Qurʾan 3:113 (“There are among the People of Scripture an upright community 
reciting God’s revelations through the watches of the night as they bow down”), see also 
Mahmoud Ayoub, The Qurʾan and Its Interpreters, vol. II: The House of ‘Imran (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1992), 296–300.
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faith in answer to Jewish (and other) questions of several kinds. This tradi-
tion developed in many forms,40 one of which was translated by Hermann of 
Dalmatia into Latin, the language in which Nicholas of Cusa came to read it in 
his copy of the Toledan Collection.
Hermann of Dalmatia’s Doctrina Mahumet describes how while in Medina, 
Muhammad is informed by Gabriel that a delegation of four Jewish religious 
leaders, led by ʿAbdia iben Salon’ (ʿAbdallah ibn Salām), is about to visit him.41 
Abdia explains that he has come to question Muhammad about things that 
are not clear in their Jewish faith. The first question is: “Are you a prophet 
(propheta) or a messenger (nuncius)?” Muhammad replies: “God has made 
me both a prophet and a messenger.” Next, Abdia asks: “Do you preach your 
law or the law of God (lex Dei)?” When Muhammad answers that he preaches 
the law of God, Abdia asks what this law is, and Muhammad answers: “Faith 
( fides).” When asked which faith, Muhammad responds with the two basic 
tenets of monotheism and resurrection of the dead. Abdia then asks: “How 
many laws of God are there?” Muhammad responds: “There is one law of 
God.” “But what about the prophets that have come before you?” asks Abdia, 
to which Muhammad replies: “The law or the faith of the prophets is one, but 
the rites of the different ones were of course different” (Lex quidem, siue fides, 
omnium una, sed ritus diuersorum nimirum diuersi). The discussion then goes 
on about whether people can attain paradise by faith, by certain beliefs, or by 
works (pro fide, aut credulitate, aut pro opere). This discussion in the Doctrina 
Mahumet comes close to the context and the terminology of Qurʾan 5:48 (surah 
al-Maʿida), which Nicholas of Cusa quoted at the beginning of his Cribratio 
Alkorani: God could have made us one community, but He has given us differ-
ent rites and customs in order for us to rival one another by doing good, and in 
the end God will pass judgment about the differences.
After this short discussion about these fundamental issues in Islamic the-
ology, the Latin text of the Doctrina Mahumet continues with a discussion 
of the book that Muhammad claims to have received from God, and then it 
goes on with a number of seemingly disconnected issues: questions about the 
meaning of numbers, about God’s creation of the heavenly bodies, and riddles 
such as “what woman came forth only from a man, and what man only from 
a woman?” What these seemingly disparate matters have in common is that 
regular human beings do not know the truth about them, but a true prophet 
40 See Pijper, Het boek der duizend vragen, and Ricci, “A Jew on Java.” 
41 In the following paragraph, English paraphrases are mine; the Latin words are from the 
Bibliander edition on the internet, http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k114531g/f214.
image; see footnote 21), fol. 189–190.
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would know how to answer the questions and riddles. Since Muhammad suc-
ceeds in responding to Abdia’s challenges, the Jewish delegation accepts that 
he is a true prophet and consequently converts to Islam. This means that the 
remark about the one law of faith and the diversity of rites also functions in the 
context of what we may call Islamic ‘prophetology,’ which has always been one 
of the foremost issues in dialogues and apologetics between Muslims and Jews, 
for instance in the Kuzari by Judah Halevi.42
In order to find out what the phrase in Islamic theology was that Hermann 
of Dalmatia translated as ‘Lex quidem, siue fides, omnium una, sed ritus diuer-
sorum nimirum diuersi,’ it would be nice if one could go back to the Arabic text 
of the Masā’il. Unfortunately, though, the history of the genre of apologetic 
‘questions’ is very complicated, and so we do not possess any original form 
of the text or any critical edition.43 I have been able to read one version of an 
Arabic text attributed to Ibn Salām on the Internet, which represents a much 
later adaptation of the text and reflects a stricter form of Islamic apologetics 
than the text translated by Hermann of Dalmatia. However, one may assume 
that the basic concepts have been preserved, even if the theological context 
in this Arabic version represents a later development.
When going back to the Arabic roots of the Latin phrase about the one lex 
or fides and the diversity of ritus, one will find that it matches perfectly with 
Islamic prophetology: Muslims believe in a plurality of prophets and scrip-
tures, because God has revealed God’s guidance at different times to different 
nations that each have their own rites. Yet, at the same time, there is only one 
true faith, which is—in accordance with the apologetic style of this Arabic 
adaptation—immediately identified with the religion of Islam. In answer to 
ʿAbdallah Ibn Salām’s question about the message that he brings as prophet and 
messenger, we find Muhammad saying, according to the Arabic text:44 “There 
is one dīn”—a word that is usually translated as ‘religion,’ but ‘Law’ is possible 
as well because the word refers to the ‘Law of God.’ In medieval Latin, the word 
lex is often used where modern readers would expect ‘religion.’45 Muhammad 
42 See the introductory remarks by Barbara Roggema, Marcel Poorthuis, and Pim Valkenberg 
in The Three Rings: Textual Studies in the Historical Trialogue of Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam (Leuven: Peeters, 2005).
43 See Kritzeck, Peter the Venerable and Islam, 89.
44 I quote a contemporary Arabic version on the Internet, which represents a more 
advanced stage of Islamic theology, as most Arabic text versions do (see Pijper, Het boek 
der duizend vragen, 39.) The text quoted can be found on: cb.rayaheen.net/showthread.
php?tid=27739.
45 I want to thank Dr. Thomas Burman for bringing this to my attention during the 
conference of the American Cusanus Society in Gettysburg, October 2012. The very title 
of Hermann of Dalmatia’s translation, Lex sive doctrina Mahumeti, is a case in point. 
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continues: “The religion of the prophets was the pure religion of God, the reli-
gion of His angels, and the religion of Islam.”46 When ʿAbdallah ibn Salām then 
asks how many religions (or Laws) of God there are, Muhammad answers: “One 
religion, and that is Islam.”47 In this later adaptation of the text, the word islām 
in Arabic is interpreted as referring to the institutionalized religion of Islam 
rather than to an attitude of faith, of submitting (or rather, aligning) oneself to 
God’s will and guidance. But in older text versions of the Masā’il, the attitude 
of faith might be the subject under discussion, since the text makes the famous 
distinction between islām as the enacting of the five pillars, and imān (belief) 
as holding the six basic tenets of the faith.48
After this discussion, Abdallah wants to know how many paths or ways 
there are—the question ‘how many?’ refers back to similar questions concern-
ing the number of prophets. He uses the Arabic word shirʿah, which literally 
refers to a path to the water well, which is essential for survival in the desert—
the word shariʿah is derived from the same root.49 Muhammad answers: “There 
were different paths (or laws) with the peoples of the past.”50 So we have two 
words, dīn and shirʿah, that can both be translated as ‘law,’ and it is precisely this 
ambiguity that defines the issue at hand between Abdallah and Muhammad. 
It creates a tension that is germane to Islamic theology: there are many cus-
tomary laws (plural: sharāʿi), while at the same time there is only one Law of 
God. Again, in the context of Jewish-Muslim dialogue one is reminded of the 
role of Jewish halakhah, the ‘way to walk’ and enact the Torah of God.
The theology in this Arabic text is clearly not pluralist, as it immediately 
identifies the one religion or dīn of the prophets with the established religion 
of Islam. However, one can still recognize the Qurʾanic theology of religions 
from surah al-Maʿida (5:48) here, in the verse that gave Nicholas of Cusa occa-
sion to make his remark about fides una, ritus diversus in his Cribratio Alkorani: 
“If God had willed, He could have made you one community, but He has given 
each of you a law and a way,51 and He will judge about the differences on the 
day of the resurrection.” So, fides una, ritus diversus is a translation of dīn 
wāhid, sharā’i‘ (or manāhij) mukhtalifa: there is one religion revealed by God, 
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48 This distinction goes back to the famous “hadith of Gabriel” quoted by Muslim and 
Bukhari in the “book of faith” in their hadith collections. The famous book by Sachiko 
Murata and William C. Chittick, The Vision of Islam (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 1994) is 
built around the distinction between islam, iman and ihsan according to this hadith. 
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51 Murata and Chittick, The Vision of Islam, 133, translate: “We have appointed a right way 
and an open road.” 
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but there are different ways or customs or rites in which this religion is enacted 
by the different peoples.52 In Nicholas of Cusa’s De pace fidei, this ambiguity of 
the notion of Law (dīn in the singular, or sharā’i‘ in the plural) translates into an 
ambiguity in the notion of religion (lex / fides / cultus / religio in the singular; 
ritus / religiones in the plural). This translation is possible, however, because 
both in the Qurʾanic theology of religions and in Cusanus’s Christian theology 
of religions, there is an identity-in-tension between the one proper religion 
willed by God as the ultimate destination of humankind, and the diversity of 
religions willed by God as a way to learn from one another and to reach peace 
and harmony between religions, which is the horizon of the eschatological 
vision in De pace fidei.
52 Michel Cuypers, The Banquet: A Reading of the Fifth Sura of the Qurʾan (Miami, Fl: 
Convivium, 2009), 242 remarks that the word minhaj (‘path’) in 5:48 “in its technical 
meaning of ‘religious custom,’ way of life, is borrowed from rabbinical language.” The 
same is true for the entire Masā’il: Muhammad responds to Jewish questions about 
religion and laws. 
Divine Difference and Religious Unity:  
On the Relation Between De Docta Ignorantia,  
De Pace Fidei and Cribratio Alkorani
Knut Alfsvåg
Nicholas Cusanus is commonly known as a promoter of religious dialogue and 
tolerance. His phrase ‘religio una in rituum varietate’ is often quoted1 and inter-
preted as an anticipation of a goal of peaceful coexistence,2 which certainly 
is not realized, but has become even more important now than it was five 
hundred years ago when Cusanus wrote De pace fidei, his book on the peace-
ful unity of different faiths. This is not to say that it was unimportant then. 
Cusanus wrote the book from which the aforementioned quotation is taken 
within a few months of receiving the news of the Muslim Turks’ conquest of 
Constantinople, a conquest that meant the end of a Christian empire with a 
history of more than a thousand years, and within whose borders were, or had 
been, the historical sites of the origins of the Christian faith.3 Furthermore, 
with news of the conquest there followed the all-too-common stories of perse-
cution and violence. If we think that the relationship between Christians and 
Muslims is difficult today, we probably cannot even begin to understand the 
 
1 The quotation is from De pace fidei I, 6. For the Latin text of this work, see Nicolaus Cusanus, 
Opera omnia, ed. Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. VII (Hamburg: Meiner, 
1932ff). All Cusanus citations will be to the Opera omnia by title, book (where applicable), 
chapter, and paragraph number. For Jasper Hopkins’ useful English translations of Cusanus’s 
works, see Nicholas of Cusa, English translations, accessed 30 April, 2012, http://jasper- 
hopkins.info/.
2 See, e.g., David J. Bosch, Transforming mission: Paradigm shifts in theology of mission 
(Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1991), 475. The story of the loss of interest in Cusanus’s 
work and the rediscovery of its significance by Lessing is told in Raymond Klibansky, “Die 
Wirkungsgeschichte des Dialogs De pace fidei,” in Der Friede unter die Religionen nach 
Nikolaus von Kues, ed. Rudolf Haubst, Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-
Geselleschaft 16 (1984): 113–125; cited hereafter as Friede unter der Religionen.
3 For an overview of the historical context of Cusanus’s works on religious dialogue, see 
James E. Biechler, “Interreligious Dialogue,” in Introducing Nicholas of Cusa: A Guide to a 
Renaissance Man, ed. Christopher M. Bellitto, Thomas M. Izbicki, and Gerald Christianson 
(New York: Paulist Press, 2004), 270–296.
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feeling of catastrophe that filled the Christians when they heard the news of 
the fall of Constantinople. They had fought for centuries to avoid this outcome, 
and now it was the new reality with which they had to cope. What to do now? 
Was there anything to do beyond calling for a new crusade, thus attempting to 
reverse the apparently unavoidable process of history?4
There was, however, an alternative, a peaceful approach, and Cusanus is 
among its best-known proponents. He was an unlikely candidate though,5 as 
he represented the only remaining politically powerful Christian institution in 
Western Europe: the Catholic Church. As one of its cardinals, he had a vested 
interested in maintaining its integrity and position as a power player on the 
international scene, and as an expert of church law and administration, he 
was well aware of the significance of the ongoing power struggle between 
the Christian and Muslim empires. Although he had a broader intellectual ori-
entation than many of his contemporaries, it was still one-sidedly Christian, 
though it did include a familiarity with the tradition of the Eastern Church, 
which must have let him feel the anguish of what happened in Constantinople 
to an even greater extent than most.6 Still, he seems to have been opposed to 
the idea of a new crusade, and advocated instead for a peaceful approach to 
the problem of religious plurality, an approach that emphasized the need for 
informed dialogue and discussion, with the explicit goal of promoting under-
standing and unity among the adherents of different religions.
Why did Cardinal Nicholas choose this approach? What was it in his intel-
lectual history that led him along this alternative path? Was it possible for him 
to promote religious tolerance and dialogue without compromising his posi-
tion as a representative of the Christian church? Moreover, was he consistent 
in maintaining his position, and thus presumably representing a theological 
and philosophical approach to the problem of religious diversity that could 
be of interest even in a contemporary perspective? Or do his writings reveal 
compromises and adjustments that make his approach appear more as a hap-
hazard collection of incoherent ad hoc statements? The problem of religious 
4 This is what Pope Nicholas V did; see Biechler, “Interreligious Dialogue,” 281.
5 For introductions to Cusanus’s biography, see Donald F. Duclow, “Life and Works,” in 
Introducing Nicholas of Cusa: A Guide to a Renaissance Man, ed. Christopher M. Bellitto, 
Thomas M. Izbicki, and Gerald Christianson (New York: Paulist Press, 2004), 25–56; Erich 
Meuthen, Nicholas of Cusa: A Sketch for a Biography (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University 
of America Press, 2010).
6 This personal background for Cusanus’s work with the unity of religions is emphasized in 
M. de Gandillac, “Das Ziel der una religio in varietate rerum,” in Friede unter die Religionen, 
192–204, especially 193.
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pluralism has not left us, and neither has the danger of it being exploited by 
violent extremists of differing persuasions.7 Thus, the question begs to be 
asked: could the fifteenth-century cardinal have something to say that is still 
worth exploring by us today, in the twenty-first century?
I will try to answer these questions by first presenting the approach to 
the problem of religious pluralism that is found in Cusanus’s first impor-
tant theological and philosophical work, De docta ignorantia,8 written 
more than ten years before the fall of Constantinople. Next, I will investigate 
how far this approach informs what is probably his best-known work in this area, 
De pace fidei (1453). Finally, I will look at Cribratio Alkorani, a considerably more 
detailed investigation of Islam that Cusanus wrote in 1461.9 This will hopefully 
give us an overview of the basic elements of Cusanus’s understanding of reli-
gion, and will consequently allow for a conclusion concerning how far these 
elements remained constant throughout Cusanus’s career.
 The Presence of the Infinite as Christian Theology
The starting point of Cusanus’s philosophy of religion is the close connection 
he finds between God and the idea of infinity.10 This has two immediate conse-
quences that orient all he has to say on God and on God’s relation to the world. 
Firstly, there can only be one infinity, since to be counted, entities must be lim-
ited in relation to each other and thus cannot be infinite. Hence, there can only 
be one infinite God, and accordingly, monotheism is established as the only 
appropriate kind of theology. Secondly, there is no proportionality between 
the finite and the infinite; thus, relations that presuppose proportionality (and 
for Cusanus that includes both purpose and causality) are from the outset dis-
abled as possible avenues of thought in exploring the relation between God 
and the world. Therefore, God cannot be considered either as the end or the 
7 While I am writing this, we have in Norway commemorated the anniversary of the 
massacre in Oslo and at Utøya in July 2011, when 77 persons were murdered as a protest 
against the allegedly devastating influence of Islam on Christian Europe.
8 Cusanus, Opera omnia, vol. I. Another useful edition is Nicolaus Cusanus, Philosophisch-
theologische Werke, 4 vols. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2002), vol. 1 (Latin text with 
German translation).
9 Cusanus, Opera omnia, vol. VIII.
10 For a more extensive presentation of the thought world of De docta ignorantia and the 
relevant research, see Knut Alfsvåg, What No Mind Has Conceived: An Investigation of 
the Significance of Christological Apophaticism (Leuven-Paris-Walpole: Peeters, 2010), 
126–146.
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cause of worldly events, in analogy with the relationships between finite phe-
nomena; ergo, the teleological and cosmological proofs of God’s existence fail.
Cusanus therefore finds participation to be the only possible concept that 
lets one explore the relation between God and the world in a way that lets both 
maintain their integrity. Thus, the finite participates in infinity by having its 
very finitude defined by infinity, which neither conflates the two nor reduces 
one to the other.11 Infinity is therefore present in the finite world as that which 
determines its finitude, and the finite manifests its finitude through participa-
tion in the infinite.
This is an approach that in Cusanus’s view is easily aligned with biblical 
monotheism.12 But he is also open to the possibility that this understanding 
of the infinite as present within, but not reducible to, finite phenomena might 
also be found within pagan religions. Admittedly, pagans tend to conflate divin-
ity with its manifestations, thus committing the sin of idolatry by worshipping 
finite phenomena as divine, instead of considering them as transparent to but 
never identical with infinity. But they do not necessarily do so.13 Cusanus thus 
upholds the philosophical and biblical criteria for distinguishing between idol-
atry and true worship, but without insisting that idolatry is a sin that all pagans 
necessarily commit.
There are reasons, though, for the traditional identification of paganism 
with idolatry, and in Cusanus’s view, the main reason is that the two central 
Christian doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation make the Christian faith unique 
precisely in the way it understands the relation between God and the world. 
All phenomena in the finite world are characterized by alterity (or otherness) 
and inequality; if not, they cannot be explored as finite phenomena. But one-
ness logically precedes alterity, and is ipso facto eternal. In the same way, equal-
ity also manifests eternity by preceding all inequality. Oneness, equality, and 
their union are thus all eternal and manifest the same infinity. God is therefore 
not only present in finitude; he is also present as the triune identity of oneness, 
equality, and union.14
11 E.g., a finite line participates in the indivisibility of an infinite line by not being divisible 
beyond the point where it no longer is a line; De docta ignorantia I, 17, 47.
12 Due to the Hegelian influence on twentieth century theology, this conflation of biblical 
monotheism and the simplicity of apophatic infinity has been heavily contested. For a 
contemporary defense of a perspective closely related to Cusanus’s, see David Bentley 
Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth (Grand Rapids, MI: 
W. B. Eerdmans, 2003).
13 De docta ignorantia I, 25, 84.
14 De docta ignorantia I, 7, 10.
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This exploration of Augustinian Trinitarianism as modified by the school 
of Chartres15 may sound abstract and speculative, but the point Cusanus is 
trying to make is valid, given the idea of infinity as his philosophical point of 
orientation. Alterity and inequality are basic phenomena in the finite world in 
the sense that they are presupposed in the investigation of all other phenom-
ena, in other words, things and concepts can only differ by being different. As 
transparent to infinity, phenomena manifest infinity in two different ways that 
are each equally transparent to the same infinity. The infinite can thus only be 
present in the finite through the identity of difference.
With these arguments, Cusanus succeeds in integrating divine oneness and 
threeness so that, without succumbing to modalism, he avoids the critique 
leveled against Peter Lombard for emphasizing God’s unity to the extent that 
it acts as a fourth element besides the three persons.16 The only consistent 
alternatives17 to the Trinitarian approach Cusanus advocates here are either 
a severing of the relation between God and the world (resulting either in a 
sharply dualist or a one-sidedly atheist worldview), or their conflation, leading 
to idolatry or pantheism. From Cusanus’s point of view, these options may be 
flip sides of the same coin. God may be inexplorable in his infinite inexplica-
bility; in his relation with the world, however, God can only be consistently 
approached as triune.
Whereas the doctrine of the Trinity presents a non-idolatrous understand-
ing of finite participation in the infinite as a logical necessity, the doctrine of 
the Incarnation presents it as a temporal reality. As a thought experiment, 
however, it is possible to develop a Chalcedonian Christology of the hypostatic 
union of the divine and human in Christ without separation or conflation, 
and in the beginning of Book III of De docta ignorantia, this is exactly what 
Cusanus does.18 Nevertheless, the Gospel story insists that this hypothetical 
union is actually realized,19 where the full realization of the participation of 
15 See Bernard McGinn, The Harvest of Mysticism in Medieval Germany (1300–1500), The 
Presence of God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism, vol. 4 (New York: Crossroad, 
2005), 470–475.
16 See, e.g., Martin Anton Schmidt, “Dogma und Lehre im Abendland II: Die Zeit der 
Scholastik,” in Handbuch der Dogmen- und Theologiegeschichte, ed. Carl Andresen, vol. 1 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), 567–754, 609–610.
17 The question whether the Orthodox approach to the Trinity as origin, birth, and procession 
is to be considered as an alternative to the modified Augustinian approach maintained by 
Cusanus, is beyond the scope of the present investigation. Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, 
tries to combine them.
18 De docta ignorantia III, 1–3.
19 De docta ignorantia III, 4.
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finite createdness in infinity is given with the perichoretic unity of God and 
human in Christ. Accordingly, Book III of De docta ignorantia is an exploration 
of faith, unfolded with an appropriation of the doctrine of the Incarnation as 
the key to understanding the relation between God and the world.20
The worldview explored in De docta ignorantia is Christian at its core and 
unlimited in its scope. Cusanus’s starting point is the exploration of the philo-
sophical concepts of finitude and infinity. But he insists that the participation of 
the finite in the infinite (without which the world either falls apart in disparate 
fragmentation or merges into undifferentiated fuzziness) can only be upheld 
through strict adherence to the Chalcedonian emphasis on the immutability 
and inseparability of the two natures of Christ. Here we see an intriguing—
possibly even provocative—insistence on the necessity of a Christ-centered 
exploration of the world, even within a philosophical context. Given Cusanus’s 
basic presuppositions, though, his position can hardly be seen as inconsistent.
 Trinitarian Christological Monotheism as Theology of Religion
How, then, does Cusanus apply his Christologically informed dialectic of fini-
tude and infinity to the problem of religious pluralism? In response to this 
question, we will see that he does this basically by repeating and extending 
the approach of De docta ignorantia, seemingly without finding it necessary to 
undertake any major shifts in the positions maintained within the work.
In De pace fidei, Christian faith is taken for granted as the point of orien-
tation, in the sense that from the outset, the Incarnation is seen as what ena-
bles the ordering of human existence toward its divine origin.21 The means by 
which religions can be reduced to a harmonious unity is thus, on the one hand, 
through an exploration of the extent to which elements from the doctrines 
of the Trinity and Incarnation can be accepted within the other religions, and 
on the other hand, through an investigation of how far one can go in accepting 
the variety of religious rites from the perspective of Christian worship. A num-
ber of wise figures from different religions and traditions are therefore sum-
moned to the heavenly throne, in order to discuss and to be instructed in how 
to realize this inherent unity within the apparent plurality of world religions.22
20 For references to literature discussing the centrality of Christology in the thought of 
Cusanus, see Alfsvåg, What No Mind Has Conceived, 127–128.
21 De pace fidei II, 7.
22 De pace fidei III, 9.
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Monotheism is the obvious presupposition of this approach: All true 
believers seek the one God, as there is no other to be sought.23 The problem 
of polytheism is therefore the first to be dealt with, and this is easily done, as 
Cusanus claims that even polytheists maintain the oneness of the concept of 
deity, common to all deities.24 Thus, in the council of the wise (as it is called in 
the book), both the monotheist Arab Muslim25 and the presumably polytheist 
Indian26 accept this solution.
The doctrine of the Trinity presents a larger—though still not insurmount-
able—hurdle. To address this, Cusanus simply reiterates the doctrine of the 
Trinity from De docta ignorantia, again emphasizing how the ineffability of 
divine infinity informs the Trinitarian structure of God’s work as Creator,27 
and presenting Christ as the manifestation of the equality through which God 
establishes the difference of the world.28 Muslim and Jewish critiques of the 
Trinity are interpreted as the consequence of an obviously misguided idea of 
a plurality of gods, whereas everyone in the heavenly council agrees that to 
reject the Trinity as it is here explained would be to isolate God and creation 
from one another, thus nullifying the idea of divine fecundity and creativity. 
Understandably, the latter is a position nobody wants to defend.29
Having thus established that all the wise have reached a common under-
standing of the Trinity,30 the investigation proceeds to Christology,31 and the 
discussion shifts towards the question of whether one can maintain the idea 
of human nature participating in God, though without compromising God’s 
oneness. The apostle Peter, who at this point in the discussion is the one rep-
resenting Cusanus’s position, argues that one cannot distinguish between the 
23 De pace fidei I, 5.
24 For a discussion of this argument in the context of Cusanus’s thought, see Klaus Kremer, 
“Die Hinführung (Manducatio) von Polytheisten zum einen, von Juden und Muslimen 
zum dreienen Gott,” in Friede unter die Religionen, 126–159, 127–136.
25 De pace fidei VI, 17.
26 De pace fidei VII, 20.
27 De pace fidei VII, 21. Kremer (“Hinführung von Polytheisten, Juden und Muslimen,” 143–
146) explores how, in spite of this emphasis on unity, the distinction between the persons 
is sufficiently treated. For a discussion of Cusanus’s doctrine of the Trinity in De pace fidei 
and Cribratio Alkorani and its historical provenance, see also Walter Andreas Euler, Unitas 
et Pax: Religionsvergleich bei Raimundus Lullus und Nikolaus von Kues (Würzburg: Echter 
Verlag, 1990), 161–170.
28 De pace fidei VIII, 24.
29 De pace fidei VIII, 24–IX, 26.
30 De pace fidei X, 27.
31 For a discussion of this part of the work, see Euler, Unitas et Pax, 171–183.
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nature of maximally realized wisdom at its source and in its manifestation, 
and that the Nicene doctrine of consubstantiality must therefore be upheld.32 
This is a doctrine that even the Muslim Persian accepts can be taught without 
hurting the doctrine of God’s oneness.33 The Jews may still disagree, Cusanus 
admits, but since they are few and unarmed, it does not present much of a 
problem.34 Furthermore, insofar as humans have a hope of immortality, 
they in fact all presuppose the possibility of a union between the divine and 
human, since only through participation in divinity can humans be carried 
across the divide of death. Christ demonstrates the realization of this union 
through his resurrection, which in reality is presupposed by all who hope for 
immortality.35 Hence, Christology is the fulfillment of the hope of all religions, 
not their rejection.36
32 De pace fidei XII, 37–38. The idea of having the fisherman from Galilee arguing 
the finer points of Nicene Christology may strike a modern reader as somewhat 
counterintuitive. By seeing in Cusanus’s Christological argument nothing but “laborious 
and contrived . . . convolutions” (Biechler, “Interreligious Dialogue,” 277), however, one 
just declares one’s lack of willingness and/or ability to engage with the central elements 
of Christian thought with anything even remotely close to the seriousness Cusanus 
brings to the question. As documented in Rudolf Haubst, “Die Wege der christologischen 
manuductio,” in Friede unter den Religionen, 164–191, 172, both the Qurʾan and contemporary 
Muslims may express a view of Christ considerably closer to Cusanus’s.
33 De pace fidei XII, 39. By letting a Persian represent Islam here, Cusanus may be thinking of, 
and speaking to, the alleged Nestorian influence on Mohammad; see Haubst, “Wege der 
christologischen manuductio,” 167–168; Euler, Unitas et Pax, 171. Historically, Mohammad’s 
rejection of Christ’s divinity is hardly due to Nestorian influence; as maintained by 
Siegfried Raeder, Der Islam und das Christentum: Eine historische und theologische 
Einführung (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2001), 28, the tendency toward a kind of 
Pelagianism among Syrian monks may be a more likely candidate.
34 De pace fidei XII, 41. Cusanus employs here a strangely pragmatic argument that differs 
substantially from the otherwise very principled discussion in the rest of the book; one 
may therefore, as Biechler suggests (“Interreligious Dialogue,” 278), speak of a certain 
‘anti-Jewish bias’ at work here.
35 De pace fidei XIII. As Euler emphasizes (Unitas et Pax, 175–176), Cusanus defends here the 
necessity of the incarnation without any reference to the doctrine of original sin.
36 As maintained by Gandillac (“Das Ziel der una religio,” 210), Cusanus thus finds the unity 
of religions in “die Bejahung der Heiligsten Dreifaltigkeit und des erlösenden Selbstopfers 
des fleischgewordenen Gottlichen Wortes.” Euler (Unitas et Pax, 180) emphasizes that this 
leads to a correlation between Christology and anthropology that may remind a modern 
reader of the work of Karl Rahner.
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The Muslims represent an additional problem in that they do not accept the 
death of Christ on the cross.37 Cusanus handles this problem in the same way 
he handles the objection against the doctrine of the Trinity: it is commend-
able as an expression of respect for Christ’s significance, but when Muslims 
understand that Christ’s death on the cross in fact enhances his glory, they will 
readily accept even the reality of his death.38 Furthermore, Cusanus employs 
allegorical interpretation to solve the fact that Muslims and Jews seem to 
expect a more sensual and temporal heavenly kingdom than the one expected 
by Christians; he argues, therefore, that the heavenly maidens of the Qurʾan 
should be understood ‘similitudinaliter,’ i.e., as parables.39
Having thus solved all doctrinal problems to the satisfaction of (almost) all 
the learned representatives of the different religions, Cusanus finally comes to 
the issue of the variety of rites. Here he finds inspiration in the New Testament 
emphasis on unity in spite of differences concerning the practice of the law,40 
and therefore tries to solve the problem by referring to the doctrine that 
informs the New Testament approach, namely, Paul’s message of justification 
by faith alone, as founded on the biblical faith in the one God.41 Salvation is 
therefore brought through faith in the divine promise.42 This faith is served 
by various signs, though these signs may change even if what they signify does 
37 For an extensive treatment of this problem within the contemporary context, see A. H. 
Mathias Zahniser, The Mission and Death of Jesus in Islam and Christianity (Maryknoll, 
N.Y.: Orbis Books, 2008). His main argument is that Jesus’ prediction of his death is hardly 
compatible with his voluntary escape from this destiny; this is an argument that should 
speak even to Muslims. His approach is thus methodologically quite close to Cusanus’s. 
38 De pace fidei XIV, 47–48.
39 De pace fidei XV, 51.
40 See Romans 14 and 1 Corinthians 8 and 10.
41 As emphasized, e.g., by Euler (Unitas et Pax, pp. 203–224) and Biechler (“Interreligious 
Dialogue,” 279), Cusanus approaches the problem of religious unity and diversity informed 
by his Neoplatonic emphasis on oneness, but the close relation he then finds for good 
reasons between his own approach and that of the Pauline link between monotheism 
and justification by faith (see Romans 3:30–31) is generally overlooked in the scholarship 
on Cusanus’s theology of religion. Albrecht Peters, “Zum christlichen Menschenbild: 
Freiheit, Erlösung und Rechtfertigung, Glaube und Werke,” in Friede unter die Religionen, 
214–242, 227–234, discusses Cusanus’s reception of the Pauline doctrine of justification by 
faith in De pace fidei, but more in the context of his anthropology than in relation to his 
theology of religion.
42 “Vis igitur quod sola fides illa iustificet ad perceptionem aeternae vitae?” is the question 
Paul is asked by his somewhat confused interlocutor, according to De pace fidei, to which 
his answer is affirmative (XVI, 58).
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not.43 As an example, Cusanus—still following in Paul’s footsteps—refers to 
the problem of circumcision (cf. Galatians 5:6). This rite does not necessarily 
lead to salvation, and should therefore be avoided; still, for the sake of peace, 
the majority may accept the differing practice of a minority, so long as it takes 
place within the framework of a mutual agreement.44
But are there, then, no necessary rites? A cardinal of the Catholic Church 
cannot be expected to treat the sacraments in quite the same way as Paul 
treats circumcision, thus Cusanus’s answer to this question is clearly affirma-
tive: there are necessary sacraments. Concerning the rites of everyday worship, 
however, he limits their number to two: Baptism and Eucharist. Admittedly, 
according to Cusanus it is faith that saves, not the sacrament.45 But by not 
making use of the sacraments, one shows oneself to be lacking in faith.46 The 
sacraments are therefore to be taken seriously,47 and his defense of them 
includes an attempt at making the doctrine of transubstantiation acceptable 
for a representative of the Bohemian opposition.48 Concerning the other sac-
raments, Cusanus argues that no conformity is necessary, with the exception 
that monogamous marriage and some form of priesthood are to be upheld. In 
other matters, all are entitled to maintain their respective ceremonies, as long 
as faith and peace are served.49
Cusanus’s attempt at solving the problem of ritual diversity through the 
doctrine of justification through faith alone gives his reflections in this part 
of De pace fidei an almost Lutheran flavor. Parts of his discussion thus read 
43 “Signa autem mutationem capiunt, non signatum.” De pace fidei XVI, 55.
44 De pace fidei XVI, 60. This is essentially a repetition of Paul’s argument in Galatians: 
Circumcision is acceptable as long as it is not considered necessary.
45 In this respect Cusanus, like Luther a few decades later, just follows Augustine; see Martin 
Luther, Luther’s works, ed. Helmut T. Lehmann and Jaroslav Pelikan, 55 vols. (St. Louis: 
Concordia, 1958–1967), vol. 32, 17.
46 “Fides est necessitatis in adultis, qui sine sacramento salvari possunt, quando assequi 
non poterunt. Ubi vero assequi possent, non possunt dici fideles, qui se tales esse per 
regenerationis sacramentum [baptismum] ostendere nolunt” (De pace fidei XVII, 62).
47 Cf. the summary of Cusanus’s view in Peter Casarella, “Sacraments,” in Introducing Nicholas 
of Cusa, 347–372, especially 347: “Cusanus’s Christ-centered mysticism . . . highlights 
rather than ignores their necessity.”
48 De pace fidei XVIII, 67–68. It is therefore hardly correct to say that Cusanus in De pace 
fidei “betrachtet . . . verehrungswürdige Gebräuche als Nebensache auf dem Gebiete 
der Sakramente” (Gandillac, “Das Ziel der una religio,” 204), or that Cusanus downplays 
unus cultus for a one-sided emphasis on una fides (Klibansky, according to the discussion 
recorded on 205 in the same volume).
49 De pace fidei XIX, 67.
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as an exposition of article seven in Confessio Augustana.50 There are two 
important differences though. Cusanus’s reflections are structured by a dual-
ist reception of the Augustinian res/signum dialectics that Luther, however, 
rejected;51 in this respect, Luther’s insistence on the reality of the sacramen-
tal manifestation of divine presence arguably maintains the perichoretic 
emphasis of Chalcedonian Christology more consistently than Cusanus and 
Augustine‘s perspectives. On the other hand, there is a breadth of scope in 
the Cusan approach that leaves all internally Christian applications of the rite 
problem behind; as there is only one God, all worship service is—willingly or 
unwillingly—related to him, and has to be evaluated as such.52
Cusanus may seem naive in his apparent optimism concerning the univer-
sal applicability of a Neoplatonic philosophy of religion and the Pauline doc-
trine of justification by faith alone, viewing them as closely related aspects of 
a unified approach to the problem of religious pluralism. After all, religions 
are not that easily reconciled. But naiveté may not be the appropriate descrip-
tion. Cusanus may well have been aware that De pace fidei could hardly expect 
immediate approval in all quarters.53 It is probably more appropriate to say that 
he was trying to work out the implications of the basic points of orientation 
constituting his own worldview. He had already come to the conclusion that 
one cannot reject the doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation without commit-
ting idolatry by destroying the possibility of developing a coherent doctrine of 
divine creativity. This argument is worked out in detail in De docta ignorantia, 
while in De pace fidei it is applied in a way that invites the adherents of other 
50 “And it is enough for the true unity of the Christian church to agree concerning the 
teaching of the gospel and the administration of the sacraments. It is not necessary that 
human traditions, rites, or ceremonies instituted by human beings be alike everywhere”; 
Robert Kolb and Timothy J. Wengert, eds., The Book of Concord (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress 
Press, 2000), 43.
51 As far as the word of God and the divinely instituted sacraments are concerned, there is in 
Luther’s view an identity between signum and signatum; see Alfsvåg, What No Mind Has 
Conceived, 227–228. But even Luther does not identify revelation and Bible to the extent 
that he questions the translatability of the latter in the way Muslims traditionally have 
done with the Qurʾan (Raeder, Der Islam und das Christentum, 211–212).
52 Luther would, however, basically agree, and one may read his exposition of the first 
commandment in the Large Catechism (Kolb and Wengert, eds., The Book of Concord, 
386–390) as an attempt at undertaking just such an evaluation.
53 According to Euler (Unitas et Pax, 223), Cusanus may have thought of this as an 
eschatological goal. Gandillac (“Das Ziel der una religio”) speaks of the utopian character 
of De pace fidei, carried by a hope for what “vom rein menschlichen Standpunkt aus als 
unerreichbar gelten muß” (204).
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religions to consider its merits.54 Given Cusanus’s basic presuppositions, this 
was probably the only way of doing it.
Thus, there are no major shifts in Cusanus’s thinking between De docta igno-
rantia and De pace fidei; there is a difference of emphasis, but not of content. 
The argument is expanded, however, in Cusanus’s exploration of the relevance 
of the Pauline argument concerning the link between monotheism and jus-
tification by faith. If God, as Cusanus argues in De docta ignorantia, is always 
present in finite phenomena as the condition of their being perceived as finite 
phenomena, all finite phenomena can therefore be seen as manifestations of 
the divine, so long as finitude and divinity are not conflated. Hence, the irre-
placeable phenomena explicitly singled out by divine revelation (the sacra-
ments) are respected. Cusanus may thus advocate (to a considerable extent) 
the possibility of a rituum varietas. However, he unabashedly emphasizes 
that the one criterion for their evaluation is the existence of the idea of the 
Creator’s presence within creation, which informs the Christian doctrines of 
Trinity and Incarnation, the absence of which Cusanus views as leading unfail-
ingly to the idolatry of a dualist spirit/matter reductionism. If God is not really 
present—and how can he be if the possibility of Incarnation is rejected?—
then all worship degenerates to idolatry. But once the specificity of the sacra-
ments is upheld and the centrality of the doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation 
is accepted as undisputable, one should then courageously explore the princi-
ple of ‘religio una in rituum varietate.’
 The Inconsistency of Alternative Religiosity as Critique of Islam
Although De pace fidei is in principle universal in its approach to the problem 
of religious plurality, the Abrahamic religions are still nevertheless the main 
frame of reference. Other religious traditions come into view insofar as the 
problem of polytheism is briefly considered, but beyond that the discussion 
is limited to problems related to Judaism, Islam, and different Christian tra-
54 This Christological foundation of Cusanus’s theology of religion is emphasized also by 
Euler (Unitas et Pax, 215), whereas in Wolfgang Heinemann, Einheit in Verschiedenheit: 
Das Konzept eines intellektuellen Religionsfriedens in der Schrift De pace fidei des Nikolaus 
von Kues (Altenburg: CIS-Verlag, 1987), the author—though clearly aware of it (138)—pays 
scant attention to it in his analysis of Cusanus’s theology of religion, thus coming to the 
conclusion that Cusanus considers religious pluralism as a necessity both for ontological 
and epistemological reasons (177–179).
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ditions. Still, the approach is somewhat general in the sense that not much 
attention is paid to the specific doctrines of the different religions.55
This is different, however, in Cusanus’s Cribratio Alkorani (“Sifting of the 
Qurʾan”), which, as the title suggests, discusses only the Qurʾan, the holy book 
of the most important alternative to the Christian faith at the time. But it is 
also not completely different, since Cusanus reads the Qurʾan as a book from 
within the Abrahamic tradition that shows considerable Christian influence 
in the way it treats the person of Christ and some of the Christian doctrines. 
Accordingly, Cusanus’s objective in Cribratio is to discover the truth of the 
Gospel in the Qurʾan, in spite of the fact that in his view, Mohammad was far 
removed from a correct understanding of it.56 Cusanus does this by showing 
that the Qurʾan maintains some Christian doctrines that are fairly unaltered, 
while those that criticize and reject other parts of the Christian faith are incon-
sistent and self-contradictory. One can certainly consider this a far cry from 
the peaceful approach demonstrated in De pace fidei.57 Arguably, however, the 
main difference is the greater realism of the Cribratio, as Cusanus here actually 
engages with Muslim theology and does not satisfy himself with lofty affirma-
tions of what all wise members of the heavenly council ought to agree on.
In Cusanus’s view, the Qurʾan is of course to be commended for its mon-
otheism.58 The problem is, however, that the Qurʾan understands the Trinity 
(the view of Christ as the Son of God) and Christ’s death on the cross as incom-
patible with true monotheism.59 Cusanus has a nuanced approach in response 
to these problems. Concerning the Trinity, he repeats the main points from De 
docta ignorantia and De pace fidei concerning the close relationship between 
the doctrines of Trinity and creation. In Cusanus’s view, it is impossible to 
reject the one without rejecting the other, and he remains convinced that he 
can make this point in a way that should be relevant for Muslims.60 Apart from 
the rationality of the Trinitarian doctrine, Cusanus points to the Qurʾan’s doc-
trine of the Spirit of God61 and its esteem for the New Testament (which clearly 
55 Cf. Euler, Unitas et Pax, 216: “Die Aussagen zu den dogmatisch-theologischen Gehalten 
der nichtchristlichen Religionen bleiben in De pace fidei äußerst vage.” 
56 Cribratio, I, 16: “in Alkorano reperiri evangelii veritatem, licet ipse Mahumetus 
remotissimus fuit a vero evangelii intellectu.”
57 See, e.g., Biechler, “Interreligious Dialogue,” 285.
58 Cribratio, I, 2.
59 Cribratio I, 3.
60 Cribratio II, 1–11.
61 Cribratio II, 11, 112.
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has a doctrine of the Trinity) as a holy book62 as arguments that should lead 
Muslims to accept a Trinitarian view of God.
The Qurʾan holds Christ in high esteem, considering him a man of God born 
by the Virgin Mary. Despite the fact that the Qurʾan denies Christ to be the 
Son of God, Cusanus tries to show that the Qurʾan does in fact consider Christ 
divine by describing him as the word sent from heaven who could perform 
miracles.63 Furthermore, the Qurʾan also accepts the Christian view that Christ 
is still alive.64 Hence, Cusanus considers the Muslim rejection of Christ’s death 
on the cross as an example of accommodation, since the Arabs at Mohammad’s 
time would not have been able to reconcile Christ’s exalted position with his 
lowly death on the cross.65 Again, basically following the argument of De pace 
fidei, Cusanus thus seems fairly confident that he can use the Qurʾan as a testi-
mony to Christ’s divinity.
What, then, is the reason that the Qurʾan both rejects and confirms the 
Trinity, as well as the divinity of Christ? Here Cusanus becomes somewhat 
more ambiguous, entertaining the view that Mohammad was both misguided66 
and willingly deceived others to maintain his own position.67 The outcome is 
that his message is unclear;68 consequently, Cusanus claims that the Qurʾan 
cannot be considered a book of God.69 In some of his critical passages, there-
62 Cribratio II, 11, 114. For a summary of this argument, see Euler, Unitas et Pax, 168.
63 Cribratio I, 12, 59. Cusanus’s reference is to Surah 3:45: “O Mary! Lo! Allah giveth thee glad 
tidings of a word from him, whose name is the Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary, illustrious in 
the world and the Hereafter, and one of those brought near (unto Allah)”; and to Surah 
3:49: “And will make him [Messiah] a messenger unto the Children of Israel, (saying): Lo! 
I come unto you with a sign from your Lord. Lo! I fashion for you out of clay the likeness of 
a bird, and I breathe into it and it is a bird, by Allah’s leave. I heal him who was born blind, 
and the leper, and I raise the dead, by Allah’s leave.” Cusanus used the Latin translations of 
the Qurʾan available to him, whose interpretations of the text are not always confirmed by 
modern translations. My quotations are taken from Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall, 
trans., Holy Qurʾan (Hyderabad: Mir Osman Ali Khan, 1976).
64 Cribratio II, 13, 121.
65 Cribratio II, 13, 124. Cusanus does not discuss the New Testament view that this skándalon 
is a necessary aspect of the Christian message; see 1 Corinthians 1:23.
66 Cribratio I, 1, 23. Cusanus is here following the traditional view that Mohammad was 
influenced by the Nestorian Sergius; see, e.g., Euler, Unitas et Pax, 157.
67 Cribratio III, 8.
68 Cribratio III, 2, 163; III, 9–10.
69 Cribratio I, 1. Cusanus states this in no ambiguous terms; it cannot be true that the Quran 
is from God, “cum illa in libro contineantur, quae ob suam turpitudinem iniustitiam 
et notorietatem mendacii et contradictionis deo sine blasphemia adscribi nequeant” 
(I, 1, 22).
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fore, Cusanus seems less interested in inviting Muslims into a reasonable dia-
logue, and instead clearly states what he as a Christian thinks of this book. 
Thus, it may well be the case that Cusanus is mainly writing to convince 
Christians who have converted to Islam.70 Still, Cusanus generally interprets 
the Qurʾan as a humanist scholar, taking the book seriously as it presents itself, 
namely, as a religious tract, written from within the Christian tradition to the 
extent that it refers to the Old and New Testaments, the prophets, and Christ as 
undisputable religious authorities. And, given his point of departure, Cusanus 
may very well be right in maintaining that the contradictions and ambiguities 
of the Qurʾan may be too many to neglect.
As a scholarly work, Cribratio Alkorani does not quite reach the level of De 
docta ignorantia and De pace fidei. It is somewhat haphazardly organized, 
and—apart from the obvious fact that it engages with Muslim positions con-
siderably more in detail than the former works—does not really advance the 
philosophical and theological arguments contained in the other two books. 
One may even argue that the Cribratio falls behind since it nowhere dis-
cusses the rites question. Cusanus does not say why it is left out, but perhaps 
the more detailed study of the doctrine and practice of Islam had made him 
doubt the feasibility of his earlier position. Except for the anti-Islamic rheto-
ric of Cribratio, it is still a work that recommends a peaceful approach to the 
problem of religious pluralism. It encourages religious leaders to relate to one 
another by means of argument and discussion, taking care not to let doctri-
nal differences disappear in a cloud of fuzzy benevolence. Compared to the 
somewhat high-minded declaration of a Christian-based unity of religions in 
De pace fidei, it is not at all clear whether this is to be considered a mistake.
 Cusanus’s Theology of Religion in a Contemporary Perspective
As demonstrated, Cusanus’s understanding of the finite world’s relation to the 
infinite informed his theology of religion. It made for a consistent and fruitful 
approach through which Cusanus sought to guide his contemporaries away 
from violence and toward a peaceful dialogue, aiming to establish a common 
point of reference for all religions without overlooking their obvious differ-
ences. A last question, however, remains to be asked: if Cusanus’s approach 
were to be extended into today’s debates, where would it take us?
70 This is the view of Biechler, “Interreligious Dialogue,” 285. Cusanus explicitly refers to this 
group in Cribratio I, 3, 28.
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In contemporary scholarship, the discussion concerning the evaluation of 
the relation between religions is usually structured according to four different 
models: Christological exclusivism, Christological inclusivism, universalism 
(also known as pluralism), and parallelism (or incompatibilism).71 Of these, 
universalism is obviously incompatible with Cusanus’s position. An under-
standing of all religions as equally valid approaches toward the Unknowable 
One is clearly far removed from Cusanus’s insistence on Christocentric 
Trinitarianism as indispensable for any rationally defensible approach to the 
question of religious pluralism.72 The one question to be asked from the Cusan 
perspective to the universalists is whether they can integrate the distinction 
between idolatrous and non-idolatrous worship into their approaches with 
the seriousness that all monotheist religions presuppose. If this question is 
answered in the negative, it seems quite difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
religious universalism is misguided.73
Furthermore, Christological exclusivism and inclusivism are not neces-
sarily opposites, since the question of how far one should go in looking for 
confirmation of an incarnational way of thinking within different religious 
traditions may have a variety of answers. Exactly where on this axis Cusanus 
should be positioned may well remain an open question.74 He is certainly not 
a narrow-minded exclusivist, but how far his inclusivism really extends is a 
difficult question to answer without becoming anachronistic. Today, we know 
71 For a summary of these positions, see Alister E. McGrath, Christian Theology: An Intro-
duction (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007), 457–463. Christological exclusivism maintains 
that Christ alone saves; Christological inclusivism agrees, but finds the saving Christ in 
a variety of religious contexts; pluralism or universalism maintains the basic equality 
of all religions, while parallelism or incompatibilism rejects the possibility of compar- 
ing them.
72 Heinemann, Einheit in Verschiedenheit (cf. note 54 above) reads universalism into Cusanus 
by systematically ignoring his Christological and Trinitarian emphases. As maintained by 
Thomas P. McTighe, “Nicholas of Cusa’s unity-metaphysics and the formula religio una in 
rituum varietate,” in Nicholas of Cusa In Search of God and Wisdom, ed. Gerald Christianson 
and Thomas M. Izbicki, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), 161–172, this would amount to seeing the 
differing religions as explicationes of the one true religion as their complicatio; this way 
of thinking, however, is contrary to what is maintained by scholars like Stallmach and 
Biechler, absent from De pace fidei. 
73 According to Clark H. Pinnock, A Wideness in God’s Mercy: The Finality of Jesus Christ in 
a World of Religions (Grand Rapids, Minn.: Zondervan, 1992), 70, universalism is founded 
on modernity’s rejection of the possibility of definite divine presence, which (pace 
Heinemann) is the very foundation of Cusanus’s theology of religion.
74 Euler, Unitas et Pax, 256–258 discusses this problem as “die Differenzierung zwischen 
exklusiver und inklusiver Absolutheit.”
65divine difference and religious unity
more about religions and the hermeneutical problems involved in interpret-
ing them, thus the question of what Cusanus’s position would have been if 
he had known as much as we do today rapidly dissolves into speculation and 
counterfactuality.
The question of the relation between Cusanus’s approach and that of incom-
patibilism remains an intriguing one. It does not allow for a direct answer, as 
the discussion of incompatibilism has been mostly informed by a discussion of 
the relationship between Christianity and Buddhism, and as there was hardly 
any engagement with Buddhism in the West before the nineteenth century, 
this is something entirely outside Cusanus’s horizon. Contemporary Buddhist 
philosophy of religion, however, has engaged with Cusanus and found his 
perspective fruitful and interesting.75 Before one concludes that the relation-
ship might have been mutual, we have to address how the Cusan emphasis on 
oneness relates to the possibility of its being manifest in incompatible ways. 
In spite of Cusanus’s emphasis on Christocentric Trinitarianism, he is suffi-
ciently informed by apophaticism to recognize clearly the unknowability of 
the infinite. Still, in Cusanus’s view, a religious or philosophical tradition that 
does not understand itself as the manifestation of the One cannot even hope 
to be taken seriously as a credible contender in the quest for truth.76 Is this 
approach at all compatible with the idea of the One being present in multiple 
and mutually incompatible instantiations? It is one thing to maintain the idea 
of the unknowability of the infinite; it may, however, be something quite dif-
ferent to entertain the possibility of the multiplicity of its simultaneous and 
incompatible manifestations.
Yet to relate Cusanus’s discussion of religious pluralism to the contem-
porary debate concerning the theology of religion may unduly limit its rele-
vance. Cusanus insists that the idea of an ineffable infinity is indispensable 
for the exploration of the world. This issues in an emphasis on the rational-
ity of a Trinitarian theology of creation that may still be relevant for current 
explorations of the relation between God and the world. Modern scholarly 
75 See Roger Corless, “Speaking of the unspeakable: Negation as the way in Nicholas of Cusa 
and Nágárjuna,” Buddhist-Christian Studies 2 (1982): 107–117. There is also some discussion 
of this perspective in relation to the Kyoto school in Alfsvåg, What No Mind Has Conceived, 
268–282.
76 Josef Stallmach, “Einheit der Religion—Friede unter den Religionen,” in Friede unter die 
Religionen, 61–81 is therefore correct in summarizing Cusanus the following way: “Es gibt 
eine Grundgestalt von Religion, einen Wesenskern, einen gemeinsamen Grundbestand 
aller Religionen—weil Gott einer ist” (66, italics in original). Cusanus differs from the 
universalists, though, by never applying this criterion positively to the differing religions; 
see McTighe, “Nicholas of Cusa’s unity-metaphysics,” 166.
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investigations of the world tend to proceed from a presupposition of its alleged 
independence from any kind of theological framework. From Cusanus’s point 
of view, however, this kind of secularized scientism is philosophically flawed. 
In his view, the possibility of giving a consistent definition to concepts like 
difference and unity (which are basic for all kinds of intellectual and scientific 
endeavors) is lost once the idea of infinity is abandoned and deemed philo-
sophically irrelevant. For Cusanus, scientism is a worldview that should be 
approached like other inherently religious worldviews.77 Moreover, the idea of 
its absoluteness can only be taken seriously to the extent that it appropriates 
the idea of the unknowability of the infinite.
On the other hand, much contemporary theology has interpreted the rela-
tion between God and the world in a way that tends toward letting the world 
appear as necessary for God to be God, the doctrine of creation thus becom-
ing more of a logical necessity than a free decision by the eternal One. For 
example, this perspective has informed much of the (Hegelian) insistence 
on the identity between the so-called immanent and economic Trinity.78 For 
Cusanus, however, God does not need the world in order to be God, and what 
he is and is not in his infinite unknowability is not for humans to know or 
guess. It is an indisputable fact that he has created the world and thus made his 
eternal Trinity manifest and knowable. But the creational and historical (i.e., 
economic) aspect of the doctrine of the Trinity is still limited in the sense that 
it can never totally inform our understanding of God in his immanence; in fact, 
we do not know anything about God beyond the relation he establishes with us 
through a decision that is entirely his own.79
For Cusanus, the idea that the unfolding of the Trinity in creation and salva-
tion should define God in the core of his divinity would imply a conflation of 
77 This does not imply the idea of an evaluation of the results of scientific research according 
to the standard of received religious Orthodoxy; it is, after all, Cusanus’s emphasis of the 
disproportionality of God and the world that informs his recommendation of experiment 
and observation that was to become the methodological foundation of modern science. 
What it does imply is that science, for the sake of its own integrity, is dependent on a 
theological framework for a consistent understanding of its own epistemological 
situation. Accordingly, John Henry, “Religion and the Scientific Revolution,” in The 
Cambridge companion to science and religion, ed. Peter Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 39–58 maintains that this is the world view within which the 
modern scientific revolution took place.
78 See, e.g., Peter C. Phan, “Systematic Issues in Trinitarian Theology,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to the Trinity, ed. Peter C. Phan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), 13–29, 16–18.
79 On this problem, see Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, 155–167.
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faith and understanding. From his perspective, all understanding—both sci-
entific and theological—starts with trust in the eternal One as irreplaceable 
and definitive, as there is no other way for God to remain divine and the world 
to remain worldly in its transparency for the infinite. This is an approach that 
might be as critically important today as it was when the cardinal wrote his 
treatises.
In this context, Islam for Cusanus appears ambiguous. It is informed by 
Christocentric Trinitarianism to the extent that all central elements of the 
Christian faith may be found in the Qurʾan. But in Cusanus’s view, this is partly 
obscured by the partially misguided attempts at accommodation and self- 
serving religiosity found in the Qurʾan. The honesty Cusanus shows in point-
ing this out is certainly to be recommended, since attempts at dialogue that 
do not take difference and disagreement into account lead nowhere. Whether 
this particular starting point is the most fruitful one is another question. We 
should, however, have no problems in recommending it as an alternative to 
discrimination, violence, and persecution.
Reading De pace fidei Christologically: Nicholas of 
Cusa’s Verbum Dialectic of Religious Concordance
Joshua Hollmann
In 2007, amidst the often polarizing tone of contemporary political and reli-
gious discourse regarding Islam and the West, various Muslim scholars from 
around the world jointly published A Common Word Between Us and You, an 
open and pacific letter addressed to Christian religious leaders worldwide.1 
The preface to the letter proposes that since Muslims and Christians com-
prise more than half of the world’s population, “[w]ithout peace and justice 
between these two religious communities, there can be no meaningful peace 
in the world,” after which it goes on to emphasize that “the future of the world 
depends on peace between Muslims and Christians.”2 The letter also observes 
that the source of this peace is found in the revealed sources of both religions,3 
for both the sacred texts of Christianity and Islam believe that God is one 
and affirm that followers of God should love their neighbours as themselves. 
In a similar vein, upon hearing the news of the fall of Constantinople to the 
Ottomans in 1453, the philosopher and prelate Nicholas of Cusa composed De 
pace fidei as a creative prayer for peace and a cogent plea for understanding the 




1 The text of the Letter is found in Miroslav Volf, Ghazi bin Muhammad and Melissa Yarrington, 
eds., A Common Word: Muslims and Christians on Loving God and Neighbor (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 28–50. 
2 A Common Word, 28.
3 A Common Word, 28–29.
4 While this event is also referred to as the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, for Cusanus 
and his Western Christian contemporaries this ominous occurrence marked more than 
merely a city’s fall, but a full-scale catastrophe filled with foreboding of the impending reli-
gious and political conflict now exploding along the eastern front of European Christendom. 
For a classic overview of the early to mid-fifteenth-century conflict between the Ottoman 
and Christian powers see Franz Babinger, Mehmed the Conqueror and his Time, ed. William C. 
Hickman, trans. Ralph Manheim (Princeton, NJ: Bollingen Series XCVI, Princeton University 
Press, 1978). 
© Joshua Hollmann, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004274761_007 
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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the source of peace between Christians and Muslims is found in the source 
of the cosmos: the Word and Wisdom of God, which the sacred texts of both 
Christianity and Islam affirm.5
Nicholas of Cusa’s religious dialogue De pace fidei unfolds his theological 
view that the common Word and Wisdom between Christians and Muslims 
is Christ. In this essay we will consider a sapiential and Christological reading 
of De pace fidei. By reading De pace fidei through a dialectical Wisdom-Word 
theological lens, Cusanus’s complex Christocentric universal and exclusiv-
ist approach to Islam will come into focus. Cusanus transmits the intrinsic 
tension between the exclusivity and inclusivity of orthodox Christology to 
address his understanding of the intricate relationship between Christianity 
and Islam. For Cusanus, the cosmic and incarnate Christ (the Verbum of God) 
forms the basis of an entire Christian philosophy to such a degree that the 
more he studies the cosmos, the more he sees Christ as the center of the coin-
cidence of opposites wherein the many rites coincide within one religion.6 In 
order to examine the centrality of Christ in De pace fidei, we will begin with 
the text itself and first read the dialogue theologically through the locus of the 
Logos, or the Word of God (Verbum). This close read will then unfold through 
a contextualization of the Logos-Verbum Christology of De pace fidei within 
the greater Western Christian tradition. Finally, we will conclude with con-
sidering what Cusanus’s philosophical and theological conversation on the 
Word and Wisdom of God might contribute to current dialogues between 
Christians and Muslims.
5 De pace fidei I, 1; h VII, ed. R. Klibansky and H. Bascour (1959); this edition incorporates 
Klibansky and Bascour’s earlier edition, Nicolai de Cusa De Pace Fidei cum Epistula ad 
Ioannem de Segobia, Medieval and Renaissance Studies Supplement III (London: Warburg 
Institute, 1956), 1–90. James E. Biechler and H. Lawrence Bond reproduce the Latin text of h 
with an English translation in Nicholas of Cusa on Interreligious Harmony: Text, Concordance 
and Translation of De Pace Fidei (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990). Unless otherwise 
noted, I shall cite Biechler and Bond for De pace fidei’s Latin text and English translation by 
chapter and paragraph number. Cribratio Alkorani (h VIII), alius prologus 15–16; I, 6, 42; I, 12, 
58; I, 14; De pace fidei VI, 16; IX, 26; X, 27; XIX, 68. 
6 F. Edward Cranz, “Saint Augustine and Nicholas of Cusa in the Tradition of Western Christian 
Thought,” Speculum 28 (1953): 297–315, especially p. 298. Reprinted in Cranz, Nicholas of Cusa 
and the Renaissance, ed. Thomas M. Izbicki and Gerald Christianson (Aldershot: Variorum, 
2000), 31–40.
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 Reading the Word and Wisdom of God in De pace fidei
In 1446 Cusanus wrote a brief and bizarre treatise on the end of the world: 
Coniectura de ultimis diebus.7 In the work, Cusanus surmises that the world will 
end sometime between 1700 and 1734.8 While today this seems eccentric, in the 
context of the fifteenth century, conjectures on the ensuing apocalypse were 
far from strange. Cusanus’s predictions are patterned on Augustine’s eight 
epochs found in the conclusion of the City of God and the pervasive apocalyp-
tic speculation of Joachim of Fiore.9 Fears of the impending end of the world 
would continue well after Cusanus with the likes of the Dominican Savonarola 
and the magisterial reformer Martin Luther, who was often depicted in his time 
as the prophetic second Elijah sent to proclaim the return of Christ.10 Cusanus 
also believed he lived in the latter days. Thus, in a letter to Jacob von Sirck from 
October 1453, after the fall of Constantinople, Cusanus writes: “I fear greatly 
that this violence may defeat us, for I see no possible uniting in resistance. 
I believe that we must address ourselves to God alone, though He will not hear 
us sinners.”11 In De pace fidei, Cusanus claims that his prayer, at least mystically 
and metaphysically, has been answered.12
What is worth noting is not the conjectured end of the world, but rather, why 
Cusanus even forges ahead with his speculation. After all, Jesus of Nazareth 
had warned that no one knows the hour of his coming, which implied the con-
demnation of those vain seers who attempted to wrest knowledge of the future 
away from God.13 According to Cusanus, however, one may only endeavor to 
know in this lifetime the incomprehensible truth, even though in this world 
7 Coniectura de ultimis diebus, in the Heidleberg Academy’s edition, Nicolai de Cusa opera 
omnia, vol. IV, Opuscula I, ed. P. Wilpert (1959) (Hamburg : Felix Meiner Verlag, 1932ff.). 
Hereafter this edition will be cited as “h” followed by volume number. 
8 Coniectura de ultimis diebus, 127.
9 Augustine, De civitate Dei XXII, 30. On Joachim and Savanarola, see Bernard McGinn, 
trans., Apocalyptic Spirituality: Treatises and Letters of Lactantius, Adso of Montier-en-Der, 
Joachim of Fiore, the Franciscan Spirituals, Savonarola (New York: Paulist Press, 1979). On 
Luther as Elijah of the last times, see Andrew Cunningham, Andrew Ole, and Peter Grell, 
eds., The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Religion, War, Famine and Death in Reformation 
Europe (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 23–25. 
10 For more on Cusanus and the end of the world, see Donald D. Sullivan, “Apocalypse 
Tamed: Cusanus and the Traditions of Late Medieval Prophecy,” Journal of Medieval 
History 9 (1983): 227–236.
11 Quoted in Karl Jaspers, Anselm and Nicholas of Cusa, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Ralph 
Manheim (New York: Harvest, 1966), 170.
12 De pace fidei I, 1.
13 Mark 13:32; Matthew 24:36.
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of conjectures, and echoing Augustine, we only know incomprehensible truth 
through symbolism that is infinitely distant from the truth itself.14 Or, as he 
says in his Apologia doctae ignorantiae, true theology remains hidden in sacred 
Scripture, the very Word of God.15 Therefore, Cusanus argues that he spec-
ulates because he claims to know only this Word of God, namely, the pre- 
incarnate Logos and the person of Christ.16 According to the dialogical 
structure of Cusanus’s tract on religious concordance, De pace fidei, it is in 
Christ that the metaphysical and the physical coincide. According to Cusanus, 
concordance is the principle by which there is harmony between the one and 
the many.17 De pace fidei identifies the Word of God as Logos and the incarnate 
interlocutor between the one (God) and the many (representatives of the reli-
gion of the world).18 Indeed, for Cusanus, Christ is the very wisdom of God.19 
Therefore, this Divine Word-Wisdom is the ground for speculating about 
time and eternity, as well as the basis and starting point for his conciliatory 
and complicated approach to Islam in De pace fidei and Cribratio Alkorani.20 
Furthermore, according to Cusanus, every human assertion on what is true is 
conjecture, yet when connected to Christ—the hypostatic union of God-Man, 
the infinite and finite, the very way and truth—these conjectures become 
closer to hidden wisdom.21 In De pace fidei and the prologue to the Cribratio 
Alkorani, this truth is none other than the Word and Wisdom of God, in whom 
all things are unfolded and from whom they are enfolded.22
In De pace fidei, Cusanus identifies Wisdom as the pre-incarnate Logos and 
the incarnate Christ through whom all things are unfolded and enfolded, and 
thereby knowable.23 Wisdom is therefore made known in the Word of God 
(Verbum). This Wisdom may be read in the reasonable order and symmetry of 
creation.24 In addition, this Wisdom became incarnate in Christ, who further 
and supremely reveals the concordance of ‘religio una in rituum varietate.’25 
Thus, in the Logos and in Christ, this Wisdom is recognizable and attainable 
14 Coniectura de ultimis diebus, 123. Cf., De pace fidei XVI, 55; Augustine, De doctrina 
Christiana, I, 4–5.
15 Apologia doctae ignorantiae (h II), 4.
16 Coniectura de ultimis diebus, 124.
17 De concordantia catholica (h XIV) I, 1, 4.
18 De pace fidei III, 8; IV, 10; X, 27.
19 Coniectura de ultimis diebus, 124; 1 Corinthians 2:2; Colossians 2:3.
20 De pace fidei III, 9; Cribratio Alkorani prologus, 8–10.
21 De Coniecturis (h III) I, prologus; De pace fidei II, 7; John 14:6.
22 De pace fidei II, 7; III, 8; Cribratio Alkorani prologus, 8–10; Idiota de sapientia (h V) I, 21–23.
23 De pace fidei II, 7; VI, 17. 
24 De pace fidei IX, 26.
25 De pace fidei I, 6.
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by Divine illumination, by grace. In De pace fidei, after Cusanus proposes that 
there remains an infinite gap between human and divine wisdom, he goes on 
to discuss how there is only one Christ, “in whom human nature is united with 
the divine nature in supposited unity.”26 In Christ, the divine intellect is united 
to the human intellect. However, in order to reassure Muslims, Cusanus affirms 
that in this union the unity of God is preserved. For Cusanus, not only are the 
Divine and human intellects united in the Word, but De pace fidei also holds 
that human nature is united with the divine nature in the incarnate Christ. 
He is, as Cusanus writes, “the face of all peoples and the highest Messiah and 
Christ, as the Arabs and Jews call Christ.”27 As the face of all peoples, Christ’s 
face is especially turned toward the great prophets of the ‘religio una in rituum 
varietate.’28 As demonstrated in the preface to Cusanus’s exposition on the 
Qurʾan, the Cribratio Alkorani, this includes the Prophet Mohammed.29 De 
pace fidei proposes a global Pentecost—a reversal of the confusion of Babel—
that entails the dialectical concordance of discordant religious languages in 
the one Word of God. The Wisdom and the Word, words and the Word, signs 
and that which is signified in everything: for the Word and Wisdom of God, 
according to Cusanus, flows through all ranks of being, and encompasses 
all things.30
Cusanus’s dialogue proper of De pace fidei begins with the Wisdom of God, 
which leads straightaway to the synonymous Word of God. From there, the 
complexities of unity and plurality and Trinity in unity are discussed, followed 
by an exposition of the tension between finite and infinite in the incarnation 
of the Word of God. Finally, resurrection, paradise, faith, tradition, and rites 
are explored. Together, these propositions or ‘storeys,’ from natural reason 
to divine revelation, further expand one by one the foundational element or 
building block of ‘religio una in rituum varietate.’31 What joins these levels of 
understanding together with peace is the Wisdom or Word of God. For it is the 
Word (Verbum) of God who builds, initiates, furthers, clarifies, and finally rati-
fies the religious discussion. It is, after all, the Word’s house of religious peace. 
Sapientia is unique and through it the cosmos came to be.32 Furthermore, 
towards the beginning of De pace fidei, sapientia is clearly identified as the 
26 De pace fidei XII, 39; trans. Biechler and Bond, p. 37.
27 De pace fidei XIII, 43: “in illo scilicet qui est facies omnium gentium et altissimus Messias 
est Christus, prout nominant Christum Arabes et Iudaei”; trans. Biechler and Bond, p. 40.
28 De pace fidei I, 6.
29 De pace fidei I, 6; Cribratio Alkorani, alius prologus, 13–15. 
30 De pace fidei II, 7; De concordantia catholica I, 2, 10.
31 De pace fidei I, 6.
32 De pace fidei IV, 11: “Non potest esse nisi una sapientia.”
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eternal and generating Word of God.33 And the cosmos is, after all—at least for 
Cusanus and his western Christian forbears and contemporaries—the created 
domain of the Word and Wisdom of God.34 Ultimately, the Cusan thesis ‘religio 
una in rituum varietate’ flows from the Wisdom and Word of God, and moves 
dialectically and hierarchically through the cosmos.35
According to Cusanus and his medieval predecessors, the world is created 
in Wisdom, by Wisdom, and for Wisdom. For Christians, this powerful Wisdom 
of God is further identified with the person and work of Jesus Christ (who, 
according to orthodox Christian doctrine, is in his twofold nature both Creator 
and creature).36 Thus, the cosmos is rational, and can (and should) be ‘read’ 
by the senses and deciphered in the mind and in the harmonious pursuit of 
being made wise unto the peace of faith.37 Cusanus posits that Divine Wisdom 
may be ‘read’ in the mind, although owing to the ignorance of sin, it is difficult 
although not impossible to decipher.38 As Book I of De docta ignorantia shows, 
the cosmos may be read in geometry and mathematics. It may also be read in 
33 De pace fidei V, 15: Sapientia igitur est aeternitas”; De pace fidei VI, 17: the Arab (as one 
well acquainted with wisdom in the Arab philosophical tradition) addresses the Word 
(Verbum), “Tu es sapientia, quia Verbum Dei.”
34 Cf., Augustine, Confessions, XII, xi; XII, xix. Augustine seeks the eternal house of God 
in the heavens of heavens. This house does not experience the vicissitudes of time. It 
is the abode of peace and harmony, the goal of the pilgrim. In De pace fidei, Cusanus 
sets his council in the heaven of reason and the court of God (i.e., the house of reason 
and house or domos of God, the place of religious peace and the goal of the pilgrim still 
struggling in a world torn apart by religious violence). In this heavenly house, the ‘Trinity’ 
of memory, understanding, and will is one (Cf., Augustine, De Trinitate X, iv). For the 
religious representatives of the world become one in peaceful accord (not only with each 
other, but also with angels and the Word of God and the saints). They understand ‘religio 
una in rituum varietate’ and remember what has transpired in the heaven or altitude of 
reason within (the mind’s road to God) in order to will it to become reality in the world 
without (senses) and below (earth). Their actions resemble and participate in the Trinity 
(by the economy of the Wisdom and Word of God) in memory, understanding, will, and 
the concord of God’s undivided peace. 
35 De pace fidei I, 6.
36 1 Corinthians 1:24. 
37 Cf., 2 Timothy 3:15. For Cusanus and St. Paul, Christ, the ultimate Word and Wisdom to 
whom Scripture testifies, makes seekers of truth and concord wise unto the peace of 
reconciliation with God and one another, and, hence, harmony between heaven and 
earth. 
38 De pace fidei I, 3: “excitatus admiratione eorum quae sensu attingit, posit aliquando 
ad te omnium creatorem oculos mentis attollere et tibe caritate summa reuniri, et sic 
demum ad ortum suum cum fructu redire.” De pace fidei I, 4: “Ex quo factum est, quod 
pauci ex omnibus tantum otii habent, ut propria utentes arbitrii libertate ad sui notitiam 
pergere queant.” Cf., Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, Ia, 1, 1: “Quia veritas de Deo per rationem 
74 hollmann
Holy Scripture and in the Qurʾan.39 As De pace fidei illustrates, it may also be 
read in the writings of the ancient Hellenic philosophers.40 The ultimate way 
in which God makes his Wisdom and the way to happiness and immortality 
known is through the Incarnation of the Word made flesh—the Word beyond 
words, the sure via of knowledge, beatitude, and peace.41 Thus, in De pace fidei, 
drastic times (such as the fall of Constantinople) call for drastic measures: 
the Word and Wisdom of God reason face-to-face with the religious leaders 
of the world in order to establish an enduring peace of faith.42 To realize this 
peace and avert the maelstrom of religious violence, Wisdom and the Word 
make opposites known (the many rites and the many adherents of those rites) 
in relation to the One (both one God and the one religion).
At the outset of De pace fidei, Cusanus identifies truth as the Word of God 
in which all things are enfolded (complicantur) and through which all things 
are unfolded (explicantur).43 This Truth, this Word and Wisdom, speaks words 
of truth and wisdom, which in turn reveal—point by point in an unfolding 
manner—the concordance of one single religion in a variety of rites. Cusanus 
affirms that “between ‘contracted wisdom,’ i.e., human wisdom, and wisdom 
per se, which is divine and maximum and infinite, there always remains 
infinite distance.”44 Thereby, in this confusing world of conjectures and simil-
itudes, Cusanus’s conception of the incarnate Word in De pace fidei utters in 
dialogical form the path to the signified one religion by means of a variety of 
signs.45 For Cusanus, the human nature of Christ united to the Divine Word 
leads the imagined wise readers of De pace fidei to the final happiness of reli-
gious concord. Cusanus’s hermeneutic of Wisdom and the Word through 
signs and things signified as flowing from and returning to the Word of God as 
investigata a paucis, et per longum tempus, et cum admixtione multorum errorum homini 
proveniret.” 
39 Cribratio Alkorani, alius prologus, 16.
40 De pace fidei XIX, 68.
41 De pace fidei II, 7; De pace fidei XIV, 49.
42 De pace fidei III, 8: “indiget humana natura crebra visitatione, ut fallaciae quae plurimum 
sunt circa Verbum tuum extirpentur et sic veritas continue elucescat.”
43 De pace fidei II, 7: “Quae quidem veritas intellectum pascens non est nisi Verbum ipsum, 
in quo complicantur omnia et per quod omnia explicantur.”
44 De pace fidei XII, 36; trans. Biechler and Bond, p. 36.
45 De pace fidei II, 7. The Verbum has put on human nature so that humans may attain to 
the truth of one religion in the variety of rites and eternal felicity: “[Verbum] et quod 
humanam induit naturam,ut quilibet homo secundum electionem liberi arbitrii in sua 
humana natura, in homine illo qui et Verbum, immortale veritatis pabulum se assequi 
posse non dubitaret.” Cf., De pace fidei III, 8; De coniecturis I, 2. 
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dialogical dialectic of peace.46 This Word speaks words in the dialogue form of 
De pace fidei, and enlightens Cusanus to write words of religious concordance. 
As his Idiota de sapientia et de mente and De veneratione sapientiae reveal, the 
master of learned ignorance spent his scholarly and spiritual life searching 
for the Wisdom and “the peace of God, which surpasses all understanding.”47 
According to Cusanus, the mysterious and cosmically generating Wisdom cries 
out in the streets to be welcomed readily by laymen (idiota) and even by the 
proponent of ‘the barbarous ineptitudes’ of learned ignorance—Cusanus him-
self.48 And yet, this wisdom leads to greater insight: the final vision of God, 
whereupon “God grants that He be made visible to us without enigma.”49
 Reading the Christology of De pace fidei within the Christian 
Tradition
Cusanus spent his life hunting for this known—yet unknown—wisdom. As 
Karl Jaspers notes, Cusanus is the only major thinker of his century who did 
not belong to any school or found a school.50 He was somewhat of a metaphys-
ical loner, much like the great scholars of the ninth century, such as John Scotus 
Eriugena. And yet, his ideas still remain and he sometimes seems strangely at 
home in our multi-religious age. His individual quest for the plenitude of wis-
dom uncovers a new Christocentric and communal understanding of religious 
peace. Cusanus’s Christocentric ideas on religious peace in De pace fidei are 
deeply rooted in ancient Hellenic thought and the Bible—wisdom as found 
in both reason and revelation. The Christology of De pace fidei is Johannine. 
Indeed, for Cusanus as for the author of the Gospel according to John, there 
is nothing beyond the horizon of the Word (Logos-Verbum).51 Cusanus’s cos-
mic Christology of De pace fidei also transmits the tradition of ancient Hebraic 
wisdom from the Book of Proverbs, as well as the Hellenic Lady Philosophy 
46 Augustine, De doctrina Christiana, I, 4–10. Cf., Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 
trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd ed. (London: Continuum, 2004), 
435–436. 
47 Philippians 4:7 NRSV.
48 Proverbs 8–9; De docta ignorantia, prologus; trans. Biechler and Bond, 87.
49 Idiota de sapientia (h V) II, 47: “sine quo in hoc mundo Dei visio esse nequit, quousque 
concesserit Deus, ut absque aenigmate nobis visibilis reddatur”; translation in Nicholas 
of Cusa, The Layman on Wisdom and the Mind, trans. M. L. Führer (Ottawa: Dovehouse, 
1989), 49.
50 Jaspers, Anselm and Nicholas of Cusa, 164.
51 John 1:1–18; De pace fidei II, 7.
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of Boethius’s Consolation.52 As in the Gospel of John, there are two dialecti-
cal aspects to Cusanus’s Christological approach to Islam: universalism and 
exclusivism.53 As a late-medieval churchman, Cusanus inherited both the uni-
versalist and exclusivist Christologies of the ecumenical councils of Nicaea 
(325) and Chalcedon (451). The former included the fundamental tenet of 
orthodox Christian faith that the Logos is the same substance as God (homoou-
sios, unius substantiae cum patre), through whom all things came to be, while 
the latter incorporated Pope Leo’s famous Tome, which stated that the incar-
nate Logos, the Son of God, is one person with two natures (divine and human, 
‘unitatem personae in utraque natura’).54 Leo’s Tome, serving as prolegomena 
to the Cribratio Alkorani, weaves together the two threads of universality and 
exclusivity into the one tapestry of Christ. For these purposes, Leo quotes 
Proverbs and the Gospel of John: “As Wisdom built a house for herself, the 
Word was made flesh and dwelt among us.” This Word becomes flesh so that the 
proper character of both natures can be maintained while coming together in a 
single person.55
While Cusanus’s sapiential ideas of religious concordance are rooted in rea-
son and revelation, in conciliar and constructive thought, they are also for-
mulated within the catholic historical theological tradition. Another angle for 
viewing Cusanus’s dialectic of reason and revelation, the exclusivity and uni-
versality of his Christology as evidenced in De pace fidei, sees Cusanus inher-
iting both the catholic exclusivity as represented by the late medieval reading 
of the third-century bishop Cyprian of Carthage, as well as the mystical inclu-
sivity of an Augustian conception of religion. It was Cyprian who famously 
52 Proverbs 8–9; Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy I, 1. 
53 John 1:1–18; 14:6. On universalist Verbum Christology, see De pace fidei VI, 17–18. On 
exclusivist Christology, see De pace fidei XI, 30–35.
54 Leo’s Tome is a famous letter sent by Pope Leo I, ‘the Great,’ to the Council of Chalcedon 
(451) on Christology. It is generally accepted as classic formulation of Christian orthodoxy 
on the person of Christ. Cribratio Alkorani, preface 1. Council of Nicea, Expositio fidei 
CCCXVIII partum in Norman P. Tanner, ed., Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, 2 vols. 
(London: Sheed & Ward, 1990), vol. 1, 5. Leo’s Tome, Epistula Papae Leonis in Tanner, 
Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, vol. 1, 80. 
55 Cribratio Alkorani, preface 1, citing Pio Secundo Universalis Christianorum Ecclesiae Summo 
Sactissimoque Pontifici. Leo’s Tome in Tanner, Decrees, vol. 1, 78: “Fecuditatem virginis 
spiritus sanctus dedit, veritas autem corporis sumpta de corpore est, est aedificante sibi 
sapientia domum verbum caro factum est habitavit in nobis, noc est in ea carne quam 
sumpsit ex homine et quam spiritu vitae rationalis antimavit. Salva igitur proprietate 
utriusque naturae et in unam coeunte personam.” Cf., Proverbs 9:1; John 1:14. 
77reading de pace fidei christologically
stated: “Outside the church, there is no salvation (extra ecclesiam nulla salus).”56 
Cyprian, much like Cusanus, was adamant in maintaining the unity of the 
catholic church, especially in the face of heresies and schisms threatening to 
rend concordance asunder. Thus, Cusanus appeals to a late medieval reading 
of Cyprian. According to Cusanus, the source of this unity is Christ, as repre-
sented on earth by the bishops and preeminently the Bishop of Rome.57 In De 
concordantia catholica, Cusanus notes that from ancient tradition there is only 
one cathedra and one rule established in hierarchical gradations.58 Similarly, 
Cyprian had asked rhetorically: “If a man does not hold fast to this oneness of 
the Church, does he imagine that he still holds the faith?”59 The precursor to 
the Cribratio Alkorani, turning us back again to Leo’s Tome, is evidence that 
Cusanus considers Islam to be an ancient Nestorian heresy now continued as a 
sect. In De pace fidei, moreover, Cusanus conceives that schisms exist because 
many longstanding customs confuse rites for religion and eventually become 
lost in the diffuse manifestations of the one unity of religion.60 Therefore, the 
goal of De pace fidei is the eradication of global religious schism through con-
ciliar and Christocentric dialogue. Furthermore, for Cyprian and Cusanus, “the 
Church forms a unity, however far she spreads and multiplies by the progeny 
of her fecundity.”61 And, for Cyprian, “[y]ou cannot have God for your Father 
56 Cyprian of Carthage, Epistle LXXII, Ad Jubajanum de haereticis baptizandis, section 21: 
“Salus extra ecclesiam non est.” See also how Cyprian is quoted by Pope Boniface VIII in 
the high water mark of the medieval papacy, Unam sanctam (1302). 
57 Cyprian, De Ecclesiae catholicae unitate, 4–6. On the primacy of the Roman chair, see 4 
(first edition of the treatise, note the two versions of the treatise on this pivotal section): 
“Super illum aedificat ecclesiam et illi pascendas oves mandat et, quamvis apostolis 
omnibus parem tribuat potestatemm unam tamen cathedram constituit et unitatis 
originem adque rationem sua auctoritate disposuit. Hoc erant utique et ceteri quod fuit 
Petrus, sed primatus Petro datur et una ecclesia et cathedra una monstratur.” 
58 De concordantia catholica I, VI, 36: “Unde sicut episcopatus unus, ita una cathedra et una 
praesidentia gradualiter et hierarchiæ constituta.” 
59 Cyprian, De Ecclesiae catholicae unitate, 4 (2nd edition of the treatise): “Hanc ecclesiae 
unitatem qui non tenet, tenere se fidem credit?” For an English translation of the above, 
see Cyprian, De Lapsis and De Ecclesiae Catholicae Unitate, text and trans. Maurice 
Bévenot (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 64–65.
60 De pace fidei I, 4.
61 Cyprian, De Ecclesiae Catholicae Unitate, 5 (2nd edition of the treatise); trans. Bévenot, 65: 
“Ecclesia una est quae in multitudinem latius incremento fecunditatis extenditur.” Cf., De 
concordantia catholica I, I, 7; I, VI, 35; I, VIII, 43; I, XIV, 58; XV, 60; II, XVII, 141; II, XXVI, 209; 
II, XXXIV, 256. Consider also the global scope of the church or one religion in the variety 
of rites in De pace fidei. 
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if you no longer have the Church for your mother.”62 In the pivotal and foun-
dational beginning of De concordantia catholica, on the Word of God, Cusanus 
cites this very same passage of Cyprian.63 There he writes that “concordance is 
highest truth itself,” and after citing Cyprian, describes how those in the church 
are united to Christ.64 Accordingly, Cusanus writes:
Christ is the way, the truth, and the life, and the head of all creatures, the 
husband or spouse of the church, which is constituted in a concordance 
of all rational creatures—with him as the One, and among themselves, 
the many—in various [hierarchical] gradations.65
Cusanus, like Cyprian before him, clearly connects the unity of the church to 
the person of Christ. Yet, in a distinctly innovative turn, he moves beyond the 
confines of the catholic church in De pace fidei to include Judaism, Islam, and 
Hinduism, through a hierarchical gradation of one religion in the variety of 
rites. These religious rites are coincidently and consubstantially joined as one 
concordance of peace through the dialogical Verbum and by way of his hierar-
chical emissaries, most notably, the apostle and first pope, Peter.66 According 
to Cusanus, it is the Verbum of God that reveals the religious concordance of 
one religion in the variety of rites dialectically, one theological proposition 
after another, until the conversation continues onto the crucial intricacies of 
Christology with Peter, who takes his turn in the dialogue of De pace fidei after 
Christ, “the eternal pontiff.”67
The Christology of De pace fidei is exclusive in its appeal to ancient formu-
laries of Christian thought, but it is also inclusive and universal in its con-
ception of religious concordance through the Word of God. Cusanus brings 
62 Cyprian, De Ecclesiae Catholicae Unitate 6; trans. Bévenot, 66: “Habere iam non potest 
Deum patrem qui ecclesiam non habet matrem.” Cf., De concordantia catholica I, I, 7. 
Cited by Cusanus in the context of arguing for the primacy of I, VI, 35.
63 De concordantia catholica I, I, 7. 
64 De concordantia catholica I, I, 7.
65 De concordantia catholica I, I, 8; Paul E. Sigmund, trans., The Catholic Concordance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 7. Cf., John 14:6. “Unde haec est summa 
dicendorum, quod Christus est via, veritas et vita et omnium creaturarum caput, maritus 
sive sponsus ecclesiae, llquaell per concordantiam creaturarum omnium rationabilium 
ad eum unum et inter se plurium constituitur secundum varias graduationes.” 
66 Peter leads the conversation of De pace fidei on Christology proper from chapters XI to 
XVI. Cf. Mark 8:29 where Christ asks Peter, “But who do you say that I am?” (NRSV). The 
question of who Christ is in De pace fidei is answered by Peter. 
67 De concordantia catholica I, III, 13; trans. Sigmund, Catholic Concordance, 11. 
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Neoplatonic philosophy into the service of catholic truth. For Cusanus, the 
hypostatic Word of God has its own exclusive substantial reality (contra 
modalism), and the Word universally flows through all things. Yet in De pace 
fidei, Cusanus aims to hold the universal and the exclusive together in his 
Christocentric approach to Islam. According to the prologue to the dialogue, 
through the art of contemplation he sees all this as the complete metaphysic of 
religious peace. God reveals the truth of one religion in the variety of rites. To 
echo Anselm of Canterbury, Cusanus sees and believes in order to understand 
the religious concordance of the Word of God.68 For Cusanus, Athens coin-
cides with Jerusalem, in other words, the City of God as reason coincides with 
revelation to form one universal metaphysic of unity. Unlike Tertullian, how-
ever, Athens has everything to do with Jerusalem.69 Thus the dialogue begins 
in a metaphorical Athens, as signified by the Greek interlocutor, and concludes 
in the heavenly and earthly Jerusalem, where the unity of the peace of faith is 
pronounced as concurrent with ancient philosophy and Christian theology as 
one complete religious metaphysic.70
In De pace fidei, Cusanus dialectically and hierarchically holds together 
Athens and Jerusalem, reason and revelation, universalist and exclusivist out-
looks, conciliar-catholic tradition and the pragmatic concerns of the present, 
all of which are centered in the cosmic and incarnate Christ.71 Another way 
of reviewing the two aspects of the universalist and exclusivist polarities of 
Cusanus’s Christology focuses on his love of cataphatic and apophatic theol-
ogy (as the master of learned ignorance). Cusanus begins the theological dia-
logue of De pace fidei with the Word as Truth and Wisdom, which embraces all 
things and is embraced by the philosophers.72 What humanity can say about 
God arises, then, (to allude to Dionysius the Areopagite) from the sum total of 
creation, but also, more precisely, from the sum total of religious rites. Cusanus 
believed that Wisdom made the world. Therefore, this cosmos is rationally 
knowable by all those seeking truth. Yet for Cusanus, all human assertions 
are but conjectures. Thus, the revelation of Wisdom made flesh is required in 
order to clarify confusions of rites with religion, or creation with the creator. 
68 Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion I, 1. 
69 Tertullian, Prescription of the Heretics, 7.
70 De pace fidei IV; XIX, 68. On the primacy of Jerusalem as city of ecclesiastical and 
hierarchical synthesis, see De concordantia catholica XVI, 64.
71 For a succinct overview of the universalist and exclusivist impulses of Christology, see 
Richard Viladesau and Mark Massa, eds., World Religions: A Sourcebook for Students of 
Christian Theology (New York: Paulist Press, 1994), 9–16. 
72 De pace fidei II, 7; IV–VI.
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Cataphatic verbosity may lend itself to catastrophic confusion of words for the 
Word. The names for God “are fittingly derived from the sum total of creation,”73 
and indeed, according to Dionysius, theologians praise God “by every name—
and as the Nameless One.”74 Thus, since God created all things, everything 
shares in beauty and is good.75
Dionysius’s hierarch, the Word of God, appears as the central character of 
Cusanus’s religious dialogue and as the foundation of his conception of one 
religion in the variety of rites.76 We therefore see a Dionysian, cataphatic 
(universalist) side to Christology: the Word embraces all things. Even so, this 
Word speaks for the hidden God who remains ever unknown and unknow-
able.77 Within this cataphatic sum total of creation, some rites are better 
than others, and some theological, dialogical points are higher than others. 
According to Dionysius and Aquinas, hierarchy operates from the lower to the 
higher by way of the middle—according to the so-called ‘lex divinitatis.’78 As 
Dionysius maintains, theologians discuss hierarchies in order to make known 
the ranks of heaven, but also to reveal the mystery of God.79 Thus, “[t]he most 
evident idea in Christian theology, namely, the sacred Incarnation of Jesus for 
our sakes, is something which cannot be enclosed in words nor grasped by 
any mind.”80 What can be grasped with more certainty is that Christology and 
the sacred incarnation of the preexistent Logos come to the fore in Cusanus’s 
conversation with Islam. Moreover this Christological approach to Islam in De 
pace fidei is not only conciliar and catholic, but also hierarchical and dialecti-
cal. Christ mediates between the lower to the higher, between discursive rites 
and speculative religious concordance. The angels receive the truth of one reli-
gion in the variety of rites through intellectual purity, while humanity receives 
it by means of sensible signs.81 It is the Word, moreover, that mediates this 
73 De divinis nominibus I, 7, 597A, p. 56. Translation by Colm Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius: 
The Complete Works (New York: Paulist Press, 1987). Cf., De pace fidei VII, 21: “Nam nomina 
quae Deo attribuuntur, sumuntur a creaturis, cum ipse sit in se ineffabilis et super omne 
quod nominari aut dici posset.”
74 De divinis nominibus I, 6, 596A, p. 54; trans. Luibheid.
75 De coelesti hierarchia II, 3, 141C.
76 De ecclesiatica hierarchia II, 1, 393A.
77 De pace fidei I, 4–5; II, 7. 
78 Ephesians 1:20–21; De coelesti hierarchia III, 1, 164D; Pope Boniface VIII, Unam sanctam; 
Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ Ia., 108, 1; Summa Theologiæ Ia., 108, 6.
79 De coelesti hierarchia II, 5, 144C.
80 De divinis nominibus II, 9, 648A, p. 65; trans. Luibheid. 
81 De coelesti hierarchia I, 1–3, 120B-124A; Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ Ia, 108, 1; De pace fidei 
I, 2; XVI, 55. 
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concordance from the angels (higher) to humanity (lower). The dialogue 
proper of De pace fidei begins more generally (with concepts such as Divine 
Wisdom and Word), and then by the end of the imagined conversation moves 
to touch upon all forms of diverse rites and practices. Yet the dialogue con-
cludes with the stillness of peace, which surpasses all human power of utter-
ance. Final realization of religious peace remains mystical and speculative, 
beyond this world, the theoria of vision, and is envisioned in the dialogue to 
be the New Jerusalem. The dialogue is bookended as Cusanus’s own recollec-
tion of an intellectual vision and as the culmination of the contemplation of 
religious concordance.82 Cusanus attempts to unfold the enigmatic aspect of 
Wisdom and the Word from memory in the flux of conjecture as if peering 
through a dark mirror.83 What does shine forth in De pace fidei is Christ as both 
creative cataphatic revealer of the concordance of every conceivable religious 
rite, and as narrow apophatic mystical way to unity beyond the finite dialogical 
conundrum, “where a sentence has both a beginning and an ending.”84
Cusanus’s Christocentric synthesis of religious concordance is formu-
lated through the concepts and categories of Christian theology, Christian 
Neoplatonic mysticism, and Greek philosophy. Cusanus’s frequent use of the 
word religio in De pace fidei echoes ancient Hellenic ideas, but also Augustine, 
the great harmonizer of Neoplatonism and Christianity.85 In De vera religione, 
Augustine explores the universal nature of religio, but also moves beyond the 
dialectic of inclusivity and exclusivity to discover the contemplative within the 
Christian faith. Cusanus had read De vera religione, and cites the work in De pace 
fidei.86 There, Augustine argues that the good and blessed life “is to be found 
entirely in the true religion wherein one God is worshipped and acknowledged 
with purest piety.”87 Furthermore, vestiges of this true religion are to be found 
everywhere through the agency and providence of Divine Wisdom.88 Even so, 
Augustine summons lovers of wisdom to “turn to God so that we may deserve 
to be illumined by his Word, the true light.”89 This path is open to everyone. 
82 De pace fidei I, 1; XIX, 68.
83 De pace fidei I, 1.
84 Augustine, Confessions IX, x (24); English translation by Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 171. 
85 Cusanus employs religio or its declensions 27 times throughout De pace fidei. 
86 De pace fidei II, 7; De vera religione 39. See critical apparatus of h VII, 8.
87 Augustine, De vera religione I, 1; translation in John H. S. Burleigh, trans., Augustine: Earlier 
Writings, The Library of Christian Classics, vol. VI (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953), 
225. Cf., De pace fidei I, 5–6. 
88 De vera religione XXXIX, 72; trans. Burleigh, p. 262. Cf., De pace fidei IV, 10–12.
89 De vera religione XLII, 79; trans. Burleigh, p. 266.
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There is one God alone to be worshipped, according to Augustine, “and [it 
is] his Wisdom who makes every wise soul wise.”90 Augustine concludes De 
vera religione by urging: “Let our religion bind us to the one omnipotent God, 
because no creature comes between our minds and him whom we know to 
be the Father and the Truth, i.e., the inward light whereby we know him.”91 As 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith detects, Augustine barely mentions Christianity in 
De vera religione, and instead, “[t]he culmination is mystic,”92 much like the 
ideal religious dialogue envisioned by Cusanus in the framework of contem-
plation.93 For religio is the bond that unites creatures to the Creator, the Truth 
and inner light of revelation. Smith also reminds us that the non-Augustinian 
introduction of the post-enlightenment notion of revealed religion into 
eighteenth-century Europe has led to confusion.94 Cusanus, however, as inher-
itor of ancient and Augustinian contemplative and universal concepts of reli-
gion, reminds readers who venture into his conceptual context that God does 
not reveal religions, but rather, God reveals God’s self as the way and means to 
beatitude and religious concordance: the Word in relation to words, the finite 
in hierarchical dialectical gradations to the infinite. Cusanus’s religion is not 
one of the many religions, but the religion: the peace of faith for the peace of 
the cosmos. In Cusanus’s all-encompassing vision and conception of one reli-
gion in the variety of rites we detect not even a hint of Pascal’s matter of the 
heart, nor Schleiermacher’s intuition of the numinous universe.95 As Biechler 
and Bond note, there are indeed pointers to Luther in De pace fidei, regarding 
religion and justification by faith.96 For Cusanus, this peace of faith is bonded 
to its object: the Word, the dialogical-incarnational and cosmic-hierarchical 
90 De vera religione LV, 112; trans. Burleigh, p. 282. 
91 De vera religione LV, 113; trans. Burleigh, p. 282.
92 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion: A New Approach to the Religious 
Traditions of Mankind (New York: Mentor Books, 1964), 31.
93 De pace fidei I, 1.
94 Smith, Meaning and End of Religion, 116.
95 Blaise Pascal, Pensées (Brunschvicg, 1897 edition), 277: “Le coeur a ses raisons que la 
raison ne connaît point; on le sait en mille choses. Je dis que le coeur aime l’être universel 
naturellement, et soi même naturellement selon qu’il s’y adonne; et il se durcit contre 
l’un ou l’autre à son choix.” In his second speech, Schleiermacher writes: “I entreat you to 
become familiar with this concept: intuition of the universe. It is the hinge of my whole 
speech; it is the highest and most universal formula of religion on the basis of which you 
should be able to find every place in religion, from which you determine its essence and 
its limits” (Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, trans. 
and ed. Richard Crouter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 24).
96 On faith in De pace fidei, see Biechler and Bond’s introduction to Nicholas of Cusa on 
Interreligious Harmony, xxxvi–xlviii. 
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Word of God, through which all things are enfolded and unfolded.97 Cusanus 
even peers subtly ahead to a central tenet of Christian theology, reaffirmed in 
the Lutheran Confessions: the ubiquity of Christ.98
 Reading the Christology of De pace fidei in Contemporary 
Christian-Muslim Dialogue
Given Cusanus’s penchant for Christocentric theology and Greek philoso-
phy, his ideas on one religion in the variety of rites are not without criticism. 
First and foremost, Cusanus had no real exposure to Muslims,99 though for a 
churchman of his time and place he was remarkably well versed on Islam.100 
Nonetheless, today he would sound naïve in his belief that rational dis-
course could indeed achieve lasting religious peace between these two great 
Abrahamic faiths. Secondly, Cusanus may indeed be guilty of the fallacy of 
equivocation: while the theological subjects may be the same for Christians 
and Muslims—for example God, Word, prophets—the predicates are never-
theless different. Thirdly, in our fragmented contemporary world, we have, no 
doubt, lost faith in the power of logical, dialectical thought as envisioned in 
De pace fidei. Perhaps it never really worked in reality, but only in Plato’s and 
Cusanus’s imaginations. Finally, what about the uniqueness of Christ as medi-
ator between the infinite and finite, God and humanity?101 For Augustine, this 
was not to be found in the books of the Platonists.102 Cusanus, on the other 
hand, seems to suggest in De veneratione sapientiae that Wisdom-Word is 
found everywhere, or at least in all of the great thinkers, pagan and Christian 
alike. The Cribratio even shows that he found the concept of Wisdom as incar-
nate in Christ within the Qurʾan. Perhaps, in the end, Cusanus conceived of 
an all-encompassing religion unrecognizable to both Christians and Muslims. 
We would do well, however, to approach Cusanus through his own words. 
97 De pace fidei II, 7.
98 Cf., Formula of Concord, Article VIII. 
99 See Cusanus’s recounting of possible interactions with Muslim converts to Christianity in 
Cribratio Alkorani, prologus 3.
100 For example, Cod. Cus. 205 includes Al-Ghazali on philosophy, Lib. De universali 
philosophia, with notes by Cusanus, and Avicenna’s Metaphysics with a note by Cusanus 
on f. 80v. Cod. Cus. 108 contains Ketton’s translation of the Qurʾan, with numerous notes 
by Cusanus. For the sometimes inaccurate catalogue to Cusa’s library in Kues, see: J. Marx, 
Verzeichnis der Handschriften-Sammlung des Hospitals zu Cues bei Bernkastel a./Mosel 
(Trier: Druck der Kunst- und Verlagsanstalt Schaar & Dathe, Komm.-Ges. a. Akt., 1905).
101 John 14:6. Cf., Cusanus, Sermon CLXXXVI; Sermon CCIII. 
102 Augustine, Confessions VII, ix, 13–14.
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Therefore, it may be hoped that a theological reading of De pace fidei leads to a 
greater appreciation of Cusanus’s thesis of one religion in the variety of rites, as 
well as an appreciation of his understanding of the peace of faith through the 
Word of God as metaphysically rooted in Hellenic thought and the plentitude 
of ancient conciliar Christology.
Cusanus’s conception of the connection between heavenly and earthly, or 
church and world, is located in the transcendent-immanent Christ, who is 
both divine wisdom (universalist) and the incarnate Word (exclusivist). As 
demonstrated by Leo’s Tome, cited by Cusanus at the outset of Cribratio, what 
he sought to avoid was schism—the schism of Christianity and Islam, or any 
schism between reason and revelation, or between the exclusivity and inclu-
sivity of ancient and conciliar Christology. The concordantia is in and through 
Christ, the Wisdom of God. With this in mind, three general approaches to 
religion and religious diversity may be formulated: all religions are the same, 
all religions are different, or religions exist as unity in plurality. From these, 
Cusanus comes closest to the third option. For Cusanus, religion is one and 
cosmic in range and effect, yet rites are many and diffuse in practice. Moreover, 
rites remain distinct and yet wholly part of one religion. Cusanus, therefore, 
seems to hold universal and exclusive together dialectically, and through an 
imagined contemplative and conciliar dialogue, discovers a religious synthe-
sis. There are striking similarities here to the fourth- and fifth-century concil-
iar Christological debates and formulations over holding to one hypostasis/
persona in two distinct but inseparable natures. De pace fidei sometimes 
accentuates the exclusive character of the Christian faith, while at other times 
highlights the universal scope of Wisdom through the plethora of religious 
rites. Yet ultimately, for Cusanus, truth is found in the Word of God, who 
“is all and in all.”103 While, no doubt, this may prove troubling to Christians 
and Muslims today, it seems to be truer to Cusanus’s thought and intentions. 
By letting Cusanus speak, we might hear that De pace fidei has something to 
say to the complexities of our multi-religious world. The ongoing work of find-
ing common ground and conversation instead of conflict continues in such 
landmark efforts as the textually focused A Common Word.
While Cusanus lived in what he conjectured were the last days, he crea-
tively constructed the contemplative dialogue of De pace fidei as a religious 
synthesis in a world drastically demarcated by belief. Of course, contra 
Cusanus, the world did not end in the fifteenth century. Against his archetypal 
meditations on the peace of faith, violence has perpetuated but religion per-
sists. Throughout the vicissitudes of past and present, Cusanus’s prayer for 
103 De pace fidei II, 7; Colossians 3:11 NRSV. 
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religious peace continues to resonate. The fifteenth century, while no stranger 
to end-time fervor, was in Southern’s terms ‘a moment of vision’ for Christians 
perceiving Islam.104 These visions of peace, however, were soon eclipsed by 
the realities of war. Today, through a religious dialogue like A Common Word, 
we perchance glimpse the moment of vision anew. Amidst proponents of 
apocalyptical clashes of civilizations and religious conflagrations, Cusanus’s 
De pace fidei reminds both Christians and Muslims of their shared philosoph-
ical concepts and the recurrent need for respectful and honest conversation. 
From a Christian perspective, Cusanus maintains the tension between uni-
versality and exclusivity inherent in ancient and conciliar Christology. In so 
doing, he ultimately points to the dialectical and hierarchical cosmic fullness 
of the hypostases of the Logos. While Christians and Muslims will continue 
to differ on fundamental points of belief and practice, adherents of both 
great Abrahamic faiths still pray along with Cusanus for peace. And, for the 
fifteenth-century theologian Nicholas of Cusa, the common word for peace 
between Christians and Muslims is none other than Jesus Christ.
104 The title of chapter three of R. W. Southern’s now classic lectures, Western Views of Islam 
in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 67–109.
The Trinity as a Challenge to Christian-Muslim 
Dialogue in Nicholas of Cusa: Nicholas of Cusa’s 
Philosophical Translation of Trinitarian Faith as  
a Response to Islamic Rejection
Felix Resch
Nicholas of Cusa provides an interesting example of fostering a Christian-
Muslim dialogue.1 Thus, the focus of this essay is on Cusa’s method of dealing 
philosophically with the Islamic accusations raised against the Christian doc-
trine of the Trinity. To explore this topic, I will first of all contrast contempo-
rary interreligious dialogue with Cusa’s interreligious dialogue, in order to get 
an idea of what the latter aims at. Then, I will turn to discuss the logical or phil-
osophical objections against the Trinity mentioned in the Qurʾan, after which 
I will examine the ways that Christians could respond to these accusations. 
Among the different options available, the kerygmatic trinitarian theology, 
which reduces the three divine persons to proper names of three individual 
entities, will draw particular attention. Therefore, the philosophical and the-
ological meanings of proper names will also have to be analyzed, in order to 
understand why Cusa saw the need to translate trinitarian proper names into 
philosophical concepts, despite the fact that naming the trinitarian God was 
still important for him.
In our globalized world, characterized by the decline of social, national, 
political, and religious borders, isolation turns out to be more and more of an 
 
1 Given that there is vast literature on this issue in general, I will just mention some works: 
Tom Kerger and Walter Andreas Euler, eds., Cusanus und der Islam, 1st ed. (Trier: Paulinus, 
2010); Rudolf Haubst, ed., Der Friede unter den Religionen nach Nikolaus von Kues, thema-
tic issue of Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft 16 (1984); Walter 
Andreas Euler, Unitas et Pax: Religionsvergleich bei Raimundus Lullus und Nikolaus von Kues, 
2nd ed., Religionswissenschaftliche Studien, 15 (Würzburg: Echter, 1995); Tibor Bakos, On 
Faith, Rationality and the Other in the Late Middle Ages. A Study of Nicholas of Cusa’s manu-
ductive approach to Islam. Dissertation presented to fulfill the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor (Ph.D.) in Philosophy (Leuven: unpublished dissertation, 2003); Markus Riedenauer, 
Pluralität und Rationalität: Die Herausforderung der Vernunft durch religiöse und kulturelle 
Vielfalt nach Nikolaus Cusanus, Theologie und Frieden, 32 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2007).
© Felix Resch, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004274761_008 
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impossible option. As a consequence, each collective entity is forced to adopt 
an attitude toward the others. Rather than resorting to confrontation, indif-
ference, or surrender, dialogue seems to be the most useful attitude to adopt 
in order to respect others while remaining faithful to oneself. In our post-9/11 
world, we see the urgent need for religions to search for common ground in 
order to overcome misunderstandings and hostilities, which often lead to 
violence. Apart from fundamentalists, most religious leaders agree that inter-
religious dialogue is preferable to forced conversion, as dialogue is used to fos-
ter mutual understanding.2 Proselytism and syncretism are both excluded as 
alternatives.3
I would call this a hermeneutical dialogue with social implications, ena-
bled by the rise of the modern secular state.4 Modern Western societies are 
based on religious plurality, where due to the secular constitutional and judi-
cial framework, religious diversity must no longer lead to political conflicts. 
As we know, the origins of the modern secular state are deeply rooted in 
European history, especially in the experiences of the bloody wars of religion 
in the Early Modern Age.5 That is why in the Late Middle Ages, when religious 
unity and social peace were still regarded as inseparable, religious diversity 
was consequently interpreted as a danger for society. Conversely, achieving 
religious unity was seen as a necessary condition for social peace. Obviously, 
there are different ways of achieving religious unity. The first method, to con-
quer or submit to another religion, lost a lot of popularity in the fifteenth 
 
2 A good example of trying to foster mutual theological understanding between Christians and 
Muslims is Christian W. Troll, Muslime fragen, Christen antworten, Topos-plus-Taschenbücher, 
489, 2nd ed. (Regensburg: Pustet, 2004).
3 An interesting example of a grassroots interreligious dialogue is the French organiza-
tion ‘Coexister,’ founded in 2009 by young Christians, Jews, and Muslims under the slogan 
“Diversité dans la foi, Unité dans l’action” (http://www.coexister.fr/association.html, accessed 
December 4, 2012).
4 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde’s famous dictum points out that the liberal, secularized state 
is based on presuppositions that cannot be guaranteed on their own (Ernst-Wolfgang 
Böckenförde, Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit: Studien zur Staatstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976), 60). Hence, Jürgen Habermas insists on the importance of reli-
gions as a resource even for a secular society. See Jürgen Habermas, “Glauben und Wissen,” in 
Friedenspreis des Deutschen Buchhandels 2001—Jürgen Habermas, ed. Börsenverein des deut-
schen Buchhandels, 9–15, especially 13. To fulfill this task, religions are requested to translate 
their religious contents into a secular language (12–13). 
5 Böckenförde, Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit, 42–64.
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century.6 Thus, in his letter to John of Segovia in 1454, Nicholas of Cusa agrees 
with his interlocutor that military actions against the expanding Turks should 
be replaced by rational argumentation, in order to convince the Muslims of 
central Christian doctrines like the Trinity and the hypostatic union.7 In the 
same work he mentions his dialogue De pace fidei, written one year before, 
where he had attempted to put such a program into practice.8
Since such an endeavor entails the risk of being refuted by the other reli-
gion, this attitude presupposes a deep conviction of the rational superiority 
of Christian faith, as well as an assurance of the importance of a rational dis-
cussion between Christians and Muslims, with the aim of defeating the latter 
through rationality.9 Contrary to hermeneutical dialogues, I would call this an 
6 On the decreasing approval of combating the Turks after the fall of Constantinople, see 
Thomas M. Izbicki, “The Possibility of Dialogue with Islam in the Fifteenth Century,” in 
Nicholas of Cusa in Search of God and Wisdom, ed. Gerald Christianson and Thomas M. 
Izbicki (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 175–185 at 175.
7 Nicholas of Cusa, “Epistula ad Ioannem de Segobia 2,” in Nicolai de Cusa opera omnia iussu 
et auctoritate academiae litterarum Heidelbergensis ad codicum fidem edita: Volumen VII 
(Hamburg: Meiner, 1970). In his dialogue with a Persian, held in 1391, the Byzantine Emperor 
Manuel II considers faith as a fruit of the soul and not of the body (Manuel II. Palaiologos, 
Dialoge mit einem Muslim, I: Kommentierte griechisch-deutsche Textausgabe von Karl Förstel, 
Corpus Islamo-christianum: Series Graeca, 4 (Würzburg-Altenberge, 1993), VII. Dialog 1.6, 
240–243). Instead of violence, speech and reasoning should be used as tools to convince 
someone (240–243). On this issue see Pope Benedict’s well-known Regensburg lecture held 
on September 12, 2006, and edited in Benedikt XVI, Glaube und Vernunft. Die Regensburger 
Vorlesung: Vollständige Ausgabe, commen. Gesine Schwan, Adel Theodor Khoury, and Karl 
Kardinal Lehmann (Freiburg: Herder, 2006), 15–17. An interesting comparison between 
Nicholas of Cusa, Manuel II, and Pope Benedict XVI is given in Walter Andreas Euler, Papst 
Benedikt XVI, Kaiser Manuel II und Kardinal Nikolaus von Kues: Das Verhältnis von Glaube und 
Vernunft und die christliche Sicht des Islams, 1st ed., Kleine Schriften der Cusanus-Gesellschaft, 
Heft 17 (Trier: Paulinus, 2007).
8 The Prologue narrates the deep impact the fall of Constantinople has on the author (De pace 
fidei 1, n. 1 [h VII]) who begs God to end the bloody fights and to overcome religious differ-
ences. Thus, God convokes a heavenly council of wise men representing different cultures 
(3, n. 9). Despite the Christian setting, which is exemplified by the chair of the divine Logos 
and the Apostles Peter and Paul, all the discussions are held in a rational and peaceful way. 
9 I agree with Markus Riedenauer that according to Cusanus, philosophical rationality seems 
to be the adequate basis for an interreligious dialogue (Markus Riedenauer, Pluralität 
und Rationalität: Die Herausforderung der Vernunft durch religiöse und kulturelle Vielfalt 
nach Nikolaus Cusanus, Theologie und Frieden, 32 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2007), 103). 
As Thomas M. Izbicki puts it: “Dissent on important matters of belief or practice, especially 
dissent based on a clear, informed conscience, was almost incomprehensible to the intel-
lectual leaders of Europe” (Izbicki, “The Possibility of Dialogue with Islam in the Fifteenth 
Century,” 183).
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alethic dialogue, the main goal of which is not to give testimony to one’s own 
faith without commenting on the other, but rather, to scrutinize the articles 
of faith—in particular the Trinity and the hypostatic union—through natu-
ral reason. This is possible because the Christian and Muslim religions are not 
mere psychological phenomena, but instead entail an alethic dimension10 and 
raise absolute and universal truth claims.11
Given that Christians and Muslims hold contradictory positions toward 
God’s personality and revelation, both positions cannot be true; according to 
the law of non-contradiction, one must be true and one must be false. Within 
this logical framework, the epistemic challenge consists in finding out which 
position is in fact true.12
 The Logical and Doxological Accusations Raised against the 
Doctrine of Christian Trinity in the Qurʾan
To better understand how Cusa’s trinitarian faith was challenged by Islam, I 
cite one of the most significant Qurʾanic rejections of the Christian doctrine of 
the Trinity, which is found in Sura 4:171–172:
People of the Book, do not transgress the bounds of your religion. Speak 
nothing but the truth about God. The Messiah, Jesus the son of Mary, was 
no more than God’s apostle and His Word which he cast to Mary: a spirit 
from Him. So believe in God and His apostles and do not say: ‘Three.’ 
Forbear, and it shall be better for you. God is but one God. God forbid that 
He should have a son! His is all that heavens and the earth contain. God 
is the all sufficient protector. The Messiah does not disdain to be a servant 
10 Of course, they entail other dimensions as well, like an aesthetical or ethical one, the 
latter of which is underlined by Hans Küng’s well-known ‘Global Ethic.’ See Küng, Projekt 
Weltethos (Munich: Piper, 1990).
11 On the absolute and universal truth claims of the three monotheistic world religions, 
see Markus Enders, “ ‘Denn Gott ist die Wahrheit’ (Koran 22,6 63; 31.30): Anmerkungen 
zum Wahrheitsverständnis und zu den Wahrheitsansprüchen der drei monotheistischen 
Weltreligionen,” Philotheos. International Journal for Philosophy and Theology 12 (2012): 
17–35; on the importance of philosophy in interreligious dialogue, see Josef Schmidt, S. J., 
“Zur Bedeutung der Philosophie im Religionsdialog,” Jahrbuch für Religionsphilosophie 9 
(2010): 9–24.
12 On the systematic and historical aspect of conflicting truth claims in the Renaissance, 
see the excellent epilogue in Paul Richard Blum, Philosophy of Religion in the Renaissance 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 177–183.
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of God, nor do the angels who are nearest to Him. Those who through 
arrogance disdain His service shall be brought before Him.13
With respect to content, we find two accusations raised against the Christians 
in this passage. First, the doctrine of the Trinity is incompatible with God’s 
unity. Second, the christological doctrine of the hypostatic union, or Jesus 
Christ’s divine sonship, is incompatible with God’s transcendence. Both are 
logical objections assuming a formal contradiction between the core doc-
trines of the Christian faith and God’s true nature. Finally, both correspond to 
Islam’s doxological accusation of shirk, i.e., associating someone or something 
with God,14 which is contrary to tawhīd, the traditional Islamic confession of 
God’s unity.15
It is interesting to observe that in Sura 4:171–172, the Trinity doctrine is only 
rejected, but not elucidated in detail. Rather, the emphasis lies on the interpre-
tation of Jesus Christ. On the one hand, Jesus, who is conceived in a miraculous 
way by the Virgin Mary,16 is said to deserve the title ‘Messiah.’17 On the other 
hand, Christians are accused of assigning a son to God and divinizing Jesus, 
although according to the Qurʾan, he only claimed to be a servant of God. The 
sura underlines the absolute transcendence of God, who possesses “all that 
the heavens and the earth contain.” Each being depends on his will, because 
all are created by him.18 Hence, the general relationship between all creatures 
and their creator can never be replaced by a special relationship between the 
son and his father.
Another text, Sura 5:116–118, deepens the impression that Christian doc-
trines do not remain faithful to Jesus Christ’s own teaching:
13 Sura 4:171–172. All English translations of Qurʾanic suras are taken from N. J. Dawood, The 
Koran: Translated with notes by N. J. Dawood, 5th revised ed. (London: Penguin, 1990).
14 On this issue, see Muhammad Ibrahim H. I. Surty, The Qurʾān and Al-Shirk (Polytheism), 
2nd revised ed. (London: Ta-Ha, 1990). The doxological accusation is also raised against 
the ecclesiastic hierarchy: “They make of their clerics and their monks, and of the 
Messiah, the son of Mary, Lords besides God; though they were ordered to serve one God 
only” (Sura 9:31).
15 Sandra Toenies Keating, “ ‘Say Not Three’: Some Early Christian Responses to Muslim 
Questions on the Trinity,” The Thomist 74 (2010): 85–104 at 86.
16 Khoury states that it is his virgin birth that makes Jesus so pure that he can be called ‘spirit 
from God’ (Adel Theodor Khoury, Der Koran: Übersetzt und kommentiert von Adel Theodor 
Khoury (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2007), 155, note 4, 171).
17 On Jesus’ peculiar prophetic mission, see Sura 3:48–55.
18 E.g., Sura 36:81–82.
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Then God will say: “Jesus, son of Mary, did you ever say to mankind: 
‘Worship me and my mother as gods besides God?’” “Glory to You,” he will 
answer, “how could I ever say that to which I have no right? If I had ever 
said so, You would have surely known it. You know what is in my mind, 
but I know not what is in Yours. You alone know what is hidden. I told 
them only what You bade me. I said: ‘Serve God, my Lord and your Lord.’ 
I watched over them while living in their midst, and ever since You took 
me to Yourself, You have been watching over them. You are the witness of 
all things. If You punish them, they surely are Your servants; and if You 
forgive them, surely You are mighty and wise.19
In this passage, Jesus Christ is presented as God’s prophet, who claims that 
neither he nor his mother is to be worshipped as God.20 Obviously, this sura 
rejects the idea of a familial Trinity made up of Father, Mother, and Son.21 
However, Sura 5:72–73 makes it clear that any type of Trinity is considered a 
violation of tawhīd, because being reduced to one of three persons, God is no 
longer one:
Unbelievers are those that say: “God is the Messiah, the son of Mary.” For 
the Messiah himself said: “Children of Israel, serve God, my Lord and 
your Lord.” He that worships other gods besides God, God will deny him 
Paradise, and Hell shall be his home. None shall help the evil-doers. 
Unbelievers are those that say: “God is one of three.” There is but one 
God. If they do not desist from so saying, those of them that disbelieve 
shall be sternly punished.22
This sura leaves no doubt that unbelievers, i.e. everyone committing shirk, 
shall be punished in hell.
 How Should Christians Respond?
There are several different ways to respond to such accusations. The first option 
would be to surrender. Seeing no possibility of refuting the Islamic objection 
19 Sura 5:116–118.
20 Sura 5:17 repeats that Jesus and Mary are creatures depending totally on God’s will: “Say: 
‘Who could prevent God, if He so willed, from destroying the Messiah, the son of Mary, his 
mother, and all the people of the earth? [. . .].’ ”
21 On this issue see Khoury, Der Koran, 155, note 4,171.
22 Sura 5:72–73.
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against the trinitarian doctrine, the Christian interlocutor could admit that the 
assertion that God is triune is incompatible with the assertion that God is one. 
Remaining faithful to the latter, he would consequently give up the first.23 Such 
a strategy could be motivated by a strong admiration for the monotheistic her-
itage, while underestimating the rationality of trinitarian belief. It is evident 
that this option abandons orthodox Christian faith.24
A second option would be confrontation. Instead of trying to refute the 
Islamic objection against trinitarian doctrine, the Christian interlocutor could 
begin to distract the Muslim’s attention by raising other objections against 
Islam, or simply enter into polemics. Obviously, this option would turn out to 
be an intellectual non-starter.
The third option, however, seems to be much more subtle. Apparently, 
indifference can help to deal with accusations raised against the trinitarian 
doctrine. Philosophical or logical objections could seduce the Christian inter-
locutor to withdraw from a speculative trinitarian theology by taking refuge 
in a mere kerygmatic trinitarian theology.25 Instead of refuting the Islamic 
attack, the Christian could remind the Muslim interrogator of the salvific his-
tory where God reveals himself as trinitarian. This includes a shift in emphasis 
from the immanent to the economic Trinity. Rediscovering the particular role 
each divine figure plays in the salvific history, this option takes ‘Father,’ ‘Son,’ 
and ‘Holy Spirit’ primarily as proper names of individual entities.
In the next section, I will discuss the philosophical and theological meanings 
of proper names in order to show why they are not sufficient for an adequate 
understanding of the Trinity. This will also elucidate why Cusa saw himself 
challenged to translate trinitarian proper names into philosophical concepts.
 Philosophical and Theological Considerations on Proper Names
In the last few decades, proper names have drawn a lot of philosophical inter-
est, especially by analytic philosophers. One of the most interesting theories 
23 On the development of non-trinitarian theologies see Gavin D’Costa, “The Trinity in 
Interreligious Dialogues,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity, ed. Gilles Emery, O. P. and 
Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 573–585 at 574–576.
24 The modalistic view arguing that ‘Father,’ ‘Son,’ and ‘Holy Ghost’ are only three names for 
one and the same entity without any real distinction boils down to the same heterodox 
result.
25 E.g., Jürgen Moltmann, Trinität und Reich Gottes: Zur Gotteslehre (Munich: Kaiser, 1980); 
Barbara Andrade, Gott mitten unter uns: Entwurf einer kerygmatischen Trinitätstheologie, 
Europäische Hochschulschriften, 631 (Frankfurt: Lang, 1998).
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is Saul A. Kripke’s Theory of Reference. In his lectures Naming and Necessity, 
held in January of 1970 at Princeton University, he treats proper names as rigid 
designators.26 While rejecting Gottlob Frege’s and Bertrand Russell’s reduction 
of proper names to definite descriptions, Kripke points out the essential role 
proper names play to guarantee transworld identity:
One of the intuitive theses I will maintain in these talks is that names are 
rigid designators. Certainly, they seem to satisfy the intuitive test men-
tioned above: although someone other than the U.S. President in 1970 
might have been the U.S. President in 1970 (e.g., Humphrey might have), 
no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon. In the same way, a des-
ignator rigidly designates a certain object if it designates that object 
wherever the object exists; [.  .  .]. [.  .  .] Those who have argued that to 
make sense of the notion of rigid designators, we must antecedently 
make sense of ‘criteria of transworld identity’ have precisely reversed the 
cart and the horse; it is because we can refer (rigidly) to Nixon, and stipu-
late that we are speaking of what might have happened to him (under 
certain circumstances), that ‘transworld identifications’ are unproblem-
atic in such cases.27
Kripke argues that the main reason for searching for criteria or descriptions to 
identify an object is the confusion of the metaphysical and the epistemological 
dimension, or, in other terms, of necessity and a prioricity.28 If one holds that 
objects are identified in all possible worlds by a property or a set of properties 
known a priori, he ignores that “(1) Generally, things aren’t ‘found out’ about a 
counterfactual situation, they are stipulated; (2) possible worlds need not be 
given purely qualitatively, as if we were looking at them through a telescope.”29 
What Kripke offers, therefore, is a different view on beings, which is not driven 
by an attempt to reduce individual entities to bundles of properties, but rather, 
by a desire to reestablish the ontological primacy of the substance.30 Hence, he 
tries to fix reference by what he calls an “initial ‘baptism.’”31 Here, it is the name 
“ ‘passed from link to link’”32 that marks exactly an individual being. Recently, 




30 Simultaneously, he defends the ontological primacy of actual beings over possible states 
of affairs.
31 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 96.
32 Ibid., 96.
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Kripke’s insistence on proper names has been adopted by Robert Spaemann 
for the purposes of philosophical theology. In his speech Was ist das, ‘quod 
omnes dicunt deum’? held in March of 2011 in Tübingen, Spaemann attempts to 
treat the word ‘God’ as a proper name,33 arguing that its reference is fixed by a 
causal chain dating back to a kind of ‘initial baptism.’ According to Spaemann, 
we can only believe that this causal chain is without a gap.34
In his book Trinität und Reich Gottes, published in 1980, Jürgen Moltmann 
treats even the trinitarian names as proper names.35 Consequently, he rejects 
the concepts of substance and subject to explain the unity of the three trin-
itarian figures. Rather, he considers the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit 
as three different subjects playing different roles in the trinitarian history.36 
According to Moltmann, even the unity of these three must be understood in 
a trinitarian way: the Father as the origin, the Son as the mutual consent, and 
the Holy Spirit as the glorifying community.37 It is hard to see how this kind of 
social trinity avoids the danger of tritheism.38
Taking the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit as three numerically dif-
ferent subjects who share one common predicate ‘God’ is incompatible with 
monotheism. In this case, God would be reduced to a mere universal, thus 
the Islamic objections would be justifiable. The only way I see how to refute 
these objections and make sure that Christian trinitarian faith is indeed mon-
otheistic is through an alethic dialogue, which still remains as a fourth option 
for Christians to turn to when responding to the Qurʾanic accusations. Since 
Muslims do not share the same source of revelation, Christians have to trans-
late the revealed proper names—‘Father,’ ‘Son,’ and ‘Holy Spirit’—into philo-
sophical concepts, in order to foster communicability and claim absolute and 
universal truth.
In the following section I will therefore focus on Cusa’s translation of the 
trinitarian proper names into philosophical concepts, within the framework of 
his dialogue with Islam.
33 Robert Spaemann, “Was ist das, ‘quod omnes dicunt deum’?,” in Gottesbeweise als 
Herausforderung für die moderne Vernunft, ed. Thomas Buchheim, Friedrich Hermanni, 
Axel Hutter, and Christoph Schwöbel, Collegium Metaphysicum, 4 (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2012), 33–45 at 37.
34 Spaemann, “Was ist das, ‘quod omnes dicunt deum’?,” 37.
35 Moltmann, Trinität und Reich Gottes: Zur Gotteslehre, 179–194.
36 Ibid., 173–174.
37 Ibid., 194.
38 On tritheism, see Christophe Erismann, “The Trinity, Universals, and Particular 
Substances: Philoponus and Roscelin,” Traditio 63 (2008): 277–305.
95the trinity as a challenge to christian-muslim dialogue
 Cusa’s Translation of Trinitarian Proper Names
Generally speaking, in Cusa’s works we find two different approaches to Islam. 
First, there is his philosophical approach, the manuductio of Muslims toward 
the Mystery of the Trinity, especially in De pace fidei and parts of Cribratio 
Alkorani. Second, there is his exegetical approach, the pia interpretatio of the 
Qurʾan in Cribratio Alkorani.39 In this essay, I will only focus on the first one, 
for which I hold that Cusa uses a double strategy: on the one hand, he shares 
the Muslim concern about God’s unity, while on the other hand, he attempts 
to convince the Muslims that God is in fact triune.
In Chapter 8 of De pace fidei, the Chaldean interlocutor picks up the tradi-
tional accusation of shirk: “But the view that God has a Son and that He par-
takes of the deity—this the Arabs (and many [others] along with them) call 
into question.”40 Thus, the Divine Word as Cusa’s spokesman is forced to trans-
late the trinitarian proper names into philosophical concepts: 
Some [writers] name Oneness Father, Equality Son, and Union Holy Spirit 
because these terms, though not proper, nonetheless signify the Trinity 
suitably. For the Son is from the Father; and Love, or Spirit, is from 
Oneness and from the Son’s Equality. For the nature of the Father passes 
over into a certain equality in the Son; therefore, Love-and-Union arises 
from Oneness and Equality. And if simpler terms could be found, they 
would be more fitting—as are Oneness, Itness, and Sameness. For these 
terms seem to explicate better the most fecund simplicity of the essence. 
And since in the essence of the rational soul there is a certain fecun-
dity—viz., mind, wisdom, and love, or will—notice that mind, of itself, 
begets understanding or wisdom, from which [proceeds] will, or love. 
39 On this issue, see Tom Kerger, Pia interpretatio: Vier christliche Theologen im Gespräch 
mit dem Islam, 1st ed., Trierer theologische Studien, 75 (Trier: Paulinus, 2010); Ludwig 
Hagemann, Der Kur‘ān in Verständnis und Kritik bei Nikolaus von Kues: Ein Beitrag 
zur Erhellung islāmisch-christlicher Geschichte, Frankfurter theologische Studien, 21 
(Frankfurt: Knecht, 1976); Jasper Hopkins, “The Role of pia interpretatio in Nicholas of 
Cusa’s Hermeneutical Approach to the Koran,” in Concordia discors, ed. Gregorio Piaia 
(Padua: Antenore, 1993), 251–273.
40 Jasper Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa’s De pace fidei and Cribratio Alkorani: Translation and 
Analysis, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis, MN: Banning, 1994), 645. De pace fidei 8, n. 23: “Sed quod 
Deus habeat filium et participem in deitate, hoc impugnant Arabes et multi cum ipsis.”
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And this trinity in the soul’s oneness of essence is a fecundity which [the 
soul] has in likeness to the most fecund uncreated Trinity.41
It is noteworthy that within the henological-apophatic framework of Cusanian 
metaphysics, even the names of the trinitarian characters are not adequate to 
express the ineffable mystery of the Trinity.42 This is perhaps one of the most 
striking facts for a Christian philosopher.43 Unlike Thomas Aquinas,44 Cusa 
explicitly states that the trinitarian names, though ‘suitable’ (convenienter), are 
not proper (non sint proprii). Philosophical concepts like ‘Oneness,’ ‘Equality,’ 
and ‘Union,’ or alternatively ‘Oneness,’ ‘Itness,’ and ‘Sameness,’ are much more 
precise because they are simpler and less anthropomorphic. This triad— 
unitas, aequalitas, and conexio or concordia—goes back to Augustine’s De 
doctrina christiana45 and was developed further by the School of Chartres, 
41 Ibid., 645–646. De pace fidei 8, n. 24: “Nominant aliqui unitatem Patrem, aequalitatem 
Filium, et nexum Spiritum Sanctum; quia illi termini etsi non sint proprii, tamen 
convenienter significant trinitatem. Nam de Patre Filius, et ab unitate et aequalitate 
Filii amor seu Spiritus. Transit enim natura Patris in quandam aequalitatem in Filio. 
Quare amor et nexus ab unitate et aequalitate exoritur. Et si simpliciores termini reperiri 
possent, aptiores forent, ut est unitas, iditas et idemptitas. Hii enim termini magis 
videntur fecundissimam essentiae simplicitatem explicare. Et attende, cum in essentia 
rationalis animae sit quaedam fecunditas, scilicet mens, sapientia et amor seu voluntas, 
quoniam mens ex se exerit intellectum seu sapientiam, ex quibus voluntas seu amor, 
et est haec trinitas in unitate essentiae animae fecunditas quam habet in similitudine 
fecundissimae increatae trinitatis.”
42 A similar position is held in De docta ign. I, 9 (h I), Sermo XXII (h XVI4 n. 21), and De non 
aliud 5 (h XII).
43 See Gilson’s reaction in Etienne Gilson, Die Metamorphosen des Gottesreiches, trans. 
U. Behler (Munich: Schöningh, 1959), 169: “Unmöglich kann man sich dem Buchstaben 
des Dogmas gegenüber noch fügsamer zeigen. Die Einheit im Glauben, von der Nikolaus 
träumt, wird es nicht einmal mehr erfordern, daß man vom Vater, Sohn und Heiligen 
Geist spricht.”
44 Thomas, “STh I q. 33 a. 2,” in Editio Leonina: Sancti Thomae Aquinatis doctoris angelici 
Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII. P.M. edita: Tomus quartus: Pars prima Summae 
theologiae: A quaestione 1 ad quaestionem XLIX ad codices manuscriptos vaticanos exacta 
cum commentariis Thomae de Vio Caietani Ordinis Praedicatorum S.R.E. Cardinalis cura 
et studio fratrum eiusdem ordinis (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda 
Fide, 1888), 359.
45 Augustine, “De doctrina christiana I, V, 5,” in Aurelii Augustini Opera: Pars IV,1: Sancti 
Aurelii Augustini De doctrina christiana—De vera religione, ed. Josef Martin, Corpus 
Christianorum: Series Latina, 32 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1962), 9.
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especially Thierry of Chartres.46 In his main work, De docta ignorantia, Cusa 
dedicates two chapters to this triad in order to elucidate the intradivine pro-
cessions.47 There he also mentions the triad unitas, iditas, and identitas.48
The passage cited above from De pace fidei makes it clear that Cusa is truly 
aware of the difficulties a naïve discussion about the Trinity could cause in 
the Muslim world. It is interesting to observe that the Chaldean interlocutor’s 
concern about monotheism produces a certain backlash in the answer of the 
Divine Word, who denies that the trinitarian names of the Christian creed 
are proper names. So Cusa’s trinitarian speculation also contributes to a cer-
tain demythologization or purification of the Trinity doctrine from popular 
misunderstandings.
The tools necessary for this demythologization process are unity- 
metaphysics and negative theology. Thus, since God is beyond any human 
concept, even religious concepts lose their weight. Accordingly, Cusa’s read-
ing of Neoplatonic sources like Proclus49 shows his optimism in assuming that 
religious differences consist much more in a different manner of speaking (in 
modo dicendi) than in different eternal truths.50 Passing from the logical to the 
ontological level, the cardinal insists on the absolute transcendence, infinity, 
and oneness of God, who is beyond all otherness. Hence, it is impossible that 
there is any otherness, i.e., numerical difference between the three divine per-
sons, because numerically different entities would be plural—and therefore, 
in theological terms, created. In De non aliud, Cusa explicitly remarks: “non 
aliud est non aliud quam non aliud.”51
46 Thierry’s use of this triad is vast in his most important works—Commentum, Lectiones, 
Glosa, and Tractatus de sex dierum operibus—which are edited in Nikolaus M. Häring, 
ed., Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and his School (Toronto: Pontifical 
Institute of Medieval Studies, 1971).
47 De docta ign. I, 8–9.
48 Ibid., I, 9.
49 On Proclus, see Werner Beierwaltes, Proklos: Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik, 2nd revised 
and extended ed., Philosophische Abhandlungen, 24 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979).
50 In the margin 557 to the 7th book of Proclus’ In Parmenidem, Cusa writes: “[. . .] videtur 
igitur subtiliter consideranti. in modo dicendi pocius esse diuersitatem, inter platonicos 
iudeos cristianos et arabes” (Marg. 557, CUSANUS-Texte: III. Marginalien: 2. Proclus Latinus: 
Die Exzerpte und Randnoten des Nikolaus von Kues zu den lateinischen Übersetzungen 
der Proclus-Schriften: 2.2. Expositio in Parmenidem Platonis, ed. Karl Bormann: Vorgelegt 
am 23. Mai 1985 von Werner Beierwaltes, Abhandlungen der Heidelberger Akademie 
der Wissenschaften: Philosophisch-historische Klasse: Jahrgang 1986: 3. Abhandlung 
(Heidelberg: Winter, 1986), 136–137).
51 De non aliud 1.
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Within Cusa’s unity-metaphysics, the principle of presupposition plays a 
key role. Thus, in chapter 4 of De pace fidei the Greek interlocutor states that 
all philosophers presuppose wisdom,52 in chapter 5 the Italian holds that 
God must be wisdom,53 and in chapter 6, the Arab agrees that even polythe-
ists presuppose divinity as the eternal principle in which the particular gods 
participate.54 According to Nicholas of Cusa, the common ground of different 
religions is absolute oneness, which is explicitly presupposed by monotheists 
and implicitly presupposed by polytheists.55 However, his search for common 
ground must not be misunderstood as a pluralistic theology of religions,56 
because he attempts to point out that Christian core doctrines like the Trinity 
or the Incarnation are also presupposed by people from other religious tradi-
tions, especially by Muslims.
If we take another look at the passage cited above from chapter 8 of De 
pace fidei, we can understand the reason why Cusa insists on the trinitarian 
structure of God. Here, he establishes an analogy between the fecundity of the 
human mind and the fecundity of the divine mind. As the human mind begets 
wisdom or understanding, the divine mind similarly begets divine wisdom. 
Like the human mind and wisdom, the divine mind and wisdom are also both 
connected by will or love.57 This analogy is made possible because every crea-
ture receives its being and fecundity from its creator, who must therefore be 
considered fecund as well.58
52 De pace fidei 4, n. 11.
53 Ibid., 5, n. 14.
54 Ibid., 6, n. 17.
55 On this issue, see Klaus Kremer, “Die Hinführung (manuductio) von Polytheisten zum 
Einen, von Juden und Mohammedanern zum Dreieinen Gott,” in Der Friede unter den 
Religionen nach Nikolaus von Kues, ed. Rudolf Haubst, thematic issue of Mitteilungen und 
Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft 16 (1984): 126–163; Markus Enders, “Die eine 
(wahre) Gottesverehrung in der Vielfalt der Religionen: Zur Begründungsfunktion der 
spekulativen Einheitsmetaphysik des Cusanus für seine Vision eines immerwährenden 
Religionsfriedens,” in Metaphysik und Religion: Die Wiederentdeckung eines Zusam-
menhanges, ed. Hermann Deuser, Veröffentlichungen der wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft 
für Theologie, 30 (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2007) 119–153.
56 E.g., John Hick and Paul F. Knitter, eds., The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a 
Pluralistic Theology of Religions (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1987). Some critical remarks are 
given in Gavin D’Costa, ed., Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: The Myth of a Pluralistic 
Theology of Religions (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1990).
57 De pace fidei 8, n. 24.
58 Ibid., 8, n. 24.
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It appears that the Divine Word tries to convince its Chaldean interlocutor 
by claiming: Whoever affirms that God is the creator and the fecund source of 
all, must affirm that he is triune. Evidently, in order to guide its interlocutor to 
the trinitarian God, the Divine Word does not resort to supernatural sources 
of revelation or to salvific history, but rather to natural knowledge. In this 
vein, Cusa follows the Iberic tradition of the Castilian John of Segovia59 and 
the Catalans Raymond Lull60 and Raymond of Sabunde,61 all of whom saw the 
urgent need to convert Muslims by proving disputed doctrines like the Trinity 
through reason. Consequently, Cusa’s philosophical translation of the trinitar-
ian doctrine is open to public—but profoundly metaphysical—reason. In this 
respect, he differs significantly from modern postmetaphysical philosophers 
like Habermas.62
The main problem, though, still needs to be solved: How can Cusanus 
overcome the apparent contradiction between the negation of otherness in 
God and the affirmation that God is in fact triune? Following Boethius’ De 
Trinitate,63 the cardinal maintains that the trinitarian persons only differ in 
relation to each other but not in their essence, in contrast to the varying nature 
of numerically different, finite beings.64 Since the Trinitarian figures therefore 
do not violate absolute unity, they neither multiply God nor limit each other. 
Hence, the Islamic accusation of shirk is philosophically rejected.
59 On John of Segovia’s apologetics, see Darío Cabanelas Rodríguez, Juan de Segovia y el 
problema islámico (Madrid: Universidad de Madrid, 1952).
60 On Raymond Lull’s apologetics, see Viola Tenge-Wolf, “Erstes Kapitel: Allgemeine 
Einführung,” in Doctoris Illuminati Raimundi Lulli Opera latina cum cura et studio 
Instituti Raimundi Lulli in Universitate Friburgense Brisigavorum ad fidem codicum manu 
scriptorum edita: Tomus XXVII: 53: Tabula generalis In mari in portu Tunicii in medio 
septembris anno MCCXCIII incepta et in civitate Neapolis in octavis Epiphaniae anno 
MCCXCIV ad finem perducta, ed. Viola Tenge-Wolf, Corpus Christianorum: Continuatio 
Mediaevalis, 181 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), 13–52.
61 On Raymond of Sabunde’s apologetics, see Walter Andreas Euler, “Raimund von Sabunde,” 
Theologische Realenzyklopädie 28 (1997): 122–125.
62 E.g., Jürgen Habermas, “Ein Bewußtsein von dem, was fehlt,” in Ein Bewußtsein von dem, 
was fehlt: Eine Diskussion mit Jürgen Habermas, ed. Michael Reder and Josef Schmidt 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2008), 26–36. However, it is hard to see why a secular society ought 
to be necessarily postmetaphysical, as Habermas states (33).
63 Boethius, De Trinitate 5 in Boethius, The Theological Tractates, ed. and trans. H. F. Stewart 
and E. K. Rand, The Loeb Classical Library (London: Heinemann., 1918), 26–27.
64 De pace fidei 8, n. 23.
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 Why Naming the Trinitarian God is Still Important for Cusa
This translation of kerygmatic proper names into philosophical concepts 
should not, however, be misunderstood as a reduction of proper names to defi-
nite descriptions, as is done by Russell.65 Proper names are constitutive for 
interpersonal communication, revelation, and religious practice. Contrary to 
conceiving something, naming someone means getting familiar with him or 
her. In one of his main theological works, Introduction to Christianity, Joseph 
Ratzinger points out the difference between a mere philosophical concept of 
God that points at God’s essence, and a name of God that is relevant for religious 
life, as the latter enables an interpersonal communication with God.66 Already 
in his first lecture held at the University of Bonn in 1959, Ratzinger states that 
God’s accessibility (Ansprechbarkeit) in prayer is one of the most important 
innovations of monotheism compared to polytheism.67 In doing so, he differ-
entiates between the meaning of personality in metaphysics and in philosophy 
of religion. In terms of metaphysics, even Aristotle’s unmoved mover can be 
called personal, due to his self-reference or self-reflection. However, in terms 
of philosophy of religion, personality must entail accessibility.68
Nicholas of Cusa shares both meanings of personality. On the one hand, 
God is absolutely self-referential. At the same time, God’s accessibility is also 
central to Cusa’s thought, testified by many passages69 and by the mystagogical 
framework of his entire oeuvre.
Above all, there always remains a gap between God’s First-Person-Speech in 
revelation, the Second-Person-Speech in prayer, and the Third-Person-Speech 
in philosophy or theology.
In his book In Excess, Jean-Luc Marion refers to the Jewish tradition of the 
ineffable name of God, which can never be pronounced as a proper name.70 
65 On Russell’s description theory, see his article “On Denoting,” Mind 14/4 (1905): 479–493.
66 Joseph Ratzinger, Einführung in das Christentum: Vorlesungen über das Apostolische 
Glaubensbekenntnis, 4th ed. (Munich: Kösel, 2005), 122–123.
67 Joseph Ratzinger, Der Gott des Glaubens und der Gott der Philosophen: Ein Beitrag 
zum Problem der theologia naturalis, ed. Heino Sonnemanns, 3rd ed. (Trier: Paulinus, 
2006), pp. 27–28.
68 Ibid., 63, note 7.
69 E.g., De docta ign. I, 26; III, Prol.; III, 12; De vis. Dei 4 (h VI n. 9)—25 (h VI n. 119); Sermo XXIII 
(h XVI, 4 n. 37). 
70 Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena, trans. R. Horner and 
V. Berraud, Perspectives in Continental Philosophy, 27 (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2001), 157.
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But even in Christianity, this apophatic tradition is still present and deploys a 
religious transformation of human beings:
For the name no longer functions by inscribing God within the theoreti-
cal horizon of our predication but rather by inscribing us, according to a 
radically new praxis, in the very horizon of God. This is exactly what bap-
tism accomplishes when, far from our attributing to God a name that is 
intelligible to us, we enter into God’s unpronounceable Name, with the 
additional result that we receive our own. This pragmatic theology is 
deployed, in fact, under the figure of the liturgy (which begins with bap-
tism), where it is never a matter of speaking of God, but always of speak-
ing to God in the words of the Word.71
According to Marion, the essence of Christian theology does not consist in 
talking theoretically of God, but in talking to God in worship. Since worship 
presupposes a certain accessibility of God, God must render himself accessi-
ble by revealing himself to mankind. Here we must be aware of an important 
difference between man and God. Human beings always reveal themselves 
after having been named by someone else, for example parents who choose 
a certain name and start talking with their child. After some time of getting 
familiar with words, it is the child who reveals him- or herself as a person by 
calling or conversing with his or her parents.72 God, in contrast, does not need 
to be named or called by human beings in order to reveal himself as personal. 
As the trinitarian formula “non aliud est non aliud quam non aliud”73 indicates, 
it is God who names himself. Although God’s proper name, which enfolds the 
essence of all beings, is absolutely transcendent,74 it becomes visible in our 
contingent world through Jesus Christ, God incarnate. In fact, for Cusa, Jesus is 
God’s proper name.75 As universal mediator, he connects divinity and human-
ity, or, more precisely, he enables the human image to be part of its divine 
exemplar without being absorbed by it.76
71 Ibid., 157.
72 An interesting phenomenological investigation on the correlation between revelation and 
personality is given in August Brunner, Offenbarung und Glaube: Eine phänomenologische 
Untersuchung (Munich: Berchmans, 1985), 11–28.
73 De non aliud 1.
74 De docta ign. I, 24.
75 Sermo XXIII, n. 28–40.
76 De vis. Dei 18, n. 82.
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So we can draw the conclusion that Cusa’s trinitarian theology finally boils 
down to a Christology aiming at guiding humans—including people from 
other religions—to the heart of the Trinity.77 In doing so, he differs significantly 
from contemporary Christian-Muslim dialogue, which excludes proselytism as 
well as syncretism. Nevertheless, Cusa still shares the Muslim concern about 
God’s unity. Therefore, the Islamic rejection of the trinitarian doctrine plays a 
key role in Cusa’s trinitarian speculation. On the one hand, it serves as a start-
ing point for Cusa’s rational apologetic of the Trinity, meant as a response to 
Qurʾanic objections. On the other hand, it helps him to deepen and purify his 
own trinitarian belief, separating it from popular, especially tritheistic, mis-
understandings. In this way, contemporary trinitarian theology could learn a 
lot from Cusa’s awareness that the trinitarian doctrine is still monotheistic. 
But also, contemporary interreligious dialogue could be reminded that both 
Christianity and Islam entail an alethic dimension.
77 On the mystical dimension of Cusa’s trinitarian speculation see Bernard McGinn, 
“Unitrinum seu triunum: Nicholas of Cusa’s Trinitarian Mysticism,” in Mystics: Presence 





Deficient Sacraments or Unifying Rites?  
Alan of Lille, Nicholas of Cusa, and Riccoldo da 
Montecroce on Muslim and Jewish Praxis
Rita George-Tvrtković
Baptismal washings occur among both Hebrews and Arabs; [accord-
ingly,] it will not be difficult for them to accept for their profession of 
faith the washing instituted by Christ. They will quite readily consent to 
their children being baptized.1
Nicholas of Cusa (d. 1464) was not the only medieval Christian to mention 
quasi-baptismal washings such as Muslim wudu and Jewish mikveh in his dis-
cussion of non-Christian religions. In fact, most medieval theologians con-
centrated their critique of ‘infidel’ rites on the same few practices: ablution, 
circumcision, abstinence from pork or wine, polygyny, and the literal inter-
pretation of scripture. However, Nicholas’s perspective here is unique. His glib 
suggestion—that wudu and mikveh are so similar to Christian baptism that 
Muslims and Jews would ‘quite readily’ accept it—is striking for its optimism 
(and naiveté). Furthermore, Nicholas’s relatively positive view can be con-
trasted with the more commonly held negative views of theologians like Alan 
of Lille (d. 1202/3), who condemned wudu as a deficient sacrament, and Islam 
itself as a ‘monstrous sect.’
Alan and Nicholas might seem to have divergent views of Muslim and 
Jewish praxis, but they are actually more similar than they first appear. Alan 
understood non-Christian rites in a pessimistic way, seeing only their ability 
to divide. Nicholas, on the other hand, understood non-Christian rites in an 
optimistic way, seeing only their ability to unify. But in both cases, the theo-
logian was unable to appreciate or even articulate the particularities of these 
 
1 Nicholas of Cusa, De pace fidei in Nicholas of Cusa’s De Pace Fidei and Cribratio Alkorani: 
Translation and Analysis, trans. Jasper Hopkins, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning, 
1994), 67. Critical Latin text of De pace fidei can be found in Raymond Klibansky and 
Hildebrand Bascour, eds., Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia, vol. 7 (Hamburg: Meiner, 1959); here, 
XVII.61. All citations of De pace in this essay will refer both to the Latin edition (chapter and 
paragraph number), and to Hopkins’s English translation (page number).
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non-Christian practices, and instead simply dismissed them—either neg-
atively like Alan (who deemed the rites deficient) or positively like Nicholas 
(who believed the rites could be easily transformed). Luckily, the reductionism 
of Nicholas and Alan does not exhaust medieval perspectives on non-Chris-
tian rites. A few other theologians, including the Dominican Riccoldo da 
Montecroce (d. 1320), offer a more nuanced but also more ambivalent approach. 
In Riccoldo’s case, this complexity is no doubt partly due to the fact that he 
lived in Baghdad for over a decade and witnessed Muslim praxis firsthand, 
unlike Nicholas and Alan who never set foot outside Christendom, as far as 
we know. Among these three authors, Riccoldo alone takes non-Christian rites 
seriously, at least in the case of Islam, for he describes Muslim praxis in great 
detail and with relative accuracy. In a few places he even praises Muslim praxis; 
this is also true for his descriptions of Eastern Christian and Tartar (Mongol) 
rites, which he also claims to have observed during his Middle Eastern travels. 
Interestingly, Riccoldo’s descriptions of Muslim rites stand in marked contrast 
to his discussion of Jewish rites, which out of all the religions he discusses in 
his books is the least detailed and nuanced.
Alan, Riccoldo, and Nicholas were born in different centuries, came from 
distinct cultural contexts, and had varying levels of familiarity with non- 
Christian practices and doctrines. In light of these differences, this article will 
spotlight what each wrote about both Muslim and Jewish praxis, with an eye to 
1) differences in the way the same author treated Muslim versus Jewish praxis, 
and 2) differences among the three authors in their overall approach to other 
religions. The three theologians are similar in that they all place their dis-
cussion of Muslim and Jewish praxis within an overall hierarchy of religions, 
stressing relationships among them and providing an implicit Christian theol-
ogy of religions. Nevertheless, they differ in their conclusions, thus offering us 
a glimpse at the wide range of medieval Christian views on Muslim and Jewish 
praxis: from deficient sacraments (Alan), to unifying rites (Nicholas), to prac-
tices sometimes even worthy of praise (Riccoldo).
 Hierarchy of Religions
Before turning to an analysis of the texts, a brief word must be said about their 
structure. Alan of Lille’s Quadripartita editio (c. 1185), also known as De fide 
catholica contra haereticos, Valdenses, Iudaeos, et paganos, is an apologetic 
handbook meant to help preachers combat various threats to orthodoxy.2 Its 
2 The Latin text of De fide can be found in Marie-Thérèse d’Alverny, ed., Alain de Lille: Textes 
Inédits (Paris: Vrin, 1965), as well as in PL 210: 305–430. See also Marie-Thérèse d’Alverny’s 
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four parts are organized hierarchically: the first two books treat the groups 
closest to the Roman Church, the heretical Cathars and Waldensians, respec-
tively; the third book treats Jews; and the last book treats pagans, by which 
Alan means Muslims (he also calls them Saracens and Mahometans, though 
interestingly he does not call them heretics, as Peter the Venerable and oth-
ers did before him).3 Riccoldo arranges the sections of his missionary hand-
book, Ad nationes orientales (c. 1300), in roughly the same order as Alan: his 
first chapter discusses what he calls the heretical Jacobites and Nestorians, his 
second chapter discusses Jews, and his third chapter discusses Saracens, whom 
he—unlike Alan—distinguishes from pagans.4 The fourth and last chapter 
discusses Tartars (Mongols).5
One can detect this very same hierarchy of religions nearly one hundred and 
fifty years later in Nicholas of Cusa’s De pace fidei (1453), although the hierarchy 
is reversed and the order is not strictly followed. De pace’s dialogue between 
seventeen different nations begins with the group ostensibly most distant 
from Christianity, thus: first pagan philosophers discuss wisdom; then an 
Indian (Hindu) discusses idolatry; then Chaldeans, Jews, and Persians discuss 
critical Latin edition and introduction in “Alain de Lille et l’Islam, Le Contra Paganos,” 
Cahiers de Fanjeaux 18 (1983): 301–350. For more on De fide and a general introduction to Alan 
of Lille, see Gillian Evans, Alan of Lille: The Frontiers of Theology in the Later Twelfth Century 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
3 Terms such as ‘pagan,’ ‘gentile,’ and ‘infidel’ retained a certain fluidity throughout the medi-
eval era. See Yves Congar, “ ‘Gentilis’ et ‘Iudaeus’ au moyen âge,” Recherches de théologie 
ancienne et médiévale 36 (1969): 222–225. Congar argues that the gentile cannot simply be 
equated with Jews; he points to Alan of Lille’s four categories and to the distinction made 
by Aquinas and others between gentiles and Jews. (Aquinas lists three kinds of disbelief in 
ST II.II.10.5–11.) For more on the ambiguous identity of the gentile in Alan of Lille, see Evans, 
Alan of Lille, 128–29. For more on the ambiguous identity of the gentile in Aquinas, see the 
article by Mark Jordan, “The Protreptic Structure of the Summa contra Gentiles,” The Thomist 
50 (1986): 173–209. 
4 There is no critical Latin edition of Riccoldo’s Ad nationes orientales, which exists in three 
medieval MSS, including one in the author’s own hand at Biblioteca Nazionale Fiorenze (MS 
Conv. Sopp. C. 8. 1173, fols. 21r–244r). Dondaine has published only excerpts in “Ricoldiana: 
notes sur les œuvres de Riccoldo de Montecroce,” Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 37 (1967): 
119–70. Kurt Villads Jensen formerly posted the entire Latin text online but has since removed 
it. All English translations in this paper are my own (translated from the Jensen version). 
5 Interestingly, Riccoldo offers another (reversed) hierarchy in the prologue of Ad nationes. 
Here, he places the Tartars (Mongols) first because he believes religions that are doctrin-
ally the most distant from Latin Christianity are also the easiest to convert, while those who 
are doctrinally closest, such as the Jacobites, are placed last, because they are most difficult 
to convert: “Experience shows that the Tartars are easier to convert than the Saracens, the 
Saracens easier to convert than the Jews, and the Jews easier than the [Eastern] Christians.”
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the Trinity and Incarnation; and finally, Armenians, English, and Bohemians 
discuss the sacraments. In general, Nicholas sticks to the hierarchy despite sev-
eral anomalies,6 and the overall movement of the discussion goes from truths 
obtained by reason (e.g., the existence of truth and the one God), to articles 
of faith obtained by revelation (e.g., the Trinity and Incarnation), to issues of 
ritual diversity (e.g., circumcision and the Eucharist).
In short, Alan, Riccoldo, and Nicholas all use the same hierarchy of religions 
to structure their writings, where the hierarchy is based on each religion’s per-
ceived proximity to or distance from the Roman Church. But similar structure 
does not necessarily generate similar content, for in the end, each theologian 
reaches a vastly different conclusion about ‘infidel’ rites.
 Alan of Lille: Deficient Sacraments
Alan of Lille (d. 1202/3) was a Cistercian master who taught at Chartres and 
Paris, but also preached against the Cathars while living in Montpellier. He 
aimed to provide a comprehensive view of all non-orthodox groups in his 
book De fide catholica, as a way to combat heresy. This goal is not surprising 
when taking into account when and where Alan was writing; scholars date his 
text to circa 1185, just a year after the Council of Verona’s condemnation of the 
Waldensians, one of the heretical groups targeted by Alan in his book.7 Alan’s 
emphasis on Christian errors over Jewish and Muslim ones can be inferred 
simply by the amount of ink he spilled on each group; the section on Cathars 
contains seventy-six chapters, while the section on Jews has only twenty-one 
and the one on pagans (Muslims) has even less at fifteen. In the first section 
of the work, Alan focuses his discussion on the seven sacraments, which also 
makes sense given his Cathar target. A discussion of Jewish and Muslim rites, 
albeit far from comprehensive, is featured in the other sections as well.
Because Alan had spent time in southern France, much of his informa-
tion on Cathar and Waldensian doctrine and practice was probably obtained 
firsthand. However, his information on Jews and Judaism most likely was not. 
There is evidence that he learned about Judaism mainly from Gilbert Crispin’s 
late eleventh-century Disputatio Judaei et Christiani, a text that seems to have 
been based on a real conversation.8 David Berger observes that roughly forty 
6 The Tartars (Mongols) are not presented with the Indians as one might think, and the Turks 
are tossed in with Spanish and German Christians.
7 Evans, Alan of Lille, 104.
8 David Berger, “Gilbert Crispin, Alan of Lille, and Jacob ben Reuben: A Study in the 
Transmission of Medieval Polemic,” Speculum 49/1 (1974): 34–47.
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percent of Alan’s chapter on the Jews in De fide is copied nearly verbatim from 
Crispin,9 while Jeremy Cohen notes that Alan’s writings “contain no evidence 
of any personal familiarity with rabbinic literature.”10 As for Alan’s chapter on 
Islam, it is unclear whether he had access to the most up-to-date information 
available in Northern Europe at the time, which would have included either 
Peter the Venerable’s Summa totius haeresis Saracenorum (a primer on Islam 
written for Christians), or the so-called Toledan Collection (a compendium of 
Islamic primary texts Peter had had translated into Latin in the mid twelfth 
century, which included the first Latin translation of the Qurʾan by Robert of 
Ketton).11 If Alan did consult Peter’s Summa or the Toledan Collection, there is 
scant evidence of it in Contra paganos.12
In fact, Alan’s short sections on Jewish and Muslim doctrine and prac-
tice contain very little originality, except in terms of their organization 
(some scholars believe it is organized like a handbook for quick reference by 
preachers).13 For example, in his section on Islam, Alan mentions the very same 
rites that almost every medieval Christian mentions when writing on Islamic 
practice: wudu (ablution), prayer, fasting, almsgiving, the prohibition of wine 
and pork, and circumcision. From these, the Muslim ritual of wudu was espe-
cially popular among Christians due to its seeming similarity to baptism.14 And 
indeed, two entire chapters of Alan’s Contra paganos (which contains only 
fifteen chapters, as noted above) are devoted to wudu. Since Alan most likely 
9 Berger, “Gilbert Crispin,” 34. Berger argues that some of the same passages from Crispin 
that were copied by Alan were also translated into Hebrew by Jacob ben Reuben in 
his Wars of the Lord; it is possible that both Jacob and Alan consulted a collection of 
polemical texts circulating in northern France at the end of the twelfth century that 
included substantial material from Crispin, 37.
10 Jeremy Cohen, Living Letters of the Law (Berkeley: University of California, 1999), 309.
11 For more on the Toledan collection, see the classic article by Marie-Thérèse d’Alverny, 
“Deux traductions latines du Coran au Môyen Age,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et 
litteraire du môyen age 16 (1948): 69–131. For a more recent treatment, see José Martínez 
Gázquez, “Translations of the Qurʾan and Other Islamic Texts before Dante (Twelfth and 
Thirteenth Centuries),” Dante Studies 125 (2007): 79–92.
12 d’Alverny, “Alain de Lille et l’Islam,” 305.
13 Evans, Alan of Lille, 117.
14 One example of the widespread medieval interest in wudu can be seen in a manuscript 
of Riccoldo’s Liber peregrinationis (MS Vatican Library, Barberini, Lat. 2687, f. 1r–12v), 
where several later annotators had underlined Riccoldo’s entire discussion of wudu. For 
the critical Latin edition of Liber peregrinationis (hereafter LP), see René Kappler, ed., 
Pérégrinationes et Letters (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1997). An English translation of LP 
can be found in Rita George-Tvrtković, A Christian Pilgrim in Medieval Iraq: Riccoldo da 
Montecroce’s Encounter with Islam (Turnhout: Brepols, 2012). All page references to LP in 
this article are to the English translation by George-Tvrtković, unless otherwise noted.
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never witnessed an actual Muslim performing this ritual, it is not surprising 
that he does not describe it in any detail. Rather, he focuses on intentionality, 
form, and efficacy, with the primary question: is the Muslim ‘ablutio corporis 
per aquam’ sufficient for the remission of sins? Alan concludes—without pro-
viding any concrete details about Muslim ablution at all—that wudu is insuf-
ficient for the remission of sins because it is merely an external washing, with 
no internal contrition involved.15 Alan’s critique is therefore focused on the 
superficiality of the external act, which he believes has no interior component. 
This parallels his critique of Muslim heaven, which he likewise condemns as 
entirely carnal because he believes that Muslims interpret the Qurʾanic descrip-
tion of heaven literally, never allegorically.16 Alan’s focus on the relationship 
between the internal and external aspects of Muslim rites makes sense given 
his overall argument against heresy, especially against the Cathars, who argued 
for the spiritual inefficacy of sacraments, which they deemed purely physical 
in nature.17
Moreover, Alan not only criticizes the intentionality or inner reality of 
Muslim wudu, he also criticizes its outward form. In Alan’s view, there are at 
least two problems with the form of wudu: it does not invoke the Trinitarian 
formula, and it can be repeated. Here too, Alan explicitly parallels the repet-
itive nature of Muslim wudu with the kind of rebaptism practiced by some 
heretics.18 In short, Alan deems Muslim wudu as a deficient baptism in every 
sense, from its inner reality to its outward form. And if that were not enough, 
Alan ends his chapters on wudu with one last criticism: he accuses Muslims 
of ‘Judaizing,’ not only in wudu but also in other practices, such as when they 
abstain from pork or take multiple wives.19 In Alan’s eyes, Jewish and Muslim 
rituals are equally ineffective and are both forms of idolatry, primarily because 
they are rooted in an overly literal interpretation of the Law of Moses.20
Alan had meant for his Contra paganos on Muslims (Book Four of De fide) 
to be read in tandem with Contra Iudaeos (Book Three), since his argument 
for the Trinity in Book Four consists simply of a short reference to what had 
already been stated in Book Three.21 Likewise, what he writes about Jewish 
15 Contra paganos (Ch. 9), 342. All page references are to the critical Latin edition of Contra 
paganos, edited by d’Alverny.
16 Contra paganos (Ch. 5–6), 338–39.
17 Evans, Alan of Lille, 105. 
18 Contra paganos (Ch. 10), 343.
19 Contra paganos, (Ch. 10), 343.
20 Contra paganos, (Ch. 10), 343. 
21 Contra paganos, (Ch. 1), 332: “Ad quos confuntandos que contra iudeos de unitate et 
trinitate diximus dicta sufficiant.”
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practice in Book Three is connected to what he later says about Muslim prac-
tice in Book Four. In both cases, he condemns Jews and Muslims for their lit-
eral interpretation of the Law. He thus criticizes the Jewish abstinence from 
pork as unnecessary in Chapter Eight (this is one of the sections he copied 
from Gilbert Crispin),22 while in Chapter Ten he connects Jewish rituals to a 
literal interpretation of the Law, which he calls a kind of ‘death’ (this section is 
original to Alan). He argues for the abandonment of all such rituals by citing 
history, claiming that there have been times in the past when Jews themselves 
have changed their observance of the Law of Moses. And since now there is 
no longer any sacrifice, priests, prophets, temple, or places of sacrifice,23 Alan 
concludes that Jewish practices such as abstaining from pork can likewise also 
be abandoned, as Christians already know.
 Nicholas of Cusa: Unifying Rites
We will now jump ahead two centuries to Nicholas of Cusa’s De pace fidei, a 
short tract written explicitly as a response to the fall of Constantinople in 1453. 
De pace is presented as a heavenly ‘dialogue’ between the members of seven-
teen different religious groups, including Jews and Muslims. It is important to 
note that Nicholas studied Islam and the Qurʾan later in life (his ‘sifting’ of the 
Qurʾan, Cribratio Alkorani, appeared in 1461), but his knowledge of Judaism in 
1453 remains unclear. He never wrote a text devoted entirely to Judaism, and 
only refers to the religion in passing in just a few places, including: two ser-
mons on God’s name, legislation regarding Jewish dress in the German diocese 
of Minden, and a few short passages in De pace.24
The goal in writing De pace, says Nicholas, is to prevent global religious vio-
lence by convincing all religions to agree that there is only “one religion in a 
variety of rites.”25 To reach such an agreement, however, the dialogue partners 
must first grapple with their diverse doctrines and practices. With respect to 
praxis, Christian sacraments are discussed alongside non-Christian practices 
22 Berger, “Gilbert Crispin,” 34.
23 Contra Iudaeos, Chapter 10, PL 201:410.
24 Thomas Izbicki, “Nicholas of Cusa and the Jews,” in Conflict and Reconciliation: 
Perspectives on Nicholas of Cusa, ed. Inigo Bocken (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 119–130. Sections of 
De pace that mention Judaism: IX.25–26; XII.41; XIII.42, 44; XV.53; XVI.54–55, 59; XVII.62. 
(Hopkins’s corresponding page numbers: 46–47, 55–56, 62–63, 65, 67.)
25 De pace I.6 (Hopkins, 35): “Non est nisi religio una in rituum varietate.” For more on 
this phrase (about which scholars have debated for years), see the essay by Wilhelmus 
Valkenberg in this volume.
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such as circumcision and the ‘baptismal washings,’ as mentioned in the quote 
at the beginning of this essay. Like Alan, Nicholas sees parallels between 
Muslim wudu and Christian baptism, though Nicholas also adds Jewish 
washings to the mix. However, unlike Alan, who deems wudu unsatisfactory, 
Nicholas instead suggests that Jewish and Muslim ‘washings’ are similar to 
baptism.26 For Nicholas, the mere presence of baptism-like ablutions among 
Jews and Muslims is yet another proof that the ‘same one religion’ underlies 
different rites:
For baptism is nothing other than a confession of that faith [in Christ] by 
means of a sacramental sign . . . Baptismal washings occur among both 
Hebrews and Arabs; [accordingly,] it will not be difficult for them to 
accept for their profession of faith the washing instituted by Christ.27
What is more, Nicholas believes that the rite of baptism could even be used to 
unify the members of various religions. This belief is evident in the following 
amazing assertion:
[Hebrews and Arabs] will quite readily consent to their children being 
baptized. Since for religious reasons they have allowed males to be cir-
cumcised on the eighth day, then the transformation of circumcision to 
baptism will be acceptable to them, and a choice will be given to them as 
to whether or not they wish to be content with baptism alone.28
Of course, Nicholas thought that the rite of baptism would unify the various 
religions because he believed that baptism is rooted in a single faith, and that 
single faith, furthermore, ‘presupposes Christ’ (a point he repeats numerous 
times throughout De pace).
In some ways Nicholas’s approach to non-Christian rites is the exact oppo-
site of Alan’s, but in other ways, it is indeed quite similar. While Alan is too quick 
to reject Muslim and Jewish rituals as deficient sacraments, thus proving that 
these religions are not de fide catholica, Nicholas seems too quick to accept the 
rites as a means to interreligious unity. In several places throughout De pace, 
Nicholas states how easy it will be to get a certain group to agree to a modifi-
cation of practice. Two examples will suffice. First, as noted above, Nicholas 
 
26 De pace, XVII.61 (Hopkins, 67).
27 De pace, XVII.61–62 (Hopkins, 67).
28 De pace, XVII.62 (Hopkins, 67).
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asserts that “washings occur for religious devotion among the Hebrews and 
Arabs” therefore “it will not be difficult for them to accept the washing insti-
tuted by Christ” and “they will quite readily consent to their children being bap-
tized.”29 Second, and even more interestingly, Nicholas seems to be open not 
only to a modification of Jewish or Muslim practice (how generous of him!), 
but at one point even expresses a willingness to modify Christian practice. 
He supports this by noting the presence of ritual diversity between Eastern 
and Western Christians, acknowledging the fact that ‘Ethiopian Jacobites’ 
(Ethiopian Orthodox Christians) even practice circumcision.30 He then goes 
on to make a surprising suggestion (given traditional Christian concerns about 
Judaizing), proposing that all Christians should be willing to get circumcised, 
if such a concession would preserve peace among the religions: “Indeed, if for 
the sake of peace the majority were to conform itself to the minority and to 
receive circumcision, then I would deem that this should be done, in order that 
in this way peace might be established.”31 It seems that for Nicholas, at least 
in De pace fidei, peace among the nations is at least as important as doctrinal 
orthodoxy, and certainly more important than ritual agreement.32
 Riccoldo da Montecroce: Ambivalence
Riccoldo da Montecroce (d. 1320) was a Florentine Dominican who lived for 
over ten years in Baghdad, where he studied Islam and Arabic with Muslim 
masters in their schools, mosques, and homes. Riccoldo’s writings on other 
religions—which include not only the missionary handbook Ad nationes 
orientales, but also his Liber peregrinationis, Contra legem Sarracenorum, 
and Epistolae ad ecclesiam triumphantem—are replete with descriptions of 
29 De pace, XVII.61 (Hopkins, 67). Emphasis mine.
30 De pace, XVI.60 (Hopkins, 66). 
31 De pace, XVI.60 (Hopkins, 66). When writing this section, Nicholas surely had in mind the 
discussions about circumcision that took place between Latin and Coptic Christians at 
the Council of Ferrara-Florence (1438). While the Council eventually came down on the 
side of non-accommodation, this section of De pace suggests that Nicholas disagreed with 
the Council’s decision. I am grateful to Dr. Walter Andreas Euler for bringing this point to 
my attention at the American Cusanus Society conference at Gettysburg in October 2012.
32 Nicholas’s involvement in efforts to reunite Eastern and Western Christians must not be 
forgotten. In the fall of 1437, he even visited Constantinople as part of a papal delegation 
to the Greeks—all in preparation for the so-called ‘reunification council’ at Ferrara-
Florence the following year. Like Alan, Nicholas’s opinions about the rites and doctrines 
of other Christians and non-Christian religions are connected.
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his personal experiences of Muslims (as well as of Eastern Christians and 
Tartars).33 Of all the religions he describes, he says the least about Judaism, 
even though he does write a lengthy section about it in Ad nationes, and 
elsewhere mentions that he witnessed a debate in a synagogue between 
Dominicans and the large community of Jews in Mosul, Iraq.34 While Riccoldo 
boasts repeatedly about his knowledge of Arabic (including several Arabic 
terms and even adding a few words in Arabic script in one manuscript), his 
knowledge of Hebrew is unknown but probably nil, as there is no evidence for 
it in his writings.35
Riccoldo writes a great deal about Muslim praxis; in fact, it could be pro-
posed that he writes more about it than any other medieval Christian author.36 
In Liber peregrinationis, he devotes an entire section to the description and 
praise of seven Muslim practices that he calls ‘works of perfection,’ which 
consist of: prayer, almsgiving, devotion to study, respect for God’s name, strict-
ness of morals, hospitality to strangers, and fraternal love.37 Three aspects 
of Riccoldo’s discussion of Muslim praxis are noteworthy. First, he describes 
Muslim practices mentioned by no other medieval Christian (such as their 
reverence for the name of God). Second, some of these details could not have 
33 For the critical Latin edition of Epistolae ad ecclesiam triumphantem (hereafter Epistolae), 
see Reinhold Röhricht, “Lettres de R. de Monte-Cruce,” Archives de l’Orient Latin 2 (1884): 
258–269. The English translation of Epistolae, to which I will be referring in this essay, can 
be found in George-Tvrtković, A Christian Pilgrim in Medieval Iraq. For the critical Latin 
edition of Contra legem Sarracenorum (hereafter Contra legem) see Jean-Marie Mérigoux, 
“L’ouvrage d’un frère prêcheur en Orient à la fin du XIIIe s., suivi de l’édition du Contra 
legem Sarracenorum,” Memorie Domenicane XVII (1986): 1–142.
34 LP, 200.
35 George-Tvrtković, A Christian Pilgrim in Medieval Iraq, 24–25.
36 William of Tripoli is a close second, both in terms of accuracy of description and 
substantive commentary. See Peter Engels, ed. and trans., Wilhelm von Tripolis: Notitia de 
Machometo (Würzburg: Echter, 1992), especially 256–57. Yet, Riccoldo still writes more 
pages and a more sustained commentary on Islamic praxis than William. For more on 
William of Tripoli, see Thomas O’Meara, “The Theology and Times of William of Tripoli: 
A Different View of Islam,” Theological Studies, 69 (2008): 80–98. Petrus Alfonsi also writes 
on Muslim praxis throughout the fifth part of Dialogi, but his descriptions are short and 
perfunctory, with little commentary.
37 It is interesting that Riccoldo omits fasting from this list, for almost all other Christians, 
whether medieval or modern, are quick to acknowledge the triumvirate of fasting, prayer, 
and almsgiving. Petrus Alfonsi lists all five pillars of Islam, including prayer, fasting, and 
almsgiving. Roger Bacon and Ramon Martí also mention all three. Fasting, prayer, and 
almsgiving are the only Muslim practices specifically mentioned in the 1965 Second 
Vatican Council document Nostra Aetate.
115deficient sacraments or unifying rites?
been gleaned simply from reading Islamic literature (for example, the looks 
on the faces of Muslims while praying), and instead, they seem to be the result 
of his personal observation of actual praxis. And thirdly, Riccoldo not only 
describes Islamic praxis, but he actually praises it, and his praise is explicit and 
sustained. Riccoldo’s praise is such that not only does he claim that Muslims 
are equal to Christians in some of their practices (e.g., hospitality), but further-
more, he maintains that Muslims even surpass Christians in some cases (e.g., 
forgiveness). No other medieval theologian is as complimentary about Muslim 
praxis as Riccoldo.38
Of the seven works of perfection, there are five works that I have never seen 
mentioned by any other medieval Christian that I know of. They are: devotion 
to study, hospitality, reverence for the name of God, mutual concord among 
Muslims, and solemn demeanor. Here I will briefly describe two of them: devo-
tion to prayer and reverence for the name of God.
 Devotio in oratio
Riccoldo begins this section by admitting to his readers that Muslim devotion 
to prayer is so great that it ‘stupefied’ (obstupuimus) him.39 He had already 
expressed the same sentiment earlier, when describing his surprise at the very 
existence of the seven works of perfection among the Saracens. In this section, 
he says that his amazement is the result of his experience (per experientiam) 
seeing Muslims pray daily. Furthermore, this firsthand experience enables him 
to describe the various types of comportment he has seen among Muslims in 
prayer: some swoon or their faces drain of all color, while others dance, change 
their voice, or shake their heads. Some seem to be in ecstasy, while others 
appear possessed by demons.40
The remainder of Riccoldo’s discussion of prayer (which amounts to half 
of the section) is devoted to wudu. He lists which body parts are washed, and 
in what order: first private parts, then hands, then face, and lastly the soles of 
 
38 William of Tripoli includes a long description of prayer in the mosque, but his account 
includes only several short compliments interspersed throughout, not sustained praise. 
See his Notitia, especially 256–58.
39 LP, 212. For an expanded discussion of the works of perfection, see George-Tvrtković, 
A Christian Pilgrim.
40 LP, 212. Riccoldo seems to be describing Sufi prayer practices here, rather than the highly 
ritualized daily salat. This is different than other medieval Christians who mention 
Muslim prayer such as Petrus Alfonsi, who merely note that Muslims pray five times a 
day, or that prayer is preceded by ablutions (both facts can be found in the Qurʾan). 
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the feet.41 Riccoldo notes that this practice is “observed by all the sects” and 
then offers specific details about Hanafi wudu, which he claims is “reputed to 
be more perfect than the others.”42 As proof of Hanafi fastidiousness, Riccoldo 
reports that if they touch a cat, dog, or donkey, they must bathe in at least 
fifteen hundred buckets of water (for this reason they usually wash in a river). 
They are so scrupulous, claims Riccoldo, that even after bathing in a river, they 
place a finger in the anus and smell it to confirm their cleanliness.43
Riccoldo’s emphasis on Muslim comportment during prayer, as well as on 
the ablution which precedes it, indicates his focus on the physical aspects of 
Muslim prayer. Riccoldo does not tell us what Muslims say when they pray, 
nor does he venture into intentionality.44 So even though Riccoldo includes 
unique details regarding Sufi prayer postures and the particularities of Hanafi 
wudu, in the end his description of Muslim prayer is nearly as superficial as 
that of Petrus Alfonsi, who also lists all the body parts washed during wudu. 
However, Riccoldo’s description of prayer still remains significant due to its 
overall complimentary tone. Unlike Alan of Lille, who considers wudu a defi-
cient form of baptism, Riccoldo regards it as a key part of Muslim prayer, which 
he calls a ‘work of perfection.’
 Reuerentia ad nomen Dei
As proof of the great reverence Muslims have for the name of God, Riccoldo 
begins by describing their practice of saying or writing the basmala—before 
beginning any letter, speech, trip, or other important act—in order to demon-
strate that all is done in God’s name.45 Riccoldo’s description of the basmala is 
accurate and sympathetic:
41 LP, 212.
42 The Hanafi, along with the Shafii, Hanbali, and Maliki, comprise the four traditional 
Muslim schools of jurisprudence. 
43 LP, 212.
44 Only William of Tripoli speculates about Muslim intentionality: “In so doing [praying], 
amazingly, I think, they please God and men, if they have true faith,” Notitia, 258. Evidently, 
William is as amazed as Riccoldo at how devoted Muslims are to prayer.
45 Basmala is derived from the first word in the phrase, bismillah ar-rahman ar-rahim, which 
means, “In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate.” The basmala is the very 
first line of the Qurʾan, and can be found before every Sura of the Qurʾan except the ninth. 
It is the most oft-recited prayer in Islam, said during all five daily prayers and many other 
times during the day.
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They take the greatest care in never doing, saying, or writing anything of 
importance without first beginning with the name of God. Also in all the 
letters they send, they first write reverently the name of the Lord and 
therefore diligently take care to avoid destroying or throwing away any 
writing. If they find a piece of paper covered with writing, they reverently 
pick it up and place it up high in the wall, lest the name of the Lord be 
trampled underfoot.46
Riccoldo is highly complimentary here; note that he repeatedly describes 
Muslims as acting with care, diligence, and reverence. As additional proof of 
Muslim reverence for God’s name, Riccoldo describes another quintessentially 
Islamic custom: the salawat. This is the adding of praises such as ‘glorified and 
exalted is he’ after mentioning the name of Allah, or ‘peace be upon him’ after 
saying the name of one of the prophets: “When they come across the name of 
the Lord while reading or speaking, never does anyone say it alone, but they 
always add a praise like, ‘God who is praised,’ or something of this nature.”47
The fact that Riccoldo includes ‘reverence for the name of God’ in his list 
of Muslim good works is significant. Unlike the other Muslim practices he 
mentions (e.g., prayer and almsgiving), which he recognizes and praises 
in Islam in part because they are Christian works already familiar to him, in 
this section he highlights a practice that finds no easy counterpart in 
Christianity. Furthermore, Riccoldo’s description of the basmala demonstrates 
a sound understanding of Islamic theology. Thus, when listing the seven 
Muslim works of perfection, Riccoldo is careful to entitle this particular virtue 
‘reverence for the name of God,’ and not merely ‘reverence for God,’ demon-
strating that he knew the basmala reflects Islam’s particular focus on the name 
of God itself . 48
However, Riccoldo’s descriptions of Muslim praxis elsewhere are less than 
complimentary. For example, in another book, Riccoldo ridicules how and 
why—and even questions whether—Muslims fast.49 Elsewhere he criticizes 
the Qurʾan for recommending fasting and almsgiving as means to repent for 
46 LP, 213.
47 LP, 213.
48 Cf. Suras 7:180, 17:110, 20:8, 59:24, where some of the names of God are listed. The hadiths 
elaborate on this concept, and refer to God’s ‘ninety-nine names.’ 
49 Contra legem, 142.
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one’s sins, suggesting that this encourages Muslims to sin.50 This criticism 
is especially strange, given that fasting and prayer are similarly important 
for Christians.
Riccoldo is clearly ambivalent about Muslim praxis. In his Contra legem he 
concedes that the Qurʾan “contains works difficult to implement, like circum-
cision, not drinking wine, avoiding inebriation, fasting, praying, and giving 
according to one’s means.”51 However, he immediately mitigates this conces-
sion by adding that it does not really matter what the Qurʾan says, since accord-
ing to his experience, Muslims do not observe it anyway:
Yet that they do not observe [the Qurʾan] is obvious; for they drink wine, 
they get inebriated with weed, they eat illicit things, they do not fast or 
pray, nor do they give what they can, and many other things which one 
knows better who tries to converse with them.52
Furthermore, in his Epistolae he asserts that Muslims only ‘appear’ to have 
good works,53 and after praising the seven works of perfection in his Liber per-
egrinationis, he feels the need to add a disclaimer: “We have narrated the above 
less to praise Saracens than to shame certain Christians who refuse to do for 
the law of life what these damned do for the law of death.”54 Here Riccoldo 
repeats an idea frequently repeated by other medievals: that while Muslim 
praxis often puts Christian praxis to shame, nevertheless it is void of efficacy 
because the underlying doctrine is false.
It is interesting to contrast Riccoldo’s view of Islam with his view of Judaism; 
the former is informed by serious study and a decade of lived experience, while 
the latter is most decidedly not. Despite the fact that he claims to have wit-
nessed a debate between Dominicans and Jews in the synagogue of Mosul, 
his section on Judaism does not seem to be informed by any personal experi-
ences of Jews whatsoever, nor any knowledge of Hebrew. Unlike all the other 
sections of Ad nationes on Eastern Christians, Muslims, and Tartars, which 
50 Contra legem, 115–16: “For [perjury], the feeding of ten poor boys is enough, or the giving 
away the same number of robes, or the freeing of one slave. However, he who cannot do 
these things will fast for three days (Qurʾan 5:89).” 
51 Contra legem, 142.
52 Contra legem, 141.
53 Epistolae, 150–151.
54 LP, 216.
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are filled with detailed firsthand descriptions of their rituals,55 the section on 
Judaism alone contains almost nothing at all about Jewish ritual. Riccoldo only 
mentions circumcision and the observance of the Sabbath in passing, and he 
does so merely to say that there were times in history that Jews themselves did 
not practice these rituals (e.g., during the time of Maccabees).56
Unlike his unique account of Muslim praxis, Riccoldo’s conclusions about 
Judaism are standard: Jews read the Old Law literally, they are blind for not 
accepting Christ as messiah, they crucified Christ knowingly, and their captiv-
ity is punishment for deicide. Riccoldo bases his argument largely on Augustine 
(some scholars claim that he is unique in preserving the ‘Augustinian Witness’ 
argument so late into the early fourteenth century),57 and copies much of his 
anti-Jewish polemic from Ramon Martí’s Capistrum Iudaeorum. Nevertheless, 
despite Riccoldo’s reliance on Martí, he differs in tone, as Riccoldo is much 
more irenic. He refers to the Talmud only twice but does not condemn it,58 and 
also refers to Jewish ‘captivity’59 rather sympathetically, possibly because he 
describes his own time in Baghdad as a kind of ‘captivity.’60
While Riccoldo frequently underscores his proficiency in Arabic and his 
personal experience of Muslims, he never claims to have studied Hebrew or 
to have had any extended contact with Jews. The disparity between his unre-
markable, unoriginal account of Judaism and his exceptional and unique 
account of Islamic praxis may perhaps be explained by the disparity between 
his intellectual and personal experience—or lack thereof—of the two 
religious communities.
55 For example, in Ad nationes, section 103, Riccoldo discusses ritual diversity in Eastern 
Christianity by mentioning differences in Lenten fasting, communion recipients, the 
ingredients of communion bread including leaven, the kinds of chalices used, etc.
56 Ad nationes, sections 118–121.
57 Lydia Walker, “A Fourteenth Century Augustinian Approach to the Jews in Riccoldo da 
Monte Croce’s Ad nationes orientales,” Comparative Religion Publications (2011): Paper 
Three, 38.
58 Walker, “A Fourteenth Century Augustinian Approach,” 40.
59 Walker, “A Fourteenth Century Augustinian Approach,” 39.
60 He begins his letters after the fall of Acre with this line (Epistolae, 137–38): “And so it 
came to pass that I was in Baghdad ‘among captives on the banks of the Chebar’ [Ez 1.1], 
the Tigris. A part of me delighted in the charm of the verdant place in which I found 
myself . . . But the other part of me was urged to sadness over the slaughter and servitude 
of the Christian people and their degradation after the lamentable loss of Acre.”
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 Conclusion
Scholars have suggested that Christian arguments against Jews and Muslims 
have been increasingly connected, beginning in the twelfth century.61 
Ryan Szpiech highlights how Islam was used in the construction of anti-Jewish 
arguments and suggests that, “like the imaginary Judaism of early anti-Jewish 
polemic, the idea of Islam took on, on limited occasions, a purely symbolic, 
hermeneutical role for Christian polemicists as witness to Christian truth.”62
While that may indeed be the case for some medieval authors, it is not so 
for Alan, Nicholas, or Riccoldo. Perhaps this is partly because the primary goal 
for none of them is to refute Judaism. Rather, they all have much broader aims. 
And this brings us back to the hierarchy of religions, utilized by all three of our 
authors. Within that hierarchy, Alan and Nicholas continuously see connections 
between the various religions and their rites. For Alan, Muslim wudu is clearly 
connected to other Muslim practices such as circumcision and polygyny, all 
of which he considers to be equally ‘Judaizing.’ Furthermore, he believes that 
Muslim wudu is likewise connected to heretical Christian forms of baptism. 
For Nicholas, who plays down the differences between Muslim wudu and 
Jewish mikveh, these ablutions (along with circumcision) are an opportunity 
to unite Christians, Jews, and Muslims, no matter how doctrinally problematic 
such a union might be. Unlike Alan and Nicholas, however, Riccoldo makes 
no explicit connections at all between the few Jewish rites he discusses (cir-
cumcision and Sabbath observance) and Muslim rites, to which he devotes a 
great deal of space. Of these three authors, only Riccoldo disconnects Muslim 
rites from the hierarchy of religions—if only for a while—by treating them 
separately and on their own terms. Of course, elsewhere he uses Muslim praxis 
to admonish Christians against their failures. Nevertheless, he begins with an 
accurate description of Muslim praxis as such.
Although Alan and Nicholas are furthest away from one another chrono-
logically, it can be said that their views of Muslim and Jewish praxis are more 
similar to each other’s than to Riccoldo’s. Neither Alan nor Nicholas seems 
able to appreciate non-Christian rites on their own terms. Why? One reason 
might be that both Alan and Nicholas were unfamiliar with the lived reality of 
61 Ryan Szpiech, “Hermeneutical Muslims? Islam as Witness in Christian Anti-Judaism,” 
unpublished paper, and Jeremy Cohen, “The Muslim Connection; or, On the Changing 
Role of the Jew in High Medieval Theology,” in From Witness to Witchcraft: Jews and 
Judaism in Medieval Christian Thought, ed. Jeremy Cohen (Weisbaden: Harrassowitz, 
1997), 141–63. 
62 Szpiech, “Hermeneutical Muslims,” 6.
121deficient sacraments or unifying rites?
the religions they describe. We have no evidence that Alan read Jewish texts 
on his own (after all, he copied nearly forty percent of his book on the Jews 
from Gilbert Crispin). And while he might have known Jews personally, given 
his northern French context, he does not draw on that experience in De fide. 
Furthermore, as far as we can tell, Alan does not use the most up-to-date infor-
mation about Islam. Nicholas, similarly, had little if any personal experience 
of Jews or Muslims, and also had little knowledge of their texts at the time he 
wrote De pace.63
Riccoldo is different, at least in regard to Islam. He lived among Muslims for 
a decade and studied their literature in its original language. His Arabic was 
so advanced that not only does he brag about it repeatedly in his work, but 
he actually uses it to write marginal comments on an extant manuscript of an 
Arabic Qurʾan.64 In stark contrast, Riccoldo’s knowledge of Judaism is very lim-
ited; we can see this in his over-reliance on Ramon Martí, Petrus Alfonsi, and 
Augustine. Riccoldo’s writings on Judaism and Jewish praxis do not demon-
strate any knowledge of Hebrew, Jewish texts, or actual Jews. But in his dis-
cussion of Muslim praxis, Riccoldo’s experience truly shines through. Only 
someone with extensive personal experience of a lived religion could have the 
ability to describe Muslim praxis with such detail. In Riccoldo we therefore see 
an interesting dichotomy: his views of Judaism are more like Alan’s (because 
he copies from others and has no direct experience of Jews), but his views of 
Islam are unique; after all, his praise of the Muslim ‘works of perfection’ is so 
effusive that he feels the need to apologize for it twice!65
To conclude, in terms of their overall views of Muslim and Jewish rites, we 
see significant differences between these three medieval theologians. Lille is 
pessimistic (their rites are deficient sacraments), Cusa is optimistic (their rites 
have the potential to unify), and Riccoldo is stupefied, ambivalent, and uneven 
in his assessment, due to the asymmetry between his knowledge and experi-
ence of Judaism and Islam.
63 See Izbicki, “Nicholas of Cusa and the Jews,” 119–130, and James Biechler, “A New Face 
toward Islam: Nicholas of Cusa and John of Segovia,” in Nicholas of Cusa: In Search of God 
and Wisdom, ed. Gerald Christianson and Thomas Izbicki (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 185–202.
64 Riccoldo’s Arabic knowledge has been confirmed recently by Thomas Burman, who 
suggests that the Latin marginal glosses in an Arabic Qurʾan in Paris (Bibliothèque 
nationale de France, MS fonds arabe 384) are the friar’s. See Burman, “How an Italian Friar 
Read his Arabic Qurʾan,” Dante Studies 125 (2007): 89–105. For more on these glosses, see 
also François Déroche and José Martínez Gázquez, “Lire et traduire le Coran au Moyen 
Âge: les gloses latines du manuscrit arabe 384 de la BNF,” Comptes rendus de l’Académie 
des inscriptions et belles-lettres 154 (2010): 1023–42.
65 LP, 211 and 216, respectively.
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Even though constructing a Christian theology of religions is primarily an 
internal task, that is, it requires the theologian to define other religions ‘on 
Christian terms,’ it is no less important for the theologian to attempt to under-
stand the other, as much as possible, on that particular religion’s own terms. 
This might seem anachronistic, yet all three medieval theologians discussed in 
this chapter did try to learn about Jewish and Muslim praxis as best they could. 
Alan remained rather ignorant about the concrete details of Muslim doctrine 
and practice, but he did try to get information on Judaism by going to a relia-
ble source, namely, Gilbert Crispin. Although Nicholas’s curiosity about Islam 
eventually led him to study the Qurʾan in greater depth and consequently cri-
tique it, until this later point, his views of Islam (as expressed in De pace) were 
not much better informed than Alan’s. Neither of them were able to appreciate 
or articulate the particularities of Jewish and Muslim practices, and instead set 
them aside too easily, either because they were thought to be too different from 
Christian practice (Alan), or similar enough (Nicholas). Therefore, Riccoldo’s 
knowledge of Islam appears the deepest: he studied the Qurʾan in Arabic with 
Muslim masters, attended Muslim schools, and observed Muslim praxis in situ. 
Partly because of this firsthand experience, Riccoldo takes Muslim rites seri-
ously, and sometimes even ‘on their own terms.’ Of our three authors, he alone 
describes Muslim praxis in detail and with relative accuracy. And as a result, his 
assessment of Islam, though still quite negative, is better informed and much 
more nuanced. Hence, Riccoldo shows us that when constructing a Christian 
theology of religions, direct experience of the other really does matter.
Perspectives on Islam in Italy and Byzantium  
in the Middle Ages and Renaissance
Marica Costigliolo
In this article I shall sketch some common features and differences between 
medieval and Renaissance approaches to Islam, which will be done by analyz-
ing the various perceptions of Christian authors on Islam from the thirteenth 
to the fifteenth centuries. This is part of an extensive project on the formation 
of Western identity in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance,1 tracing the ways 
in which Latin and Byzantine thinkers defined their own civilization over and 
against Islam. In the line of scholars such as Nancy Bisaha, Thomas E. Burman, 
and Cary J. Nederman, who have illuminated the changing perceptions of 
Islam,2 I shall explore how both Western and Byzantine thinkers sought to 
deepen their approach to the foreign religion. Central to this story are the 
Renaissance humanists, whose views on the Turks acted as a bridge between 
medieval and modern attitudes regarding the West and Islam.3 Indeed, the 
exchange between Byzantium and the Latin West intensified as they formed 
strategic alliances against the Turkish enemy,4 and the consequent humanist 
 
1 My extensive research project will also consider works of authors such as Bessarion, Plethon, 
Ciriaco d’Ancona, Guarino Veronese, Enea Silvio Piccolomini, Francesco Filelfo, Manuele 
Crysolora, and Nicetas Choniates.
2 Thomas E. Burman, Reading the Qurʾan in Latin Christendom (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2007); Cary J. Nederman, Worlds of Difference: European Discourses of 
Toleration, c. 100–c. 1500 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000). 
Extremely relevant is the work Nancy Bisaha, Creating East and West: Renaissance Humanists 
and the Ottoman Turks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). See also Alain 
De Libera, La philosophie médiévale (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993).
3 Bisaha, Creating East and West, 9. See also William R. Jones, “The Image of the Barbarian in 
Medieval Europe,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 13 (1971): 376–407; Michele 
Angelo Piemontese, “Il Corano latino di Ficino e i Corani arabi di Pico e Monchates,” 
Rinascimento 36 (1996): 227–73; and Margaret Meserve, Empires of Islam in Renaissance 
Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).
4 James Hankins, “Renaissance Crusaders: Humanist Crusade Literature in the Age of 
Muhammad II,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 49, Symposium on Byzantium and the Italians, 13th–
15th Centuries (1995): 111–207.
© Marica Costigliolo, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004274761_010 
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responses to the Ottoman advance greatly influenced Western perceptions of 
the Turks and Islam, continuing to do so to this very day. However, to form their 
opinions, these humanists relied on earlier accounts of Islam, especially the 
Contra legem Sarracenorum, which was written by the thirteenth-century 
Dominican friar Riccoldo da Montecroce, and was one of the most widely cir-
culated and influential works about Islam until the eighteenth century.
 Due to its significance, I shall first briefly examine Riccoldo’s Contra legem 
Sarracenorum [CLS], and then trace its rich legacy as it was translated and used 
in the works of five representative authors from the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries. From these five, Fazio degli Uberti’s Dittamondo shows that the CLS 
was so widely known that it was even echoed in fourteenth-century vernacular 
poetry. Riccoldo’s work also informs the Byzantine responses to Islam in 
Demetrius Kydones’ Pro subsidio Latinorum and De non reddenda Callipoli, and 
in the treatise On the Eternal Glory of the Autocrat by George of Trebizond, writ-
ten to Mehmed II. Finally, Nicholas of Cusa’s Cribratio Alkorani and Marsilio 
Ficino’s De Christiana religione both adapt CLS to argue that Islam presupposes 
Christian truth—a truth that Muslims nevertheless fail to acknowledge.
As we shall see, Riccoldo’s legacy vividly demonstrates both the shift in rhet-
oric concerning Islam and Muslims, and the slowly changing perception of 
Islam from ‘enemy’ to ‘other.’ The circulation of texts on the interpretation of 
the Qurʾan, especially Riccoldo’s CLS, created a slow but growing knowledge 
about the affinities and the differences between Islam and Christianity, which 
consequently shaped the formation of a Christian and Western identity in 
opposition to the ‘uncivilized’ Turk. A pattern thus emerges: until the thir-
teenth century Islam was considered a terrifying enemy, however starting in 
the fourteenth century, apologetic and polemical works turned towards 
emphasizing the barbarism and ignorance of the Muslims more than the dan-
gers that they posed.5
5 The transformation of the perception of another social or religious group is a slow process in 
cultural history, and it is possible to trace it through the analysis of metaphors, sentences, 
and the use of sources in the texts. By analyzing the repetitions, the differences or affinities 
with the previous tradition (in this case with CLS), or the insistence on one theme (the theme 
of ‘ignorance’) against another (the theme of ‘enemy’), I demonstrate how during Humanism 
the perception of Islam begins to change. See Jan Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, 
Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen (München: C. H. Beck, 1992).
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 The Source on Islam from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance: 
Riccoldo da Montecroce
To begin, let us first ask a fundamental question: What was the goal of Western 
humanists writing about Islam? Were they trying to increase general knowl-
edge about Islam, or were they trying to erase all traces of Islamic influence on 
the West? An approach to answering this question can be provided by an 
 analysis—for example, as undertaken by Thomas Burman and Norman 
Daniel6—of the work of Riccoldo da Montecroce, whose influential Contra 
legem Sarracenorum argues against the Qurʾan, and in the process addresses 
wider issues of Christian-Muslim relations. This text is of major historical 
importance because of its vast influence, and remains strikingly relevant as it 
deals with relations between Christian and Muslims—a topic powerfully 
linked to political and social tensions today.
Riccoldo da Montecroce (1243–1320) was a Dominican friar at the priory of 
Santa Maria Novella in Florence.7 For many years he was a missionary in 
Mesopotamia (today’s Iraq) and lived in Baghdad. We can reconstruct his biog-
raphy through his works, some of which are kept at the National Library of 
Florence. In particular, his Liber peregrinationis (also known as the Itinerarium) 
describes his journeys in the Holy Land, Lebanon, Greece, Armenia, Turkey, 
Persia, and Mesopotamia, the land of the Chaldean Christians, where Riccoldo 
became acquainted with Jacobitism and Nestorianism.8
Nevertheless, his fundamental work is the Contra legem Sarracenorum, 
a work structured in the medieval form of quaestio.9 Its tone is aggressive 
throughout, as Riccoldo seeks to demonstrate the irrationality and 
6 Norman Daniel, Islam and the West: The Making of an Image (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1960).
7 About Riccoldo da Montecroce, see Jean Marie Mérigoux, “L’ouvrage d’un frère prêcheur flo-
rentin en Orient à la fin du XIIIe siècle: Le Contra legem Sarracenorum de Riccoldo da Monte 
di Croce,” in Memorie Domenicane 17 (Rome: Centro Riviste della Provincia Romana, 1986), 
1–142; Mérigoux publishes the critical edition of Contra legem Sarracenorum, which will be 
cited as CLS, followed by Prologue or chapter and page number; translations are my own. 
Emilio Panella, “Ricerche su Riccoldo da Montecroce,” Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 58 
(1988): 5–85; Thomas E. Burman, “How an Italian Friar Read His Arabic Qurʾan,” Dante Studies 
125 (2007): 93–109; Rita George-Tvrtkovic, A Christian Pilgrim in Medieval Iraq: Riccoldo da 
Montecroce’s Encounter with Islam (Turnhout: Brepols, 2012).
8 Mérigoux, “L’ouvrage d’un frère prêcheur florentin,” 22.
9 Giuseppe Rizzardi, “Introduzione,” in I saraceni, Italian translation of the Contra legem sara-
cenorum (Firenze: Nardini, 1992), especially 25–47.
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 insubstantiality of Islam. He describes Muhammad as a persecutor of the 
divine—that is, Christian—law,10 and Muslims, moreover, as persecutors of 
Christians.
In the first chapter, Riccoldo writes that Muhammad’s principal intention is 
to convince readers that Christ is neither a god nor the Son of God, but only a 
wise man.11 Accordingly, Riccoldo outlines the affinities between Islam and 
heresies such as Arianism and Manichaeism. Furthermore, he underlines the 
lecherous reputation of Muhammad, as the Prophet affirms, according to 
Riccoldo, that beatitude consists in carnal pleasures and in food, in marvelous 
clothes, and in living in gardens rich in water. To support this, Riccoldo notes 
that in the Qurʾan Muhammad aims to eliminate everything that is difficult to 
believe or to do, and instead permits believers to indulge the sensual pleasures. 
In chapter two of his work, Riccoldo writes that because Muslims cannot grasp 
the mystery of the Trinity, it is easier to prove to them that their own law is false 
than to prove the truth of the Christian religion.12
Later in the second chapter, Riccoldo continues to relate that the Saracens 
deny the miracles and words of the Apostles, since they contradict the Qurʾan. 
He insists that the Qurʾan is not a divine law but is in fact perfidious, and that 
the Saracens must therefore accept the authority of the Gospel. To demon-
strate these arguments he turns to his analysis of the Qurʾan, pointing out sev-
eral times the theme of violence. Thus, he concludes that the Qurʾan does not 
fit with the divine law, since God’s law does not permit murder, robbery, and 
concupiscence, while the Qurʾan, on the contrary, does. Throughout the work, 
Riccoldo describes Muhammad as being wicked, a thief, adulterous, incestu-
ous, and as a man who committed homicide.13 Then, in chapter ten, Riccoldo 
repeats that the Qurʾan promotes violence. By insisting on the violence inher-
ent in Islam and Muhammad’s cruel nature, Riccoldo aims to demonstrate the 
dangerous threat that Islam poses to Christianity.
Another tactic Riccoldo employs for this purpose is to point out contradic-
tions in the Qurʾan.14 Furthermore, he argues that the Saracen law contains not 
only many contradictions, but also many lies and fabrications. He also points 
out the lack of logic or order in the Qurʾan, and therefore states in chapter 
eleven: “I do not remember finding in all of that book [the Qurʾan] an adequate 
10 CLS, Prologus, 62.
11 CLS, ch. 1, 64.
12 CLS, ch. 2, 69. 
13 CLS, ch. 8, 91–93.
14 CLS, ch. 6, 83.
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argument. This law cannot derive from God, since it does not follow any 
order.”15
Defensive arguments are also found throughout the treatise, as Riccoldo felt 
the need to defend Christianity against a powerful enemy. He does this in three 
ways. Following the Dominican rhetorical tradition, he first presents some 
sentences from the Qurʾan in order to prove their falsity. In contrast to these, 
he then exalts the coherence of the Christian texts and the rationality of 
Christian doctrine. Finally, he turns the Islamic denial of miracles against the 
‘Muslim law’ itself, since—unlike Christian faith—Islam cannot be verified by 
miracles.16
In sum, in the work of Riccoldo we can note the following elements: there is 
a patent fear of Islam as the enemy of Christianity and its persecutor, and 
accordingly, there is a rhetorical use of many defensive arguments, as well as a 
stress on the irrationality of the Qurʾan. As we shall see, Riccoldo’s later readers 
used and modified these elements from the CLS in their own writings.
 The Stereotypes about Islam in a Vernacular Work:  
Fazio degli Uberti
One of the many genres influenced by Riccoldo’s Contra Legem Sarracenorum 
is the vernacular literature from fourteenth-century Italy.17 For example, the 
poet Fazio degli Uberti (1301–1367) makes extensive use of the CLS in his Dit-
tamondo (c. 1345),18 an encyclopedic poem in six books with a meter of chained 
15 CLS, ch. 11, 113.
16 CLS, ch. 7, 90.
17 For example, Cod. 205, University of Bologna, cited in Fazio degli Uberti, Il Dittamondo e 
le rime, ed. Giuseppe Corsi (Rome: Laterza, 1952), 333. 
18 About the work of Fazio degli Uberti, see Corsi’s introduction to his edition of Dittamondo, 
and Charles Edward Whitmore, The Lyrics of Fazio degli Uberti in their relation to Dante 
(Boston: Ginn & Co, 1917). For a biography of Fazio, see Filippo Villani, De civitatis 
Florentiae et eiusdem famosis civibus, ed. Giovanni Calò (Rocca San Casciano: L. Cappelli, 
1904). For additional information on Fazio, see Eleanor F. Jordain, “Holyday’s ‘Survey of the 
World’ and the Dittamondo” The Modern Language Review 2/1 (1906): 44–55. Also intrigu-
ing is the relationship between Fazio and Dante, in order to trace the possible influence 
of Riccoldo in the work of Dante; see, for example, Leonardo Olschki, “Mohammedan 
Eschatology and Dante’s Other World,” Comparative Literature 3/1 (1951): 1–17; John Tolan, 
“Mendicants and Muslims in Dante’s Florence,” Dante Studies 125 (2007): 227–48; and Karla 
Mallette, “Muhammad in Hell Author(s),” Dante Studies 125 (2007): 207–24. See also 
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triplets.19 The theme of the poem is a journey through Europe, North Africa, 
and Palestine. Many legends and much of its geographical and historical infor-
mation are drawn from the works of Solino, Pliny the Elder, Martin Polonio, 
and Riccoldo. Of the latter, Fazio writes, “Here I came and I heard about 
Riccoldo / Po di qua venni e di Ricoldo m’è deto,”20 and Dittamondo does indeed 
contain many details about the Islamic tradition from CLS. Furthermore, 
Riccoldo had travelled along the same route that Fazio intended to take, 
namely, the route in the eastern lands, although Fazio died before completing 
his poem and travels.
In Book Five, chapters ten–twelve and fourteen are dedicated to explaining 
the Islamic religion and the figure of Muhammad. Among the claims about the 
Prophet that Fazio includes21 is Riccoldo’s assertion that Muhammad was 
lascivious and inclined to drink.22 Fazio repeats this assertion in chapter 
Twelve,23 where he describes Muhammad as attracted to the vices of gluttony 
and lust. Another theme likely drawn from the CLS is the absence of miracles 
in the Islamic tradition.24 According to Fazio, Muhammad raised no one from 
the dead, nor did he heal the blind or disabled, but instead, he often received 
his support through weapons. Fazio thus recalls the argument of the sword 
that is found in the CLS: Muhammad proclaims that he was not sent to perform 
miracles but to fight with weapons, to which the priests of the Qurʾan then 
wave the sword.25 The themes of the sword and violence are also repeated to 
support the argument of the inconsistency of Qurʾanic law: in the Qurʾan, Fazio 
recounts, we read many indecent things, but it also commands believers to 
obey Muhammad or to die.26
Although he attributes all information about Islam to Riccoldo, it is unclear 
whether Dittamondo in reality relies solely on this text as a source about 
Islam.27 For example, Fazio quotes the Qurʾan to illustrate a legend that is 
José Martínez Gázquez and Andrew Gray, “Translations of the Qurʾan and Other Islamic 
Texts before Dante,” Dante Studies 125 (2007): 79–92. 
19 Pierangela Izzi, “Il vocabolario dantesco nel Dittamondo di Fazio degli Uberti,” 
www.italianisti.it.
20 Henceforth, I shall cite Corsi’s edition of Dittamondo by page, Book, and chapter, as here: 
Dittamondo, 364, Bk. 5, c. 9. 
21 Dittamondo, 365, Bk. 5, c. 10. 
22 Dittamondo, 368, Bk. 5, c. 11.
23 Dittamondo, 373, Bk. 5, c. 13.
24 Dittamondo, 374, Bk. 5, c. 13.
25 Dittamondo, 371, Bk. 5, c. 12.
26 Dittamondo, 371, Bk. 5, c. 12. 
27 Corsi, Dittamondo, appendix, vol. ii, 330–33.
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found in the CLS, while Riccoldo correctly locates the legend’s source not in the 
Qurʾan, but in the Doctrina Machumeti. This misattribution reflects Fazio’s 
broader confusion about his sources, and we are aware now that he also drew 
from the Legenda Aurea of Jacopo da Voragine.
Nevertheless, in the work of Fazio we can observe the use of CLS as the main 
source of information about Islam in a vernacular work, and there is a clear 
repetition of Riccoldo’s stereotypes about the Islamic tradition and the figure 
of Muhammad. And yet, Fazio takes a noticeably less aggressive tone towards 
Muhammad and the Islamic tradition than Riccoldo does.
 Different Rhetoric on Islam: Demetrius Kydones and  
George of Trebizond
Alongside its usage by fourteenth-century Italian writers, as discussed above, 
the CLS was also utilized by Byzantine scholars. By analyzing works of two such 
scholars, Demetrius Kydones and George of Trebizond, we can see how they 
use Riccoldo’s work, and repeat his stereotypes of Islam, as well. Yet their rhet-
oric also displays a shift from perceiving Islam as an ‘enemy’ to viewing the 
Turks as merely ‘uncivilized.’28
A Demetrius Kydones
Demetrius Kydones (1324–1398) was a Byzantine humanist at the Court of John 
Kantakouzenos, a mesazon or minister for government affairs. He was the 
teacher of George Gemisto Plethon, and had also travelled to Italy, where he 
intensively studied Latin culture.29 His work is important for two main  reasons: 
28 The works of Kydones and Trebizond show also that “one last variable that encouraged 
classical treatment of the Turks was the influence of contemporary Byzantine attitudes. 
The result was not only an increase in classically inspired rhetoric on the Turks but also 
the development of a more unified discourse of European civility versus Asian barba-
rism,” as Bisaha rightly states (Creating East and West, 44).
29 On Kydones, see Giovanni Mercati, Notizie di Procoro e Demetrio Cidone, Manuele Caleca e 
Teodoro Meliteniota (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1931). Cf. Frances 
Kianka, Demetrius Cydones (c. 1324–c.1397): Intellectual and Diplomatic Relations between 
Byzantium and the West in the Fourteenth Century (Ph.D. diss.: Fordham University, 1981); 
and Raymond-Joseph Loenertz, ed., Démétrius Cydonès: Correspondance, 2 vols. (Vatican 
City: Biblioteca apostolica vaticana, 1956, 1960). Cf. George T. Dennis, “Demetrios Cydones 
and Venice,” in Bisanzio, Venezia e il mondo franco-greco (XIII–XV secolo): Atti del Convegno 
Internazionale Organizzato nel Centenario della nascita di Raimond-Joseph Loenertz o.p., 
Venezia, 1–2 dicembre 2000 (Venice: Istituto ellenico di Studi Bizantini e Postbizantini di 
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he translated many works from Latin into Greek, among them the Summa con-
tra gentiles of Thomas Aquinas, and he was dedicated to fighting the Ottomans. 
Furthermore, his works provide valuable insight into the Byzantine scholar’s 
attitude towards both Ottomans and Latins.
He is also responsible for translating Riccoldo’s Contra legem Sarracenorum 
from Latin into Greek,30 and sent the work to Emperor Manuel II in 1358. Nor 
is this the end of the story—in the late fifteenth century, Bartolomeo Picerno 
di Montearduo retranslated CLS back into Latin from Kydones’s Greek,31 and 
dedicated it to Ferdinand II, king of Aragon and Sicily. In the prologue, 
Bartolomeo asserts that Kydones’ Greek translation admirably enriches 
Riccoldo’s original text. Hence, rather than sending Riccoldo’s Latin text 
directly, Bartolomeo was motivated to retranslate the CLS into more elegant 
Latin, as a gift to the king who was fighting the Muslims in Spain. These diffe-
rent versions of the CLS show how Riccoldo’s treatise against Islam circulated 
from the Byzantine territories to Spain, and highlight the relation between 
Byzantine scholars and the Latin heritage. Moreover, they also exemplify how 
a common image of Muslims was building between the Western and Eastern 
Empires.
Kydones’s approach towards the Turks can be seen in his works about rela-
tions with the Ottomans, namely, the Pro subsidio Latinorum (1366) and the De 
non reddenda Callipoli (1369).32 Both works concern the site of Gallipoli 
(Turkey), a strategic point in the Hellespont, and both are important sources 
about the political strategies of the Byzantines towards the Ottomans and 
Latins. Following the surrender of Gallipoli to the Turks, Kydones calls for 
Venezia, 2002), 495–502. See also Dimiter G. Angelov, ed., Church and Society in Late 
Byzantium (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 2009); Judith R. Ryder, The 
Career and Writings of Demetrius Kydones: A Study of Fourteenth-Byzantine Politics, 
Religion and Society (Leiden: Brill, 2010); Vasileios Syros, “Between Chimera and Charybdis: 
Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Views on the Political Organization of the Italian City-
States,” Journal of Early Modern History 14 (2010): 1–54. See also Frances Kianka, 
“Demetrios Kydones and Italy,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 49 (1995): 99–110; Frances Kianka, 
“Byzantine-Papal Diplomacy: The Role of Demetrius Cydones,” The International History 
Review 7/2 (May, 1985): 175–213; and Ihor Ševcenko, “The Decline of Byzantium Seen 
through the Eyes of its Intellectuals,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 15 (1961): 167–86. 
30 Ryder, The Career and Writings of Demetrius Kydones, 156. The translation, dated 1350, is 
found in PG 154. See Mérigoux, “L’ouvrage d’un frère prêcheur florentin,” 58, as well as 
works by Kianka, Ryder, and Mercati.
31 The Latin version of CLS, translated by Picerno, is in PG 154.
32 Demetrius Kydones, Oratio pro subsidio Latinorum, PG 154, cols. 961–1008; and De non red-
denda Callipoli, PG 154, cols. 1012D–1013B.
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Latin assistance, considering the Latins as allies of Byzantium in the fight 
against the Ottomans, the enemies of freedom.33 The De non reddenda points 
to the fall of Gallipoli in 1354 as immediately “provoking great panic, while his 
work on the Contra legem Sarracenorum shows him already concerned with a 
theological confrontation with Islam.”34 Also, in the Oratio pro subsidio 
Latinorum, Kydones affirms that western Europe and the papacy were not 
Byzantium’s enemies, but rather, its most natural political and military allies 
against the aggression of the Turks.35
How does Kydones describe the Ottomans in these works? He uses term 
‘barbaroi’ to describe the Turks, which he uses to refer to other social groups as 
well. As in the CLS, the Turks are represented as fundamentally uncivilized and 
cruel, with “all characteristics directly in contrast with the Christians of the 
oikumene,”36 where ‘Christianity’ means the unity of the Latin and Greek 
Churches. Here we see at play the process of building Western identity as a 
phenomenon in contrast with the Islamic tradition.37
Another description of the Turks emphasizes the “cupiditas Barbarorum,”38 
which is a way of underlining the evil nature of the Ottomans; this also seems 
to recall the argument of CLS about the depraved attitude of Muslims. Never-
theless, in CLS the mistakes of Muslims are connected to the errors of Muham-
mad as a false prophet, while in Kydones’s works, the negative  attributes 
describe the entire community of Muslims, in contrast with the virtuous Chris-
tians. Kydones also recalls the violent character of the Islamic people, and 
affirms that they conquered the Greek territories though the use of enslave-
ment and violence.39 Again, this theme of violence echoes Riccoldo’s CLS.
33 See Ryder, Career and Writings of Kydones, 79.
34 Ryder, Career and Writings of Kydones, 156.
35 Kianka, “Kydones and Italy,” 103.
36 Ryder, Career and Writings of Kydones, 59. About the relationship between Byzantium and 
Islam, see Adel-Théodor Khoury, Les théologiens byzantins et l’Islam: textes et auteurs 
(VIII–XIII s.) (Paris-Louvain: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1969). 
37 See Kianka, “Demetrios Kydones and Italy,” 102: “Kydones attempted solutions [through] 
anti-Turkish, pro-Latin policy and an intellectual appreciation for and defence of the phi-
losophy and theology of the Latin West, seen primarily in his attraction to the work of 
Thomas Aquinas.”
38 Demetrius Kydones, De non reddenda Callipoli, PG 154, 1027.
39 See Kianka, “Demetrios Kydones and Italy,” 103: “Faced with the continuing conquests and 
settlements of the Ottoman Turks in Byzantine territory, especially in Thrace, [Kydones]
pursued the forging of alliances with the Catholic powers of the West—a new crusade, 
directed not at the recovery of the Holy Land but at rescuing what remained of Byzantine 
lands from the aggression of their Muslim enemy.”
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In summary, we can identify three distinguishing features in Kydones’s writ-
ings: his scorn towards the Ottomans, called ‘barbaroi;’ an attempt to unify the 
Latin and Greek Churches against the Ottomans; and the influence of the CLS 
on his approach to Islam.
B George of Trebizond
In his response to the Turks, George of Trebizond uses a very different rhetoric. 
Rather than employing Kydones’s approach of scorning the Turks to build an 
alliance with the Latin West, Trebizond aims instead to convert the sultan 
Mehmed II, and hence his tone is more subdued and even laudatory.
George of Trebizond (1395–1472/73) was born in Crete, then converted to 
Roman Catholicism and began a new life in Italy, all the while remaining 
devoted to the Greek cause.40 For most of his career he was attached to the 
papal court as a secretary and Greek translator, but he also lectured and taught 
in Florence, Rome, and Venice on topics such as rhetoric, poetry, and the Greek 
language.
Here we shall focus on Trebizond’s treatise On the Eternal Glory of the 
Autocrat and His World Empire, written to the Emir, Mehmed II, when he 
stormed Constantinople, as an attempt to convert him to Christianity. We also 
find this attempt in other works of Trebizond, addressed to Mehmed as well.41 
 
40 The translation and comments on Trebizond works are in John Monfasani, ed., Collectanea 
Trapezuntiana: Texts, Documents and Bibliographies of George Trebizond (Binghamton, 
N.Y.: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies in conjunction with the Renaissance 
Society of America, 1984). George Trebizond, “Preface of His Translation of Plato’s Laws,” 
trans. John Monfasani, in Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts, 
vol. 2: Political Philosophy, ed. Jill Kraye (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
128–34. See Thomas Berns, “Construire un idéal vénitien de la constitution mixte à la 
Renaissance: L’enseignement de Platon par Trébizonde,” in Le Gouvernement mixte (Saint-
Etienne: Université de Saint-Etienne, 2005), 25–38; Franco Gaeta, “Giorgio da Trebisonda, 
le Leggi di Platone e la costituzione di Venezia,” Bullettino dell’Istituto storico italiano per il 
Medio Evo e Archivio Muratoriano 82 (1970): 479–501; John Monfasani, George of Trebizond: 
a Biography and a Study of His Rhetoric and Logic (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976), 171–74; Giorgio 
Ravegnani, “Nota sul pensiero politico di Giorgio da Trebisonda,” Aevum 49 (1975): 310–
329; and Carl Joachim Classen, “The Rhetorical Works of George of Trebizond and Their 
Debt to Cicero,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 56 (1993): 75–84. See 
Bisaha, Creating East and West, 116: “George of Trebizond, by focusing on Greece’s position 
in antiquity as defender of all Europe, and therefore as a crucial part of Europe, . . . firmly 
brings Byzantium within the Western cultural identity.”
41 See Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 131–136.
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As John Monfasani notes about one of these treatises, On the Truth of Faith of 
Christians to the Emir, written in 1453:
Nor was he alone in attempting to convert Muhammad II. We have the 
famous letter of Pope Pius II to the Conqueror. Scholars have never fath-
omed what George meant by this letter. He was not motivated by an 
extraordinary irenic spirit, as some have suggested, nor by eccentric 
political ideas, as others have supposed.42
According to Monfasani, the answer to what motivated Trebizond lies in his 
treatise On the Eternal Glory of the Autocrat and in another letter to Mehmed II, 
On Divine Manuel, Shortly to be King of the Whole World.43 These writings are 
inspired by the apocalyptic text of Pseudo-Methodius, who predicted that the 
sons of Ishmael would conquer the Latin Empire.44 Thus,
By converting Mehmed II, Trebizond hoped to avert the dreadful reign of 
the Ishmaelites: he would remake the Moslem conqueror of Constanti-
nople into the universal Christian Emperor. Trebizond considers Greece 
and Latin West as a unity.45
How, then, does George of Trebizond try to convert Mehmed II? Which rhetori-
cal strategies does he use? In On the Eternal Glory of the Autocrat, he calls 
Mehmed II ‘King of kings’ and ‘Mightiness,’46 and his words in general are 
extremely positive towards Mehmed II: “Now I do not think it escapes you, 
O wondrous autocrat, that God has selected you and yours to rule the whole 
world.”47
42 Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 131.
43 George of Trebizond, “On the Eternal Glory of the Autocrat,” and “On the Divinity of 
Manuel,” in Collectanea Trapezuntiana, 492–527, 564–574. 
44 Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 132: “According to the script of Pseudo-Methodius, the all 
conquering Ishmaelites would usher in a reign of terror which would only end when the 
last true Christian emperor arose to disperse them and bring about the reign of peace 
which must precede the coming of Gog, Magog, and the Antichrist.” 
45 Ibid.
46 George of Trebizond, “On the Eternal Glory of the Autocrat,” in Collectanea Trapezuntiana. 
See Bisaha, Creating East and West, 136: “By combining aspects of medieval conversion 
treatises with humanist rhetoric, they hoped to persuade the Turks to accept the enlight-
ened path of Christianity.” 
47 George of Trebizond, “On the Eternal Glory of the Autocrat,” in Collectanea Trapezunti-
ana, 524. 
134 costigliolo
At the beginning of On the Eternal Glory of the Autocrat, Trebizond proposes 
to use the Aristotelian rule “by which in the comparison of conflicting 
 propositions, men would find the truth and cast falsity aside,”48 since he had 
heard that “every day you [Mehmed] philosophize as much as possible.”49 
Although this text exalts Mehmed, we also note some topics drawn from the 
medieval tradition. Was Trebizond then familiar with the work of Riccoldo? 
The answer to this question is ‘probably,’ since he quotes Demetrius Kydones, 
the translator of the CLS, in a letter from 1452 (Exhortation to Pope Nicholas V 
Ad defendenda pro Europa Hellesponti claustra),50 and because in On the 
Eternal Glory of the Autocrat we find many topics about Islam that are also 
present in CLS, such as: how it is difficult for Muslims to comprehend the 
Trinity (from chapter six to chapter sixteen), as well as the crucifixion and 
death of Christ (fifteen–sixteen) and his resurrection (chapter seventeen).51 
But unlike Riccoldo, George of Trebizond believes that for Mehmed, and 
indeed for all Muslim people, it is necessary to convert to Christianity, however 
difficult it may be. Furthermore, for Trebizond, the only real hope to save the 
Christian empire is by converting Mehmed II.
In this work, Trebizond perceives Westerners and Byzantines as a unity 
against the Turks.52 This perception changed, however, after being warned of 
the capture of Constantinople,53 as becomes clear in another work, the above-
mentioned Exhortation to Pope Nicholas V. Here, the author requested the 
48 George of Trebizond “On the Eternal Glory of the Autocrat,” in Collectanea Trapezuntiana, 
496.
49 Ibid.
50 George of Trebizond, “Exhortation to Pope Nicholas V ad defendenda pro Europa 
Hellesponti claustra,” in Collectanea Trapenzuntiana, 434–444. 
51 George of Trebizond, “On the Eternal Glory of the Autocrat,” in Collectanea Trapenzuntiana. 
Although these themes are common in the medieval tradition on Islam, CLS was the most 
popular treatise on the Qurʾan. Furthermore, in Trebizond’s elite circle of humanists, 
Riccoldo’s treatise was read and used. About the relations between Byzantine and Italian 
scholars, see Kenneth M. Setton, “The Byzantine Background to the Italian Renaissance,” 
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 100/1 (1956): 1–76. See also Mérigoux, 
“L’ouvrage d’un frère precheur florentin,” 53: “George of Trebizond, humanist and theolo-
gian was affected by the influence of the work of Riccoldo.”
52 See Bisaha, Creating East and West, 132: “Despite the hostility Europeans once felt toward 
Byzantines, and which some individuals continued to express, the year 1453 marked the 
beginning of a change in Western perceptions of the Greeks. Greeks had been settling in 
Italy before this date, and thousands more came to settle afterward.”
53 About this point, see Carlo Maria Mazzucchi and Agostino Pertusi, Bisanzio e i Turchi 
nella cultura del Rinascimento e del Barocco (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2004); Roberto Weiss, 
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Pope’s help in order to protect Constantinople from the Turks. Undoubtedly, it 
was after the fall of Constantinople that Trebizond’s approach to Islam 
changed. Whereas he previously considered the Pope as the only one who 
could save the Empire, in his letter of 1466 to Mehmed, Trebizond requests the 
help of the Autocrat himself. I suggest that this change was caused by multiple 
factors. First, it was due to geopolitical strategy: after the fall of Constantinople, 
Christians inevitably acknowledged Mehmed to be both a great conqueror and 
a great political figure, as the famous letter of Pius II shows.54 Second, there 
were traditional theological and eschatological beliefs involved (like the pre-
diction of Pseudo-Methodius), as Monfasani stresses.55 Third, there began a 
slow evolution in the perception of Muslims, who were no longer viewed so 
much as ‘enemies,’ but rather as Christians who did not know that they are 
Christians.
Although Trebizond uses many topics from medieval tradition—for exam-
ple, the insistence on the incapacity of Muslims to grasp the truth of Trinity—
he nevertheless attempts to convert Mehmed by using an elaborate rhetoric of 
praise, rather than a fierce diatribe like Riccoldo’s. Thus, in the works of 
Trebizond, the perception of Islam seems to change yet again: Mehmed is no 
longer considered an ‘enemy,’ but instead becomes a possible ally.
 Nicholas of Cusa and Marsilio Ficino: ‘Presupposition’ and the 
Changing Face of Islam
The following section will highlight the use of CLS in Nicholas of Cusa’s 
Cribratio Alkorani and Marsilio Ficino’s De Christiana religione. Specifically, 
I shall discuss Cusanus and Ficino’s rhetorical strategy of praesuppositio, 
namely, their claim that whatever is true in the Qurʾan reflects its borrowings 
from the Christian Scripture, which it ‘presupposes.’ We shall also see how this 
strategy fits within the larger scheme of perceptions shifting from Islam as 
‘enemy’ to ‘other.’
La scoperta dell’antichità classica nel Rinascimento, Italian translation (Padua: Antenore, 
1989). 
54 Enea Silvio Piccolomini, “Letter to Mehmed II”; see Luca d’Ascia, Il Corano e la tiara 
(Bologna: Pendragon, 2001).
55 Monfasani, George of Trebizond, in particular 131–135.
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A Nicholas of Cusa
Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464)56 knew Riccoldo’s CLS well. Cusanus himself 
informs us: “In Rome I saw the book of Brother Riccoldo, of the Order of 
Preachers, who studied Arabic in Baghdad; this [book] was more gratifying 
than the others.”57 Nicholas’s manuscript of CLS, with marginal notes in his 
own hand, survives in his library at St. Nicholas Hospital in Bernkastel-Kues,58 
and his Cribratio Alkorani makes extensive use of it. However, according to 
Jean Marie Mérigoux, Cusanus distorts the original intention of CLS, because 
instead of considering it a missionary theological work, he sees it as a source of 
information on Islamic culture and religion.59
Nicholas of Cusa wrote the Cribratio Alkorani in 1461, three years before his 
death. This work is dedicated to Pope Pius II, who is urged to consider the 
‘Mohammedan sect’ as originating from the Nestorian heresy and, con-
sequently, erroneous but able to be refuted. Following CLS, Nicholas writes 
about Muslim violence against Christians, the overall violent nature of the 
Qurʾanic law, and the ‘continuous persecutions’ put into effect by the Muslims 
against Christian populations.60 Cusanus insists over and over again on 
56 On Nicholas of Cusa and Islam, see the essays in Part I this volume. See also James E. 
Biechler, “Interreligious Dialogue,” in Introducing Nicholas of Cusa: A Guide to a 
Renaissance Man, ed. Chistopher M. Bellitto, Thomas M. Izbicki and Gerald Christianson 
(Mahwah: Paulist Press, 2004), 270–96; G. Christianson and T. M. Izbicki, eds., Nicholas of 
Cusa: In Search of God and Wisdom (Leiden: Brill, 1991); Walter A. Euler and Tom Kerger, 
eds., Cusanus und der Islam (Tier: Paulinus, 2010); Pim Valkenberg, “Sifting the Qurʾan: 
Two Forms of Interreligious Hermeneutics in Nicholas of Cusa,” in Interreligious 
Hermeneutics in Pluralistic Europe, ed. D. Cheetham, U. Winkler, O. Leirvik and J. Gruber 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2011), 27–48; Rita George-Tvrtkovic, “After the Fall: Riccoldo da 
Montecroce and Nicholas of Cusa on Religious Diversity,” Theological Studies 73 (2012): 
641–62; Marica Costigliolo, Islam e cristianesimo: mondi di differenze nel Medioevo. Il dial-
ogo con l’Islam nell’opera di Nicola da Cusa (Genoa: Genova University Press, 2012). 
57 The critical edition of Cribratio Alkorani is in Ludwig Hagemann, ed., Nicolai de Cusa 
Opera omnia, vol. 8 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1986). I shall cite this edition by Prologue 
or Book, chapter, paragraph number (n.), and lines, as here: Prol., n. 4, lines. 3–5: 
“Vidi . . . Romae libellum fratris Ricoldi ordinis praedicatorum qui arabicis literis in bal-
dach operam dedit et plus caeteris placuit.” English translation by Jasper Hopkins in 
Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Nicholas of Cusa, vol. II (Minneapolis: 
Banning, 2001), 963–1105, here, 966.
58 James E. Biechler, “Three Manuscripts on Islam from the Library of Nicholas of Cusa,” 
Manuscripta 27 (1983): 91–100.  See also Marica Costigliolo, “Qurʾanic Sources of Nicholas 
of Cusa,” Mediaevitisk 24 (2011): 219–238.
59 Mérigoux, “L’ouvrage d’un frère precheur florentin,” 48.
60 Cribratio Alkorani, III, iii, n. 168.
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Muhammad’s dominating actions.61 He also acknowledges that Christians 
might convert to Islam but will nonetheless remain Christian in their hearts; 
he therefore argues that persecution on religious grounds is senseless for both 
religions.62 In Cusanus’s opinion, Muhammad’s sole purpose was to pursue 
power through the sword, to extend his property on the pretext of religion and 
God.63 Muhammad’s work on the Qurʾan would be completed later, thanks to 
a group of counselors, among whose number were some heretical Christians 
and ‘perverse’ Jews.64
Nicholas describes the Cribratio’s project as follows:
Nonetheless, we intend to critically examine, presupposing the Gospel of 
Christ, Muhammad’s book, and prove that also that book includes some 
things, which would notably confirm the Gospel, should it need to be 
confirmed, and wherever it disagrees with the Gospel, it was caused by 
ignorance, and consequently, by perversity in Muhammad’s inten-
tions. . . . For he did not pursue the glory of God and the salvation of man, 
but rather his own glory.65
Nicholas’s comment—that ‘the Qurʾan confirms the truth of the Gospel’—
severely limits his textual hermeneutics because he declares that he already 
knows the outcome of his analysis, namely, the affirmation of the Gospel’s 
truth through an analysis of the Qurʾan. To support this thought, Nicholas 
wants to thoroughly and critically examine (cribrare) the Qurʾan. To do so, he 
makes use of ‘pia interpretatio’ (pious or faithful interpretation),66 a method he 
had already used in his dialogue De pace fidei (1453). He thus begins his argu-
ment from a conceptual principle that he had developed in his earlier dialogi-
cal work: there is only one truth, the truth of the Gospel, and no comparisons 
can be made without this presupposition. However, in the Cribratio, praesup-
positio is no longer used to prove the uniqueness of truth appearing in a variety 
61 In particular, Cribratio Alkorani, III, viii n. 184.
62 Cribratio Alkorani, III, vi, n. 180, lines 10–15.
63 Cribratio Alkorani, III, viii, n. 184, lines 1–5. 
64 Cribratio Alkorani, I, i, n. 23, lines 9–11.
65 Cribratio Alkorani, Prol., n. 10, lines 1–7, my translation.
66 See J. Biechler, “Interreligious Dialogue,” 289: “The Sifting utilizes a hermeneutic principle 
which like the foregoing elements, has an ameliorative effect on the Christian-Muslim 
confrontation. Cusanus uses what he terms an interpretatio pia, a kind of benign under-
standing by means of which certain Qurʾanic passages are understood in a sense not con-
tradictory to Christian belief.” See also P. Valkenberg, “Sifting the Qurʾan,” 36–46; and 
Cribratio Alkorani, II, xii, nn. 119–120.
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of rites,67 but instead, is meant to demonstrate the wicked intention of the 
Qurʾan’s author Muhammad, who, Nicholas claims, perversely subverted the 
truth of the Gospel.
The Cribratio Alkorani is grounded on the premise that if the Qurʾan is cor-
rectly understood, it shall prove the truth of the Gospel, as Nicholas affirms in 
the work’s prologue. The work is filled with polemical and apologetic inten-
tions, and consistently uses the rhetorical strategy of praesuppositio. Cusanus 
does not deal with the specific traditions and rites of Islam, as he had done 
previously in De pace fidei. Here his gaze is not introspective and self-critical, 
and he does not attempt to investigate whether historical reasons or common 
affinities exist. Rather, Nicholas does not change his general theoretical 
approach and resorts to the same concepts expounded in his previous theo-
logical works, since here too he analyzes the differences between the two reli-
gions based on the presupposition that the truth is in the Gospel. Hence, he 
concludes that if anything beautiful or truthful can be found in the Qurʾan, it 
necessarily originates from the Gospel.68
In the Cribratio, Cusanus presents two different kinds of analyses of the 
Qurʾanic text. First, Nicholas examines the Qurʾan without criticizing its con-
tents, since he wants to confront his opponent on equal terms and prove that 
the Qurʾan actually bears witness to Christian truths. But at the same time, 
Nicholas also intends to prove that the Qurʾanic text cannot be the fruit of a 
divine revelation. Thus, the Cribratio shows a strong textual consistency with 
both the tradition of the Bible and Nicholas’s own thought. This consistency 
emerges in particular in his comparison between the holy books, especially in 
the chapter entitled “The Qurʾan is not trustworthy in the points in which it 
contradicts the Holy Scriptures.”69 Nicholas maintains that in a comparison 
between the two holy books, the term ‘variation’ means not only the replace-
ment of words, but also the different meaning of the Qurʾan’s words compared 
to the evangelical word. In that case, he adds, the Qurʾan cannot be justified; 
therefore, we must admit that it was not God who transmitted the Qurʾanic 
word to Muhammad.70
Hence, the use of praesuppositio can be seen as part of the slow transforma-
tion of the perception of Turks from ‘enemy’ into ‘other.’ Indeed, Cusanus con-
siders Muslims ‘different’ from Christians because of their ignorance, and he 
67 See Pim Valkenberg, “Una Religio in Rituum Varietate: Religious Pluralism, the Qurʾan, and 
Nicholas of Cusa,” in this volume.
68 Cribratio Alkorani, I, vi, n. 41, lines 1–5.
69 Cribratio Alkorani, III, vi, n. 179, lines 10–15.
70 Cribratio Alkorani, III, vii, n. 183, lines 12–16.
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underlines the obliviousness of Muslims, who must be converted to Christian-
ity. To summarize, Cusanus’s Cribratio Alkorani exhibits two key features: a reli-
ance on CLS for many themes, including the violence of the Qurʾanic law, and 
the use of praesuppositio to guide Nicholas’s reading of the Qurʾan. Thus, by 
arguing that the Qurʾan presupposes the Gospel’s truth, Nicholas simultane-
ously modifies his perception of Muslims by insisting on their ignorance.
B Marsilio Ficino
In the De Christiana religione of Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499) we can also clearly 
see the influence of the CLS, as Angelo Michele Piemontese asserts:
The Contra legem Sarracenorum is the main source for Marsilio Ficino 
about Muhammad and the Qurʾan in the De Christiana religione (1474), in 
particular chapters Twelve and Twenty-six. In chapter Two Ficino quotes 
his source.’71
Furthermore, the De Christiana religione is not the only text where Ficino tack-
les the issue of Islamic culture. As Bisaha notes:
In October 1480 Marsilio Ficino, the Florentine humanist and Neoplatonic 
scholar, wrote a letter to Matthias Corvinus of Hungary entitled “An 
exhortation to war against the barbarians.” Ficino implores Matthias to 
help and save Italy and all of Christendom from the ravages of the inhu-
man Turks. He chose to emphasize the damage the Turks had done to 
learning.72
This theme (of the Turks as ‘barbaro,’ or ‘uncivilized’) is repeated also in De 
Christiana religione. Though the premises of Ficino’s philosophy might seem 
71 De Christiana religione, in Marsili Ficini Florentini, Opera quae hactenus extitere et que in 
lucem nunc primum prodiere omnia, Basileae, ex officina Henricpetrina, MDLXXVI, ed. 
Mario Sancipriano, vol. II (Turin: Bottega d’Erasmo, 1983). On Ficino and his work De 
Christiana religione, see Sebastiano Gentile and Stéphane Toussaint, Marsilio Ficino: fonti, 
testi, fortuna: atti del convegno internazionale (Firenze, 1–3 ottobre 1999) (Rome: Edizioni di 
storia e letteratura, 2006). See also Giuseppe Saitta, Marsilio Ficino e la filosofia 
dell’umanesimo (Bologna: Fiammenghi & Nanni, 1954); Paul Oskar Kristeller, Marsilio 
Ficino and his work after five hundred years (Florence: F. S. Olschki, 1987); and Cesare 
Vasoli, “Per le fonti del De christiana religione di Marsilio Ficino,” Rinascimento 38 (1988): 
135–234. 
72 Bisaha, Creating East and West, 74.
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open to a religious exchange, as will be discussed below, this treatise clearly 
displays the opposite tendency.
According to Ficino, the soul is the fixed center of the world, and links every-
thing in a concrete unity.73 From this, he moves to develop an original theory 
of natural religion, which is deeply rooted in man, and distinguishes men from 
animals.74 The philosophical doctrine is meant to show the truths of religion 
with theoretical arguments.75 Although Ficino bases these arguments on the 
concept of natural religion, which would seem to make all religions equal, he 
firmly asserts the superiority of the Christian religion. Indeed, he tries to 
defend Christian theology, a project that he undertakes in his major apologetic 
work, De Christiana religione. In the first part of the work, in addition to his 
famous remarks on the relationship between philosophy and religion, he 
explains how the authority of the Christian religion can be justified with good 
reasons against the Jews and Muslims.76
In his library, Ficino had a Qurʾan translated into Latin as well as other texts 
from the Islamic tradition (e.g., Avicenna’s writings), and he had the CLS of 
Riccoldo. Indeed, Ficino’s works echo several arguments found in Riccoldo’s 
CLS, including the disorder and fabrications of the Qurʾan, and the violence of 
Muhammad. Furthermore, Ficino states that this fiction that is the Qurʾan is 
credible among foolish people such as the Muslims, and has spread through 
violence and deception (a theme from CLS), since it seems ridiculous to intel-
ligent and wise men. Here we can note a difference between Ficino and 
Riccoldo: although Riccoldo also describes Muslims as unlearned people, 
Ficino considers ignorance to be their primary fault.
In chapter twelve of the De Christiana religione, Ficino writes that although 
Muslims may seem Christian, they are in fact heretics or Arians or Manicheans: 
“We conclude that Jews, Muslims, and pagans recognize the Christian religion 
as the most excellent above all.” He then adds: “Although these people prefer 
their doctrine, however, they put the Christian religion before all the others.”77 
Therefore, if a Muslim were to judge with sincerity, he would prefer the 
Christian religion without doubt. In this case Ficino uses the same rhetorical 
strategy of Cusanus, namely, the praesuppositio: Muslims must recognize that 
73 Paul Oskar Kristeller, Il pensiero filosofico di Marsilio Ficino, Italian translation (Florence: 
Sansoni, 1953). See also Paul Richard Blum, Philosophy of Religion in the Renaissance 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 109–27.
74 Kristeller, Il pensiero filosofico di Marsilio Ficino, 344. 
75 Kristeller, Il pensiero filosofico di Marsilio Ficino, 345. Bisaha, Creating East and West, 172. 
76 Bisaha, Creating East and West, 265.
77 Marsilio Ficino, De Christiana religione, chapter twelve. 
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the Truth is the Christian truth, since rational thinking necessarily leads to this 
conclusion. Unlike the CLS, Ficino insists that Quranic statements confirm 
the truth of the Gospel, and he uses this argument to affirm that Muslims 
should then accept Christianity. He emphasizes that Muhammed himself 
recognized the affinities between Islam and Christianity, and that this is a sign 
of the Gospel’s superiority, since only ignorant people would disregard these 
 similarities and believe instead that Muhammed was the last Prophet and not 
Jesus.
By using the rhetorical device of ‘praesuppositio,’ Ficino aims to prove that 
there is only one truth, the truth of the Gospel, and that it is impossible to 
make any other comparison without starting from this presupposition. Like 
Cusanus, he uses the praesuppositio to claim that the Qurʾan’s author 
Muhammad perversely subverted the Gospel’s order of truth. For this reason, 
some parts of the Qurʾan deviate from the points where it agrees with the 
Christian text.
We can therefore note Ficino’s insistence on the ignorance of Muslims, as 
well as his description of them as ‘barbarians.’ Moreover, like Cusanus, Ficino 
uses the praesuppositio to insist on the affinities between Muslims and 
Christians, and to highlight how Muslims are really Christians but simply 
refuse to recognize this. Although Ficino drew many themes from CLS, they are 
nevertheless modified in his work, since his perception of Islam is focused less 
on the dangers that it poses, and more on the ignorance of Muslims.
 Conclusions
In conclusion, by comparing the works of six authors, I have been able to high-
light some themes in Christian apologetic treatises, in order to show how the 
perception of Muslim culture changed over time. The different ways of writing 
on Islam are quite clear: whereas Riccoldo considers Muslims as enemies, 
Ficino describes them less harshly as ‘those who do not know.’ Thus, the main 
point shifts to an insistence on the ignorance of Muslims—a modification that 
is also noticeable in the works of other authors, such as Piccolomini.78
78 A debate on the source of his Letter to Mehmed II is still open. I support the thesis of the 
use of Contra Legem in the work of Pius II; see Costigliolo, Islam e Cristianesimo, 120–21. 
For essays on Islam and Piccolomini, see Luca D’Ascia and E. Mecacci, eds., Conferenze su 
Pio II nel sesto centenario della nascita di Enea Silvio Piccolomini (1405–2005) (Siena: 
Accademia senese degli intronati, 2006). See also Luigi Totaro, ed., Pio II nei suoi 
Commentarii, un contributo alla lettura della autobiografia di Enea Silvio de Piccolomini 
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As demonstrated by the wide circulation of Riccoldo’s work, humanists 
inherited a medieval perception of Islam, which has since been carried for-
ward into modern Western thought.79 Because CLS was the main source about 
Islam for Christian authors throughout the centuries, it is essential to uncover 
how this work was used, as well as identify its translations and assess its influ-
ence on the course of history. Riccoldo wrote the CLS in light of his long experi-
ence in an Arabic-speaking country: throughout the work he appears to be 
angry and continually fighting against Islam, with no hope that Muslims would 
accept Christianity.80 In the space of one century, however, the perception 
begins to change, and Christian authors, both Catholic and Orthodox, study 
Islam from a different perspective. Islam is no more the enemy but the ‘other’—
something that can be controlled and must necessarily be converted to 
Christianity. Here the work of George of Trebizond is extremely important for 
two reasons: it shows the change from a medieval to a humanist perception, as 
well as the development of a more unified discourse of European civility, con-
trasted with an Islamic barbarism.81
Regarding this last aspect, it is important to note that over the course of 
time fewer Italian scholars traveled to Byzantium, largely because Byzantine 
Greeks were coming to Italy in increasing numbers. “A combination of pres-
sure from the Turks and growing opportunities in the West led many Greeks to 
leave their homelands in search of employment in Italy, while others relocated 
to different areas of Greece and Venetian Crete.”82 The work of Trebizond and 
others such as Bessarion, Plethon, and Kydones is an important indication of 
this tendency.
According to Edmund Reiss,83 the literary and philosophical production of 
the Middle Ages is consistently characterized by strong polemical intentions. 
(Bologna: Patron, 1978). Studies on the centrality of Humanism in Piccolomini’s works 
can be found in F. Nevola, ed., Pio II Piccolomini: il papa del Rinascimento a Siena: atti del 
convegno internazionale di studi, 5–7 maggio 2005 (Colle Val d’Elsa: Protagon, 2009).
79 Bisaha, Creating East and West, 41.
80 About the emotions of Riccoldo about Islamic expansion, see René Kappler, trans., 
Epistolae ad ecclesiam triumphantem, Riccold de Monte Croce, Pérégrination en Terre Sainte 
et au Proche Orient, Lettres sur la chute de Saint-Jean d’Acre (Paris: H. Champion, 1997); for 
the Italian translation, see Davide Cappi, ed., Libro della peregrinazione; Epistole alla 
Chiesa Trionfante (Genova-Milano, 2005). 
81 Bisaha, Creating East and West, 44. See also Weiss, La scoperta dell’antichità classica nel 
Rinascimento. 
82 Bisaha, Creating East and West, 140.
83 Edmund Reiss, “Conflict and its Resolution in Medieval Dialogues,” in Arts libéraux et phi-
losophie au Moyen Age, Actes du quatrième Congrès international de philosophie médiévale 
(Paris: Vrin, 1969), 863–872.
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As a matter of fact, disputes, apologetic treatises, polemical libels, and similar 
texts converged in the literary genre of ‘dialogue.’ In fifteenth-century political 
and social life, religious problems were hardly separable from the political 
context; thus, they were particularly thorny everyday issues for both scholars 
and the mighty of that age. Dialogue between different religions was therefore 
an urgent and topical matter on which authors debated, putting forward a var-
iety of philosophical, theological, and political arguments. Nevertheless, the 
medieval genre of ‘dialogue’ was constructed through paraphrases, quotations 
that were frequently unattributed, and a range of textual misinterpretations 
that often depended on unreliable sources and inaccurate translations of 
original texts.
According to Thomas Burman, the translations of the Qurʾan that circulated 
in Europe until the eighteenth century show evidence of a deep interest among 
Western scholars in the Islamic world, despite the translations’ many 
 inaccuracies.84 Based on these translations and polemical works on the Qurʾan, 
it finally became possible to start weaving an intercultural and interreligious 
dialogue. Even a polemical and apologetic work can be considered a form of 
interreligious dialogue, since it is constructed with a continuous comparison 
of the essential texts and themes of two monotheistic religions, namely, 
Christianity and Islam.
As mentioned above, Bartolomeo Picerno re-translated the CLS from Greek 
back into Latin as a gift for Ferdinand II, who in 1492 conquered the kingdom 
of Granada; furthermore, Bartolomeo’s letter invites the king also to liberate 
Jerusalem and the African countries from Muslim control. In the sixteenth 
century, anti-Islamic propaganda continued to use the CLS as the source of 
‘inspiration’ for fighting the Muslims (for example, through Luther’s widely 
known translation). However, if it is true that dialogue is a sort of mutual 
knowledge, then it is also true that we can detect a change in this respect dur-
ing the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. If on one hand the circulation of the 
texts on the interpretation of the Qurʾan (like Riccoldo’s work) created a slow 
but growing knowledge about the similarities and differences between Islam 
and Christianity, then on the other hand, this textual and theorical comparison 
also contributed to the formation of a Christian and Western identity that saw 
itself as the center of Roman and Greek culture, in direct opposition to the 
‘uncivilized’ Turks. This theme must be considered as part of the birth of two 
polar images: the Turk becomes not only the ‘wild beast’ but also the barbarian 
and adversary of learning, while the West finds its own identity through this 
very contrast with the totally strange ‘other.’
84 This is the thesis on which Burman’s Reading the Qurʾan is based.
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In the Middle Ages, as Christian sources on the Islamic world show, Muslim 
culture was perceived as extremely threatening. Hence, there were many 
defenses for Christianity, such as the treatises on the ‘mistakes’ of the followers 
of Allah. However, as our analysis has illustrated, over the course of time this 
textual attitude was modified, and authors aimed to point out the Christian 
truth in comparison with the ‘falsity’ of Islamic theology, in order to reinforce 
Christian identity through the presupposition of its own absolute truth. Thus, 
the apolegetic aim is gradually replaced by a systematic comparison based on 
partial translations of the Qurʾan. The comparison with the ‘other,’ moreover, 
becomes the basis for reinforcing identity, in order to demonstrate the truth 
and consequently the supremacy of one’s own theoretical position. The ‘other,’ 
the Muslim, is no longer the enemy; instead, he takes on the role of the non-
Western, the non-European, the ‘something’ different and alien. Alongside the 
forced conversion of Muslims and Jews conducted by the Spanish Inquisition, 
the works of the authors analyzed above show the Western European passage 
from a position of fear and open hostility towards Muslims, to a progressive 
position of supremacy, which finally turns into the disappearance of any 
notion of an ‘other’ and a respect for legitimate differences.85
85 I dedicate this article to my children, Antonio and Adele. I wish to thank Donald Duclow, 
who provided crucial support. I thank Ian Levy and Rita Tvrtkovic for their questions and 
editing. Thanks also go to Thomas E. Burman, Gerald Christianson, and all who partici-
pated in the Gettysburg conference on “Christian-Muslim Dialogue in the Late Middle 
Ages.”
Juan de Segovia on the Superiority of Christians 
over Muslims: Liber de magna auctoritate 
episcoporum in concilio generali 10.6
Jesse D. Mann
No discussion of dialogue between Christians and Muslims in late medieval 
Europe can overlook the contributions of the Spanish theologian Juan de 
Segovia (ca. 1393–1458). As is now increasingly well known, especially to those 
interested in Nicholas of Cusa, Segovia initiated an important correspondence 
regarding Islam with several prominent churchmen (including Cusa) after 
the fall of Constantinople in 1453 and subsequently produced the first trilin-
gual Qurʾan (Arabic, Latin, and Castilian), which unfortunately has not come 
down to us.1 Although the Ottoman conquest of the Byzantine capital surely 
gave new urgency to Segovia’s interest in the ‘Islamic question,’2 that interest 
1 On Segovia, his correspondence pertaining to the ‘Islamic question,’ and his trilingual Qurʾan, 
see Rudolf Haubst, “Johannes von Segovia im Gespräch mit Nikolaus von Kues und Jean 
Germain über die göttliche Dreieinigkeit und ihre Verkundigung vor den Mohammedanern,” 
Münchener Theologische Zeitschrift 2 (1951): 115–29; Darío Cabanelas Rodríguez, Juan de 
Segovia y el problema islámico (Madrid: Universidad de Madrid, 1952); R. W. Southern, Western 
Views of Islam in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 86–103; 
James  E. Biechler, “A New Face Toward Islam: Nicholas of Cusa and John of Segovia,” in 
Nicholas of Cusa: In Search of God and Wisdom, ed. Gerald Christianson and Thomas M. 
Izbicki (New York: Brill, 1991), 185–202; Anne Marie Wolf, Juan de Segovia and Western 
Perspectives on Islam in the Fifteenth Century (Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 2003); 
Victor Sanz Santacruz, “Juan de Segovia y Nicolás de Cusa frente al Islam: su comprensíon 
intelectualista de la fe cristiana,” Anuario de Historia de la Iglesia 16 (2007): 181–194; Thomas E. 
Burman, Reading the Qurʾān in Latin Christendom, 1140–1560 (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 178–197; Walter Andreas Euler and Franz-Bernhard Stammkötter, 
“Johannes von Segovia und Nikolaus von Kues im Gespräch über den Islam,” in Cusanus und 
der Islam, ed. Walter Andreas Euler and Tom Kerger (Trier: Paulinus, 2010), 49–63; and most 
recently, Juan de Segovia, De gladio divini spiritus in corda mittendo Sarracenorum: Edition 
und deutsche Übersetzung, ed. Ulli Roth, 2 vols. (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2012) [hereafter 
Roth, De gladio].
2 On the significance of the fall of Constantinople, see Erich Meuthen, “Der Fall von 
Konstantinopel und der lateinische Westen,” Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der 
Cusanus-Gesellschaft 16 (1984): 35–60, esp. 58–60.
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long antedated 1453.3 We also know that Segovia and Cusa shared their 
mutual interest in Islam while they were together at the Council of Basel in 
the 1430s.4
Until recently, scholarly attention has primarily focused on Segovia’s corre-
spondence with Cusa, Jean Germain, and Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini.5 Now, 
however, scholars are studying and editing Segovia’s other writings on Islam, as 
the work of Ulli Roth attests.6 Santiago Madrigal has also rightly observed that 
even in works seemingly unrelated to Islam, such as his Liber de magna aucto-
ritate episcoporum in concilio generali, Segovia occasionally addresses issues 
pertaining to Christian-Muslims relations.7 Indeed, it is a chapter from this 
work that concerns us here.
Of course, what has particularly stimulated modern interest in Segovia’s 
views on Islam is his seeming openness to dialogue with Muslims, which he 
repeatedly calls “the way of peace and doctrine rather than the way of war.”8 
Regardless of whether Segovia’s dialogic and pacifistic approach to Islam 
3 For examples, see Wolf, “Juan de Segovia,” 111ff.; Burman, Reading the Qurʾan, 179; and 
Santacruz, “Juan de Segovia,” 184. See also Roth, De gladio, 1: xxx–xliii.
4 See Biechler, “A New Face,” 189; and Santacruz, “Juan de Segovia,” 183.
5 Davide Scotto’s recent doctoral thesis (Florence, 2012) on this correspondence, which I was 
unable to consult for this article, should provide a better textual foundation for further study 
of this correspondence. 
6 See, e.g., Roth’s edition cited above (n. 1). See also the recent improved edition of Segovia’s 
prologue to the trilingual Qurʾan by Jose Martínez Gázquez, “El Prólogo de Juan de Segobia al 
Corán (Qurʾān) trilingüe (1456),” Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch 38 (2003): 389–410.
7 Santiago Madrigal Terrazas, “Lex Christi, lex Moysi, lex Machometi: Juan de Segovia y la 
polémica anti-islámica,” in Umbra, imago, veritas: homenaje a los profesores Manuel Gesteira, 
Eusebio Gil y Antonio Vargas-Machuca, ed. Secundino Castro et al. (Madrid: Universidad 
Pontificia Comillas, 2004), 339–365; and idem, “Judíos, moros y cristianos: La vision teológica 
de Juan de Segovia (1393–1458) acerca de las tres culturas ibéricas,” in Christlicher Norden—
Muslimischer Süden: Ansprüche und Wirklichkeiten von Christen, Juden und Muslimen auf der 
iberischen Halbinsel im Hoch -und Spätmittelalter, ed. Matthias M. Tischler and Alexander 
Fidora (Münster: Aschendorff, 2011), 489–504. Anne Marie Wolf has also noted this point as 
evidence of the connection between Segovia’s ecclesiological and Islamic writings, see Wolf, 
“Juan de Segovia,” 238–239. According to Rolf De Kegel, the Liber de magna auctoritate (here-
after: LMA) is the only ecclesiological work in which Segovia discusses Islam. See Rolf De 
Kegel, ed., Johannes von Segovia, Liber de magna auctoritate episcoporum in concilio generali 
(Fribourg: Universitätsverlag, 1995), 34.
8 See Wolf, “Juan de Segovia,” 222–23; and Biechler, “A New Face,” 191.
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derives from Scripture,9 from his university background,10 from his personal 
experiences in Spain or Basel,11 or from some combination of these factors, this 
approach has understandably made him attractive to those seeking non- 
violent models for Christian-Muslim interaction. As I have argued elsewhere, 
however, the attractive aspects of Segovia’s approach to Islam should not blind 
us to his ultimate aim, namely the conversion of Muslims to Christianity,12 nor 
to his seemingly longstanding reliance on the traditional and quite negative 
Western image of Islam and Muslims.13
Hence, as Thomas Burman has so ably discussed, Segovia presents us with a 
fine example of the tension or oscillation experienced by some medieval 
Christians between hostility toward Islam and a desire to study and under-
stand Islam, or between “polemic and philology.”14 While manifest in his work 
9 This is Wolf ’s argument, see, e.g., her, “Juan de Segovia,” iv, 255–257, and idem, “Pleas for 
Peace, Problems for Historians: A 1455 Letter from Juan de Segovia to Jean Germain on 
Countering the Threat of Islam,” in Religious Conflict and Accommodation in the Early 
Modern World, ed. Marguerite Ragnow and William D. Phillips, Jr. (University of 
Minnesota: Center for Early Modern History, 2011), 55–68.
10 I have myself advanced this view, though not to the exclusion of the others listed here. See 
Jesse D. Mann, “Truth and Consequences: Juan de Segovia on Islam and Conciliarism,” 
Medieval Encounters 8 (2002): 79–90.
11 On the Spanish context, see, e.g., Wolf, “Juan de Segovia,” esp. chap. 3; idem, “Pleas for 
Peace,” 62–63 (with bibliography); and Gerard Wiegers, Islamic Literature in Spanish and 
Aljamiado: Yça of Segovia ( fl. 1450), His Antecedents and Successors (Leiden: Brill, 1994). 
Leyla Rouhi’s “A Fifteenth-Century Salamancan’s Pursuit of Islamic Studies,” in Under the 
Influence: Questioning the Comparative in Medieval Castile, ed. Cynthia Robinson and 
Leyla Rouhi (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 21–42 is an interesting, but ultimately unconvincing 
attempt to apply a postmodern analysis to the collaboration between Segovia and Yça 
Gidelli. For relevant experiences at Basel, see Thomas M. Izbicki, “The Possibility of 
Dialogue with Islam in the Fifteenth Century,” in Nicholas of Cusa: In Search of God and 
Wisdom, ed. Gerald Christianson and Thomas M. Izbicki (New York: Brill, 1991), 175–183 at 
179–180. Segovia himself suggests that the ‘success’ of Basel’s negotiations with the 
Hussites supported his approach. See Mann, “Juan de Segovia,” 88; Roth, De gladio, 1:xl–
xli; and below, p. 21.
12 For a fuller discussion of this aim, see Wolf, “Juan de Segovia,” 204ff.
13 See Mann, “Truth and Consequences.” On this image, see Norman Daniel, Islam and the 
West: The Making of an Image (Edinburgh: University Press, 1960); and John Tolan, 
Saracens: Islam in the Medieval European Imagination (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2002). Wolf notes that Segovia employs a “pejorative description of Muslims” 
already in one of his earliest works dating from 1427, see Wolf, “Juan de Segovia,” 119. 
See also Roth, De gladio, 1:xxxi.
14 See Burman, Reading the Qurʾan, 180, 186.
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on the trilingual Qurʾan, this tension also shows itself in Segovia’s ‘plan’15 to 
foster debate between Christians and Muslims while simultaneously bemoan-
ing the paucity of worthy Muslim interlocutors and decrying the supposed 
Muslim contempt for reason and aversion to disputation.16 In the words of a 
modern advocate of honest interreligious dialogue, Segovia often engages “not 
a real, but a projected other.”17 And so we come to the text translated in this 
chapter.
Segovia’s LMA is one of his ‘late’ works, probably composed after the Council 
of Basel (1449) but before November 1453.18 Although an ecclesiological trea-
tise that seems to represent some modifications of Segovia’s previous concili-
arist views,19 the LMA also contains numerous references to Islam and 
Muslims.20 The most extensive discussion of Islam appears in Animadvertencia 
10, chapter 6. Rolf De Kegel has called this chapter the “earliest passage in 
Segovia’s writings in which he treats Islam at such length.”21 More importantly, 
De Kegel also notes that this passage contains the central themes of Segovia’s 
15 Wolf has rightly observed that Cabanelas overstated the coherence or systematic nature 
of Segovia’s ‘plan.’ See Wolf, “Pleas for Peace,” 65, n. 9.
16 These were, of course, traditional Christian criticisms of Islam. See, e.g., Daniel, Islam and 
the West, 123–124; and Mann, “Juan de Segovia,” 85.
17 See David Tracy, Dialogue with the Other: The Inter-Religious Dialogue (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1990), 4.
18 For a critical edition, see De Kegel, LMA (see above n. 7). On the dating of this work, see 
De Kegel, LMA, 31–36. For more on the LMA, see Werner Krämer, Konsens und Rezeption. 
Verfassungsprinzipien der Kirche im Basler Konziliarismus (Münster: Aschendorff, 1980), 
248–251; H. J. Sieben, “Basler Konziliarismus konkret (II). Der ‘Liber de magna auctoritate 
episcoporum in concilio generali’ des Johannes von Segovia,” in Vom Apostelkonzil zum 
Ersten Vatikanum. Studien zur Geschichte der Konzilsidee, ed. H. J. Sieben (Paderborn: 
Schöningh, 1996), 157–95; Rolf De Kegel, “Johannes von Segovia und die verfassungsmäs-
sige Vereinbarkeit von Papst und Konzil,” in Nach dem Basler Konzil: Die Neuordnung der 
Kirche zwischen Konziliarismus und monarchischem Papat, ca. 1450–1475, ed. Jürgen 
Dendorfer and Claudia Märtl (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2008), 45–66; and Thomas Prügl, 
“Herbst des Konziliarismus? Die Spätschriften des Johannes von Segovia,” in Das Ende des 
konziliaren Zeitalters (1440–1450): Versuch einer Bilanz, ed. Heribert Müller (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 2012), 153–174, esp. 159ff.
19 See Prügl, “Herbst des Konziliarismus,” 159: “Am sichtbarsten änderte Segovia seine früh-
ere Position im LMA.”
20 For examples, see Madrigal, “Lex Christi,” 350–355; and Wolf, “Juan de Segovia,” 238. De 
Kegel, “Johannes von Segovia und die verfassungsmässige Vereinbarkeit,” 63 also notes 
that about twenty citations from the Qurʾan appear in LMA. 
21 See De Kegel, LMA, 34: “Es ist die früheste Stelle in Segovias Schriften, die so ausführlich 
über den Islam berichtet.”
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more detailed discussion of Islam in his subsequent correspondences and in 
his later tract De gladio divini spiritus in corda mittendo Sarracenorum.22 Others, 
too, have seen the significance of this chapter.23
LMA 10.6 is part of Segovia’s larger argument that monarchy has always been 
and will always be the ‘political’ structure of the Christian church or polity 
(politia).24 In discussing the superiority of this monarchical structure as well as 
the general superiority of the Christian polity over other ‘polities’ (including 
Jewish, Muslim, and pagan), Segovia advances four reasons for Christianity’s 
preeminence.25 From these, the fourth reason is that the Christian religion 
excels in its number of learned men. On this point, Segovia compares 
Christianity to both Judaism (10.5) and Islam (10.6), but he is especially inter-
ested in explaining why the Muslims lack learned men, despite their large 
population and their extensive political power.26
Such is the context and principal aim of LMA 10.6. This brief introduction to 
the appended translation cannot even attempt to address all the issues raised 
by this rich chapter. Nevertheless, I should like to offer four observations here.
First, while it clear that Segovia intends to criticize and denigrate Muslims 
in this chapter, he does not hesitate to criticize Christians as well. He accuses 
Christians, notably learned Christians, as well as Muslims and Jews, of hypoc-
risy, of preaching virtue but practicing vice (10.6.9). More significantly, he also 
suggests that Christians have been woefully remiss in explaining their faith to 
Muslims, and that this failure has plagued Christianity since the rise of Islam 
(10.6.6). One should not exaggerate its importance, but this self-criticism in the 
context of criticizing the ‘other’ is at least noteworthy.27
22 De Kegel, LMA, 34. See also idem, “Johannes von Segovia und die verfassungsmässige 
Vereinbarkeit,” 63.
23 See Meuthen, “Der Fall,” 58 with n. 104; the articles by Santiago Madrigal cited above (n. 7) 
repeat arguments Madrigal first advanced in his book, El pensamiento ecclesial de Juan de 
Segovia (1393–1458): La gracia en el tiempo (Madrid: Universidad Pontificia de Comillas, 
2004), esp. chap. 3; see De Kegel’s own subsequent discussion in “Johannes von Segovia 
und die verfassungsmässige Vereinbarkeit,” 52–54; and Roth, De gladio, 1:xlii–xliii.
24 See LMA 10.1.1 (ed. De Kegel, 366–67).
25 LMA 10.2.2 (ed. De Kegel, 368).
26 LMA 10.5.5 (ed. De Kegel, 376). 
27 Both these self-criticisms echo arguments apparently first made in his 1427 Repetitio de 
fide catholica. See Wolf, “Juan de Segovia,” 122–124. Madrigal published an ‘edition’ of this 
Repetitio as an appendix to his El pensamiento ecclesial, 193–225. The corresponding pas-
sages are found in Madrigal, El pensamiento ecclesial, 223–224. Madrigal seems to have 
followed a different foliation from Wolf. Recently, Madrigal discussed a plan to re-edit this 
Repetitio. See Santiago Madrigal Terrazas, “Juan de Segovia y la transmisión de sus 
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Second, Segovia seems especially fond of the four reasons he presents in this 
chapter as to why Islam has so few learned men (10.6.1–4).28 In a somewhat 
modified form, these same four reasons, which echo traditional Christian criti-
cisms of Islam, reappear in Segovia’s letter to Jean Germain (18 December, 
1455)29 and even more interestingly in the De gladio divini spiritus in corda mit-
tendo Sarracenorum (1453–57).30 That Juan de Segovia recycled his own argu-
ments is not news.31 Intriguing, however, are the varying ways in which he 
employed these arguments. In the De gladio, for example, Segovia sets his four 
reasons for the Sarracens’ lack of wisdom and understanding (here sapientia 
and intellectus, not sapientes) within the context of Aristotle’s discussion of 
masters and slaves, or rulers and ruled.32 He concludes that, given their intel-
lectual deficiencies and their indulgence of carnal appetites, Muslims are by 
nature better suited to be slaves than masters.33 This is not the place to pursue 
this matter further, but only to note that it merits more detailed investigation.
 manuscritos: El ejemplo del ‘Liber de substancia ecclesie,” in De la prima a la segunda 
“Escuela de Salamanca”: Fuentes documentales y lineas de investigación, ed. M. A. Pena 
González (Salamanca: Universidad Pontificia, 2012), 43–53 at 50.
28 Briefly stated, these are: 1) their obsession with venery; 2) their emphasis on military 
training and warfare; 3) the deleterious effects of the warm climates they inhabit; and 
4) their disdain for reasoned debate and for literary pursuits. I think both Madrigal, “Lex 
Christi,” 354, and De Kegel, “Johannes von Segovia und die verfassungsmässige 
Vereinbarkeit,” 53, somewhat misrepresent Segovia’s fourth reason when they suggest 
that, in Segovia’s view, Muslims are so occupied with the study of the Qurʾan that they 
consequently neglect other studies. Apart from other problems with this interpretation, 
Segovia says quite clearly that Muslims do not merely neglect but actively disdain ‘studia 
litterarum.’
29 See Mann, “Juan de Segovia,” 85.
30 See Roth, De gladio, 1:358–386, esp. 366ff. (= consideratio 18). I believe Prof. Roth was the 
first to notice this specific connection between the LMA and the De gladio. See Roth, De 
gladio, 1:367, n. 26.
31 For additional examples of this practice, see Jesse D. Mann, “The Historian and the Truths: 
Juan de Segovia’s Explanatio de tribus veritatibus fidei,” 2 vols. (Ph.D. diss, University of 
Chicago, 1993), 1:171, 270.
32 See Roth, De gladio, 1:364–366. Cf. Aristotle, Politics, 1252b–1255b. This seems to be a little-
studied instance of Segovia’s use of Aristotle. On the general theme, see H. J. Sieben, 
“Aristotles bei Konstanzer und Basler Konziliaristen,” in Vom Apostelkonzil zum Ersten 
Vatikanum. Studien zur Geschichte der Konzilsidee, ed. H. J. Sieben (Paderborn: Schöningh, 
1996), 196–222 at 214–216.
33 Roth, De gladio, 1:366.120–126: “Quomodo autem Sarracenis natura magis servos quam 
dominantes esse conveniat, illis presertim, a quibus incepit secta, Machometus ipse 
omnifariam testis est, cum persaepe affirmet gentem, ad quam missus est, ineruditam et 
insciam esse legendi scribendive ac rudem, quin immo et scientiae incapacem, sed et 
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Third, lest we forget that LMA 10.6 aims to emphasize the superiority of 
Christians over Muslims, toward the end of the chapter (10.6.13) Segovia asserts 
that the real leaders in many Muslim communities, including even the military 
leaders, are apostate Christians. In so doing, he seems to show some familiarity 
with the devshirme, the obligation to surrender Christian children to be raised 
as Muslims in Ottoman state service, often as Janissaries.34 To wit, Segovia 
speaks of the exalted status such ‘apostates’ have achieved in Muslim society, 
and describes the lengths to which some Muslim parents would go to have 
their own children included among these ‘renegades.’ Modern scholars have 
noted that recruits from the Christian levy did indeed obtain some of the high-
est offices in the state, and that Muslim parents grew envious of these Christian 
converts.35 Precisely how Juan de Segovia might have known about the 
devshirme I cannot at present say. And one cannot completely exclude the pos-
sibility that Segovia is here simply embellishing the polemical commonplace 
that the Muslim elite is secretly Christian,36 though this seems less likely. In 
any case, Segovia’s point is clear enough: even in military matters, where Islam 
seemingly surpasses Christianity, there too the Christians are deemed superior 
to the Muslims.
My final observation does not pertain directly to LMA 10.6; however, it is 
germane to the theme of interreligious comparison that marks this entire 
chapter. Before undertaking his comparison of Christianity with Islam, Segovia 
had noted that there are some differences between Christianity and all other 
religions or ‘polities’ (including Islam) that render comparison impossible. 
One such incomparable difference is Christianity’s ‘end’ ( finis). Accordingly, 
Segovia writes:
No attempt will be made to compare Christianity’s manifold superiority 
in other matters where one cannot properly speak of ‘superiority,’ since 
[Christianity] and the other religions (politiae) do not share a common 
compendii gratia restringens se pro modo calamus alias explicare rationes commemorat 
dumtaxat notissimas cuilibet intueri volenti quattuor causas, quare Sarraceni a magnitu-
dine deficiant sapientiae et intellectus . . .”
34 On the devshirme and the Janissaries, see V. L. Ménage, “Devshirme,” in Encyclopaedia of 
Islam, 2nd ed. See also Godfrey Goodwin, The Janissaries (London: Saqi Books, 1997), esp. 
chap. 3; and Robert Elgood, The Arms of Greece and Her Balkan Neighbors in the Ottoman 
Period (New York: Thames and Hudson, 2009), 33. I owe to Rita George-Tvrtkovic and 
Christine Isom-Verhaaren the suggestion that Segovia may be alluding to the Janissaries 
here.
35 See Goodwin, Janissaries, 35; and Elgood, The Arms of Greece, 33.
36 On this view, see Tolan, Saracens, 252 (citing Riccoldo da Montecroce).
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ground. Such, for example, is Christianity’s end, namely the attainment 
of eternal beatitude and direct vision of God. For, as was explained 
[above] in the fourth consideratio, no other society (societas) shares in 
this end.37
This may not be quite the same as saying extra ecclesiam salus nulla est, but it 
is not too far from a similarly exclusive view about salvation. Such a view of the 
way to salvation helps explain why, in LMA 10.6.12, Segovia states that the goal 
of engagement with Muslims is “to endeavor to save their souls.”38 Just as eccle-
siology is, for Segovia, ultimately a matter of soteriology,39 so too is dialogue 
with Islam ultimately a matter of the salvation of souls. No wonder, then, that 
Segovia puts this important discussion of Christian-Muslim relations in one of 
his mature ecclesiological works—a work in which he also suggests that a gen-
eral council could be an appropriate place for Christians and Muslims to dis-
cuss their differences.40
37 LMA 10.2.2 (ed. De Kegel, 368): “Nec fit comparacio de aliis multis preeminenciis eius, in 
quibus proprie non dicitur excellere, cum cetere policie non sint illorum participes, pote 
de fine, qui est eterne assecucio beatitudinis in faciali Dei visione constitute. Huius 
quippe finis, prout in quarta consideratione fuit explanatum, experte sunt cuncte alie 
societates.” Segovia’s terminology is notably not uniform here ( politia, societas, lex, etc.).
38 LMA 10.6.12 (ed. De Kegel, 382): “. . . operam dare ad salvandas eorum animas.” Here again, 
Segovia’s position is reminiscent of views expressed in his Repetitio de fide catholica. See 
Anne Marie Wolf, “Juan de Segovia and the Lessons of History,” in In the Light of Medieval 
Spain: Islam, the West and the Relevance of the Past, ed. Simon R. Doubleday and David 
Coleman (New York: Palgrave, 2008), 33–52 at 33.
39 On this point, see Jesse D. Mann, “Refuting the Pope: Comments on Juan de Segovia’s 
Gloss on the Bull Etsi non dubitemus,” Annuarium Historiae Conciliorum 37 (2005): 323–
340, esp. 340.
40 See LMA 11.37.3 (ed. De Kegel, 605). For the context of this suggestion, see Sieben, “Basler 
Konziliarismus konkret,” 189; and De Kegel, “Johannes von Segovia und die verfas-
sungsmässige Vereinbarkeit,” 62. For an alternative, but not wholly unrelated view on why 
Segovia treats Islam in this ecclesiological work, see Madrigal, “Lex Christi,” 350–352.
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Appendix
A Translation of Juan de Segovia, Liber de magna auctoritate 
episcoporum 10. 6 (ed. De Kegel, 377–383)
Four reasons are provided as to why there is not a multitude of learned men 
among the Saracens, which is connected to a discussion of how the law of 
Muhammad saps their strength with blindness.
(§1) The foregoing [chapter] has set out why the Jewish community has contributed, 
albeit in a limited way, to the support of the Christian faith with a certain multitude of 
learned men and books. [Now] the reasons must be explained why the Muslim com-
munity, despite its large numbers, is not brimming with learned men, or at least has 
very few. First of all, the most obvious reason is that the Muslims are excessively given 
to carnal desire. Acts of venery completely distract [their] minds from the height41 of 
mental reflection that is essential for and of great necessity to the growth of knowl-
edge. Wherefore, as Jerome teaches, it is a salutary remedy for scholarly men “to love 
the science of Scripture in order not to love the vices of the flesh” (Ep. 125.11). The 
Saracens, however, have the liberty according to their law to take numerous wives; and, 
as many of them inhabit warm regions, they continuously devote themselves to erotic 
deeds or, to put it more aptly, to venereal passions. For not satisfied by intercourse with 
women, many of them burn “with desires for each other, men committing shameless 
acts with men” (Rom 1:27). Nor is this point undercut just because certain Christians, 
among whom there are many wise men, may also be charged with this [crime], since 
such ones are said to be very few, and they hardly dare to commit this outrage even in 
secret. Moreover, these Christians are not at all interested in wives so that, except to 
produce offspring, they are hardly said [even] to engage in intercourse. Those consid-
ered most learned are rarely or never accused of this terrible crime. But the Saracens, 
who have many children, burn greatly with that heinous crime and even permit public 
brothels of adolescent youths. Consequently, since they love vices of the flesh too 
much, they do not at all apply themselves to the study of Scripture. Book II of 
Maccabees recounts the story [that] impious Jason made use of this very evil, indeed, 
one might even say, diabolical stratagem [when] he tried to convert his coreligionists 
to the Gentile rite so that they might forget God’s law and stray from all moral disci-
pline. Under the citadel of Jerusalem he established a gymnasium, and “he put the 
noblest youths in brothels” (2 Mc 4:10, 12).
* I should like to thank Bernard McGinn and Tom Izbicki for their helpful suggestions. As 
will be evident, this translation is more literal than literary.
41 One might read arce as arte and translate it as ‘practice.’
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(§2) Here is the second reason why the Muslims do not enjoy an abundance of learned 
men, a situation excused—indeed commanded—by their law. For among all the com-
mands contained in the Qurʾan one very frequently finds that good men are required 
to go to war, and the exhortations toward this end are quite numerous. Consequently, 
the Qurʾan regularly reproves indolence and cowardice. We see, however, that certain 
[religious] orders that are trained to fight against infidels produce few literate men, 
while the Mendicant orders that were established to preach do [produce such men], 
since the training of the military orders was not geared toward knowledge, as was the 
case with the Mendicants, but rather toward military ends. Since, therefore, the reli-
gion of Muhammad so zealously incites Muslims to fight against Christians, whom 
they call ‘unbelievers,’ wanting to fulfill this commandment, the Saracens prefer to 
devote themselves to military training rather than to study. Their concern is not so 
much to abound in a multitude of learned men as in a multitude of [military] 
victories.
(§3) Furthermore, the nature of the regions where the Saracens dwell provides a clear 
indication [of] why there should be a lack of learning among them. For those regions 
are very hot and thus not so conducive to the study of sciences, while the regions 
where the Latins live are neither [very] hot nor very cold, but rather cool. For knowl-
edge is gained by intense consideration that requires a collectedness of spirit; however, 
it is characteristic of heat to melt and of cold to break down. Thus, we know from 
repeated experience that in universities and schools, students who learn in winter 
rather than in summer succeed. The proof of this is that both in the time of the pagans 
and of the Christians, the vast number of books was not written by those residing in 
very hot places, but rather by those residing in cool places, with the exception of those 
areas that are near the coast and thus tempered by the coolness of the sea air. So we see 
that the Saracens who live among the Christians, although very few in number, have an 
aptitude for learning sciences provided they abstain from venery.
(§4) The final reason for the lack of learning among the Saracens, at least as regards the 
study of their law, [is] that being strong in numbers, they do not think it worthy to 
debate according to reason, and thus they do not so much neglect as contemn the 
study of letters. And this has been the case since the beginning of that sect. 
Consequently, by this very fact they show themselves [to be] devoid of truth. They are 
only willing to defend themselves with an armed multitude so that by means of that 
multitude they might defeat those whom they cannot overcome by reason.
(§5) This defect of theirs in no small measure helps the Catholic faith. For if, like the 
Jews, the Saracens were willing to engage in debate, since they are so numerous, they 
would perhaps frequently change the minds of many faithful [into] thinking that they 
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are on the side of truth. But since they avoid debate, they serve to strengthen the faith 
of Christians. They avoid debate when they come together with others [i.e., non- 
Muslims] not, as many believe, because their law so mandates—for the law of 
Muhammad in Surah 38 actually exhorts all men of laws (except the evil ones) to speak 
and dispute always with respectful words—but rather, Muslims avoid debate perhaps, 
nay rather undoubtedly, because their priests fear being confuted. Whoever carefully 
observes the Muslim religion will find that it is not so much malice as blindness that 
causes it to deviate so strongly and fundamentally from the law of grace. To wit, Islam 
asserts that Christians believe that the Son and the Holy Spirit are like companions or 
consorts of God. It asserts that the Son and Holy Spirit are ‘participants’ in deity and 
that [Christians] worship them [as such]. If this were in fact the case, then Muslims 
would rightly ridicule Christians as they [now] do, calling them ‘worshipers of the 
companions or participants of God.’ For they say that none but the one sole God should 
be worshiped [and] that sect thinks that Christians worship Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit as if they were three essentially different gods.
(§6) Now in truth it would appear that much work must be done so that the Christian 
faith might be cleared of this abominable calumny. For the failure to expound the doc-
trine and to demonstrate that such was not the case was greatly detrimental from the 
beginning of that diabolical sect that blasphemes the Christian faith to such a degree, 
because they are unable to understand that the three persons [of the Trinity] are one 
and the same God. Note, however, that I have said ‘unable’ not ‘unwilling.’ Indeed, it 
greatly appears from the tenor of that religion42 that smallness of intellect and dull-
ness of mind have been largely responsible for its propagation.
(§7) And just as they failed on account of blindness in regard to the mystery of the 
Trinity, so too [they have failed] in regard to the mystery of the Incarnation. For they 
consider it impossible that God should have taken on human form. They do not know 
or do not want to declare that God took on not the person but rather the nature of 
humanity.
(§8) Likewise, the book of the Qurʾan, which makes mention of this point more than 
fifty times, speaks so equivocally and variously that it frequently contradicts itself; and 
as proof that [their] religion is true, it expressly alleges that all the devils of hell could 
not compose so much as even a single one of its very complicated chapters.
42 Here, as elsewhere, I have translated lex as ‘religion’ rather than ‘law’ when context and 
sense suggest and justify such a translation.
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(§9) In the same way it speaks most confusedly about the Gospel, the books of Moses, 
of David, and of the other prophets because, rightly wanting to defend their religion, 
they hate the light. Actually, one can understand these four books clearly, indeed con-
cretely, through learned reasoning. All Muslims, to the extent that they are learned in 
their law, indeed the more learned they are, the more clearly [they] understand that 
their religion lacks any basis in authority or reason. What happens to them, just as 
Augustine says of the philosophers in his book De vera religione (1.1), is that they under-
stand one thing and do another. Indeed, the philosophers understood that those ‘gods’ 
worshiped in the temples were not really gods; but not wanting to contravene the com-
mon error, they venerated them [anyway] along with the [entire] population. Even the 
Apostle did not pass over this crime in silence, saying that they “suppress the truth of 
God in wickedness” (Rom 1:18). The learned among the Jews were not free from 
reproach of this type. For while preaching that one should not steal, they themselves 
stole; and while preaching to others that one should avoid adultery, they themselves 
committed adultery; and while [supposedly] abhorring idols, they themselves com-
mitted sacrilege. In general: those who instructed others did not instruct themselves. 
Of course, many learned men in the Christian religion are entangled in that vice. As 
the Apostle testifies, their minds and consciences are befouled, because, trusting 
themselves in [their] words, they deny God in [their] deeds. Thus they become abomi-
nable and disbelieve “and reject every good work” (Ti 1:15).
(§10) Surely, therefore, if such is the case among learned Saracens, [then] as the old 
proverb says, “believe the one with experience in the matter.” Those who wish to meet 
and debate with Muslims must have at the ready reasons and arguments [for] why, 
with the coming of the law of grace, the law of Moses had to cease, and [why] the one 
law does not support the other but rather constitutes an obstacle to its observance. 
That most evil sect glories in this, namely that it has mixed together the law of Scripture 
and the law of the Gospel. Properly speaking, it has made a pastiche, preserving nei-
ther law but rather destroying both. Thus, once one has established the incompatibil-
ity between the law of grace and the law of Scripture, [i.e.,] the law of the Gospel and 
of Moses, by this fact the bond of that mixture disappears, and the one wanting to 
sustain it sees its foundation crumble. [Then], because he believes that these two laws 
were given by God, unless he is quite shameless, he necessarily must adhere to the law 
of the Gospel. And for the Muslims, who find the rites and condition of the Jews espe-
cially odious, it is no mean step, once they understand these things, to prefer living 
under the law of the Christians after they have heard an explanation of the truths that 
especially belong to the catholic faith from which they shrink, thinking [Christians] to 
be worshipers of the Son and Holy Spirit, not as if one with God the Father, but as if 
companions or associates in deity.
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(§11) Moreover, they also judge it to be impossible that God’s son should be the son of 
Mary. They are unable to understand that great love by which “God so loved the world 
that he gave his only begotten Son so that all who believe in Him should not die but 
have eternal life” (Jn 3:16). Likewise, they misunderstand the Passion, thinking only in 
human terms that a father whose son has been condemned to prison would beseech 
the judge and offer him gifts and even kiss his hands, as they say, that the judge might 
free his son. They therefore consider the Christian faith stupid for affirming such 
things. Additionally, since Christianity involves eating Christ’s body and drinking His 
blood, the Muslims ridicule the Christians for ‘eating’ their God and for forgiving men’s 
sins and for other such things they consider absurd. But this misapprehension is due 
solely to a lack of understanding. For when one explains the mysteries of faith to them, 
they are stupefied and, conscious of their ignorance, they admire those who explain 
these mysteries. Consequently, anyone having honest discussions with them has pro-
found pity on the ignorance of the Muslims that derives from their lack of thorough 
instruction, as well as on their blindness that seeks in so many things to be 
illuminated.
(§12) There is one point we cannot pass over in silence, namely that for three hundred 
years now numerous Christian armies have made expeditions against the Muslims 
both by land and by sea. They have achieved very little in regard to the intended goal 
of liberating the Holy Land and of exterminating Muhammad and his followers. 
Rather, these expeditions have greatly harmed the Christian religion. And today, with 
the Muslims so numerous and the way of war so difficult, it would perhaps not be use-
less nor ill-advised to try another way to win them over. For an enemy is not always 
conquered by the sword, but often by many other means, and this would be the great-
est victory: to endeavor to save their souls. Have we not seen in our own days that many 
great armies of the faithful had little success against the Hussites and other heretics of 
the kingdom of Bohemia, who were going around devastating with fire and sword? But 
when they agreed to the church’s exhortation to examine their differences in a public 
debate, it was noteworthy that they ceased the persecution they had previously 
inflicted on the neighboring territories on account of their errors. Nor did they after-
wards boast, as they had previously done, about their widely disseminated letters as if 
those letters contained the truth and everyone else had erred.43
43 Segovia is referring to the debates with the Hussites at the Council of Basel. On these 
debates, see Johannes Helmrath, Das Basler Konzil 1431–1449: Forschungsstand und 
Probleme (Cologne: Böhlau, 1987), 353–372; and more recently, Gerald Christianson, 
“Church, Bible, and Reform in the Hussite Debates at the Council of Basel, 1433,” in 
Reassessing Reform: A Historical Investigation into Church Renewal, ed. Christopher M. 
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(§13) We will put off for another time the discussion of the method the church should 
employ in its debates with the Saracens regarding the aforementioned four points, 
namely: the mystery of the Trinity, the mystery of the Incarnation, the book of the 
Qurʾan, and of the Gospel and the other books of the sacred canon commemorated 
therein and similar matters. Would that this may come to pass in our days! However, it 
was relevant to our purpose to have shown that the community of the faithful exceeds 
all others in its number of learned men. As the Philosopher teaches, wisdom is the 
greatest of all joys in the world (cf. Aristotle, Ethics 10). And as Solomon testifies, “wis-
dom is better than arms” (Ws 6:1). Regarding military strength, which is inferior to 
wisdom, it is well known that, when one compares the faithful Christian people with 
the Muslim people in the neighboring regions, apostate Christians constitute the 
strength and core of their army such that these apostates rule over them. Furthermore, 
in certain Muslim domains only a renegade Christian can become the ruler. For reli-
able sources have observed that in numerous Muslim principalities no one except ren-
egade Christians assumes the captainship or [any] offices of higher rank. Wherefore 
the more astute Muslims who want to comply with this custom have their children 
baptized so that these children may be judged worthy of such offices. Then when the 
children are older, they induce or coerce them to abjure the Christian faith so that they 
might be considered apostate Christians. Thus, when they die, their children succeed 
to the posts that their parents held. Accordingly, the Muslims themselves attest that 
[even] in regard to this military strength those marked by the name of Christ are 
superior.
(§14) Of the other three aforementioned points in which the Christian religion sur-
passes all others, it is not necessary to say much. They follow directly from this, given 
the presupposition regarding the number of learned men. For given that the greatest 
number of learned men is found among the [Christian] faithful, and given that by 
nature everything strives to preserve itself, in order that this multitude of learned men 
should not diminish, there should be an increase in the number of universities, librar-
ies, and books, as well as an expansion of the Latin language, which is useful to all 
these ends. Now given this excellence, namely the multitude of learned men by which 
the faithful people outshines all others, it is quite clear that the community of God’s 
people was most rightly established from the beginning of the world and will continue 
in this way forever. As the Philosopher teaches, “it is the mark of the wise man to 
[establish] order” (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1). “It is in the very nature of wisdom that 
powerfully links one end to another to order all things well” (Ws 8:1) and give order to 
the things of the universe, to declare [them to be] from God and to show this to others. 
Bellitto and David Zachariah Flanagin (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America 
Press, 2012), 124–148.
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Whence, since [the Christian religion] outstrips all others in its number of learned 
men, anyone can very clearly see that the Christian community is most rightly estab-
lished over all others and indeed that, by virtue of its abounding wisdom, this com-
munity is the measure and order of all others. For in any genus whatsoever, that which 
is first is the measure of the other [elements], and surpasses them in this virtue that 
the others might imitate in a proportional manner but never fully attain.
How to Deal with Muslims? Raymond Lull and 
Ignatius of Loyola
Paul Richard Blum
As a small contribution to the topic of the relationship between Christians 
and Muslims, I should like to exploit two sources that shed light on it from a 
late medieval and a Renaissance angle.1 One is Raymond Lull’s Vita coetanea2 
and the other is Ignatius of Loyola’s autobiography, which was originally 
referred to as Acta P. Ignatii.3 What is peculiar about these sources is that both 
are non-thematic accounts of the relation of a Christian to Muslims; each is 
an autobiographical narrative about events that occurred before the author’s 
main career, but which was dictated late in his life. In addition, the narratives 
are indubitably designed to instruct their followers, as they are written in the 
third person, which decreases subjectivity and enhances authority. I tend to 
read the two accounts as deliberate messages about what was important to 
each author, to the effect that all of Acta may be read as an agenda et vitanda 
because the narrated facts acquire emblematic meaning. If we keep in mind 
Ignatius’s instruction to visualize the life of Christ (compositio loci), we may as 
well visualize the episodes of his life for the sake of gaining delight and instruc-
tion about our own courses of action. Without further ado, here is a quick sum-
mary of the two stories:
1 The title of this article has been deemed provocative by some people. The word ‘to deal with’ 
appeared to be demeaning. However, there must have been a suspicion that this ‘dealing’ 
might be derogatory because it is about Muslims. Honi soit qui mal y pense. And indeed, both 
Ignatius and Lull did not think highly of Muslims. Therefore, I want to share the way both 
converted in their views, in addition to the conclusions we may draw.
2 Raimundus Lullus, Vita coetanea, n. 189, in Raimundi Lullii Opera Latina, ed. Hermogenes 
Harada, vol. 8, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis, 34 (Turnholti: Brepols, 1980), 
261–309. English quotations are taken from Anthony Bonner, ed., ‘Doctor illuminatus’. A 
Ramon Llull Reader (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
3 Acta S. Ignatii in Scripta de Sancto Ignatio de Loyola, vol. 1, Monumenta Ignatiana, series 
quarta (Matriti: Lopez del Horno, 1901), 31–98 (Spanish). English quotations, cited as 
Reminiscences, are taken from Ignatius of Loyola, Personal Writings, ed. Joseph A. Munitz and 
Philip Endean (London: Penguin, 2004); on the production of the autobiography see 
Introduction, 8–11.
© Paul Richard Blum, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004274761_012 
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Raymond Lull’s (1232–1315) narrative has to do with his Saracen slave who 
had taught him Arabic. One day in 1273, he and his slave began to fight after the 
slave uttered some anti-Christian slurs. While the Saracen was in prison, Lull 
was tormented by the thought that he might be obliged to kill his teacher- 
servant. When the prisoner had hanged himself, Lull thanked God for sparing 
him from having to soil his hands. Ignatius of Loyola’s account, on the other 
hand, occurred in 1522, when he encountered a Moor who ridiculed the virgin-
ity of St. Mary. Unsure about whether or not to go after him, Ignatius let his 
mule decide. As a result, he saw it to be God’s will to proceed to Montserrat, 
instead of fighting the Muslim.
In both cases, it is not the wickedness or ignorance of the Muslims that 
drives the conflict; instead, it is the weakness of the Christians. Let us now take 
a closer look into the biographical and theoretical contexts of each story, in 
order to see whether there is a pattern that helps in conceptualizing the 
Christian-Muslim relationships.
 Raymond and the Slave
There is no need to explain further the structure and origin of the Vita 
coetanea;4 however, what is worth stressing is the fact that it is a narrative of 
conversion and illumination.5 In this narrative construction, the slave episode 
is located after Raymond had completed a peregrination and had accepted 
that he would return home instead of going to Paris. When he arrived at home, 
he tells us, he did three things: he dressed himself in the simplest fashion, he 
learned Latin (here rather than in Paris), and, “having bought himself a Saracen, 
4 Cf. Vita coetanea, 261–263; Erhard Wolfram Platzeck, Raimund Lull. Sein Leben—Seine Werke, 
Die Grundlagen seines Denkens, 2 vols (Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1962–1964) vol. 2, p. 66*; idem, 
Das Leben des seligen Raimund Lull. Die ‘Vita coetanea’ und ausgewählte Texte (Düsseldorf: 
Patmos, 1964), 21–26. Jordi Gayà, “ ‘De conversione sua ad poenitentiam’ Reflexiones ante la 
edición crítica de Vita Coetanea,” Estudios Lulianos 24 (1980): 87–91. Anita Obermeier, The 
History and Anatomy of Auctorial Self-Criticism in the European Middle Ages (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 1999), 229–231 (nothing on the slave episode). Cf. Domínguez and Gayà, “Life,” in 
Raimundus Lullus. An Introduction to his Life, Works and Thought, ed. Alexander Fidora and 
Josep E. Rubio, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medevalis 214; Raimundi Lullii Opera 
Latina 2 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), 3–124; on the Vita 5–8.
5 Mark D. Johnston, “Ramon Llull’s Conversion to Penitence,” Mystics Quarterly 16/4 (1990): 
179–192.
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he learned the Arabic language from him.”6 From this, we gather that his role 
as a hermit and his study of Latin and Arabic are one act.
After that, there follows a lacuna of nine years: “Nine years later, it happened 
that . . . his Saracen slave blasphemed the name of Christ.”7 This gap in time is 
famous because filling it would provide details about Raymond’s education. 
From the narrative point of view, it is pointless to speculate what he might 
have been doing during those nine years. In fact, what matters is that Lull 
refuses to tell us. The plot says: the upshot of nine years of retirement and 
study was that the slave spoke up against his master. Since the episode ends 
with the death of the slave, one may even interpret this gap as the effective 
obliteration of the content of the nine years of formation.8
The exact blasphemy regarding the name of Christ is unclear. As an indica-
tion, however, one may turn to the narrative in the manuscript Breviculum, 
which has the merit of giving a historically close interpretation. In this account, 
the Saracen says: “Christ is fake, because he preached to be God and deified 
man, and incarnate.”9 Here is not the place to contemplate the probability that 
the slave may have uttered something to this effect, because it would require a 
historical discussion of the Muslim interpretation of Christ. To grasp the impli-
cations of the narrative, it is more interesting to look instead at Lull’s 
Christology. His teaching on Christ emphasizes humility. For instance, the 
6 Vita coetanea, n. 11; Bonner, Doctor illuminatus, 15. On slaves and Moors in Mallorca at Lull’s 
times, see Domínguez and Gayà, “Life”, passim. The question of symbolism in this phase of 
Lull’s life has been raised in Fernando Domínguez Reboiras, “Idea y estructura de la Vita 
Raymundi Lulii,” Estudios Lulianos 27 (1987): 1–20, 12–13. 
7 Bonner, Doctor illuminatus, 16.
8 Amador Vega, Ramon Llull and the Secret of Life (New York: Crossroad, 2002), 7. Another pos-
sibility is that the elderly Lull, in affirming his authority, wanted to blur over heterodox 
sources he had studied: Massimo Candellero, “Un importante documento biografico lulliano: 
la Vita coetanea,” Istituto Univeristario Orientale Annali, sezione romana 34/1 (1992) [Atti del 
Convegno Internazionale Ramon Llull, il lullismo internazionale, l’Italia]: 15–33, 28 f.
9 Ramon Llull, Breviculum seu Electorium parvum Thomae Migerii (Le Myésier), ed. Charles 
Lohr, Theodor Pindl-Büchel and Walburga Büchel, Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio 
Mediaevalis. Raimundi Lulli Opera Latina. Supplementum Lullianum, 1 (Turnhout: Brepols, 
1990), 283–8, 311–356. Here I take advantage of the online edition http://lullianarts.net/ 
miniatures/mini/BREV03.HTM, retrieved April 1, 2014, table 3: “Numquid vides, Raimundus, 
in hoc Alcorano, quod cum scias legere, intelligere et loqui arabicum, quod pulchrius dicta-
men nec aequale in pulchritudine homo nec angelus possent facere, a quo igitur factum est 
a Deo solo, et ex quo ergo a Macometo nobis traditus est? Numquid Dei nuntius et propheta 
dici potest et exaudiri a Deo, cum pro nobis Deum rogaverit in die iudicii? Falsum Christum, 
qui praedicavit se Deum hominem deificatum, incarnatum, qui dixit Deum tantum et tri-
num et unum esse?” (my translation).
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Liber contemplationis subsumes Christ’s humility under humility as a divine 
attribute:
Praise and glory and blessing to Your sacred humility; for in the same 
measure as it is great and admirable through the fact that You willed to 
descend from the highest good and highness into this world to take on 
flesh, so the magnitude of haughtiness in us wants to elevate us to the 
dignities and heights and honors to which we are not entitled.10
The Saracen’s allegation stands in stark contrast with the theological interpre-
tation of what is known as kenosis, which according to Lull is inversely propor-
tionate to man’s arrogance. Elsewhere, Lull emphasizes that God became 
incarnate not for the sake of human redemption, as often expected, but rather 
for the sake of self-revelation and consequent love.11 This is a theology based 
on divine dignity and hierarchical imbalance.12 Lull suggests remedying exag-
gerated pride by contemplating God’s humble descent into human flesh. In 
fact, in the following chapter, Lull relates haughtiness to irascibility: “As haugh-
tiness makes humans irascible, boorish, and ill-behaved, so Your [Christ’s] 
humility made man amiable, simple, and well-behaved while You were in this 
world among humans.”13 With due fairness, in his Book of the Gentile, Lull has 
the Saracen interlocutor claim the same divine humility for the Prophet 
Mohammed, which has been bestowed upon him by God in order to prevent 
10 Raimundus Lullus, Liber magnus contemplationis in Deum, tomus 3 (Palma de Mallorca: 
Cerdà, Antich, Amoròs, 1746), vol. 1, l. 2, dist. 19, cap. 87, n. 13, p. 211: “Tuae sanctae Humili-
tati sit laus et goria et benedictio; quia, sicut ipsa est magna et mirabilis per hoc, quod 
voluerit (!) de supremis bonis et altitudinibus Te descendere in hunc mundum ad 
assumendum Carnem; ita magnitudo superbiae, quae est in nobis, vult nos elevare ad 
nobilitates et ad altitudines et ad honores ad nos non pertinentes.” In Catalan: Ramon 
Llull, Libre de Contemplació en Deu, ed. Antoni M.a Alcover and Mateu Obrador i Bennás-
sar, vol. 2 (Palma de Mallorca: Comissió Editora Lulliana, 1906), (Obres de Ramon LLull, 
vol. 3; reprint Palma: Miquel Font, 1989), 152.
11 Tomás and Joaquin Carrèras y Artau, Historia de la filosofia española. Filosofia cristiana de 
los siglos XIII al XV, vol. 1 (Madrid: Real Academia de ciencias exactas físicas y naturales, 
1939), 505–507. Cf. Carles Llinàs Puente, “Angelología y Cristología en Ramon Llull,” Studia 
Lulliana 48 (2008): 41–68; 56–64.
12 Details in Walter Andreas Euler, Unitas et Pax. Religionsvergleich bei Raimundus Lullus 
und Nikolaus von Kues, 2nd. ed. (Würzburg-Altenberge: Echter/Oros, 1995), 84–92.
13 Liber Contemplationis, ibid., cap. 88, n. 27, p. 225: “Sicut superbia facit hominem iracun-
dum et rusticum et male morigeratum, ita Humilitas Te fecit esse hominem dulcem et 
simplicem et suavem et bene morigeratum, quando eras in mundo hominum.” Libre de 
Contemplació, 159.
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pride and vainglory.14 These two sources were composed around the time of 
the event with the Saracen; later, we see Lull accusing infidels (Jews in this 
case) of using the name of God ‘in vain,’ that is, as an accidental description 
rather than invoking His theological essence. Here, the blasphemy consists of 
understanding the name of God in human terms.15 In his later Disputation with 
Hamar the Saracen (1308), written a few years before dictating his reminis-
cences, Lull has the Muslim contrast the absolute attributes of God with the 
finitude that is entailed in the incarnation.16 Lull, the narrator, certainly does 
not suggest that his slave-teacher had such sophisticated arguments at hand, 
but he does return to the subject of strife. In the conclusion to the disputation, 
he notes that the book made use exclusively of “rational arguments rather 
than authorities, for authorities become acrimonious through conflicting 
interpretations.”17 Exaggeration, pride, haughtiness, and concomitant ire sur-
round his Christology, and that is precisely what follows in the autobiographi-
cal narrative.
Following the aforementioned incident, Raymond loses his temper (nimio 
zelo motus) and beats the slave.18 The slave, however, resisted—but what made 
him resist? He grew enraged to the same extent that Raymond had exceeded 
what was appropriate: “As a result, the Saracen became extremely embittered 
(rancore nimio inde concepto), and he began plotting against his master.”19 
14 Lullus, The Book of the Gentile and the Three Wise Men, book 4, n. 3, in Bonner, Doctor 
illuminatus, 144.
15 Ramón Lull, El “Liber predicationis contra Judeos,” ed. José M.a Millás Vallicrosa (Madrid-
Barcelona: Istituto Arias Montano, 1957), de 9.o sermone, p. 87: “Idcirco infideles nomen 
Dei accipiunt in vanum, eo quia blasphemunt nomina Dei intrinseca, scilicet deitantem, 
deitatum et deitare. Item infideles accipiunt nomen Dei . . . quo ad descriptionem, sicut 
homo qui magis perfecte nominat alium hominem diffiniendo ipsum quam 
describendo . . .” 
16 Raimundus Lullus, Disputatio Raymundi Christiani et Hamar Saraceni, in Opera, vol. 4 
(Mainz: Mayer, 1729) (separate pagination), 2–12. On the specific theology of this work see 
Hans Daiber, “Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam. Eine philoso-
phiegeschichtliche Analyse des Liber disputationis Raimundi Christiani et Homeri 
Saraceni,” in Juden, Christen, und Muslime. Religionsdialoge im Mittelalter, ed. Matthias 
Lutz-Bachmann and Alexander Fidora (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 
2004), 136–172; on the Saracen‘s, view 138–148.
17 Disputatio, 46: “. . . ut Christianus et Saracenus per Rationes, non per Autoritates, ad invi-
cem disputarent; nam Authoritates calumniantur ratione diversarum expositionum.” 
This does not at all mean that Lull would desist from accusing Muslims from converting 
Christians, as Lull continues.
18 Vita coetanea, n. 11; Bonner, Doctor illuminatus, 16 f.
19 Vita coetanea, n. 11; Bonner, Doctor illuminatus, 17. Peers, following the later Catalan ver-
sion, has: “Now the said slave was of a very haughty spirit, and further . . . he had a great 
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Charles de Bovelles (1479–1567) broadened this analysis by narrating that the 
“purchased Saracen feared that Raymond’s education might become danger-
ous for the Mohammedan religion (particularly because he had exacted to be 
trained in speaking Arabic only for the purpose of preaching).”20 While this 
may be true, Raymond focuses on the equivalence of passions. The question 
evoked is not about the intentions of the Muslim or the would-be missionary, 
but the pent-up zeal on both sides.
Consequently, the slave plotted to kill his master. While shouting “You’re 
dead!” he managed to get hold of a sword, with which he attacked and wounded 
his master. But Raymond overcame the attacker.21 While the athletic Franciscan 
friar Erhard Wolfram Platzeck relished the prowess and strength of his hero,22 
it appears to be more important that Lull, after so many adventures, still 
reminds his readers that he had been wounded and that physical violence was 
needed to stop the assault. Whereas the philosopher emerges from the event 
physically victorious, he finds himself in a spiritual and moral standoff. Having 
prevented his household from killing the Muslim, and having locked him up, 
he subsequently faced a dilemma:23 to put him to death would have been 
severe and harsh, since the culprit was his Arabic teacher, after all; however, to 
release him appeared too dangerous. Obviously, the dilemma comes from the 
very same relationship that had led to the fight, namely, that the slave-owner 
was subordinate to the slave as a teacher, or in other words, the Christian had 
made himself dependent on the Muslim for the sake of subduing him (or any 
other version that describes this imbalanced relationship).
If we look at Lull’s predicament as a paradigm of a global pattern, we may 
say: one conundrum encountered in the attitude of the Christian world towards 
the Muslim world is that any assertion of hegemony depends upon the ability 
to understand the allegedly lower religion; however, any effort to understand 
the other religion creates a kind of coexistence in which using violence would 
be contradictory. This mutual dependency appears to be the result of the most 
elementary attempt at living with the target of the mission.
wrath at these blows . . .” (E. Allison Peers, Ramon Lull. A Biography (London: Society for 
Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1920), 41). 
20 Carolus Bovillus, Vita, in Acta Sanctorum, Junii tomus septimus (Paris-Rome: Palme, 1867), 
June 30, 613–618; n. 5, cap. 2, p. 616A: “Timensque ideo emptitius Saracenus, qui eum 
docuerat, ne Raemundi doctrina Mahumenticae legi perniciosa fieret (praesertim cum 
solius praedicationis causa, Arabici sermonis peritia, ab eo se imbui postulasset) . . .” 
21 Vita coetanea, n. 12; Bonner, Doctor illuminatus, 17.
22 Platzeck, Das Leben des seligen Raimund Lull, 152: “Die Szene zeigt uns einen körperlich 
noch gewandten Raimund, der dazu über beachtliche Kräfte verfügte.”
23 This has been carefully analyzed in M. V. Dougherty, Moral Dilemmas in Medieval Thought. 
From Gratian to Aquinas (Cambridge: University Press, 2011), 94–101.
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In terms of slave-master relationship, we see that the mutual instruction 
(language traded for Christian education) brings the slave-teacher to hate the 
master’s religion, whereas the master-student is prevented from bluntly exer-
cising his power. Since this leads the slave to take recourse to verbal abuse, the 
master then falls into violence, which only induces the slave to attempt taking 
the master’s life. At this point, the master gains the upper hand not only by 
overwhelming the attacker, but, more importantly, by putting an end to the 
violence. Now, let us see how the story ends.
In his ‘perplexity,’ Raymond retires to praying to God. In a classic mystical 
pattern, he is ‘sad’ about God’s persistent silence. Upon returning home, he 
made a detour to the prison cell in order to see after the captive, and found that 
his slave had hanged himself with the very “rope with which he had been 
bound.”24 Obviously, the poor man had no other tool for his suicide, a reader 
might flippantly remark. Why should Lull remember this detail after forty 
years? In a symbolic reading, the Muslim was put to death by his Christian 
host, and yet he agreed to it and participated actively in his defeat. In this 
sense, he took the weapon out of his master’s hand (as the master had extorted 
the sword from his own hand) and executed himself. We moderns would, of 
course, expect that upon seeing this, Lull would mourn the loss of his teacher 
of Arabic. Instead, we learn that Lull “joyfully gave thanks to God, not only for 
keeping his hands innocent (innoxias) of the death of this Saracen but also for 
freeing him from that terrible perplexity concerning which he had just recently 
so anxiously asked Him for guidance.”25
According to Michael Dougherty, it is a pattern of the Vita coetanea that 
Lull ascribes, or even imputes, the solution of moral dilemmas to divine 
 intervention.26 In fact, this is consistent with the mystical persona that emerges 
from the Vita. The solution is external to his actions, and yet, it resolves his 
conflicting intentions: the blasphemer and attacker is dead without having 
soiled the missionary’s hands.
The next step in the narrative is the divine inspiration of the Ars major. In a 
symbolic reading, post haec is propter haec.27 After retiring for nine years to 
study Latin and Arabic, the Muslim teacher becomes a threat that is removed 
by divine intervention, thus clearing the way for the intuition of the new 
24 Vita coetanea, n. 13: “inuenit, quod ipse fune, quo ligatus fuit, iugulauerat semet ipsum”; 
Bonner, Doctor illuminatus, 17.
25 Ibid.
26 Dougherty, Dilemmas, 101.
27 Vita coetanea, n. 14, p. 280: “Post haec Raimundus ascendit in montem quendam . . .”
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method to convert Muslims with rational arguments. What are we then sup-
posed to learn from this narrative?
• Mission inevitably requires acculturation, that is, immersion in the culture 
of those who are the intended subjects of conversion.
• Familiarity with the world of the others, however, tends to become mutual: 
the inherent negation of the culture to be converted will be turned against 
the missionaries and their haughty behavior. The slave sees through the ruse 
of the master and consequently emulates him.
• The ‘sword’ of the sermon therefore tends to fall back into the sword of vio-
lence, which is an instantaneous and mutual twist.
• Hence, there follows a predicament of violence and non-violence that can-
not be resolved but by external intervention.
• Does this not tell us, regarding mission to non-believers: do not even try?
As we all know, Lull kept trying and advocating—continuously and with 
endurance—for the usage of both swords.28 The Breviculum underscores this 
through its use of military imagery, even when illustrating Aristotelian and 
Lullian logic.29 Also, to give up mission would indeed end the dialectics of 
acquaintance and hostility that is at the heart of our episode. One might even 
argue that the contention in verbal disputations carries out this very dialectic. 
In the same way as only God could have it both ways, namely, leaving Lull inno-
cent and yet having the attacker killed, it is also God who commands him to try 
both swords, and not only the militant one. In this dialectical reading, the most 
troubling sub-dilemma is the death of the Saracen, if we identify him as both 
the target of mission (manifest in his role as a slave) and the facilitator of the 
acculturation attempt by Lull (manifest in his role as the teacher). Why must 
the teacher die? The answer may lie in two details: first, that Raymond did not 
regret his teacher’s death, and second, that Raymond quotes his teacher’s 
threatening remark: “You are dead!” The first point indicates that this is not a 
novel about sensibilities, but about the dilemmatic structure of mission as 
such. The second, moreover, says that the religion to be converted must ‘die,’ or 
in other words, disappear from the tribulations of the missionary, and only 
28 Cf. Paul Richard Blum, Philosophy of Religion in the Renaissance (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 
1–14, on Lull’s advocating the two swords in the sense of conversion by the word and by 
crusade. 
29 See Breviculum, images 6 and 7.
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then is the mission accomplished.30 In historical reality, Lull repeatedly trav-
elled to Northern Africa, where he engaged in disputes with Islamic authori-
ties. Eventually, he was attacked and driven out. Despite this, the divine 
command remains: maintain your innocence! Whether it is possible to remain 
innocent while subjugating another culture is a question that Lull patently 
answers in the affirmative. Thus, Lull’s way of speaking about God to Muslims 
is totally independent of the Holy Scripture because it is purely logical; conse-
quently, he hoped his new logic would be apt to convince Muslims of the truth 
of Christianity, and that is what he kept doing for the rest of his long life. His 
paradoxical way to teach Christian revelation was based on his personal reve-
lation that there might be a transcultural method of communication, namely, 
his Lullian art.
 Ignatius and the Moor
Let us now switch to Ignatius of Loyola’s encounter with a Moor.31 This event 
happened in 1522, about two hundred and fifty years after Lull. As I previously 
mentioned, the narrative structure of his account is the same as Lull’s: Ignatius 
is telling, in third person, the story of his own life to a confidant.32 Furthermore, 
both events occur at similar points in each author’s life: the saint is also 
approaching his spiritual and intellectual breakthrough. In the narrative, 
Ignatius is on his way to Montserrat to pay homage to the Black Madonna. It is 
here that he inserts the episode of when he met a Moor. The epithet ‘moor’ 
may have been derogatory at that time,33 and if so, it was probably intentional 
because the thrust of the narrative argument is to desist from persecution, as 
30 A symbolic interpretation, ventured in Johnston, “Conversion to Penitence,” 184, would 
be: “Ignorant of Divine Truth, they [the Averroist and Muslim audiences] will inevitably 
destroy themselves and, like suicides, incur eternal damnation.” Among the irenic inter-
pretations championing inter-cultural exchange I may mention Berthold Altaner, 
“Glaubenszwang und Glaubensfreiheit in der Missionstheorie des Raymundus Lullus. 
Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Tolleranzgedankens,” Historisches Jahrbuch 47 (1928): 
586–610, 591.
31 For the socio-cultural context, see Marjorie O’Rourke Boyle, Loyola’s Acts. The Rhetoric of 
the Self (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 60–65. The status of the debate 
about Saint Mary’s virginity in Islamic sources is beyond the scope of my study. 
32 That the words recorded are his is obvious from Louis Gonçalves da Câmara, the secretary 
who received the dictation and describes in detail Ignatius’s design and determination. 
See Munitz and Endean, “Introduction,” in Personal Writings, 4–7.
33 Boyle, Acts, 61. 
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we will see. Moreover, already fifty years later when Pedro Ribadeneira (1527–
1611) wrote the first biography of the founder of the Society of Jesus in 1572, he 
felt the need to explain that there actually lived “Saracens or Moors” in Aragon 
as remainders of that “ancient tribe.”34 Daniello Bartoli (1608–1685) also uses 
the term ‘Moresco’ in his very popular biography from 1650, and adds that this 
person was a Muslim.35 From this we are reminded that, from the narrative 
standpoint of the later Ignatius, the Moor had to be a Muslim for the story to 
be plausible.36
Ignatius emphasizes that it is worthwhile for the episode “to have [been] 
written, so that people can understand how our Lord used to deal with this 
soul.” This is because the not so young but newly converted man is on his way 
to Montserrat; however, his soul at the time “was still blind, though with great 
desires to serve [God] as far as its knowledge went.”37 And so, with youthful 
vanity, he dreams of great ‘exploits’ (hazañas) in the footsteps of the great 
saints, unaware that his dreams were nothing but ‘exterior deeds’ devoid of 
humility and patience, not to mention discernment.38 It cannot escape the 
intended readership that Ignatius is inserting key terms regarding his spiritual-
ity. Even after the Moor incident that he is about to recount, Ignatius enter-
tains chivalric fantasies, modeled on the knight errant Amadis that would later 
be parodied by Cervantes. We shall return to the motif of chivalry. At this point, 
34 Petrus Ribadeneira, Vita Ingatii Loiolae . . . (Matriti: Gomezius, 1586), cap. 3, fol. 8r: 
“Sarracenus quidam sive Maurus”, and he explains: “Erant per id tempus in Hispania 
Tarraconensi adhuc aliqui ex antiquis eius gentis reliquiis.” Cf. Pedro Leturia, Iñigo de 
Loyola, trans. Aloysius J. Owen (Syracuse: Le Moyne College Press, 1949), 137 f. 
35 Daniello Bartoli, Della vita e dell’istituto di S. Ignatio . . . libri cinque (Roma: Manelfi, 1650), 
lib. 1, cap. 9, p. 25: “Un viandante, di stirpe Moresco, e di Religione Maomettano, de quali, 
in que’ tempi era gran numero ne’ Regni di Valenza, e d’Aragona . . .” From these testimo-
nies that are closer to the events than modern interpretations we may gather that, if there 
was any negative ring in the autobiography, then the early Jesuits clarified the terminol-
ogy and the historical facts.
36 Boyle, Acts, 61 surmises that at that time the ‘moor’ must have been a Morisco, i.e. bap-
tized. However, that does not play out in the narrative.
37 Ignatius, Reminiscences, n. 14, p. 18. Acta S. Ignatii, p. 44.: “. . . será bueno escriuirse, para 
que se entienda cómo nuestro Señor se abía con esta ánima, que aun estaua ciega, 
avunque con grandes deseos de servirle en todo lo que conociese . . .” 
38 Ignatius, Reminiscences, n. 14, p. 18–19; “exploits” n. 17, p. 20 (Acta, p. 46). Acta, p. 45: “. . . no 
mirando á cosa ninguna interiror, ni sabiendo qué cosa era humildad, ni charidad, ni 
patiencia, ni discretion . . . , sino toda su intención era hazer destas obras grandes 
exteriores . . .”
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though, we may assume that the irony of Ignatius following the knightly path 
on a mule may have been narrated on purpose.39
During the journey, Ignatius encounters another traveler on a mule, a Moor. 
The two of them begin conversing about Our Lady. In their exchange, the 
Muslim accepts the virginity in conception but doubts the possibility that 
Mary remained a virgin after giving birth, invoking ‘natural reasons.’ We do not 
learn what kind of response Ignatius had to offer.40 We only see that he loses 
the argument, which is depicted in the narrative with the image that he lost 
sight of the speeding Moor. The reported detail that this fellow traveler 
appealed to natural reasons may have suggested to readers that the Moor was 
a physician and was therefore capable of arguing as a naturalist. At any rate, 
the Moor must have been well versed in Christian doctrine.
It is well known that the virginity of Our Lady can only be defended by theo-
logical or mystical arguments. A mystical argument has been imputed to 
Ignatius by the dramatist Pedro Calderón de la Barca (1600–1681).41 Thomas 
Aquinas, moreover, had adduced a series of theological arguments, based on 
the dignity of the Mother for the sake of the dignity of the son, Christ.42 The 
Jesuit Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) will later comment on this article and 
ascribe the blasphemy—specifically that Mary could not remain a virgin after 
giving birth—to Protestant heretics (not to Muslims), singling out Erasmus of 
Rotterdam. His discussion of the question regarding her virginity post partum 
alone extends over four folio pages and invokes a great number of Church 
Fathers and scholastic authorities, which shows that the Muslim’s objection 
was not at all outrageous.43 Jacobus Pontanus (1542–1626), the Jesuit professor 
in Augsburg, however, poked fun of the issue in the 1580s. In one of his school 
comedies, the main character Stratocles ridicules classic education by scolding 
the muse “Lady Calliope, allegedly a virgin (a ‘virgin’ who gave birth to both 
39 Mules were not appropriate for gentlemen, see Boyle, Acts, 53 f.
40 Also Ribadeneira has “naturales rationes aliquot” without saying how Ignatius responded 
(Vita, 8r). Bartoli makes the Moor appear “empio” and arguing “perfidiosamente,” to 
which Ignatius responded “con similitudini, e con ragioni” (Della vita, 26), thus blaming 
the Moor. 
41 Pedro Calderón de la Barca, El gran Príncipe de Fez Don Baltasar de Loyola, jornada II, esc. 
16 compares the birth of Christ with sunlight passing through glass; excerpts in Leturia, 
Iñigo, 177 f. 
42 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, III q. 28, a. 3 c. 
43 Franciscus Suárez, Commentariorum et disputationum in tertiam partem divi Thomae 
tomus secundus (Venetiis: Apud Minimam Societatem, 1594), q. 28, art. 1–3, disp. 5, sect. 2, 
75–78. 
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Linus and Rhesus).”44 We may conclude from these parallels that the goal of 
the narrative was not to expose the content of the blasphemy, but the change 
of attitude in Ignatius.
Given the careful choice of words in Ignatius’s seemingly simple narrative, it 
may be significant that the narrator refers to himself as ‘the pilgrim’ at this 
point, since it is not the charisma of a pilgrim to engage in theological and 
scientific debates. At any rate, following the incident, he becomes enraged and 
feels “obliged to stand up for [St. Mary’s] honor” and to stab the blasphemer.45 
Instead of praying explicitly, the Pilgrim follows a pattern familiar to him from 
his beloved chivalric novels: since the Moor was continuing for a while on their 
common route but soon would turn off the shared road, Ignatius decided not 
to decide himself, but let the mule go on a loose rein and choose whichever 
path it would take.46 Ignatius reports that God willed to have his mule choose 
the path that would spare the Muslim’s life.47 After this incident, Ignatius pro-
ceeded to Montserrat.
With this course of action, the author is employing a chivalric plot device 
that would have been very familiar to his audience. For instance, Amadis, in 
the anonymous novel with this same title, had a dream in which his horse, with 
loosened reins, would carry him out of troubles.48 And early in his career as a 
knight, Don Quixote comes to a crossroads and, undecided where to go and 
explicitly imitating the knights-errant, lets the horse decide (which then 
chooses to return home).49 Although I have no evidence that Ignatius was 
aware of it, it is worth mentioning that Raymond Lull, in his book on the Order 
of the Knights, also discusses the symbolism of the reins, rendering it the fol-
lowing way:
44 Jacobus Pontanus, Soldier or Scholar. Stratocles or War, ed. Thomas D. McCreight and Paul 
Richard Blum (Baltimore: Apprentice House, 2009), lines 46 f.: “Domina Calliope, quam 
esse narrant virginem / (Si virgo est, quae Linumque, Rhesumque peperit).” Translation 
from this bilingual edition; cf. comment, 133 f. 
45 Ignatius, Reminiscences, n. 15, 19. 
46 Acta, n. 16, p. 46: “. . . no hallando cosa cierta á que se determinasse, se determine en esto, 
scilicet, de dexar yr la mula con la rienda suelta . . .”
47 Ignatius, Reminiscences n. 16, p. 19.
48 Vasco Lobeira, Amadis of Gaul, vol. 1 (London: Smith, 1872), book 2, chapter 3, 266.
49 Miguel de Cervantes, El ingenioso hidalgo don Quijote de la Mancha, [1605], I 4; read at 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/2000/2000-h/2000-h.htm#1_iv. Leturia, Iñigo, 140, note 60, 
mentions Don Quijote.
172 blum
A bridle is put on the horse, and into the hands of the knight the reins are 
given. This signifies that with the bridle the knight shall bridle his mouth 
from speaking evil or false words, that he shall bridle his hands not to give 
so much as to need to beg thereafter, nor shall he be so reckless that his 
courage becomes mindless. And through the reins he should understand 
that he shall let himself be guided wherever the Order of the Knights 
wants to engage or send him. And whenever necessary [. . .] he should be 
courageous and not fear his enemies, and if he hesitates to injure them, 
make it vanish from valor. And if he does the contrary of that, then his 
horse, which is a beast without reason, will follow the rule and duty of 
knighthood better than the knight.50
This advice is unmistakably Lullian, as it pairs rationality with trust in divine 
authority. Ignatius adopts a similar attitude that leaves emotional response 
behind while trusting the wisdom of the beast.
In a more direct way than Lull, Ignatius finds himself in a dilemma, namely, 
to murder the Muslim or to let him go. Ignatius’s biographer, Daniello Bartoli, 
outlines the dilemma in a way similar to what we saw with Lull: outrage and 
zeal inflamed Ignatius, who already perceived himself as a ‘Cavaliere di Christo,’ 
which brought him into ‘doubt and perplexity’ as he heard an ‘inner spirit’ say-
ing that punishment is public whereas private revenge does not befit a 
Christian. As a result, “he left the judgment to Chance, or—as he thought—to 
Heaven.” Eventually, it was God’s compassion (pietà) for the inexpert novice, 
still unable to tell the duties of a Christian from the impulses (spiriti) of a 
knight, which willed that the horse (cavallo, not mule) take the other way. 
“Hence Ignatius concluded it to be God’s will that [the Moor] lived or at least 
he should not kill him.”51
50 Raimondo Lullo, Libro dell’Ordine della Cavalleria [Libre qui és de l’Ordre de Cavalleria], 
ed. Giovanni Allegra. ([Carmagnola]: Arktos, 1994), part 5, sect. 14, 206: “A cavall és donat 
fre, e a les mans del cavaller són donades regnes, a significança que cavaller pe lo fre refrèn 
sa boca de parlar letges paraules e falses; e refrèn ses mans que no dó tant que haja a 
 quérrer, ni sia tan ardit que de son ardiment git seny. E per les regnes entena que ell se 
leix menar vers qual part l’ordre de cavalleria lo vulla aempar ni trametre. E con hi serà 
mester, [. . .] e que sia ardit, e no dubte sos enemics; e con dubtarà de ferir, leix flaquea de 
coratge. E si d’açò lo cavaller fa lo contrari, son cavall, qui és bèstia que no ha raó, segueix 
mills la regla e l’ofici de cavalleria que lo cavaller.”
51 Bartoli, Della vita, lib. 1, p. 26, the episode concludes with the words: “. . . d’onde Ignatio 
interpretò, esser voler di Dio, o che colui vivesse, o almeno ch’egli non l’uccidesse.” This 
sentence is missing in the English translation: Daniel Bartoli, History of the Life and 
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We know that throughout his years of pilgrimage, Ignatius always wanted to 
go to Jerusalem. In fact, he planned to go there right after his visit to the Black 
Madonna of Montserrat. Eventually, after many frustrations and disappoint-
ments, while his still unofficial Society never managed to get a passage to the 
Holy Land, he desisted from his plans only because Christ himself appeared to 
him at La Storta, saying: “In Rome I will be more favorable to you.”52 The choice 
of the mule in our episode has the same message as Christ on the way to Rome: 
divert your itinerary away from your mission to the Muslims and towards what 
later would be called the Catholic Reformation!
In terms of ideology and personal mindset, the universal message of 
Ignatius’s narrative may actually lie in the chivalric framework. Pierre Quesnel 
(1699–1774), an eighteenth-century French biographer, enhanced exactly those 
motives and called Ignatius a ‘Chevalier de la Vierge’ in the title of his book, 
which bears a title plate with the Saint holding vigil in front of the Madonna.53 
While following closely the autobiography and Bartoli’s biography,54 he points 
out that Ignatius compared the mundane and the spiritual versions of knight-
hood, opting for the latter, though still with ‘marvelous things’ in his head.55 
This interpretation agrees with that of Ribadeneira, who surmises that Ignatius 
at that juncture was still too much of a soldier and held on to fallacious ideals 
Institute of St. Ignatius de Loyola . . ., trans. Author of “Life in Mexico,” vol. 1 (New York: 
Dunigan, 1855), 42.
52 Acta, n. 96. 
53 [Pierre Quesnel], Histoire de l’admirable Dom Inigo de Guipuscoa, Chevalier de la Vierge, et 
fondateur de la Monarchie des Inighistes . . . Par le Sieur Hercule Rasiel de Selva, vol. 1 (La 
Haye: Charles le Vier, 1736). This book has been reprinted a few times. According to 
Dr. Hoefer, Nouvelle biographie générale, vol. 41 (Paris: Didot, 1862), col. 323 f., Quesnel is 
also author of an anonymous critical Histoire Des Religieux De La Compagnie De 
Jesus . . . Pour servir de Suplément a l’Histoire Ecclésiastique des XVI, XVII & XVIII siécles, in 
four vols. (Soleure: Librairies Associés, 1740), which also narrates Ignatius’ life, however in 
a very different tone. There is more on Quesnel as a journalist in Lynn Hunt, Margaret C. 
Jacob, and Wijnand Mijnhardt, The Book that Changed Europe. Picart and Bernard’s 
“Religious Ceremonies of the World” (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 
336 n. 22. Thanks to Ugo Baldini for ascertaining in the Jesuit archives that Quesnel was 
not affiliated with the Jesuits.
54 Quesnel’s book presents itself as a chivalric novel, suppressing the name Loyola, but de 
facto it is a biography. 
55 Quesnel, n. XIII, 16: “. . . après avoir comparé la Chevalerie errante Mondaine avec la 
Spirituelle, donna la Préférence à celle-ci, parce qu’il y trouva un plus grand Merveilleux.”
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of honor.56 Quesnel further explains that Ignatius followed the model of 
Amadis and other ‘Histoires Romanesques,’ which requires that new knights 
hold a ‘vigil in armes’ before being accepted into the order.57 In his view, 
Ignatius wanted to fulfill this ‘essential formality,’ and therefore held the vigil 
described in the autobiography. This is how he became a Knight of the Virgin.58 
Shortly thereafter, Quesnel continues, the unknown knight would make the 
hitherto unknown town of Manresa ‘extrémement célèbre,’ thanks to the 
Pilgrim’s ‘penitence.’ Although he adopted this observation from Bartoli’s 
account,59 he added that in this Ignatius surpassed “Amadis de Gaule . . .  
et . . . Dom Quichotte.”60 Even though we are aware that in reality it was 
Cervantes who imitated Ignatius and his role models, this remark does not 
necessarily abate the piety of the Saint, but rather ridicules—in agreement 
with the Pilgrim—the exterior orientation that remains ostentatious in its 
modesty. An English translation of the book has even promoted Ignatius to a 
‘Spiritual Quixote.’61 With this, however, the author and the translator clearly 
take advantage of the Pilgrim’s self-critique, especially the critique of the chi-
valric ideology and pride that kept besetting him. We should remember that 
Ignatius dictates his memoir late in his life when he was critical of his chivalric 
beginnings, and that he is showing how slowly he freed himself from them.
From this perspective, the vigil at Montserrat may acquire an important 
meaning for our interpretation of the Moor episode. For Ignatius does 
not immediately hold this vigil; rather, in the order that he tells it, he first pon-
ders the examples of “Amadis of Gaul and books of that sort” and chooses 
“to  abandon his clothes and to clothe himself in the armour of Christ.” 
56 Ribadeneira, Vita, cap. 3, fol. 8v: “Homo quippe militaris, et fallaci veri honoris imitatione 
olim delusus . . .”
57 Similarly, Bartoli, Della vita, 28. On this and other rules concerning the chivalric vigil, see 
Leturia, Iñigo, 141–144. On such vigils in honor of St. Mary, required from new to be 
invested knights in the Middle Ages, see Léon Gautier, La chevalerie (Paris: Welter, 1895), 
288–291, which included depositing weapons on the altar. Also Lull reports the vigil in 
arms: Libro dell’Ordine della Cavalleria, part 4, sect. 3, 180–182 and note 4. 
58 Quesnel, n. XVI, 25 f. Cf. Acta/Reminiscences, n. 17–18. Cf. Bartoli, Della vita, 28, and 
Ribadeneira, Vita, cap. 4, p. 9v.
59 Bartoli, Della vita, cap. 11, p. 29: “E Manresa . . . famosa hoggidì, e venerabile per le memo-
rie che conserva . . . dell’estreme penitenze, che S. Ignatio vi fece.”
60 Quesnel, n. XVIII, 27. 
61 [Pierre Quesnel], The Spiritual Quixote; Or, the Entertaining History of Don Ignatius Loyola, 
Founder of the Order of the Jesuits. . . . (London: Bouquet, 1755). The French text (p. 3) says 
at the beginning that Ignatius made himself “aussi fameux dans la Chevalerie errante 
Spirituelle, que Dom Quichotte, son illustre Compatriote, l’a été dans la Mondaine.”
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Following this, he delivers a general confession to his confessor, and with the 
same confessor he arranges to take the mule and to hang his sword and dagger 
in the church “at the altar of Our Lady.” Ignatius emphasizes that this was an 
important  decision.62 Then, he enacts his plans and abdicates all attributes of 
violence by dressing as a mendicant and pilgrim, and by holding the vigil “with 
his staff in his hands,” i.e., as a pilgrim. So, the French biographer was correct: 
Ignatius does change the worldly knighthood into a spiritual one, and by giving 
his weapons as ex voto63 to St. Mary, he begins transforming courtship into 
Marian devotion.64 While conducting the ritual of initiation into knighthood, 
Ignatius sheds the mundane knighthood and becomes a vassal of Christ. From 
now on persecuting Muslims is no longer an objective, the founder of the 
Jesuits ultimately exhorts his readers.
Compared with Lull’s experience and message, Ignatius’s is simpler; how-
ever, it also simplifies and reduces the problem. For in his narrative, the drive 
to the Holy Land and to convert Muslims appears to be a mere impulse, the 
naïve calling of a descendant of the knightly class. He describes it as the same 
impulse to imitate the saints:65 mere daydreams of a youth who has not yet 
realized that the role of a hero and the role of a companion of Jesus are con-
flicting and incompatible. God and the mule must determine the true 
calling.66
It is understandable now that the Moor episode foretells the La Storta vision, 
which was held to be the key to the Jesuits’ mission away from the Muslims and 
towards reform within the Christian world (which was almost torn apart by 
62 Ignatius, Reminiscences, n. 17, 20; Acta, 47 uses the term “determinación”. [See p. 171, with 
note 46]
63 James Broderick, Saint Ignatius Loyola. The Pilgrim Years (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Cudhay, 1956), 85. Bartoli, Della vita, lib. 1, cap. 10, 28 has Ignatius leave dagger and sword 
only after the night and assigns the act no specific importance.
64 I am indebted to Robert Miola for prompting me to investigate this motif.
65 Acta, nn. 7, 9, 14, 24.
66 Andrew Olesh, Jr., suggests comparing both narratives with the experience of St. Francis 
of Assisi. Indeed, the Fioretti tell an episode that is comparable, namely, when Francis 
converts the Sultan. See Guido Davico Bonino, ed., I fioretti di San Francesco (Milan: 
Einaudi, 1964), chapter 24, 66–68. The components of predication and God’s intervention 
are there; however, it is not the saint who refrains from violence but the Muslim; and it is 
(most likely) not a firsthand dictated narrative. John Victor Tolan, Saint Francis and the 
Sultan: The Curious History of a Christian-Muslim Encounter (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009) is a study of the episode in the medieval context and its reception through 
the centuries. 
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heretics of all brands). Therefore, compared with Lull’s narrative, the Counter-
Reformation narrative teaches:
• Mission in the post-medieval world requires rational discourse.
• The other knows at least as much about the would-be missionary as the mis-
sionary does about the other. Hence, a civil discourse is necessary but pos-
sibly without result.
• The sword of the sermon has turned into the sword of persuasion, and 
where that fails, even violence is pointless.
• If the missionary is ignorant of the dialectics of violence and non-violence, 
he should take recourse to external intervention.
• Consequently, regarding mission to non-believers: do not even try! Reform 
your own religious behavior instead.
These are the conclusions we may draw from Ignatius’s narrative. When com-
pared with the conclusions drawn from Lull’s narrative, they mark a clear 
development following the realization of the paradoxical or even dialectical 
nature of converting others, which eventually led towards the internal reform 
of Christianity as it took place during the sixteenth century.
part 3
Muslim Responses to Christianity
∵

The Messiah ʿIsa, Son of Mary:  
Jesus in the Islamic Tradition
Asma Afsaruddin
Although Abraham is considered the common progenitor of the world’s three 
monotheistic religions, Jesus may be considered the central figure in defining 
their relationship to one another. Jews reject him as the promised Messiah, 
Christians embrace him as their Redeemer, and Muslims both accept him as a 
messianic prophet and reject him as a savior. The status of Jesus in these three 
religious traditions is therefore critical in demarcating their outer boundaries 
in relation to one another. Until not too long ago, it was assumed that these 
were essentially antagonistic positions, incapable of amelioration. As Jews, 
Christians, and Muslims increasingly co-habit today, however, many of these 
positions have softened and each is willing to listen to the other’s perspective 
as a way of illuminating one’s own. In this essay, I will discuss Muslim percep-
tions of Jesus as shaped by foundational religious texts within Islam and the 
larger, internally diverse Islamic tradition, in the context of Christian-Muslim 
conversations on the importance of Jesus in each religion. Muslim and 
Christian valorizations of the servant of God, whom both call the Messiah 
(Christ), will thus be seen as both distinctive and as sharing many common 
features, which will consequently allow for Jesus to emerge not as a divisive 
figure but as one who creates opportunities for greater appreciation of the 
other’s tradition.
 Jesus in the Qurʾan
The name Jesus, ʿIsa in Arabic, is mentioned twenty-five times in the Qurʾan. 
Al-Masih ʿIsa, or Jesus the Messiah (Christ), is a Qurʾanic prophet in a long line 
of prophets, sent by God to an erring humanity over time. This point is under-
scored through the frequent mention of Jesus’ name in connection with other 
biblical prophets in the Qurʾan. Jesus is therefore part of a long line of proph-
ets, who were righteous men sent by God through time to various communities 
in order to preach an unchanging divine message of monotheism and to bring 
an erring humanity back to the primordial religion of islam, understood in a 
non-confessional sense of surrender to the one universal God. Jesus is also 
© Asma Afsaruddin, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004274761_013 
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among a select group of prophets who were given a specific revelation that 
constituted the proofs for the truth of their mission. Thus Qurʾan 2:87 states: 
“And truly We gave to Moses the Books and We caused a train of messengers to 
follow after him, and We gave to Jesus, son of Mary, clear proofs and We sup-
ported him with the holy spirit.” The holy spirit (al-ruh al-qudus) is glossed in 
the exegetical literature as a reference to the angel Gabriel,1 who was also the 
bearer of heavenly revelation to the Prophet Muhammad.
The revelation vouchsafed to Jesus is specifically termed the Injil or the 
Gospel, and, like the Qurʾan, it does not represent a supersession or abrogation 
of previous revelations, but rather, is considered a confirmation. Thus, Qurʾan 
5:46 says:
We caused Jesus, son of Mary, to follow in their footsteps, confirming 
what was before him, and We bestowed on him the Gospel in which there 
is guidance and light, confirming that which was before it in the Torah—a 
guidance and a reminder to those who are careful.
In fact, the Qurʾan instructs the Prophet Muhammad to declare to his listeners 
that Muslims must believe in the prior revelations vouchsafed to God’s mes-
sengers, who are equally righteous and blameless. The equality of God’s mes-
sengers is a recurrent theme in the Qurʾan and in the Islamic tradition, even 
though a number of medieval Muslim theologians went on to articulate a doc-
trine of supersessionism2 vis-à-vis the Jewish and Christian scriptures,3 in 
explicit defiance of verses such as Qurʾan 3:84:
1 See, for example, al-Tabari, Jamiʿ al-bayan fi taʾwil al-qurʾan (Beirut: Dar al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 
1997), 1:448–449. Al-Tabari notes, however, a minority viewpoint that regarded the holy spirit 
as a reference to the Gospel that strengthened Jesus. 
2 Supersessionism (naskh in Arabic) is a doctrine that developed among a considerable num-
ber of medieval Muslim theologians, according to which Islam abrogates the validity of 
Judaism and Christianity before it. For a critique of this position as contrary to the Qurʾan, 
see my article “The Hermeneutics of Inter-Faith Relations: Retrieving Moderation and 
Pluralism as Universal Principles in Qurʾanic Exegeses,” Journal of Religious Ethics 37 (2009): 
331–54.
3 See, for example, Ibn Taymiyya, al-Tafsir al-kabir, ed. ʿAbd al-Rahman ʿUmayra (Beirut: Dar 
al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, n.d.), 4:136–138, where he discounts the possibility that Jews and 
Christians may still hope for salvation on the basis of their religions, despite the occurrence 
of Qurʾanic verses 2:62 and 3:69, which state the opposite, for he maintains that these reli-
gions have been corrupted since their formative period. In addition to supersession, some 
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Say: We believe in God and what is revealed to us and what was revealed 
to Abraham and Ishmael and Isaac and Jacob and the tribes, and what 
was entrusted to Moses and Jesus and the prophets from their Lord. We 
make no distinction between any of them, and to Him we have surren-
dered (muslimun).4
The Qurʾan further asserts that all the prophets submitted to a similar cove-
nant with God, and each proclaimed the same essential message. Accordingly, 
the sectarian divisiveness among humans is a result of their faulty understand-
ing over time of the divine eternal message, which was faithfully conveyed by 
all of God’s apostles. Thus, Qurʾan 33:7–8 states:
And when We exacted a covenant from the Prophets, and from you 
(O Muhammad) and from Noah and Abraham and Moses and Jesus, son 
of Mary. We took from them a solemn covenant; that He may ask the loyal 
of their loyalty. And He has prepared a painful doom for the unfaithful.
And again, Qurʾan 42:13 states:
He has ordained for you that religion which He commended to Noah, and 
that which We inspire in you (referring to Muhammad), and that which 
We commended to Abraham and Moses and Jesus, saying, “Establish the 
religion and do not be divided in it.”
Jesus, like all the prophets preceding him, is thus innocent of the theological 
wrangling that ensued among his followers and the followers of other proph-
ets, and furthermore, the Qurʾan affirms that there is no fundamental disjunc-
tion between the Judeo-Christian revelation and the Islamic one.5 Jesus was 
granted the proofs and the necessary wisdom to invite all to follow the straight 
path, which represents God’s primordial religion, as stated in Qurʾan 43: 63–64:
(by no means all) pre-modern theologians have focused on the alleged corruption (tahrif ) of 
Jewish and Christian scriptures to posit the superiority of Islam. 
4 For a discussion of inclusivist and exclusivist understandings of this verse and of the term 
Islam itself, see Abdulaziz Sachedina, The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 38–40. 
5 The Qurʾan frequently refers to itself as confirming (musaddiq) the previous revelations 
vouchsafed to the People of the Book (cf., for example, 2:41; 2:91; 3:3; 3:50; 5:48; 35:31, etc.). 
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When Jesus came with the proofs, he said, “I have come to you with wis-
dom, so as to make clear to you that regarding which you used to differ. So 
worship God and obey me. Indeed, God is my Lord and your Lord, so 
serve Him; this is the straight path.”
These Qurʾanic passages are reminiscent of Matthew 11:19, in which Jesus 
is described as being filled with wisdom, as well as of John 20:17 and 
Matthew 7:13f., in which he exhorts people to follow the narrow and straight 
way, which is the path of God.6
Jesus, as a Qurʾanic exemplar, is presented as a prophet, a teacher, and a 
humble servant of God. He is also above all a human being whose biographical 
details constitute some of the most moving passages in the Qurʾan. Through 
the emotive accounts of Jesus’ birth and his brave and almost implausible 
defense of his chaste and helpless mother, the Qurʾan establishes God’s deep 
solicitude for the infant Jesus and his single mother. There are several refer-
ences to the birth of Jesus in the Qurʾan; the lengthiest and one of the most 
evocative accounts of the dramatic circumstances of Jesus’ birth are recorded 
in the nineteenth chapter, which is wholly devoted to Mary and titled Surat 
Maryam, in verses 16–34. These verses embody powerful language to convey 
the significance of this seminal event and to elicit a sense of deep compassion 
in reference to a defenseless young mother and her child. The bond between 
them is portrayed as stronger than the usual mother-child relationship, for 
they are described as also being direct agents in the unfolding of God’s self-
revelation to humankind.
In verses 16–34, Mary encounters the spirit (Gabriel) who assumes the like-
ness of a perfect man and identifies himself as a messenger of God. When he 
informs her that she would give birth to a blameless son, she remonstrates:
How can I have a son when no mortal has touched me, neither have 
I been unchaste? He said: So your Lord says: It is easy for Me. And (it will 
be) that We may make of him a revelation for mankind and a mercy from 
Us, and it is a thing ordained. And she conceived him, and she withdrew 
with him to a far place. And the pangs of childbirth drove her to the trunk 
of the palm tree. She said, “Oh, would that I have become nothing, forgot-
ten!” Then (one) cried to her from below her, saying: Grieve not! Your 
Lord has placed a rivulet beneath you. And shake the trunk of the palm 
tree toward you. You will cause ripe dates to fall on you. So eat and drink 
and be consoled. And if you meet any mortal, say: I have vowed a fast to 
6 Cf. Geoffrey Parrinder, Jesus in the Qurʾan (Oxford: Oneworld, 1995), 95–96.
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the Compassionate, and may not speak this day to any mortal. Then she 
brought him to her own folk, carrying him. They said, “O Mary! You have 
come with an amazing thing. Oh sister of Aaron! Your father was not a 
wicked man nor was your mother a harlot.” Then she pointed to him. 
They said: “How can we talk to one who is in the cradle, a young boy?” He 
spoke, “See! I am the servant of God. He has given me the Book and has 
appointed me a Prophet, and has made me blessed wherever I may be, 
and has enjoined on me prayer and almsgiving so long as I remain alive. 
And (has made me) dutiful toward her who bore me, and has not made 
arrogant, and unblessed. Peace on me the day I was born, and the day 
I die and the day I shall be raised alive!” Such was Jesus, son of Mary: (this 
is) a statement of the Truth concerning which they doubt.
Thus, Mary’s initial doubt about the possibility of the virgin birth is consider-
ably allayed by her personal encounter with the divine and her receptivity to 
being selected as an instrument of good in the world—against remarkable 
odds. Above all, poignantly etched in these verses is a loving mother-child rela-
tionship, tinged with desperation but also with unwavering servitude to God. 
The infant Jesus and his virgin mother appear to be pitted against a faithless 
world, which is all too eager to pass judgment on them. After all, who could 
possibly be more vulnerable to societal criticism than a barely pubescent girl 
and her child, born out of conventional wedlock? Yet God chose to act in his-
tory through the medium of these ostensibly contemptible, insignificant indi-
viduals, whose obedience to God’s calling serves as a paradigm of faith and 
service for all humanity. And to send this message home, Jesus in the Qurʾan is 
addressed primarily in terms of his relationship to his mother. In a run-of-the-
mill, patriarchal society, the appellation ‘Jesus, Son of Mary’ must have raised 
some eyebrows and further underscored their marginal status. One need not 
be a feminist per se to appreciate how piety in these sacred narratives is ren-
dered in non-gendered terms, and that foundational texts in both Islam and 
Christianity recognize goodness equally in men and women, as well as their 
equal agency in transforming the world. This perspective gets elided in the 
gendered constructions of piety and legal rights that later developed in both 
traditions, but is fully retrievable from the Qurʾan and the Christian Bible.7 The 
tale of Mary and her child destined for greater things is above all a story of how 
7 See in general Asma Barlas, “Believing Women” in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations 
of the Qurʾan (Austin, TX: University of Texas, 2002), where she convincingly demonstrates 
how androcentric interpretations of the Qurʾan have progressively masked its fundamental 
gender egalitarianism.
184 afsaruddin
a personal relationship with and fealty to God can transcend socially con-
structed categories and human systems of valuation.8
 Jesus as the Word of God and the Promised Messiah in  
Qurʾanic Exegesis
We now proceed to focus on another shorter but significant cluster of verses 
(Qurʾan 3:45–47), referring to the birth of Jesus and to his various attributes. 
Since some of these attributes appear to be emphasized equally in Islam and 
Christianity, we will analyze them at greater length and present the views of a 
number of prominent Muslim exegetes. The verses under discussion state:
Behold the angels said: O Mary! God gives you good tidings of a Word 
from Him: his name will be Christ Jesus. The son of Mary, held in honor 
in this world and the hereafter and of (the company of) those nearest to 
God; He shall speak to the people in the cradle and in maturity. And he 
shall be one of the righteous. She said; O my Lord! How shall I have a son 
when no man has touched me? He said: Even so: God creates what He 
wills: when He has decreed a plan, He only says to it, Be—and it is!
These significant passages in the Qurʾan from the third chapter titled Al ʿImran 
(the family of ʿImran) are particularly worthy of our attention because they are 
much cited in the literature comparing the position of Jesus in Islam and 
Christianity. Furthermore, to Christian ears, they sound similar to the descrip-
tion of the Annunciation that occurs in the Gospel of Luke (1:26–38). It will be 
a useful exercise for us to review quickly what some of the major Muslim com-
mentators have said concerning several critical concepts pertaining to Jesus in 
these verses. Among these critical concepts are ‘a word’ (kalima) and the 
Messiah (al-masih), which remain contested notions among Muslim exegetes 
themselves, and which are also of great interest to Christian theologians who 
have similarly struggled to define these notions in relation to Jesus.
The well-known commentator al-Tabari (d. 923) understands ‘a word’ as 
referring to the good tidings imparted by God to Mary concerning ‘a son for 
you whose name is the Messiah, ʿIsa son of Mary.’ He nevertheless presents an 
8 For assessments and appreciations of Mary’s exalted role in the Islamic tradition, see, for 
example, Aliah Schleifer et al., Mary, the Blessed Virgin of Islam (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 
1997); Mary F. Thurlkill, Chosen among Women: Mary and Fatima in Medieval Christianity and 
Shiʿate Islam (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007). 
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alternative interpretation, which understands ‘a word’ to be a reference to the 
divine command in the verse, “Be!”9 Al-Tabari also points out that the famous 
Companion Ibn ʿAbbas was of the opinion that the word (al-kalima) was a ref-
erence to Jesus himself, “who is the word from God.”10 From these, Al-Tabari 
prefers the first explanation that he lists for kalima; that is, a reference to the 
good tidings that the angels brought to Mary about Jesus’ prophethood and the 
annunciation that God would grant her a son (walad) without a husband, 
whose name would be the Messiah or the Christ.11 The full designation ‘The 
Messiah, son of Mary,’ continues al-Tabari, underscores the fact that Jesus was 
indeed the son of his mother, thus negating the claims of Trinitarian Christians 
as well as the accusations of impurity hurled at Mary by the Jews.12
As for the term ‘The Messiah,’ it is interpreted by al-Tabari as meaning that 
God Himself had wiped the sins off Jesus, on account of which ‘the Messiah’ 
may be equated with ‘the Truthful One’ (al-Siddiq). Others, however, have 
claimed that the name Messiah referred to someone who was touched by 
blessings (musiha bi ʾl-baraka).13
The noble status (wajihan) promised to Jesus is a reference to the elevated 
status that he would enjoy both in this world and the next, continues al-Tabari. 
Furthermore, the verse promises that he would be brought close to God on the 
Day of Judgment. His ability to speak to people from his cradle allowed him to 
defend his mother from the slanderous lies circulated about her, and it was a 
confirmation of his prophecy. Later, his speech to people as a mature man 
(kahlan) allowed him to convey the message of God as revealed to him, and to 
enjoin what is good and forbid what is wrong. According to one source, how-
ever, the reference to Jesus’ speech as a mature man refers to his second com-
ing when he will kill the anti-Christ.14 The final part of the verse, according to 
al-Tabari, is an affirmation that God can create ex nihilo; Jesus’ birth by a virgin 
mother is an attestation to this divine attribute.15
A prominent exegete of the Seljuq period, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 1210), also 
has much to say on these two verses and hence a synopsis of his extensive com-
mentary is offered here. He comments that just as the just ruler can be 
described as ‘the shadow of God on earth’ and ‘the light of God,’ implying that 








he is a medium (sabab) for the appearance of the shadow of justice and the 
light of charity (al-ihsan), Jesus is similarly a medium for the appearance of the 
word of God, which serves to elucidate the Truth and dispel doubts and false-
hoods. It is in this sense that Jesus is named ‘the Word of God the Almighty.’16
To someone who might remonstrate that every human being must spring 
from a father, al-Razi is quick to refute this position by pointing to Qurʾan 3:59, 
which states: “Indeed the likeness of Jesus in the presence of God is the like-
ness of Adam.” Since Adam did not require a father to be born, Jesus does not 
require a father, either. Furthermore, it is pointed out that the world of animals 
is replete with examples of auto-genesis, as well as the reproduction of crea-
tures unrelated to the parent.17 Interestingly, al-Razi seems to be appealing 
here to observable facts (as he understands them) and the world of nature to 
establish the miraculous nature of the birth of Jesus.
The phrase ‘a Word from Him’ contains the Arabic preposition min, which 
usually connotes a partitive sense (tabʿid); here, however, al-Razi explains that 
the preposition cannot be understood in a partitive sense, since that would 
imply a composite divine nature capable of being divided into constituent 
parts that could in turn be assembled into a whole. Composite bodies belong 
to created beings, “and God is far removed from that!” he asserts. Thus, the 
phrase ‘a Word from Him’ conduces to the meaning that the Word of God (Be!) 
was the origin of Jesus’ coming into being and has nothing to do with the 
notion of incarnation.18
What, then, is the significance of the Arabic title al-Masih (the Messiah)? 
Al-Razi lists several possibilities that testify to the fecundity of the root msh in 
Arabic, which essentially means ‘to rub, to anoint.’ According to one source, 
Jesus earned the title because he would barely touch someone afflicted with 
disease and that person would be healed. Another source maintained that it 
was because Jesus had been anointed with a special blessed oil reserved for 
prophets, which serves as a sign for the angels to recognize all those who were 
born to be prophets. Yet another source commented that it was so because 
Gabriel is said to have brushed Jesus with his wings at the time of his birth so 
that he would be protected from being touched by Satan.19
As for the full appellation—the Messiah ʿIsa, son of Mary—it indicates to 
al-Razi that ʿIsa is his given name while ‘the Messiah’ is an honorific title, and 
16 Al-Razi, al-Tafsir al-Kabir (Beirut: Dar Ihya al-Turath al-ʿArabi, 1999), 3:221.
17 Ibid., 3:221–22.
18 Ibid., 3:222–23. Here, of course, al-Razi is specifically taking issue with the Christian posi-
tion on the Logos and with incarnationists in general (al-Hayluliyya).
19 Ibid., 3:222–23. 
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‘son of Mary’ is descriptive in the sense that it describes a fact. According to 
another source, the ascription specifically to Mary underscores that Jesus was 
born without a father, unlike other prophets, and that contributed to “an 
increase in his merit and enhancement of stature.”20
Jesus’ noble stature in this world and the next is stressed in the Arabic word 
wajihan used in the verse in relation to him, continues al-Razi. As he explains, 
this adjective describes someone who is “possessed of [a high] station, honor, 
and esteem.” It can also describe someone who is very generous. The same 
word was used to describe the status of Moses in Qurʾan 33:69, both in this 
world on account of his function as a prophet, as well as in the next on account 
of his high rank in the presence of God. With regard to Jesus, it additionally 
referred to his ability to raise the dead, cure the leper, and heal the sick in this 
world, while in the next it referred to his status as an intercessor for his com-
munity, whose intercession will be accepted, as will that of the other great 
prophets. Furthermore, the epithet suggests that Jesus was innocent of the 
slurs cast at him by his enemies in this world, and was assured of an elevated 
status in the next because of “the plenitude of his merits” (kathrat thawabihi).21
From both al-Tabari’s and al-Razi’s exposition, it is therefore clear that nei-
ther the expression ‘a Word from Him’ nor ‘the Messiah’ corresponds to 
Christian notions of the Logos and Savior, respectively. These Qurʾanic epithets 
applied to Jesus are to be understood in the context of his humanity and his 
role as a prophet selected by God in a long line of prophets, who had varying 
degrees of skills and aptitudes commensurate with the needs of their time and 
the people to whom they were sent. Many of the miracles attributed to Jesus in 
the Gospels are affirmed by the Qurʾan and sometimes even elaborated upon 
by the exegetes, since they are credible manifestations of an all-powerful God 
who can directly intervene in history when He wants. Furthermore, Al-Razi’s 
caveat that none of these Qurʾanic attributes should be understood as having 
anything to do with Christian notions of incarnation or immanence is under-
standable within the Islamic conception of prophethood and its purpose in 
this world. Despite the similarity in the use of these terms in both traditions, 
the underlying assumptions about the meaning(s) of Jesus’ mission on earth 
are strikingly different, particularly in the deployment of these epithets. 
However, the Qurʾan’s affirmation of a high status for Jesus in this world and 
the next would ring true for Christians, and his role as an intercessor in the 




 Other Qurʾanic Attributes of Jesus
Jesus’ miracles (ayat) are well attested in the Qurʾan. In addition to his ability 
to speak from the cradle, as already mentioned, he healed the leper and the 
blind man, raised the dead to life (Qurʾan 5:110), and breathed life into birds of 
clay (Qurʾan 3:49; 5:110)—deeds that no other prophet has carried out. These 
exceptional accomplishments attributed to Jesus are balanced in the Qurʾan 
with unequivocal expressions of his servanthood to God and his human status 
as a messenger of God. Thus, Qurʾan 4:172 states: “The Messiah will never scorn 
to be a servant of God, nor will the favored angels. Whoever scorns His service 
and is proud, all such will He assemble before Him.”22 And again, in Qurʾan 5:75 
we find the assertion that: “The Messiah, son of Mary, was no other than a mes-
senger, messengers the like of whom had passed away before him. And his 
mother was a virtuous woman. And they both used to eat (earthly) food.”
Jesus is also considered the precursor prophet in the Qurʾan, who announces 
the coming of Muhammad as the Messenger of God after him. In Qurʾan 61:6, 
it is stated:
And when Jesus, son of Mary, said, “O Children of Israel! Lo! I am the mes-
senger of God to you confirming that which was [revealed] before me in 
the Torah, and bringing good tidings of a messenger who will come after 
me, whose name is the Praised One (Ahmad).
Ahmad is a variant of the name Muhammad, and is regarded in Muslim apolo-
getic literature as being the equivalent of the Comforter or the Paraclete men-
tioned in John 16:7, who will allegedly come after Jesus. The Greek word 
Paraclete is rendered as Periclytos, however, which yields the meaning of ‘The 
Praised One,’ which is the meaning of both Ahmad and Muhammad.23
From all the Qurʾanic references to Jesus, it is perhaps the verses regarding 
his last days on earth that have sparked the most interest among Christian 
 
22 Kenneth Cragg discerns a similarity between Qurʾan 4:172 and the Christological hymn in 
Philippians, which refers to Jesus taking the form of a servant. Cragg states: “Both 
Scriptures affirm his being gladly ‘servant’ to God. That is their unity. The Qurʾan however 
denies his ‘Sonship’ on the very grounds in which the Christian sees it to consist, namely 
a loving obedience to God.” See his Jesus and the Muslim (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1985), 30.
23 See a discussion of this in Parrinder, Jesus in the Qurʾan, 96–100. 
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 students of Islam; this topic will now be briefly discussed. The locus classicus 
for the traditional Muslim understanding of Jesus’ last days one earth is Qurʾan 
4:157–58, which states:
And because of their saying, “Behold, we have slain the Christ Jesus, the 
son of Mary, the messenger of God—but they slew him not nor crucified 
but it appeared so to them; indeed, those who disagree concerning it are 
in doubt thereof; they have no knowledge of it save pursuit of a conjec-
ture; they slew him not for certain but God took him unto Himself. And 
God is Almighty, All-Wise.
The Qurʾanic denial of the killing of Jesus affirms a basic theological premise in 
Islam, namely, that God does not let evil triumph over goodness (cf. Qurʾan 
5:56; 9:32; 58:22; 61:8). The wrongdoers may hatch relentless intrigues and plots 
against Him (Q 3:54; 5:110; cf. Q 8:30; 13:42) and His prophets, but their machi-
nations will never prevail in the end.24 Jesus’ ascension to heaven is a resound-
ing affirmation of God’s omnipotence and the vanquishing of His enemies. 
William A. Bijlefeld has called the Qurʾanic denial of Jesus’ death on the cross 
a “corrective denial,”25 which challenges the Jewish claim that they had cruci-
fied him and thereby proved that he was not the Messiah, as well as the 
Christian belief in the role of the cross in the redemptive atonement, although 
the cross is not specifically mentioned in these Qurʾanic verses. The prevalent 
position among the overwhelming majority of Muslim exegetes and scholars is 
that Jesus was raised by God to His presence while still alive, and thus miracu-
lously delivered from the harm intended by his enemies.26
24 Cf. Qurʾan 3:54, which states: “And they (the disbelievers) plotted, and God plotted, and 
God is the best of the plotters.”
25 Willem A. Bijlefeld, “Other Faith Images of Jesus: Some Muslim Contributions to 
Christological Discussions,” in Christological Perspectives: Essays in Honor of Harvey K. 
McArthur, ed. Robert F. Berkey and Sarah A. Edwards (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1982), 204.
26 The rich and diverse exegetical tradition that grew up concerning these verses is dis-
cussed comprehensively by Todd Lawson in his The Crucifixion and the Qurʾan: A Study in 
the History of Muslim Thought (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2009). For a detailed com-
parison between Muslim and Christian traditions on this topic, see A. H. Mathias 
Zahniser, The Mission and Death of Jesus in Islam and Christianity (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 2008); cf. Parrinder, Jesus in the Qurʾan, 121.
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 Summary of the Points of Convergence and Divergence between 
Muslims and Christians Concerning Jesus
To conclude this section on the Qurʾanic depiction of Jesus and his prophetic 
mission, it is useful to summarize the main points concerning both the funda-
mental agreement and disagreement that exist between Islam and Christianity. 
As far as the points of convergence are concerned, both Islam and Christianity:
1) show profound respect for Jesus and affirm that while he lived in the 
world, he was pure and free of sin, and directly guided by God;
2) believe that Mary, Jesus’ mother, was chaste, pure, and obedient to God;
3) assert that Mary was a virgin who conceived Jesus miraculously;
4) affirm that Jesus performed a number of miracles, including healing the 
sick and raising the dead.
Islam and Christianity, however, differ in the following ways:
1) While Christianity declares Jesus to be both human and divine, Islam 
rejects the notion of Jesus’ divinity. As a result, Christians worship Jesus, 
while Muslims revere Jesus and accept him as an inspired prophet, based 
on the Qurʾanic accounts of his life and acts;
2) Christians regard Jesus as the son of God, a concept that is not accepted 
by Muslims, who instead affirm that God does not procreate and have 
offspring.
3) Christianity asserts that Jesus was crucified. Contrastingly, Islam main-
tains that it only appeared as if Jesus was crucified, and that God instead 
raised him up to Himself.
4) Christianity maintains that Jesus died in order to redeem the original sin 
of humankind. For Muslims, however, Jesus does not serve as a redeemer 
since the concept of original sin is lacking in Islam. Instead, human 
beings individually earn their redemption through their belief in God 
and His revealed scriptures, as well as through their commission of righ-
teous deeds.27
These points of convergence and divergence between Muslim and Christian 
beliefs regarding the life and mission of Jesus Christ have made for lively 
27 Adapted from the list developed by Alan Godlas, available at http://islam.uga.edu/ 
jesusdif.html, last accessed on February 10, 2013.
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debates and conversations throughout the centuries, and continue strong in 
our own time.28
 Jesus in the Hadith Literature and Muslim Tradition
In the standard hadith compilations—mainly the Six Books29 revered by Sunni 
Muslims—Jesus is primarily connected with the end of time. This is unique to 
the hadith literature, for the Qurʾan makes no explicit reference to such an 
eschatological role for Jesus. Two Qurʾanic verses—4:159 and 43:61—are under-
stood to allude to Jesus’ second coming by the majority of exegetes,30 but this 
(at best) inchoate idea is fully developed only in the extra-Qurʾanic literature. 
Thus, in one well-known hadith (a statement attributed to the Prophet 
Muhammad), the Companion Abu Hurayra relates:
The Messenger of God, peace and blessings be upon him, said, “By Him in 
whose hands my soul is, the son of Mary will soon descend among you as 
a just judge. He will break crosses, kill swine and abolish the poll-tax, and 
wealth will pour forth to such an extent that one will accept it and one 
prostration will be better than the world and what it contains.”31
There are also hadiths that contain descriptions of the manner in which Jesus 
will fulfill his eschatological role of overcoming the anti-Christ, called al-Dajjal 
(‘the Imposter’) in Arabic, or more fully al-Masih al-Dajjal (‘the false Messiah’). 
This figure is not mentioned in the Qurʾan, but is prominent in the eschatologi-
cal sections of hadith compilations. Here, Jesus’ role is to come back during 
these end-times when the Dajjal makes his appearance, and eventually to slay 
him. One well-known hadith occurring in an authoritative collection describes 
in some detail the appearance of the Dajjal, claiming he will be a young man 
with curly hair and a defective eye, and who will emerge from between 
28 Cragg’s remark on the ‘Christian potential of the Qurʾan’ is also worthy of note in this 
context; see his “Islamic Theology: Limits and Bridges,” in The Gospel and Islam: A 1978 
Compendium, ed. Don M. McCurry (Monrovia, CA: MARC, 1979), 31.
29 The Six Books are: the Sahih of al-Bukhari (d. 870); the Sahih of Muslim b. Hajjaj (d. 875); 
the Sunan of Ibn Maja (d. 886); the Sunan of Abu Daʾud (d. 888); the Sunan of al-Tirmidhi 
(d. 892); and the Sunan of al-Nasaʾi (d. 915).
30 See Neal Robinson’s discussion of these two verses in his Christ in Islam and Christianity 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1991), 78–105.
31 English translation given by Muhammad Ata ur-Rahim, Jesus: Prophet of Islam (Norfold, 
England: Diwan Press, 1977). 
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Damascus and Iraq and will be able to travel fast on earth. When the Prophet 
is asked how fast the Dajjal will be on earth, he replies:
Like rain backed by wind. He comes to a nation and they believe in him 
and accept (his message). He commands the sky to rain and it rains, and 
the earth to grow grass, and it grows. He provides them with plenty of 
wealth. He comes to another nation and they reject his message. He turns 
away from them and they become poor with nothing in their hands. He 
passes a remnant of an ancient city and tells her “take out your treasures.” 
Its treasures follow him like bees, then he calls a man full of youth and 
strikes him with his sword, cutting him in two. Then he calls him and he 
(the youth) comes laughing with shining face (as if al-Dajjal was unable 
to kill him), at that moment God sends Jesus the son of Mary. He descends 
on the top of the white minaret at the east of Damascus, putting his 
hands on the wings of two angels. (He is so beautiful that) When he bows 
his head, water drops when he lifts it and shines like pearls. Any non-
believer who finds his breath will be killed; his breath reaches as far as his 
sight. He pursues al-Dajjal and finds him at the gate of Lydda, then he 
kills him. Then a nation who was saved in the trial of the Anti-Christ 
comes to Jesus. He touches them and tells them about their levels in para-
dise. At that time God inspires Jesus that he has sent some people (Gog 
and Magog) that no one can defeat. And God says: “Take my servants to 
the mountain of Tour.”32
While some Muslim theologians accept the content of the above hadith and 
others similar to it as literal references to specific events at the end of time, 
others detect in them broad allegorical references to a final showdown between 
good and evil, with a prominent role accorded to Jesus, who will end the fright-
ful reign of the Dajjal and inaugurate the messianic era. He will fill the earth 
with justice and peace, and put an end to hatred and poverty. Jesus will then 
marry and beget children, and all will believe in him during this era of peace.33
Jesus also plays a prominent role in other, non-standard collections of 
delightful reports and anecdotes concerning biblical prophets who impart pro-
found wisdom to a Muslim audience and instruct them in the proper ways of 
32 Muslim, Fitan, #110; translation given by Zeki Saritoprak, “The Legend of al-Dajjal 
(Antichrist): The Personification of Evil in the Islamic Tradition,” Muslim World 93 (2003): 
293–94.
33 Mahmoud M. Ayoub, “Towards an Islamic Christology, II: The Death of Jesus, Reality or 
Delusion,” Muslim World 70 (1980): 120–21. 
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the world. They form part of a literary genre known as the ‘Tales of the Prophets’ 
(Qisas al-anbiyaʾ), which have proven to be very popular. A well-known histo-
rian of Islam, Tarif Khalidi, has collected many of these reports concerning 
Jesus and published them in a monograph entitled The Muslim Jesus. In this 
‘incarnation’ of Jesus (to use the term in a non-theological sense), he is, as 
Khalidi describes it, at times “the ascetic, the prophet of the heart, the gentle 
teacher of manners, the mystic, the lord of nature, the healer of spiritual ills.”34 
One homiletic tradition states:
It was said that Jesus, son of Mary, peace be upon him, met a man and 
said to him, ‘What are you doing?’ He replied, ‘I am devoting myself to 
God.’ He said, ‘Who is providing you with what you need?’ He said, ‘My 
brother.’ Jesus then said, ‘He is more devoted to God than you.’35
The report contains a gentle rebuke that faith and solitary worship without 
good deeds is less meritorious and less desirable than good deeds accompa-
nied by faith. Hence, acts of charity and social interactions with one’s fellow 
beings are a necessary complement to private devotion to God.
In another wise saying, Jesus counsels:
Time revolves around three days: a yesterday which has passed away and 
during which you have been admonished, a today which supplies your 
needs, and a tomorrow in which you do not know what is in store for you. 
All matters revolve around three things: a thing whose rightness has 
become apparent to you and which you must follow, a thing whose evil 
has become apparent to you and which you must shun, and a thing which 
appears uncertain to you and which you must defer to God.36
Jesus thus exhorts a Muslim audience to adopt a commonsensical approach to 
time—to learn from past mistakes, maximize today’s potential, and not worry 
unduly about what tomorrow may bring. Furthermore, one must couple self-
reliance with a fundamental reliance upon God and His beneficence. Jesus also 
34 Quoted in the article “The Fifth Gospel: Tarif Khalidi and Jesus in the “Muslim Gospel,” 
interview and commentary by Salim Tamari, available at www.jerusalemquarterly.org/
images/Articlespdf/15_gospel.pdf, last accessed on February 12, 2013.
35 Tarif Khalidi, The Muslim Jesus: Sayings and Stories in Islamic Literature (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 102.
36 Ibid., 77.
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affirms a basic ethical tenet within Islam in this didactic report, namely, the 
upholding of what is good and right while avoiding what is evil and wrong.
Jesus is also invoked as a worldly-wise figure that warns against those who 
would yoke religious authority to worldly power, and admonishes the ostensi-
bly pious who do not practice what they preach. Such a sad state of affairs is a 
harbinger of the end-times, for which he predicts:
At the end of time, there will be religious scholars who preach abstinence 
but do not themselves abstain, who encourage yearning for the afterlife 
but do not themselves yearn, who forbid visits to rulers but do not them-
selves desist, who draw near to the rich and distance themselves from 
the poor, who recoil from the lowly and fawn upon the mighty. They 
are the tyrants and the enemies of the Merciful God.37
The great affection and veneration that Muslims are encouraged to harbor 
towards Jesus and his mother is perhaps best encapsulated in a story about the 
fall of Mecca in 630 CE, preserved in the biography of the Prophet Muhammad 
by Ibn Hisham. According to Ibn Hisham, when Muhammad entered the 
Kaʿba, the shrine that housed the Meccan pantheon, he ordered that all its 
idols and paintings be cleansed or destroyed. One of the paintings held there 
was of the Virgin and the Christ-child. The Prophet is said to have approached 
this icon, covered it with his cloak, and did not allow it to be washed away.38 
Whether this anecdote is true or apocryphal is irrelevant for our purposes. 
What matters is that the report is quite archaic and is extracted from some of 
the earliest historical narratives about the founding of the Muslim community. 
Its preservation and dissemination in the foundational literature of the Muslim 
community illustrates a fundamental reverence on the part of Muslims for the 
figure of Jesus, who along with his virgin mother epitomizes what it means to 
be a willing and humble servant of God.
 Jesus in Edifying and Sufi Literature
Jesus is much beloved in devotional literature of all sorts, and is especially pop-
ular in Sufi literature. The celebrated magnum opus of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali 
37 Ibid., 103–104. As Khalidi comments (ibid., 104), the behavior of these ulama’ “echoes the 
behavior of the Pharisees rebuked by Jesus in Matthew, and merits a more direct censure 
of Muslim scholars who sell their integrity in order to gain favor with rulers, a reversal of 
the true vocation of scholars.”
38 Azraqi, Akhbar Makka, 111; Lings, Muhammad, 302.
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(d. 1111), Ihya ʿulum al-din, contains several reports concerning Jesus that 
emphasize his proclivity for asceticism and otherworldly spirituality. One such 
report relates: “Jesus lay down one day with his head upon a stone. Satan, pass-
ing by, said: ‘O Jesus, you are fond of this world.’ So Jesus took the stone and cast 
it from under his head, saying: ‘This be yours, together with this world.’ ”39
The Sufi’s constant efforts to purify himself or herself by forsaking the vain 
things of this world and its vain company, all of which distract from the remem-
brance of God, are exemplified by Jesus and his abstemious ways. To illustrate 
this, we can once again extract an edifying anecdote from al-Ghazali’s Ihya, 
which relates what Jesus once said to his disciples:
“O disciples, seek the love of God by your hatred of sinners; seek to be 
near Him by [doing] that which distances you from them; and seek His 
favor by being angry with them.” He [Malik]40 said, “I do not know which 
[commandment] he began with.” They said, “O Spirit of God, whose com-
pany then shall we keep?” He replied, “Keep the company of him whose 
sight reminds you of God, whose speech increases your knowledge, 
whose deeds make the afterlife desirable.”41
Jesus, in al-Ghazali’s depiction, is a very human Jesus, who accepts his lot in life 
as divinely ordained, experiences frustration and despair, and makes no 
attempt to use physical force to overcome any adverse situation. His gentleness 
and patient resignation are invoked by al-Ghazali as a model to be emulated by 
mystical practitioners, and he encourages them to pray the way Jesus did:
O God I have arisen from my sleep and am not able to ward off that which 
I hate and am not able to possess the benefit of that which I desire and 
the matter rests in hands other than mine. And I have pledged myself to 
my work and there is no man so poor as I am. O God, let not my enemies 
rejoice over me and let not my friends deal ill with me, and let not my 
afflictions come to me in matter of my religion. And do not allow the 
world to occupy my care, and do not allow the unmerciful to overcome 
me, O Thou Eternal!42
39 Samuel Zwemer, “Jesus Christ in the Ihya of al-Ghazali,” The Muslim World 7.2 (1917): 
144–45.
40 This is Malik b. Mighwal (d. 776), who was an early traditionist from Kufa and transmitted 
many sayings attributed to Jesus.
41 Khalidi, Muslim Jesus, 57.
42 Ibid., 150.
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Jesus’ meekness and ascetic piety are celebrated by other Sufis as well, as he 
constitutes a model and guide for their way of life, centered on a renunciation 
of the wealth and luxury of this world. This is the path to true happiness, says 
Jalal al-Din Rumi (d. 1273), as confirmed by Jesus’ ministry, which he describes 
as follows:
From all sides the people ever thronged
Many blind and lame, halt and afflicted
At the door of the house of ʿIsa at dawn,
That with his breath he might heal their ailments.
As soon as he had finished his orisons? . . . .
He spoke to them saying, “O stricken ones,
The desires of you all have been granted by God,
Arise, walk without pain or affliction,
Acknowledge the mercy and beneficence of God.43
In mystical literature, Jesus is often called the ‘man of sorrows,’ though he is 
also considered a prophet who through exemplary piety and abstinence has 
achieved nearness to God—a trait that Sufis strive to emulate.44 Thus, the well-
known Persian Sufi poet Mahmud Shabistari (d. 1340) describes the pious mys-
tic as one who “obtains release from his own knowledge, and, like the prophet 
Jesus, he becomes near to God. He gives up his existence utterly to be plun-
dered and in the steps of the most pure he ascends.”45
Ibn ʿArabi (d. 1240), a celebrated mystical philosopher from the thirteenth 
century, went on to call Jesus ‘the Seal of the Friends of God’ on account of hav-
ing achieved the highest knowledge of God. In Ibn ʿArabi’s understanding, a 
wali (literally ‘friend,’ usually translated into English as ‘saint’) is one who on 
account of his knowledge of God realizes his essential unity with God the 
Creator (Arabic, wahdat al-wujud; i.e., monism). Furthermore, Ibn ʿArabi dis-
tinguishes between general prophecy and particular prophecy. General proph-
ecy, which is identified with ‘friendship with God’ (wilaya), refers to “those 
personal laws which are entrusted to people ‘created for Himself, chosen for 
His service and selected from among His worshipers for His presence.’ ”46 That 




46 Andreas D’Souza, “Jesus in Ibn ʿArabi’s Fusus al-hikam,” Islamo-Christiana 8 (1982): 196.
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is, the Friends of God (awliyaʾ) receive certain personal laws directly from God. 
These personal laws deal with the recipients’ relationships to God, and hence 
are manifested primarily in their worship of God and cannot be propagated. 
Particular prophecy, on the other hand, which includes both the prophets and 
the apostles, is related to the institution of laws. Being temporal, it has come to 
an end with Muhammad, who is ‘the Seal of the Prophets.’ Therefore, no new 
law will be proclaimed to abrogate, contradict, or complement the law of 
Muhammad.47 Whereas prophethood and apostleship are temporal, wilaya is 
eternal and continues into the future. Being eternal, wilaya (or friendship with 
God) is regarded by Ibn ʿArabi as being of a higher degree than prophethood 
and apostleship. Thus, Jesus will return to the earth during the end-times as 
the seal of the Friends of God, for there will be no more awliya after him.48
 Jesus among the Shiʿa
The Shiʿa, like Sunni Muslims, hold Jesus in great esteem. He is regarded as one 
of the five most important prophets, called the ‘Prophets of Power,’ the other 
four being Noah, Abraham, Moses, and Muhammad. However, for the Shiʿa, 
Jesus is not only a prophet but also an imam—that is to say, a spiritual leader 
and a vicegerent of God. As an imam he is endowed with esoteric knowledge 
and belongs to both the exoteric and esoteric cycles of prophethood. In Shiʿi 
Islam, the imams are greater and more exalted than all the prophets who came 
prior to the Prophet Muhammad.49 The Shiʿa also tend to see certain aspects of 
Jesus’ person and life reflected in their imams. For example, the Shiʿa believe 
in the priority of the imams as God’s primordial Word and Spirit, and that it is 
through the imams, and for their sake, that everything was created. According 
to Mahmoud Ayoub, the conception of Jesus as the divine Logos and God’s 
spirit has probably contributed to the Shiʿi view that the imams are God’s pri-
mordial Word and Spirit.50
Both the first imam ʿ Ali and the second imam, his son al-Husayn, are consid-
ered to be the embodiment of the betrayed and suffering martyr. Al-Husayn, 




50 Mahmoud Ayoub, “Towards an Islamic Christology: An Image of Jesus in Early Shiʿi 
Muslim Literature,” The Muslim World 46 (1976): 167–168.
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in his sufferings. Several reports recorded by Shiʿa scholars relate how Jesus 
presciently lamented the future martyrdom of al-Husayn. According to one of 
these accounts, a lion once blocked Jesus and his disciples when they arrived 
at Karbala during their peregrinations. When Jesus asked the lion the reason 
for his behavior, the lion said: “Here will be killed the grandson of the Prophet 
Muhammad and I will not let you pass until you curse his murderers.” Jesus 
then inquired about the would-be murderers of al-Husayn, to which the lion 
responded: “He is the accursed of the inhabitants of the heavens and earth, of 
the beasts of the fields, and the fish of the sea, he is Yazid.”51 Lifting up his 
hands to the heavens, Jesus then cursed the murderer and his companions four 
times, and the disciples responded with “Amen.” The lion then allowed them to 
proceed.52
Although the Shiʿa do not claim that al-Husayn was born of a virgin 
mother, some among them believe that both al-Husayn and Jesus had a mirac-
ulous nativity because each was in the womb for only six months. Like 
Jesus, al-Husayn had also praised God from his mother’s womb, and was simi-
larly capable of raising the dead. Some among the ghulat—that is, Shiʿi extrem-
ists outside the mainstream tradition—have gone even as far as to say that 
al-Husayn, like Jesus, did not die and was miraculously raised to heaven 
instead.53
Because of the striking similarities in their lives and earthly roles, the Shiʿi 
in general regard al-Husayn to be Jesus’ brother. Although al-Husayn was not a 
prophet, his position as an imam conferred on him a status similar to prophet-
hood in terms of cosmic importance. This is signaled in a report emanating 
from the fifth Shiʿi imam, Muhammad al-Baqir, who stated:
On the night that ʿAli was killed, under every stone that was turned there 
was found congealed blood. The same thing happened also when Aaron 
(Harun), brother of Moses, and Joshua, son of Nun, were killed; when 
Jesus was lifted up to heaven, and when Simon Peter (Shamʿun al-Safa) 
and Husayn, son of ʿAli, were killed.54
51 Yazid was the second Umayyad caliph during whose reign al-Husayn and his family were 
killed on the battlefield at Karbalaʾ in Iraq.
52 Mahmoud Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islam: A Study of the Devotional Aspects of 
Ashura in Twelver Shiʿasm (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1978), 35.
53 Ibid., 36.
54 Ibid., 34–35.
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 Modern Views
Moving on to the modern period, we find that there is a tendency among a 
number of modern Muslim authors to emphasize the universality of Jesus’ 
prophethood, in order to find common ground between Islam and Christianity 
on the basis of shared universal ethics that can bridge theological differences. 
Furthermore, the universality of Jesus’ mission can be justified on the basis of 
the Qurʾan; verse 2:191, after all, describes Jesus as an aya or ‘a sign’ for all peo-
ples, in parallel with the New Testament (John 4:1–26 and Luke 7:1–10), which 
describes Jesus’ ministry as embracing not only the Jews but also the Samaritans, 
Romans, Phoenicians, and Greeks.
In his book ʿAbqariyyat al-Masih (“The Genius of the Messiah”), the Egyptian 
author ʿAbbas al-ʿAqqad (d. 1964) portrays Jesus as a prophet-teacher whose 
message has universal significance. Although Jesus and his disciples began 
their mission in Galilee within the traditional Jewish ethno-religious frame-
work, they eventually embraced universal humanity as they progressively 
defied the Jewish establishment. Al-ʿAqqad emphasizes that the universality of 
Jesus’ mission inheres in his ethical message, which he fought to promote by 
launching a spiritual warfare against his own baser instincts and vigorously 
counseling others to do likewise. As he explains it:
It is quite clear that we must recognize that the Messiah is of the same 
material as his companions, the great prophets, for whom spiritual war-
fare knew no truce. This continual struggle against themselves condemns 
them to anguish and brings them to question at the deepest level their 
own faithfulness or unfaithfulness to the path which God has chosen for 
them. It is undoubtedly this warfare which is expressed in the gospel nar-
rative of the temptation. Christ is victorious in this trial, like the other 
prophets, in agony, struggle and anguished acceptance.55
Al-ʿAqqad emphasizes the social justice component of Jesus’ universal mes-
sage, as well as the transformational nature of this project. He was solicitous 
towards women and the poor, and was charitable and forgiving toward all, 
including his enemies, notes al-ʿAqqad. Jesus the Christ succeeded primarily in 
a spiritual vein in conveying his message, continues our author, in comparison 
55 Translation given by Penelope Johnstone, “Christ Seen by Contemporary Muslim Writers,” 
Encounter 87 (1982): 5.
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to the Prophet Muhammad, who was successful both spiritually and socially in 
conveying and establishing his message for all of humanity.56
Another Muslim author, Khalid Muhammad Khalid, emphasizes the com-
plementarity of the missions of Muhammad and Jesus in his book Maʿan ʿala 
al-tariq: Muhammad wa l-masih (“On the Road Together: Muhammad and the 
Messiah”). He cites the hadith that describes the brotherhood of the prophets 
as a proof-text, and refers to Jesus’ role as the precursor prophet and the escha-
tological prophet. Thus, Jesus is a necessary complement to Muhammad’s 
prophethood since he had foretold the latter’s coming as ‘the Seal of the 
Prophets,’ while Muhammad is a necessary complement to Jesus’ prophethood 
since he had announced the latter’s second coming as the eschatological 
prophet. Khalid comments that this complementarity should be an invitation 
for Christians and Muslims to work together in order to improve human soci-
ety and further the common good.57
 Conclusion
Khalid’s message is often repeated in our own times—the way forward for 
Christians and Muslims is to emphasize the universality of the ethics they 
share and their common reverence for Jesus, rather than focusing on the theo-
logical differences that separate them. In 2009, Robert Shedinger, a Lutheran 
academic, published a book provocatively titled Was Jesus a Muslim?,58 in 
which the author explores the question of whether Jesus can be considered a 
Muslim. His ultimate answer is yes—for if Jesus is regarded primarily as some-
one who was supremely concerned with social justice, then he was as much of 
a Muslim as Muhammad or, one could add, as any other prophet was. Perhaps 
this is shocking to some Christian ears, but to Muslims it reassuringly affirms 
the commonality of the messages imparted by righteous men chosen by God 
to be His devoted servants. As we recall, ʿAbbas al-ʿAqqad had also similarly 
emphasized the ethical message of Christianity, which was the basis of its 
common ground with Islam. Even though Muslims reject for the most part the 
christological doctrines concerning the nature of Christ, they nevertheless 
embrace him as an essential part of Islam, whose existence and ministry made 
possible the culminating mission of the Prophet Muhammad.
56 Al-ʿAqqad, ʿAbqariyyat al-Masih (Cairo: Dar Nahdat Misr, 1973), passim.
57 Cragg, Jesus and the Muslim, 52 ff.
58 Robert Shedinger, Was Jesus a Muslim? Questioning Categories in the Study of Religion 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2009).
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It would be fitting to end this essay by quoting Tarif Khalidi, who simply and 
elegantly explains why Jesus remains the common link between Muslims and 
Christians, and why their common love for him will continue to bring them 
together, despite critical doctrinal differences. Khalidi memorably writes:
So: I think it can safely be shown that Islamic culture presents us with 
what in quantity and quality are the richest images of Jesus in any non-
Christian culture. No other world religion known to me has devoted so 
much loving attention to both the Jesus of history and to the Christ of 
eternity. This tradition is one that we need to highlight in these danger-
ous, narrow-minded days. The moral of the story seems quite clear: that 
one religion will often act as the hinterland of another, will lean upon 
another to complement its own witness. There can be no more salient 
example of this interdependence than the case of Islam and Jesus Christ. 
And for the Christian in particular, a love of Jesus may also mean, I think, 
an interest in how and why he was loved and cherished by another 
religion.59
Given the increasing dialogic encounters between contemporary Christians 
and Muslims, Khalidi’s comments are particularly appropriate and point the 
way ahead for more productive conversations regarding the meanings of the 
life and mission of the Messiah ʿIsa, which resonate strongly in both 
traditions.
59 Remarks posted at www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam, last accessed on 2/15/2013.
Revisiting the Charge of Taḥrīf: The Question of 
Supersessionism in Early Islam and the Qurʾan
Sandra Toenies Keating
In recent times, a great deal of interest in bringing about peace and harmoni-
ous relations between Muslims and Christians has been generated, both within 
the walls of the academy and beyond. This renewed interest has caused many 
aspects of the interactions between the two communities to be reassessed, 
resulting in an explosion of new research, editions, and translations of signifi-
cant texts, and fresh insights into ancient questions. On the whole, this move-
ment has been positive and productive, engaging people from around the 
globe in an endeavor that could have far-reaching consequences.
There has also been the propensity, however, to downplay real points of dis-
agreement in an effort to reach the goal of peace. Nowhere is this more appar-
ent than in the tendency to discount the importance of the theological 
convictions of the communities being studied. In many cases, researchers with 
little interest in or sensitivity to theological questions discount such evidence 
as ‘bias’ in an effort to find ‘what really happened.’ For some, the answer to ten-
sions between adherents of the two religions is simply to conclude that debates 
about ‘abstract and theoretical’ questions of truth are useless in the academy, 
since no definitive conclusions can be reached by human inquiry. Unfortunately, 
in many cases this has led to historical and linguistic studies that, although 
helpful, neglect the cultural values and overall intentions of the author(s) of 
the texts or of the community within which these texts were preserved and 
transmitted. Thus, conclusions are drawn concerning texts and accounts of 
events without taking seriously the theological impact they have had on the 
communities that preserved them. This approach, moreover, imposes contem-
porary (often academic) interests and assumptions on authors and communi-
ties far removed from our own concerns. One can identify such non-theological 
interpretations in almost every area of Islamic studies, which has generally 
been relegated to history, political science, or religious studies.
Nevertheless, these non-theological interpretations obscure the religious 
convictions of the founder of Islam and his followers. It seems that almost 
from the very beginning, Muḥammad understood himself as a religious 
reformer, drawing his listeners back to the primordial worship of the One God. 
It is very clear from the earliest sources that Muḥammad and his followers 
believed that he was a prophet like the prophets of the Jews and Christians, 
© Sandra Toenies Keating, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004274761_014 
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and he expected that his message would be recognized and accepted by those 
communities. When they did not welcome him as one of their own, however, 
an explanation was necessary. It is here that the notion of taḥrīf comes into 
play. In its developed form, taḥrīf is the Islamic teaching that the scriptures of 
other monotheists and/or their interpretations have been corrupted, and thus 
obscure the message that had been previously sent by God. The implication of 
taḥrīf is that the Qurʾān comes both to confirm (cf. Sura 4:46–7) and to correct 
errors in the teachings of the Jews and Christians, making Islam not simply 
another monotheistic religion, but rather, the final and most pure revelation 
by which all others are measured. In recent years, however, some scholars have 
argued that this was not Muḥammad’s intent, and that supersessionist ideas 
should be attributed instead to later sources.
A particular movement among researchers into the origins of the Qurʾān 
and the early Islamic community has thus postulated a rather late appearance 
of sectarian Islam. This movement has taken off in two general directions. One 
group, characterized by the provocative book of Christoph Luxenberg,1 has 
sought to demonstrate that the religion now known as Islam has its origins in 
an initial confusion over earlier Syro-Aramaic texts, perhaps as the result of a 
misguided attempt to evangelize the Arabs. A related view is that the body of 
literature traditionally identified as the Qurʾān came to be associated with the 
Arab chieftain Muḥammad at a later date, even though he was only peripher-
ally responsible for it. These scholars have also tended to emphasize socio-
economic rather than theological reasons for the rise of Islam.2
A second group of scholars has taken a more irenic approach, suggesting 
that the earliest followers of Muḥammad were an inter-confessional group 
including Jews, Christians, and other monotheists who, according to Fred 
Donner,3 called themselves ‘Believers’ and whose primary criterion for mem-
bership was belief in the one God. They argue that it was only later, perhaps 
more than a century after Muḥammad’s death, that the sayings and traditions 
associated with him were collected together into the present forms of the 
1 Christoph Luxenberg, The Syro-Aramaic Reading of the Koran: A contribution to the decoding 
of the language of the Koran (Berlin: Verlag Hans Schiler, 2007).
2 In this group I would include many of the contributions of Patricia Crone and Michael Cook 
and their followers. Theories about the relationships among the appearance of early Islam, 
Muḥammad, and the Qurʾān are in flux and beyond the scope of this paper. For a good sum-
mary of several of them, see Stephen J. Shoemaker, The Death of a Prophet: The End of 
Muhammad’s Life and the Beginnings of Islam (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2012), especially the Introduction and chapters 1–2.
3 Fred M. Donner, Muhammad and the Believers: At the origins of Islam (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), see especially chapter 1.
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Qurʾān, Sīra (biography), and hadīth. Consequently, these texts reflect not the 
original teachings of Muḥammad, but rather, a later ideology desiring to estab-
lish the community of Believers separate from Christians and Jews. Thus, the 
ideology shifted from an early emphasis on the commonality of Jewish, 
Christian, and general monotheistic belief in the One God, the impending 
Hour of Judgment, and the importance of Syro-Palestine, to the creation of a 
separate identity for ‘Those Who Submit’ (muslimūn) and the sacred geogra-
phy of Arabia.4
Recently, a proponent of this approach, Stephen J. Shoemaker, has pub-
lished an intriguing book entitled The Death of a Prophet,5 which builds upon 
the work of previous scholars such as Donner, Cook, Crone, and Wansbrough. 
He proposes that the most significant characteristic of the earliest community 
of Believers who had gathered around Muḥammad was the shared belief in an 
imminent eschatology—the expectation that the final Hour would arrive 
within the lifetime of Muḥammad. Remnants of this teaching can be found 
both in non-Muslim accounts of the appearance of Islam, as well as in the 
reshaped orthodox accounts of Muḥammad’s death. Shoemaker argues, rather 
convincingly I believe, that when Muḥammad died before the coming of the 
final Hour, his followers needed to rethink and reinterpret his message, ulti-
mately leaving the eschatological aspects of his teaching aside. As a conse-
quence, the contents of the Qurʾān and Sīra were systematized at a date quite 
removed from Muḥammad’s life. They reflect an attempt to collect the mate-
rial and put it into an order that would make sense out of both the truth of 
Muḥammad’s message (and its confirmation through the success of the Islamic 
conquests) and how events had actually turned out—the Hour had not arrived 
as expected. I find many aspects of Shoemaker’s arguments thought- provoking, 
and his collection and analysis of early non-Muslim accounts of the rise of 
Islam is quite helpful. However, he is not able to effectively account for the gap 
between his hypothetical version of the early community and demonstrable 
characteristics of Islam less than a century later.6
As compelling as the vision of an irenic prophet and his multi-cultural fol-
lowers is, I am inclined to question many of the conclusions reached by these 
4 See various contributions of Patricia Crone and Michael A. Cook, Hagarism: The Making of 
the Islamic World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Patricia Crone, Slaves on 
Horses: The Evolution of the Islamic Polity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); 
Suliman Bashear, Arabs and Others in Early Islam, vol. SLAEI 8 (Princeton: Darwin Press, 
1997); and John E. Wansbrough, The Sectarian Milieu: Content and Composition of Islamic 
Salvation History, vol. London Oriental Series 34 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).
5 Shoemaker, Death of a Prophet.
6 See my review of Shoemaker’s book in Hugoye 16/1 (2013): 160–165.
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recent books. Two issues in particular do not seem to be accounted for in this 
approach to the origins of Islam. First, while he is to be commended for taking 
seriously the evidence found in non-Muslim sources for evaluating the Muslim 
tradition, Shoemaker has paid little attention to a significant source, namely, 
those texts that recount early interactions between Muslims and Christians 
that reveal a deeper awareness of theological differences between the two com-
munities. For example, Christian writers in Greek, such as Anastasius of Sinai 
(d. ca. 700),7 and in Syriac, such as Jacob of Edessa (d. 708),8 are quite aware of 
the teachings of Muslims that are critical of Christian beliefs concerning the 
Trinity and Incarnation. These, along with several other references to the 
beliefs and practices of the young Muslim community, imply that at least 
the broad outlines of Islam’s distinctive characteristics were already in place 
by the end of the seventh century. This is a little-studied area of inquiry, pri-
marily because until recently it was assumed that non-Muslim sources were of 
little value for understanding what was taken to be a firmly established account 
of Muslim origins.
Second, although the Qurʾān was collected and preserved in a manner that 
appears random, it nonetheless reflects a more developed theological system 
than these theories acknowledge. One finds in the Qurʾān a distinctive under-
standing of revelation, sin, covenant, prophethood, ethics, etc. A peculiar 
aspect of the Qurʾān, though, is that it does not reflect any attempt to organize 
the material thematically or historically. In fact, it seems difficult to explain 
why, if the text was collected and edited in the eighth or even early ninth cen-
tury as a few scholars have proposed, more effort had not been given to making 
it more consistent and orderly, as one finds in the Sīra and hadīth.9 Furthermore, 
7 For example, he complains that the Arabs accuse Christians of worshipping two gods 
(cf. Qurʾān 16:51, as well as 5:116, in which Jesus denies that he taught his followers to worship 
himself and his mother as gods). Viae dux I.1, 9 (PG 89, 41A), cited in Robert G. Hoyland, 
Seeing Islam as Others Saw It: A survey and evaluation of Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrian 
writings on early Islam, Studies in Late Antiquity and Early Islam 13 (Princeton, New Jersey: 
The Darwin Press, Inc., 1997), 107.
8 Sidney H. Griffith, The Church in the Shadow of the Mosque: Christians and Muslims in the 
World of Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 30–33.
9 Shoemaker sees the possibility of parallels in the formation of the New Testament canon and 
that of the Qurʾān. One great difference, though, is that the New Testament writers were 
apparently interested in offering their readers a consistent ‘story line’ within a particular con-
text (e.g., Matthew is concerned with demonstrating the ways in which Jesus fulfilled Jewish 
prophecy, Luke is writing for Gentile converts). The Qurʾān, however, does not exhibit any 
attempt at order or even desire to give a clear answer to particular questions. If the collectors 
and redactors had a particular agenda, they were certainly not as effective in communicating 
it as they might have been!
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if the Qurʾān had been written down as late as some are suggesting, the clear 
misunderstanding of Christians and Christianity found in it becomes even 
more puzzling. How could the Qurʾan have been so mistaken about the role of 
Jesus, Mary, and the Trinity in Christian doctrine during a period in which 
there was close contact between Muslims and Christians?10 If one assumes a 
very early date for the verses concerning Christian teaching, these errors could 
be explained as the result of misinformation; later dating, however, renders 
them inexplicable.11
Therefore, the question ultimately is: how aware was the initial community 
of Muḥammad’s followers (indeed, Muḥammad himself) of the differences 
between his message and what was regarded as ‘orthodox’ Christianity and 
Judaism in the Arabian Peninsula? It has long been recognized that the canon-
ical Qurʾān contains apparently contradictory verses, which can best be under-
stood when assigned to particular contexts. Although the extent to which it is 
possible to associate these verses with a specific period in Muḥammad’s life 
(e.g., ‘Meccan’ or ‘Medinan’) has recently been called into question, it nonethe-
less remains clear that the early community felt compelled to include all of 
these verses, meaning that it attributed some sort of authority to them. The 
verses can be grouped together according to the extent that they reflect a 
 positive/optimistic or a negative/skeptical view of the teachings and behavior 
of Christians and Jews. Given the fact that those verses that display a negative 
view also imply the possibility of having some authority and power over these 
other communities, one can surmise that they belong to a later period, after 
Muḥammad’s ascendancy had begun. Furthermore, these verses appear to 
exhibit a development, as Muḥammad and his followers began to reflect on 
what they believed God was doing at that point in history. Inconsistencies and 
even apparently outright contradictions are likely explained as reflecting his-
torical development in Muḥammad’s thought and experience. The accounts of 
Christians, Jews, and both their scriptures found in the Qurʾān reflect such a 
development, and the earliest evidence of the teaching of taḥrīf can give us 
some insight into the issue.
10 Jane Dammen McAuliffe, Qurʾānic Christians: An Analysis of Classical and Modern Exegesis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
11 An explanation of the odd references to Christian teachings that include Mary in the 
Trinity (4:171, 5:116) and the seemingly garbled account of the Last Supper (5:112–7) has 
eluded scholars and commentators. Over the centuries some have suggested that these 
refer to aberrant Christian groups or to Muḥammad’s confusion about these doctrines. 
A major contribution toward answering this problem has been made by Sidney H. Griffith 
in his recent book, The Bible in Arabic: the Scriptures of the ‘People of the Book’ in the 
Language of Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).
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As I will argue below, the formulation of the doctrine of taḥrīf gives us a 
strong indication that Islam was from its inception supersessionist—the view 
that the new revelations sent by God would replace the corrupted scriptures 
possessed by other communities. Muḥammad seems to have gradually come 
to understand himself as a reformer, first bringing the Arabian polytheists to 
monotheism, and then drawing Jews, Christians, and other monotheists back 
to their original scriptures. Thus, although, he did not assume that God had 
commanded identical customs or languages for all people, it seemed clear to 
him that God would not command contradictory things of different people. 
Muḥammad’s teachings thus reflect a unification of monotheistic groups, but 
with a particular vision of what society should look like. In this sense, the 
Qurʾān could be seen as a ‘corrective,’ as well as a confirmation of what had 
come before.
 Revelation and Supersessionism
One of the intriguing questions surrounding the origins of the Qurʾan is the 
context that prompted its appearance. Was it a reaction against closed 
Christian and Jewish communities who made no attempt to draw Arabian 
polytheists toward monotheism? Or was it the desire of Muḥammad and his 
followers to have a religion in the monotheistic tradition that expressed par-
ticularly Arabian norms and values, which was then transformed into a reli-
gion claiming roots in the family of Abraham? In my opinion, a glaring problem 
with current theories of the origins of Islam is the lack of a compelling account 
of why the early followers of Muḥammad did not simply join any of the mono-
theistic communities available in the Arabian Peninsula at the time, of which 
there was apparently a wide variety. There are many reasons to expect that the 
inclination of the tribes toward monotheism would bring them within the 
folds of Judaism, Christianity, or Zoroastrianism, as had already happened in 
northern Arabia. Certainly by the end of the sixth century there seems to have 
been a self-conscious movement among historically polytheistic Arabians 
toward monotheistic beliefs and nominally Jewish practices. The Qurʾān, how-
ever, does give us a few hints at the answer to this question, suggesting that the 
revelation to Muḥammad is an ʿArabic reading’ (qurʾānan ʿarabiyyan) of ‘the 
clear Book’ (al-kitābi-l-mubīn), which brings what had previously been revealed 
in other languages to the Arabic-speaking tribes (Sura 12:1–3). One might iden-
tify in this clue some parallels to the early mission to the Gentiles among the 
followers of Jesus—the belief that it was imperative that God make the revela-
tion known to these peoples in their native tongue.
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Our available sources do not provide a coherent report of the earliest 
stages of the interplay between the messages Muḥammad received and his 
 interpretation of their meaning and implications. Nonetheless, even if one 
rejects the traditional Islamic account of the origins of the Qurʾān and Islam, it 
does seem to be the case that Muḥammad and his followers saw themselves as 
submitting to an ancient set of monotheistic beliefs and rituals that was differ-
ent from those of their polytheistic ancestors; the evidence also suggests that 
the change was prompted by private revelations that had come to Muḥammad. 
These monotheistic beliefs included submission to a single, all-powerful and 
all-knowing, merciful Creator God, a particular moral perspective that 
demanded a certain relationship with that God, and apparently an imminent 
eschatology that expected cosmic judgment. All of these have strong counter-
parts in nearly every form of Judaism and Christianity. Thus, there is no reason 
to believe that the original community of ‘believers’ did not see themselves as 
participating in a larger monotheistic community, accepting what had been 
revealed as Truth many times before, while at the same time being concerned 
that what they held was not exactly what their Jewish and Christian neighbors 
professed.
A growing awareness of discrepancies between Muslim beliefs and those of 
other monotheists is evident in the Qurʾān, although not in a systematic way. 
Rather, in numerous Suras, statements are made in defense of the primacy of 
the Qurʾān whenever Christians and Jews make claims that contradict a revela-
tion to Muḥammad. These references imply that quite soon after the appear-
ance of Muḥammad, differences between the messages he delivered and the 
teachings of the Jews and Christians became apparent. Many theories have 
been advanced to explain the various references in the Qurʾān to this problem, 
ranging from denial that the Qurʾān rejects orthodox Jewish and Christian 
teaching, to the claim that Muḥammad’s intention was to eliminate all other 
religious practice. It may well be the case that early on Muḥammad was quite 
convinced of the continuity between his message and that of Jews and 
Christians, but their refusal to recognize him on theological grounds eventu-
ally led to a breach. Thus, (and I believe this is the most likely scenario) he 
began to emphasize errors, first in their interpretation of their scriptures, and 
then even in the editions of the scriptures themselves.
The critiques of Jewish and Christian scriptures and their interpretations in 
the Qurʾān are bolstered by an insistence that Muḥammad is a prophet in a 
long line of prophets who brought the same message to their followers. Seen as 
a whole, however, the Qurʾān presents a theology of revelation that is pro-
foundly different from that of mainstream Judaism and Christianity, in that a 
fixed text is identified as the fundamental means of divine communication. 
Whereas God is understood as revealed in the divine relationships of the 
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Covenant (seen in God’s actions and commands) for the Jews and in the 
Incarnation for Christians, the Qurʾān emphasizes instead the clarity and con-
stancy of God’s commands. Theologically, one can say that the Jewish and 
Christian view of ‘salvation history’ (a Christian term) is that God’s plan for His 
relationship with humanity unfolds over time, a process that is both ongoing 
and mysterious. The Qurʾān, on the other hand, is insistent on God’s unchang-
ing relationship with Creation, a relationship that was made known even in 
the first revelation to Adam (Sura 2:30–5).
Nevertheless, there are some difficulties with the Biblical view of salvation 
history, two of which are relevant here. The first is that it is difficult to deter-
mine when a new event or ‘revelation’ should be interpreted as an authentic 
expression of God’s will in His plan. The second is that it is difficult to explain 
how God can hold individuals equally accountable at the Divine Judgment. If 
some people were given different commands or did not know critical require-
ments, how can God justly judge them? For example, Abraham, whom all Jews, 
Christians, and Muslims revere, had neither the Mosaic Law nor the sacra-
ments, both of which are understood to be obligations by their respective com-
munities. Over the centuries, Jews and Christians have sought to account for 
this problem in various ways that cannot delay us here. What this problem 
does throw into relief, though, is the primary purpose of the Qurʾān: to explain 
how the new Arabian monotheists fit into God’s ancient plan of salvation. The 
Qurʾān proposes that Divine justice requires that God’s will for human beings 
be knowable, known, unchanging, and within human capabilities. Thus, there 
must be a single clear revelation that has been accessible to all human beings 
in order for God to judge justly. Because God has been revealed as Merciful and 
Just, He has indeed made His will known to all people so they cannot say on 
the Last Day that they did not know.12 The Qurʾān is the most recent (and final) 
copy of that revelation sent to humanity.
According to the Qurʾān itself, God sent down the revelation to Muḥammad 
as a ‘mercy’ (rahm) and a ‘reminder’ (dhikr) to those who would believe. 
Muḥammad was commanded by the Angel Jibrīl (Gabriel) to recite what he 
would be given. The recitation (qurʾān) would come from the divine source, 
the Preserved Tablet (Sura 85:22). This Preserved Tablet (Lawh al-Mahfūẓ) is 
also referred to as the Umm al-Kitāb, the Mother of the Book (3:7), which is 
preserved and guarded from all corruption (15:9). It is a fixed text, unchanging 
and reliable, which guarantees God’s promise of mercy and justice. Among the 
many verses illustrating this is Sura 43:2–4: “[By] the Clear Book, We have made 
it an Arabic recitation [Qurʾān] so that you may understand, and it is in the 
12 Among the many examples, Sura 7 gives an extended account of the final Judgment, 
emphasizing that no one will be able to hide from God’s justice.
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Mother of the Book in our Presence, high, wise.”13 Significantly, the Qurʾān is 
characterized here as being ‘in’ ( fī) the Umm al-Kitāb, but the verse does not 
imply that it is the totality of the Umm al-Kitāb. The Qurʾān is, rather, the final 
revelation sent down to humanity as a guide on the ‘straight path,’ as well as 
the confirmation and ‘correction’ of all previous authentic revelations. The 
very use of the word qurʾān to describe the revelation implies that it is the read-
ing of a preexistent text, a text that has been revealed to others and that might 
be mysteriously read in a multitude of languages.
In line with this notion of revelation, the Qurʾān acknowledges that the 
‘Book’ has been sent down previously to other chosen prophets, among them 
Adam, Abraham, Moses, and Jesus. To each of these God has sent a pristine 
copy of a part of the Umm al-Kitāb, so that every people is guided toward per-
fect submission to Himself (e.g., Sura 6:84–90; 10:47; 16:36–7). God does this out 
of mercy and justice so that each person can be fully prepared for the Final 
Hour of Judgment. Significantly, these prophets are upright and trustworthy, 
unlike many of their followers. The Qurʾān includes numerous accounts of the 
prophets themselves reprimanding their followers for misunderstanding or 
refusing to accept the revelation they have been given. For example, in Sura 
2:67–71 (The Heifer), the Israelites badger Moses into requesting of God more 
and more specifics concerning the red heifer they are to sacrifice, each time 
implying they cannot comply because they do not understand the command. 
In Sura 5:116–8, Jesus is described as defending himself on the Day of Judgment 
against those who worship him and his mother as gods. Thus, the blame for 
discrepancies in the teachings of the Jews and Christians is laid at the feet of 
the followers of the prophets, and not the prophets themselves, the revelation, 
or God.
Seen through this lens, many confusing and apparently contradictory pas-
sages in the Qurʾān make more sense. For example, oft-quoted passages such as 
“To each of you we have given a law and a clear path; and had Allah willed, He 
would have made you one people, but [He wants] to test you concerning what 
He gave to you” (Sura 5:48) and “to you your religion and to me my religion” 
(Sura 109:6)14 do not reflect the sort of progressive, pluralistic vision of society 
as contemporary thinkers wish to imagine. Rather, they are reminders that 
13 All translations of the Qurʾān are my own, unless otherwise noted.
14 This verse is widely misunderstood by non-Muslims because it is usually quoted out of 
context. When read with the verses immediately preceding it, our point becomes clear: 
“Say: O you who are unbelievers (kāfirūn), I do not worship what you worship and you do 
not worship what I worship. And I will not worship what you have worshiped, and you 
will not worship what I worship. To you your religion and to me my religion.”
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there is no use disputing with those who do not recognize the authentic 
 revelation—at the Final Judgment, God will vindicate His true servants. On 
this point, the arguments of Shoemaker are helpful. It seems very likely that 
the early ‘Believers’ did not waste time disputing with their fellow monotheists 
because they expected that the end was near and they would be justified soon. 
In the meantime, they needed to hold fast to the message God had now sent 
to them.15
Muḥammad and his followers were convinced that he was receiving a new 
iteration of revelations previously given, yet paradoxical verses in the collec-
tion of these revelations seem to point to a lack of knowledge about the actual 
beliefs of those to whom God had sent His angels before. It is only over time 
that Muḥammad began to recognize exactly what was different, and what the 
implications of those differences were. Simultaneously, to understand why 
Muḥammad and his ‘Believers’ did not simply become Jews or Christians, one 
has to assume that he thought he was receiving something new or distinctive, 
something that needed to be preserved in spite of its differences from the 
‘Books’ of the Jews and Christians—something that should replace what they 
now possessed. It is in this sense that Islam was from its very origins 
supersessionist.
 Taḥrīf and Supersessionism
All of this leads to some significant questions about the theological perspec-
tive of early Islam. In this short paper, we will address two interrelated issues, 
which have a sort of ‘chicken and egg’ relationship. Perhaps the problem can 
be best expressed in the following questions: in what way did Muḥammad and 
his followers understand the differences between what he was preaching and 
the teachings of other monotheists, and how did this come to be expressed in 
the Qurʾān? From an Islamic viewpoint, the true revelation was given first to 
Muḥammad, followed by communal reflection on its differences from Jewish 
and Christian teachings. Historical-critical methods, however, have indicated 
that the multitude of verses commenting on the scripture, teachings, and sta-
tus of Jews and Christians are likely the result of increased interaction with 
members of these communities. In any case, the early Muslim community felt 
it necessary to account for these discrepancies, and traditionally, Muslim 
answers to these questions have been found in the doctrine of taḥrīf. At this 
point we will give some general outlines of the sources for this teaching in the 
15 See especially Shoemaker, Death of a Prophet, ch. 3.
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Qurʾān, and try to ascertain whether those who have questioned its impor-
tance for Muḥammad and his early followers are correct.
The term taḥrīf comes from the second form of the Arabic root ḥarafa, 
which means to slant or bend, distort, misconstrue, or falsify. The expression, 
as will be discussed below, refers both to a particular type of distortion of the 
revelation, as well as to distortion of revelation and its general interpretation. 
A broad definition of taḥrīf is the Islamic notion that Jewish and Christian 
scriptural texts, as well as subsequent interpretations of them, have been 
manipulated or misunderstood. Consequently, the Qurʾān itself claims that 
God sent this revelation down through Muḥammad as a reminder of the true 
revelation. A particularly relevant passage concerning the relationship 
between previous scriptures and the Qurʾān states:
And We have revealed to you (Muḥammad) the Book in truth, confirming 
what was already possessed of the Book and guarding16 over it. So judge 
between them according to what Allah has revealed, and do not follow 
their vain desires, diverging from what came to you of the Truth. To each 
of you we have given a law and a clear path; and had Allah willed, He 
would have made you one people, but [He wants] to test you concerning 
what He gave to you. Strive, then, towards good deeds. To Allah is the final 
goal of all of you, He will instruct you concerning that on which you dif-
fered. And judge between them with what Allah has revealed, and do not 
follow their vain desires. Beware of them lest they lure you away from 
part of what God has revealed to you. And if they turn away, know that 
Allah only wishes to punish them for some of their transgressions, and 
that many people are indeed rebellious! (Sura 5:48–49)
Passages such as these have traditionally been understood to teach that the 
Qurʾān is both a confirmation that God has revealed scripture to human beings 
(so they can be judged justly for their actions), and that the ‘clear path’ 
has been obscured by ‘grave sinners,’ necessitating a further corrective revela-
tion. The Qurʾān thus affirms the authenticity of these previous scriptures 
while also correcting diverging accretions associated with them, among which 
are Christian teachings on the Trinity, Incarnation, and celibacy, as well as the 
suppression of revelations predicting the prophethood of Muḥammad. As 
noted above, the understanding of revelation presented in the Qurʾān rejects 
any notion that God’s will unfolds or that recent revelation ‘builds on’ what 
is more ancient, because such a belief calls God’s justice into question. 
16 Muhayminan: to ‘amen’ something; to guard, protect, or be master over something.
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In short, there is no principle of ‘development of doctrine’ as one finds in 
Christianity. Rather, taḥrīf explains how the same revelation received by a myr-
iad of prophets can exhibit such differences in the hands of the followers of 
those prophets. From the Qurʾānic perspective, the revelation to Muḥammad 
remains the norm by which other revelations are judged for their authenticity, 
superseding and correcting all contradictions and deviations from it.
A complication for understanding the role of taḥrīf in early Islam is that the 
Qurʾān hints at the tension among the monotheistic communities in a multi-
tude of ways, preventing any single clear-cut definition. Only a few studies 
have been made on the term in the Qurʾān, most significantly in an important 
(but not often cited) article by Caspar and Gaudeul.17 They note that several 
specific terms are used in the Qurʾān in relation to the divergence between 
what was taught by Jews and Christians and what Muḥammad had ‘received.’ 
Each of these terms appears to refer to a different type of ‘alteration’ of the 
original revelation, ranging from simple misinterpretation or forgetfulness to 
intentional changing of meanings and even rewriting of the text. The terms 
can be categorized according to two recognizable groups: taḥrīf al-maʿānī 
(alteration/corruption of the meaning of authentic scriptures) and taḥrīf 
al-naṣṣ (alteration/corruption of the actual text of the scriptures). A further 
distinction made within taḥrīf al-maʿānī is that of taʾwīl, or interpretation of 
the meaning.18 One finds these categories reflected in later commentators, 
who generally emphasize either the proclivities of Jews and Christians to mis-
interpret (intentionally or unintentionally) their scriptures, or who maintain 
that the extant Jewish and Christian scriptures have been physically altered.19
17 Jean-Marie Gaudeul and Robert Caspar, “Textes de la tradition musulmane concernant le 
taḥrīf (falsification) des écritures,” Islamocrhistiana 6 (1980): 61–104.
18 Gaudeul and Caspar, “Textes de la tradition musulmane,” 61.
19 Several significant studies have been done on the later use of taḥrīf by Muslims, for 
example I. di Matteo, “Il ‘taḥrīf ’ od alterazione della Bibbia secondo i musulmani,” 
Bessarione 38 (1922): 64–111, 223–60; Gaudeul and Caspar, “Textes de la tradition musul-
mane”; Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Intertwined Worlds: Medieval Islam and Bible Criticism 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); I. Resnick, “The Falsification of Scripture 
and medieval Christan and Jewish Polemics,” Medieval Encounters (1996): 344–80; Hava 
Lazarus-Yafeh, “Taḥrīf,” in Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. 10 (2000), 111a; and Martin Accad, 
“Corruption and/or Misinterpretation of the Bible: The Story of the Islamic Usage of 
Tahrif,” Theological Review—Beirut (2003): 67–96; as well as the recent comments by 
Gabriel Said Reynolds, “On the Qurʾanic Accusation of Scriptural Falsification (taḥrīf) and 
Christian Anti-Jewish Polemic,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 130/2 (April–June, 
2010): 189–202.
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Under the two main headings introduced above, six different verbs or their 
derivatives are employed in the Qurʾān when speaking of the corruption of the 
scriptures through human interference: taḥrīf, tabdīl, kitmān, labs, layy, and 
nisyān.20 Verses that point to the attempt to distort the meaning of the scrip-
tures often use the word kitmān, which connotes ‘hiding or concealing,’ (Sura 
2:42, 140, 146, 159, 174; 3:71, 187), and is sometimes found in conjunction with 
labs, ‘disguising’ (2:42; 3:71). Sura 2:42, for example, exhorts the Jews of Medina: 
“And do not disguise (talbisū) the truth with falsehood, nor conceal (taktumū) 
the truth, for you know it.” A third term, lawā, meaning ‘to twist,’ suggests that 
pronunciation of certain words during the recitation of the scriptures was 
corrupted so that the listener either did not understand it properly, or would 
misunderstand (Sura 3:78; 4:46). For example, Sura 3:78 says of the People of 
the Book:
And there is among them a group who twist ( yalwūna) the Book with 
their tongues, so you would think it is from the Book, but it is not from the 
Book; and they say ‘it is from Allah,’ but it is not from Allah, and they tell 
a lie against Allah and they know it.
In Sura 4:46, furthermore, this ‘twisting’ is used to explain taḥrīf:
Some of the Jews alter the words ( yuḥarrifūna) out of their places, and 
they say: ‘We have heard and we disobey,’ and ‘Hear without Harkening,’ 
and ‘rāʿinā,’21 twisting (layyan) their tongues and slandering religion.
Here the verse suggests that by changing the words, the revelation is made to 
say the opposite of what God intended. The following verses continue with the 
explanation without clearly stating whether this twisting and alteration is 
intended, until it is clarified in verse 50. In this verse, which brings the section 
to a conclusion, the underlying intentionality is finally discussed: “See how 
they invent the lie against Allah, and that alone is a clear sin!”
The Qurʾān also implies that false interpretation of the meaning of the 
scriptures stems from a disregard for important passages, or from simply for-
getting certain revelations. The term nisyān, ‘forgetting, overlooking,’ is used 
both in reference to Jews (Sura 7:53, 165; 5:13) and Christians (5:14; 7:53). Sura 
5:13–4 relates how God punished the Jews and Christians because they broke 
20 Gaudeul and Caspar, “Textes de la tradition musulmane,” 62–3.
21 This is a term of abuse.
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their Covenant by cursing them and making both of them “forget a large part 
of what was given to them.”
A more serious form of taḥrīf is tabdīl, the actual changing or substitution 
of the text of the scriptures with something not revealed. It is mentioned in the 
Qurʾān two times explicitly in connection with the Israelites living after Moses 
(Suras 2:59 and 7:162), in which it is clearly stated that evildoers among them 
‘substituted’ (baddala) what was given to them by God with something else. 
According to the Qurʾān, this intentional distortion of the scripture was not 
limited to the substitution of words in previously revealed texts; those who 
heard the new message also tried to corrupt it. In Sura 10:15, God instructs 
Muḥammad to resist those who ask him to substitute (baddilhu) something 
else for the authentic revelations, either because they are too difficult or con-
tradict the other scriptures. Instead, God tells him to say: “It is not for me to 
substitute it (ubaddiluha) [with something else] of my own accord . . .” Unlike 
the other forms of taḥrīf found in the Qurʾān, tabdīl is unambiguously inten-
tional: just as the unbelievers asked Muḥammad to change the true revelations 
he was receiving, those who kept and interpreted previous scripture knowingly 
and deliberately altered what they had received. The seriousness of this accu-
sation is obvious, and explains why later Christians and Jews felt the need to 
respond.
One should understand taḥrīf, then, as an essential element of a compre-
hensive and coherent theory of revelation and divine justice. A shortcoming of 
some of the current scholarly work on this subject is the failure both to distin-
guish among the various types of corruption, and to understand the signifi-
cance of each within this larger context. A common approach has been to 
emphasize the linguistic roots and the various meanings of the term, in order 
to support the particular theory of the origins of Islam that each researcher is 
seeking to defend. Consequently, the term taḥrīf has been translated in differ-
ent ways and often reflects the position of the scholar more than the intent of 
the text itself. These translations include ‘falsification,’ ‘misinterpretation,’ 
‘alteration,’ or ‘corruption,’22 all of which are sometimes correct, but can also 
lead to a misunderstanding of the purpose of the teaching. Too much empha-
sis on parsing terms can cause one to lose sight of the larger trajectory of the 
text and the intention of its author.
As we have seen above, the Qurʾānic understanding of revelation requires 
that an account be given of the obvious discrepancies (both minor and signifi-
cant) between what Muḥammad was receiving and the teachings and scrip-
tures of the Jews and Christians. If God, out of mercy and justice, has revealed 
22 This is a clear limitation of the arguments put forth by Reynolds and Accad.
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His divine will to prophets throughout human history, then all authentic ver-
sions of this revelation should be identical. But if the prophets have all received 
different messages, God cannot justly hold all people equally accountable. The 
teaching of taḥrīf offers an explanation of the existent discrepancies by placing 
the blame on human fallibility (and in some cases evil intentions), thus pre-
serving God’s integrity as just, merciful, and trustworthy. As a consequence, the 
Qurʾān is sent both to confirm what has been given before, and to remind peo-
ple of the true revelation. All scripture and practice should therefore be judged 
and purified according to this Arabic revelation, which is presumably the final 
and perfect revelation so long as Muḥammad’s followers also take care that it 
is not corrupted.
Further support for the position that supersessionist teachings have their 
roots in the earliest period of Islam can be found in the writings of Christians 
living in the first two centuries after Muḥammad. Along with those mentioned 
above who defended Christian doctrine and practice against Muslim efforts to 
convert them, one should add more well-known figures such as John, Patriarch 
of the Church of the East, John of Damascus, and the anonymous writer of the 
Treatise on the Trinity. The Damascene’s systematic explanation of Christian 
faith, particularly his writings on the Trinity, is best understood within the 
wider context of the Umayyad conquest. His identification of Islam as a type of 
heresy is indicative of his opinion that the religion of the conquerors was a 
distinctive movement, one that saw itself as making truth claims that contra-
dicted the teachings of orthodox Christianity and therefore required a lengthy 
rebuttal.23 Another example of someone who took up this problem is Abū 
Rā’iṭa al-Takrītī, a Syrian Orthodox Christian who died around the year 830. He 
was one of the first to address the charge of taḥrīf in a systematic way. Abū 
Rā’iṭa took up the problem towards the end of his apology for the Trinity, where 
he presents a number of logical arguments against any suggestion that 
Christians and Jews have placed words into the mouths of the prophets, con-
cealed what was revealed, or worse, substituted the words of revelation with 
other words.24 It is clear that all of these writers appear to have been engaged 
at a very early period in the defense of their beliefs and scriptures against 
attempts to replace them with the new revelation of the Qurʾān.
23 See, for example, Sandra Toenies Keating, “ ‘Say Not Three’: Some Early Christian 
Responses to Muslim Questions about the Trinity,” The Thomist 74/1 (2010): 85–104.
24 Sandra Toenies Keating, “Refuting the Charge of Taḥrīf: Abū Rā’iṭa (d. ca. 835) and His 
‘First Risāla on the Holy Trinity’,” in Ideas, Images, and Methods of Portrayal: Insights into 
Classical Arabic Literature and Islam, ed. Sebastian Günther (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2005), 
41–57.
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 Conclusion
The movement of reform put into motion by Muḥammad in the early seventh 
century did not grow out of a simple desire to create a community of like-
minded ‘Believers,’ nor is it the remnant of confused and misunderstood Jewish 
or Christian teachings floating around the Arabian Peninsula. The Qurʾān and 
the earliest teachings of Muḥammad display a clear theology of revelation 
that, though not systematically presented, is concerned with establishing the 
credibility of the nascent community. Over time, it comes to be articulated in 
a way that emphasizes its supersessionist character. It is not, however, a type of 
supersessionism that desires to suppress or destroy monotheistic religions 
already in existence. In fact, it depends on them. Rather, this is a forward- 
looking supersessionism, intent on incorporating Muḥammad and his follow-
ers into the greater plan of salvation history. To do this, the Qurʾān insists on 
God’s justice, equality among all believers, and equitable access to revelation. 
Nevertheless, without a notion of taḥrīf, such a vision becomes nearly impos-
sible to defend.
Ibn Ḥazm’s and al-Ghazzālī’s Most Divergent 
Responses to Christianity: A Question of 
Epistemology and Hermeneutics1
Tamara Albertini
Muslims consider themselves the heirs of both Judaism and Christianity. 
However, the Islamic religion takes the Qurʾān to be a more faithful expression 
of divine revelation than the Torah or the Gospels, and therefore often ‘ corrects’ 
biblical narratives. This has to do with the Islamic doctrine of taḥrīf, which 
states that Jews and Christians have either distorted the ‘wording’ (taḥrīf 
al-naṣṣ) or the ‘meaning’ (taḥrīf al-maʿānī) of their respective sacred texts. The 
following Qurʾānic versions of some biblical stories are representative samples 
of the various types of ‘discrepancies:’2
• Ḥawwa’ (Eve) was not created from Adam’s rib (this version only appears in 
the Ḥadīth, Islam’s second scriptural text). Also, she is not responsible for 
the Fall. Adam and Eve both disobeyed God and, accordingly, were pun-
ished equally.3
• Contextual clues in the Qurʾānic narrative suggest that Ismāʿīl (i.e., Ishmael, 
the ancestor of the Arabs through Hagar)—not Isḥāq (Isaac)—was meant 
to be sacrificed (Q XXXVII, 102–105).
1 There is an earlier study of these two Muslim philosopher-theologians by Roger Arnaldez, 
“Controverses théologiques chez Ibn Hazm de Cordoue et Ghazali,” Les Mardis de Dār 
el-Salām, Sommaire MCMLIII: 209–248. Arnaldez’s study is very rich in information. It is, 
however, of a more descriptive nature and, accordingly, contributes little to the comparative 
approach taken in the present essay.
2 On ‘Biblicizing’ (the Qurʾānic narrative) and ‘Islamicizing’ (the Bible) as means for Islam’s 
double appropriation of the biblical tradition, see Sidney H. Griffith, “Arguing from Scripture: 
The Bible in the Christian/Muslim Encounter in the Middle Ages,” in Scripture and Pluralism. 
Reading the Bible in the Religiously Plural Worlds of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, 
ed. Thomas J. Heffernan and Thomas E. Burman (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 29–58.
3 For the many relevant passages on Adam and Eve in the Qurʾān, see the section on 
“Anthropology” in Tamara Albertini, “Islamic Philosophy: An Overview,” in The Companion to 
World Philosophies, ed. Eliot Deutsch and Ron Bontekoe (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 
99–133, at 106–107.
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• King Suleymān (Solomon) is a Muslim, and Bilqīs (as the Queen of Sheba is 
known to Muslims) converts to Islam after meeting him (Q XXVII, 22–44).
• Maryam (Mary) grows up in the Temple where she is placed in the care of 
Zakariyyā (Zacharias) and receives religious education (Q III, 35–37). As in 
the Gospel she is a virgin-mother, but she has no male companion (i.e., no 
Joseph) and thus raises her son ʿĪsā (Jesus) all by herself. As a result, she 
comes across as a much more independent figure than in Christianity.
• ʿĪsā is not the son of God, but just the son of Mary. Accordingly, his geneal-
ogy is reflected in his name, ʿĪsā ibn Maryam, which may explain why Mary 
is the only woman in the Qurʾān to be called by name (for the identification 
of other female biblical figures one needs to rely on contextual clues). 
Therefore, Jesus cannot be one with God, which is why there may be no 
theological basis for the Christian doctrine of Holy Trinity in Islam. Muslims 
address Jesus as ‘Sayyiduna ʿ Īsā’ (Our Lord Jesus) or ‘al-Masīḥ’ (The Messiah).
• As the Qurʾānic chapter named after Maryam states, Jesus performs his first 
miracle as a newborn by making a palm tree grow dates to help sustain his 
mother (Q XIX, 24–26). He also defends her against accusations of unchas-
tity (Q XIX, 30–33).
• Finally, Jesus does not die on the cross (Q IV, 157). According to Islamic 
teaching, God would never submit one of his prophets to such humiliation 
and pain.
Clearly, the Qurʾānic narrative is not entirely compatible with the canonical 
books of the Bible. One should keep in mind, however, that the ancient 
Christian communities in Muslim lands happened to represent a great variety 
of Christological views and did not even agree on which books were canonical. 
Nevertheless, there is still sufficient overlap between the Muslim and Christian 
records to grant Mary and Jesus, for instance, a prominent place in Islam’s 
sacred history. Many Muslim theologians go as far as to assign Jesus a major 
role on the Day of Judgment, a role second only to Prophet Muḥammad. For 
this purpose, they rely on a ḥadīth (narration) preserved solely by Abū Hurayra, 
a close companion of the Prophet. Abū Hurayra, being the transmitter of over 
5300 aḥadīth (pl. of ḥadīth), was deemed a reliable source. Nevertheless, con-
sidering the extremely narrow textual basis, acceptance of the ḥadīth in ques-
tion by some leading theologians like al-Ghazzālī may also be read as a 
testament to their veneration of al-Masīḥ.
The thesis of the present essay is that the degree to which Muslim theolo-
gians are at all prepared to examine Christian teachings, however critically, 
depends on a pre-existing hermeneutics. Basically, this entails that their atti-
tude towards Christianity, and any other religion for that matter, is determined 
220 albertini
by the kind of scriptural exegesis used in their own schools of thought. The 
more sophisticated the hermeneutical approach applied to Islamic scripture, 
the more likely it is that non-Islamic scripture will also be subjected to exegeti-
cal scrutiny (rather than rejected or belittled from the outset because it contra-
dicts certain Qurʾānic narratives). Within this context, the key terms to be 
explored are ‘word’ (lafẓa), ‘meaning’ (maʿnā), and ‘intention’ (niyya).
The first part of my paper examines Ibn Ḥazm (d. ca. 418/1027), who is fre-
quently depicted as a literalist. The following discussion will shed light on the 
background against which he developed his (so-called) literalism. Rather than 
summarize his merciless critique of Christianity, as expounded in his Kitāb 
al-Fiṣal fī al-Milal wa al-Ahwāʾ wa al-Niḥal (The Separator [Concerning] 
Religions, Heresies, and Sects),4 I will introduce his al-Risāla al-Bāhira (The 
Magnificent Epistle) to uncover the ‘authority-centered’ epistemological basis 
of his theology, according to which Truth may solely be found in scripture. 
Furthermore, I will show the link between this epistemology and Ibn Ḥazm’s 
linguistic theory, in which words rule over meanings.5 The second part of this 
essay focuses on the prominent Persian philosopher, theologian, and Sufi, 
al-Ghazzālī (d. 505/1111), whose ‘subject-centered’ epistemology, in which the 
seeker is required to validate Truth, permitted him to be inclusive and search 
for truth in all traditions, sacred or secular, without being limited by wording. 
This epistemology, moreover, opened the path to a hermeneutical receptive-
ness that remains unmatched in the Islamic world to this day.
A Ibn Ḥazm, a Literalist or an ‘Apparentist’? The Dominance of  
Words over Meanings
Ibn Ḥazm was an Andalusian logician, theologian, moralist, and littérateur 
who belonged to the Ẓāhirī madhhab (=school of law), a school inspired 
by Dāwūd ibn Khalaf (d. 883), also known as al-Ẓāhirī. The name al-Ẓāhirī 
is derived from the Arabic word ‘ẓāhir’ (=apparent), as opposed to ‘bāṭin’ 
4 An excellent discussion of this polemics may be found in Theodore Pulcini, Exegesis as 
Polemical Discourse. Ibn Ḥazm on Jewish and Christian Scriptures (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars 
Press, 1998). See also Roger Arnaldez, “Controverses théologiques.” For more literature see 
section on Ibn Ḥazm in David Thomas and Alex Mallett, eds., Christian-Muslim Relations. 
A Bibliographical History, vol. 3 (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2011), 137–145.
5 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Risālah al-Bāhirah (The Magnificent Epistle), trans. Muhammad Saghir Hasan 
al-Maʾsumi (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1996). This is a different approach from Roger Arnaldez, 
who takes Ibn Ḥazm’s Tawq al-Hamāma (The Ring of the Dove) to be the key to his thought. 
See his Grammaire et théorie chez Ibn Ḥazm de Cordoue. Essai sur la structure et les conditions 
de la pensée musulmane (Paris: J. Vrin, 1956, 21–23).
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(=hidden, concealed), and is taken to be synonymous with ‘literal.’ Ẓāhir and 
bāṭin are paired in Qurʾānic exegesis to allow for (some) scriptural passages to 
have both an ‘apparent’ and a ‘hidden’ meaning, the latter term reflecting what 
al-Ghazzālī believed to be access to divine ‘inner speech,’ thus making the text 
of revelation the expression of God’s outer (historic) word.6
In our context, the specific (and often overlooked) interest of the Ẓāhirī 
madhhab is that it introduced a third approach into the aforementioned 
dichotomy by differentiating between ‘literal’ and ‘apparent.’7 To give a con-
crete example, the frequent Qurʾānic reference to the ‘Throne of God’ may 
then be read not only metaphorically or literally, but also according to its 
‘apparent’ meaning. Ibn Masarra (d. 319/931), an earlier Andalusian philoso-
pher and Sufi master, took the ‘Throne of God’ to be a scriptural metaphor for 
prime matter, thereby suggesting that the act of creation takes effect from 
where God governs the totality of Being.8 By contrast, the literal meaning con-
jures up the image of the Creator actually sitting, which would imply that God 
has a corporeal nature. For obvious reasons, literalists have often been attacked 
by rationalists in Islam, and vice versa. Yet, there is no good reason to think that 
the apparent meaning should be synonymous with the literal. In fact, this 
would betray the spirit of Ẓāhirite teaching that was all bent on fighting anthro-
pomorphisms. To put it succinctly, a Ẓāhirī is not (necessarily) a literalist, but 
rather a scholar who rejects the need for a hidden meaning. The middle course 
therefore consists in focusing on what seems to be the obvious meaning, for 
instance, understanding that ‘Throne’ is merely a term used to underline divine 
majesty. Ẓāhirites thus succeed in avoiding the trap of an absurd literal reading 
or of having to assume the existence of a hidden meaning accessible to only 
few, such as the philosophers and the mystics. Moreover, the method allows 
the apparent meaning to be either a straightforward or a metaphorical 
 expression. Basically, the school maintains that any Qurʾānic word or expres-
sion has but one meaning in the sentence in which it appears.
6 See Ebrahim Moosa, Ghazālī & the Poetics of Imagination (Chapel Hill-London: The Univer-
sity of North Carolina Press, 2005), 148–153.
7 Ironically, after having been extinct for many centuries, the Ẓāhirī School is currently enjoy-
ing a comeback in the ultra-conservative Salafiyya scene, where it is being applied rather 
superficially in defense of a literalist reading of scripture.
8 Miguel Cruz Hernández, “Islamic Thought in the Iberian Peninsula,” in The Legacy of Muslim 
Spain, ed. Salma Khadra Jayyusi (Leiden: Brill, 1992) 777–803, at 778. This is precisely the kind 
of reading denounced later by Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328). In his view, Muslim philosophers 
who apply their Greek derived knowledge to Qurʾānic narratives are guilty of corrupting 
Islamic scripture, both by tabdīl and taḥrīf. (See Thomas F. Michel, S.J., ed. and trans., 
A Muslim Theologian’s Response to Christianity. Ibn Taymiyya’s Al-Jawab al-Sahih (Delmar, 
N.Y.: Caravan Books, 1984, 21).
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A good example of eliciting the apparent (as opposed to the literal) mean-
ing of a scriptural passage is when Ibn Ḥazm underlines that religious injunc-
tions found in scripture apply to both men and women, even when the 
grammatical expression suggests male addressees only. Following Roger 
Arnaldez, A. G. Chejne sees Ibn Ḥazm make use of ‘linguistic intuition’ in this 
example, a basic technique consisting of mastering vocabulary, identifying the 
value of a word within a sentence, and determining the meaning of a word by 
placing it into the larger textual context.9 On a more profound level, Ibn Ḥazm’s 
exegetical approach relies on his theory of languages as systems of meaning in 
which every word has an assigned meaning in a given context. Furthermore, 
the guarantor of univocality in language is God himself:
Any rational being knows that God . . . arranged languages and provided 
them with clarity. They consist of expressions resting on clear meanings 
of designated things. The Almighty God said: “We have not sent any mes-
senger except with the tongue of his people so that he may make things 
clear to them.” The tongue is the language, and there is no disagreement 
about that. But if speech did not clarify meaning, what things do the 
deserters of God and His Prophet understand, or with what do they 
understand each other?10
The particular interest of the above quotation is that Ibn Ḥazm manages to 
illustrate precisely his approach by pointing out that the apparent meaning of 
‘tongue’ in the Qurʾānic passage cited (Q XIV, 4) does not refer to the muscular 
organ in one’s mouth but to ‘language.’ While all languages are able to convey 
univocal content, the epitome of linguistic clarity is exemplified in scriptural 
(but not in literary or spoken) Arabic. According to Ẓāhirī teaching, the Qurʾān 
not only restores the original revelation once imparted to humankind’s first 
prophets, but it also presents God’s words in unambiguous Arabic, as it were, 
in its primordial purity.11 This explains why, unlike other Muslim theologians, 
Ibn Ḥazm did not think that the Bedouins’ knowledge of Arabic, however pris-
tine, could be trusted in elucidating scriptural language. Nor was he interested 
9 A. G. Chejne, Ibn Hazm (Chicago: Kazi Publications, 1982), 116.
10 Ibid., 120, my emphasis.
11 Roger Arnaldez, Grammaire et théorie, 44–45. On the already existing difference between 
jurisprudential truth (ḥaqīqa sharʿiyya) and linguistic truth (ḥaqīqa lughawiyya) in 
Islamic theology, see Ignaz Goldziher, Die Ẓāhiriten. Ihr Lehrsystem und ihre Geschichte. 
Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der muhammedanischen Theologie (Leipzig, 1884; repr. 
Hildesheim: Olms, 1967), 128.
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in tracing the common trilateral roots of scriptural terms in order to elicit their 
meaning, which represented another common technique borrowed from the 
Grammarians. Also, Qurʾānic terms were not to be categorized by genera and 
species as in Greek logic, but by their meanings, which consequently prompts 
the question as to how ‘meaning’ is then to be uncovered.
As Roger Arnaldez has been able to show, Ibn Ḥazm distinguishes between 
a primary (murād) and a secondary (maqsūd) purport of words (alfāẓ, pl. of 
lafẓa). While the Andalusian recognizes that authors may coin a term by intro-
ducing a secondary purport, his focus lies on the primary purport, which is 
essentially the sense (maʿnā) of a word, determined not by an idea or an image 
but by the word itself and its ‘meaning-carrying’ intention (‘intention significa-
tive,’ niyya). Basically, Ibn Ḥazm excludes both the extraneous meaning and 
the psychological intention that language users introduce in their private 
vocabulary.12 Words are therefore not guided by thought; rather, they deter-
mine meanings. Accordingly, truth is not external to the meaning God placed 
in words.
This extreme nominalism, anchored in the notion that God clarified mean-
ing through the very wording of his revelation, also explains the Ẓāhirī rejec-
tion of qiyās (analogical reasoning) as introduced by Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767), 
the founder of the Ḥanafī madhhab, Islam’s first and most progressive school 
of law. Ẓāhirītes only consider the Qurʾān, Ḥadīth, and the ijmāʿ (consensus) of 
Muḥammad’s immediate Companions as legitimate sources of law. All other 
sources are considered bidʿa (prohibited innovation). In his Risāla al-Bāhira 
(The Magnificent Epistle) Ibn Ḥazm even underlines that the Companions who 
joined the Prophet on his escape from Mecca to Medina take precedence over 
later contemporary followers.13 And yet, how is one to demonstrate that these 
are truly the exemplars of knowledge in Islam? Or, put differently, how does 
one show the futility of the question that asks who among the founders of 
Islam’s (Sunni) schools of law “is grander (ajall), more excellent (afḍal ), more 
pious (awraʿ), more versed in jurisprudence (afqah), and more knowledgeable 
12 Ibid., 57.
13 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Risālah al-Bāhirah, 41. The Companions mentioned by name are ʿUmar ibn 
al-Khaṭṭāb (Islam’s third Khalīf), the Mother of the Believers ʿĀʾisha (the Prophet’s favor-
ite wife), ʿAlī ibn Abī Tālib (Islam’s fourth Khalīf), ʿAbd Allāh ibn Masʿūd, and ʿAbd Allāh 
ibn ʿAbbās (a cousin of the Prophet). One cannot help but notice the prominent position 
given to ʿĀʾisha. She is on par with the other Companions in respect to “excellence in 
knowledge, sagacity, grace, and piety” (ibid.).
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(aʿlam)?”14 To opponents raising this question, Ibn Ḥazm replies sharply that 
they are obviously unable to judge the words (alfāẓ) used in their own 
phrasing:
You are ignorant of their meaning (maʿnā), you do not master their sub-
ject (mawḍūʿ), you do not understand their truth (ḥaqīqa), you do not 
know their purport (murād bihi), and you do not comprehend their [phil-
ological] exegesis (tafsīr).15
This brief quotation from the beginning of the Risāla al-Bāhira contains noth-
ing less than Ibn Ḥazm’s methodology. What then follows it in the Risāla is an 
exercise showing how to extract the meaning of words in order to assess their 
juridical applicability. To mention but one semantic analysis, the Andalusian 
specifies that the Arabic word ‘jalāla’ (majesty, same root as ajall, the word 
translated above as ‘grander’) refers either to one’s rank in society or to one’s 
rank among the believers. Since the first meaning would make no sense in the 
interrogative sentence cited earlier, while the second one remains necessarily 
unknown to human beings, Ibn Ḥazm concludes that the very wording of his 
opponents’ question is inadequate.16
It is, therefore, absurd to ask who . . . is more learned—Mālik, Abū Ḥanīfa, 
Shāfīʿī, Aḥmad or Dāwūd. This question carries no sense, no significance, 
and is just to care for something useless. No reasonable person will 
intrigue in a case like this.17
Ultimately, the question carries no sense because true knowledge (ʿilm)—as 
needed for legal injunctions—may never be derived. Only the wording found 
in statements collected directly from a select group of Muḥammad’s 
Companions qualifies as such a basis. Therefore, derived knowledge such as in 
14 For the original Arabic, see ibid., 100. I have used my own translation, since al-Maʾsumi’s 
rendering of the key words in this passage (ibid., 38) is not consistent with the rendering 
of the same words later in the text. 
15 For the original Arabic, see ibid., 101. Al-Maʾsumi shortens this passage in his rendering 
(ibid., 38) and seems to be unaware of the importance of the technical terms in it, which 
is why I offer my own translation. Ibn Ḥazm allows for tafsīr but not taʾwīl (allegorical 
exegesis).
16 Ibid., 65–67.
17 Ibid., 40. The names refer to founders of Sunni schools of law: Mālik ibn Anas (d. 179/795), 
Abū Ḥanīfa, al-Shāfīʿī (d. 205/820), Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), and Dāwūd ibn Khalaf 
al-Ẓāhirī.
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the outcome of analogical reasoning, which necessarily departs from scrip-
tural wording, is a mere opinion and consequently without authority. As a 
result, even the views expressed by the venerable founders of Islam’s schools of 
law, including Dāwūd, are not legally binding.18
The Magnificent Epistle exemplifies what I meant by Ibn Ḥazm’s ‘authority-
centered’ epistemology in the beginning of the present essay, the ‘authority’ 
being the scriptural content as reflected in the concise wording of divine rev-
elation. This is the epistemology that also determines the hermeneutics used 
by the Andalusian theologian, as well as the background without which one 
could not possibly situate Ibn Ḥazm’s most polemical work, Kitāb al-Fiṣal, a 
treatise examining other world religions, in particular Judaism and Christianity. 
Here, his condemnation of Christian beliefs belongs to the harshest statements 
one may find in Islam, surpassing in sharpness even the accusations of Ibn 
Taymiyya.
Theodore Pulcini provides the following list of epithets used by Ibn Ḥazm in 
reference to Christians: stupid, irrational, frivolous, impious, lying, obstinate, 
blindly submissive to authority, arbitrary on belief and practice, avaricious, 
inferior, and theologically extremist.19 Except for ‘avaricious,’ which the 
Andalusian uses in reference to Church leaders whose greed he (rightly) 
accuses, all other epithets suggest that Ibn Ḥazm is questioning the orthodoxy 
and orthopraxy of Christians in the same way he would when scrutinizing 
Muslims following schools of thought different from his own. A typical exam-
ple for what he takes to be the Christian lack of ‘rationality’ (logic) may be 
found where Ibn Ḥazm is baffled that Christ should be seated at the right hand 
of God the Father and also be God himself,20 or similarly, that the Father is the 
Son and the Son is the Father, making a relative relationship turn into a recip-
rocal one.21 Furthermore, the Andalusian also detects numerous contradic-
tions among the Gospel passages, which he imputes to the lack of an abrogative 
18 In fields other than theology, Ibn Ḥazm’s position is remarkably different. In his Categories 
of the Sciences (Marātib al-ʿUlūm) he thus underlines: “For the one who speaks on his own 
authority and on the basis of what he thinks is not the same as the one who speaks on the 
authority of someone else. A bereaved mother is not the same as a hired mourner. And he 
who listens to one scholar only will get almost nothing; he would be like the one who 
persists drinking from one well containing turbid salt, having abandoned sweet and fresh 
water were he to drink from other wells. Engaging one’s equal and opposing enemies in 
debates that truth can be discerned from falsehood. There is no other way” (A. G. Chejne, 
Ibn Hazm, 203).
19 Pulcini, Exegesis as Polemical Discourse, 164.
20 Roger Arnaldez, “Controverses théologiques,” 221.
21 Ibid., 220.
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methodology (naskh) in Christian theology.22 Finally, he also points out the 
absence of a sound chain of transmission to help create scholarly consensus 
(ijmāʿ ).23
The greatest difficulty Ibn Ḥazm faces when approaching Christian scrip-
ture has to do with metaphors, parables, and other didactic means used in the 
Gospels. As Pulcini explains:
For example, according to the Christian scriptures, Christ specifically told 
his disciples that anyone who becomes angry with his brother is liable to 
judgment and that anyone who sins with his right eye should pluck it out 
(cf. Mt. 5:22,29). These, Ibn Ḥazm contends, are clear legal prescriptions 
from Christ, yet Christians feel no obligation to comply; in failing to obey, 
they contradict Christ himself.24
Whereas Christians read the referenced passages as hyperboles, Ibn Ḥazm 
takes them to be religious injunctions with legal force. Essentially, he responds 
to the quoted Gospel lines in the same way as he would to a verse from Islamic 
scripture. From where he stands, Christians (who do not make use of the same 
methodology) are therefore necessarily stupid, irrational, impious, lying, obsti-
nate, arbitrary on belief and practice, inferior, and theologically extremist. 
Evidently, St. Paul’s emphasis on the Spirit of the Law (as opposed to the Letter 
of the Law, 2 Cor. 3:6) was alien to Ibn Ḥazm’s world of thought.
To answer the question posed in the title of this section, Ibn Ḥazm can 
therefore be seen as both an ‘apparentist’ and a literalist. In respect to his own 
scriptural tradition, his exegetical goal is to extract the apparent meaning. 
However, when he applies himself to non-Islamic scriptures such as the 
Gospels, Ibn Ḥazm takes all non-straightforward expressions à la lettre. In his 
defense, one may say that since he had to rely on Arabic translations of the 
Gospels (he mostly focuses on St. Matthew’s account)25 and had no knowledge 
of any of the languages relevant to biblical studies (Hebrew, Aramaic, Greek, 
and Latin), he was in no position to make use of linguistic intuition. It is more 
22 Ibid., 226. The Qurʾān is a self-referential text that comments on earlier revealed verses. 
Naskh is the Islamic exegetical principle that determines which Qurʾānic verses may be 
invoked to abrogate, i.e., modify, other verses. For instance, a general principle may 
require modification in response to historic circumstances.
23 Ibid., 234.
24 Pulcini, Exegesis as Polemical Discourse, 135.
25 For the translation Ibn Ḥazm most likely used, see Pulcini, Exegesis as Polemical Discourse, 
185–187.
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than likely, however, that if Ibn Ḥazm had been able to read the original 
Gospels, he would still have insisted on interpreting any imperative phrasing 
as a divine command (amr).
B Al-Ghazzālī: Journeying beyond Words to Reach Meanings
A very different tone emerges from al-Ghazzālī’s writings, which is not to say 
that the Persian philosopher could not be a polemicist as well. It suffices to 
mention his harsh invective against the Bāṭinites, as the Ismāʿīlīs were called in 
his native region, or his Tahāfut al-Falāsifa (Incoherence of the Philosophers), in 
which he brilliantly argues against twenty theses he singled out from the works 
of the Peripatetic philosophers al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā because they challenged 
or contradicted orthodox Islamic teaching. On the whole, however, al-Ghazzālī 
appropriates, adapts, and integrates non-mainstream Islamic as well as non-
Islamic sources whenever he recognizes the intrinsic value of their teaching, 
be it a concept, a single statement, or a metaphor. This is in keeping with the 
strict criteria for certainty formulated in his al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl (The 
Deliverance from Error), the autobiography he wrote upon returning home 
from years of wanderings as a humble Sufi.26
In terms of ancient sources, al-Ghazzālī seems to have had a predilection for 
authors from the Roman period. Thus, without mentioning the name of the 
Stoic philosopher Epictetus, he expands the latter’s sea voyage metaphor in 
which passengers disembark on an island with some interrupting the journey 
all together, the island being a metaphor for the trappings of earthly existence. 
At other times he describes himself as a diver for truth, tacitly borrowing the 
metaphor from Diogenes Laertius (who attributed it to Socrates).27 Naturally, 
al-Ghazzālī also makes frequent references to themes, terms, and teachings 
derived from pre-Islamic Persia, such as the Zoroastrian metaphysics of light. 
As if he had anticipated the attacks of the later Ibn Taymiyya for having dared 
to quote the verses of a Christian Arab poet in support of there being an ‘inner 
speech’ of God, al-Ghazzālī took great efforts to clarify his approach to truth in 
26 Al-Ghazali, Deliverance from Error. Five Key Texts Including His Spiritual Autobiography 
al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl, trans. and annot., Richard Joseph McCarthy (Louisville: Fons 
Vitae, 2004), 57.
27 Cf. Tamara Albertini, “Mystical Landscapes—Places of the Mind. Emptiness and 
Plenitude in Islamic Philosophy,” in Labirinti della mente. Visioni del mondo. Il lascito intel-
lettuale di Elémire Zolla nel XXI secolo, ed. Grazia Marchianò (Siena: Società Bibliografica 
Toscana, 2012) 175–190, at 184, 185.
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The Deliverance from Error: knowledge is not to be defined by identity.28 In 
other words, the provenance of a statement or an insight may not influence 
either its acceptance or rejection. In the same way as a well-trained magistrate 
listens to all voiced opinions without adopting any before due scrutiny, the 
philosopher too is under the obligation to remain impartial when searching for 
truth in different traditions. To support this, the Persian philosopher cites a 
famous saying: “Do not know the truth by men, but rather know the truth and 
you will know its adherents.”29 The statement is quite poignant, also for the 
fact that it happens to be a quotation of ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Islam’s fourth Khalīf 
and the revered first Imam of the Shīʿa. Al-Ghazzālī goes one step further in his 
uncompromising and impartial embrace of truthfulness, claiming that it is to 
be acknowledged even where it is mingled with obvious falsehood or errors. 
Regarding the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā (The Brethren of Purity), another group of 
Shīʿites for whom he had little sympathy, he thus writes: “If we were . . . to aim 
at forgoing every truth which had been first formulated by the mind of one in 
error, we would have to forgo much of what is true.”30 What al-Ghazzālī meant 
to express is that, although he had many issues with the teaching of the Ikhwān, 
he still gave them credit for citing or deriving truthful statements from scrip-
ture, Sufi teachings, and other authoritative sources. Not surprisingly, the 
Persian philosopher therefore had no difficulty in both accepting and rejecting 
the statement of a Christian affirming “there is no God but God; Jesus is the 
apostle of God,” i.e., recognizing the validity of the monotheistic creed but 
objecting to Jesus (rather than Muḥammad) being the Apostle of God.
Hence, if he [the Christian] is an unbeliever only because of his denial of 
the latter [Muḥammad’s prophethood], he should not be contradicted in 
matters other than what he disbelieves. I mean something which is true 
in itself, although the Christian also holds to be true.31
Put in a different way, if one were to reject the entire Christian creed, this 
would also apply to its true portion, i.e., the assertion that God is one. It is 
tempting to think that al-Ghazzālī had a favorable bias towards Christianity, 
certainly more favorable than towards the Shīʿa. However, this is not the same 
as having any particular leaning for Christian teaching. Instead, as the follow-
ing will show, it was al-Ghazzālī’s ‘Islamized’ understanding of Jesus that facili-
tated a benign attitude towards Christianity.
28 Ebrahim Moosa, Ghazālī & the Poetics of Imagination, 148–153.
29 Al-Ghazali, Deliverance from Error, 68.
30 Ibid., 69.
31 Ibid., 68, my emphasis.
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To return to al-Ghazzālī’s notion of knowledge, a precondition for the one 
who earnestly desires to find truth in any tradition is to uncover the meaning 
(maʿnā) of a teaching, statement, or injunction. In tune with his ethics, in 
which the intention (niyya), not the outcome of an act, serves as the measure 
of one’s deeds, the Persian philosopher analyzes Christian Trinitarian teaching 
in light of what it is designed to convey. Here is his analysis from one of his 
epistles:
When Christians refer to God as the third of the three, they do not mean 
that God is [numerically] three . . . indeed God is one in his essence [dhāt] 
and three with respect to his attributes [ṣifāt]. And this is the wording of 
their statement: One in substance [ jawhar] and three by way of hyposta-
sis [uqnūmiyya]. By ‘hypostasis,’ they mean attributes.32
Al-Ghazzālī is remarkably accurate in rendering the early Christian Trinitarian 
understanding; some of his wording sounds like a gloss or may possibly be a 
direct quotation of a Christian source.33 Notably, he explores the creed with-
out condemning it beforehand or ‘correcting’ the message it conveys. He 
focuses instead on what ‘they mean’ to express, not what the creed says verba-
tim. In stark contrast to Ibn Ḥazm, al-Ghazzālī thinks wording is secondary to 
intention. For him, the hermeneutical challenge consists in discovering the 
psychological intention of the author (human or divine), rather than the inten-
tion attached to the meaning that the words themselves carry.
Regarding his fellow theologians (mutakallimūn), it is not surprising that 
al-Ghazzālī says that they ably defended orthodoxy but utterly failed in arriv-
ing at primary and self-evident truths:
They relied on premises which they took over from their adversaries, 
being compelled to admit them either by uncritical acceptance, or 
because of the Community’s consensus, or by simple acceptance derived 
from the Qurʾān and the Traditions.34
32 Ebrahim Moosa, Ghazālī & the Poetics of Imagination, 149, my emphasis. In this statement 
al-Ghazzālī tacitly applies the two categories of divine names in Islam: those that refer to 
God’s essence, and names that are divine attributes.
33 Roger Arnaldez makes reference to an earlier researcher who showed that al-Ghazzālī 
had consulted a Coptic version of St. John’s Gospel during his stay in Egypt. See his 
“Controverses théologiques,” 245–246.
34 Al-Ghazali, Deliverance from Error, 59.
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Scripture is considered a source of knowledge, but not knowledge itself. Its 
truth only makes itself manifest to the one who validates knowledge, either by 
the use of (critical) credence in other people’s testimony (īmān), apodeictic 
proofs, or mystical fruition (dhawq)—basically, by one of the three degrees of 
knowledge with which the seeker may gain certainty of the veracity of a 
teaching.35
Al-Ghazzālī’s ‘subject-centered’ epistemology accords with the hermeneuti-
cal recommendation he issued in his magnum opus, the Iḥyā ʿ Ulūm al-Dīn (The 
Revival of Religious Sciences):
If you examine the writings of anyone who had gained distinction in 
knowledge, then do not so with condescension . . . And do not stop where 
the author’s text ends. For, surely, meanings are more expansive than 
their literal expressions, and the bosoms [hearts] are more capacious 
than compiled books, for there is much knowledge in what is not articu-
lated. So aspire to grasp all the possible meanings of his writing with the 
perception of his heart.36
There could not be a clearer invitation to explore a text beyond its mere verbal 
expression. A very different approach, however, may be found in his al-Durra 
al-Fākhira (The Precious Pearl), a short eschatological treatise that the Persian 
philosopher wrote for a wider audience. In it he envisages God summoning 
Jesus son of Mary on the Day of Judgment to ‘recite’ the Gospel. Jesus complies 
and “he brings the Gospel fresh and new, so that even monks think that they 
have never known one verse of it.”37 While al-Ghazzālī remains faithful to the 
Islamic position that takes the historic Gospel text to be a corrupted version of 
a pre-existing original, he is careful not to state what the differences between 
the two versions might be. Instead, he has Jesus most delicately make one 
 single ‘correction.’ This approach is quite different from Ibn Ḥazm and Ibn 
Taymiyya, the latter of whom had once bluntly declared: “And the Christians 
have erred in the denotation [musammā] of speech [kalām], so they made the 
messiah [Jesus] self-sufficient, who is then identical to the word of God.”38 
35 Ibid., 82. 
36 Ebrahim Moosa, Ghazālī & the Poetics of Imagination, 114.
37 Jane Idleman Smith, The Precious Pearl. A Translation from the Arabic with Notes of the 
Kitāb al-Durra al-Fākhira fī Kashf ʿUlūm al-Ākhira of Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad b. 
Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (Harvard University: Scholars Press, 1979), 67.
38 Ebrahim Moosa, Ghazālī & the Poetics of Imagination, 152.
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Obviously, The Precious Pearl does not include the ‘original’ Gospel. 
The only change it reflects is the one applied to the notion of Holy Trinity. 
Thus, before God instructs Jesus to recite the Gospel he asks him: “Did you say 
to people ‘Take me and my mother as gods, apart from God?’ ” To this Jesus 
responds:
It is not for me to say what I have no right to say. Had I said it, You would 
have known it. You know what is in my soul, though I do not know what 
is in Yours.39
Al-Ghazzālī’s reaction to Christian Trinitarian teaching in The Precious Pearl is 
noticeably different from the one expressed in his epistle. In the eschatological 
treatise composed for the non-specialist, no attempt is made to assess the pos-
sible compatibility between Christian and Islamic teachings. Like all well-
trained Muslim theologians, al-Ghazzālī is careful not to confuse or put doubt 
in the mind of believers, who may be insufficiently trained or lack intellectual 
aptitude to discuss the ‘inner meaning’ of a scriptural text, either Islamic or 
Christian for that matter. Remarkably, though, Jesus does not explicitly reject 
the notion of Holy Trinity in The Precious Pearl. All he does is clarify that he 
never meant that he and his mother should be divinized. In other words, the 
Persian philosopher has Jesus only address the vulgarized version of Holy 
Trinity, which mentions Mary as the third divine person instead of the Holy 
Spirit. Another point of interest is Jesus’s Islamized features. For instance, he is 
called upon to recite the Gospel the way Muslims ritually chant the Qurʾān 
from memory. Also, Jesus (who leads the poor on the Day of Judgment) is 
lauded for his poverty, not for his love, charity, or compassion.
Learn a lesson from the messiah, for it said that he had no purse at all, 
that he was dressed in the same woolen garment for twenty years, and 
that in his travels he had only a small mug and a comb. One day he saw a 
man drinking with his hand, so he threw the mug from his hand and 
never used it again. Then he passed by a man running his fingers through 
his beard, so he threw away the comb from his hand and never used it 
after that.40
39 Smith, The Precious Pearl, 67. This is a direct scriptural quotation (Q V, 116).
40 Ibid., 77.
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In al-Ghazzālī’s version, when Jesus encounters individuals poorer than he is, 
he does not offer them his few possessions. Instead, the mug and comb are 
merely tossed away. Jesus thus comes across as the embodiment of Islamic 
asceticism from the period preceding the rise of Sufism, i.e., Islamic mysticism, 
of which al-Ghazzālī stated that its greatest achievement was its injection of 
love into Islamic spirituality. Therefore, it may not be a coincidence that only 
two pages after the above quotation, the Persian philosopher cites the famous 
Muslim ascetic Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, who lived precisely at the time when Islamic 
asceticism transformed into a mystical movement. From a Christian point of 
view, one might say that Jesus’s poverty was the expression of his love for 
humankind and that love is therefore the dominant element in Christ’s teach-
ing. However, one should also bear in mind that asceticism was a particularly 
salient feature of Eastern Christianity, which would explain al-Ghazzālī’s great 
emphasis of Jesus’s own ascetic lifestyle in the Precious Pearl. Christ’s love (of 
God), however, is greatly alluded to in another work of al-Ghazzālī’s.
In Love, Longing Intimacy and Contentment (Kitāb al-Maḥabba wa al-Shawq 
wa al-Uns wa al-Riḍā), another book of the Iḥyāʾ and with a strong emphasis on 
Sufism, al-Ghazzālī speaks of Jesus as one of God’s preferred prophets. He 
explains the matter by stating: “it was based on the graciousness he [Jesus] had 
witnessed in the stage of intimacy.”41 ‘Intimacy’ is translated from ‘uns,’ a tech-
nical term of Islamic mysticism that al-Ghazzālī interprets as the exultation of 
the heart that experiences closeness to God.42 The language used in Love, 
Longing Intimacy and Contentment clearly indicates that Christ is taken to be a 
mystic. Moreover, Jesus’s preference for the longing for heaven over the fear of 
hell, and for the love of God over the desire for heaven,43 is reminiscent of a 
saying attributed to Rābi‘a al-‘Adawiyya (d. 185/801), one of Islam’s earliest mys-
tics, whose loving memory the Persian philosopher helped preserve:
I am going to light a fire in Paradise and to pour water on to Hell, so that 
both veils (i.e., hindrances to the vision of God Himself) may vanish 
altogether from before the pilgrims and their purpose may be sure, and 
41 Al-Ghazālī, Love, Longing Intimacy and Contentment. Kitāb al-maḥabba wa al-shawq wa 
al-uns wa al-riḍā, Book XXXVI of the Revival of the Religious Sciences Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn. 
Translated with an Introduction & Notes by Eric Ormsby (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts 
Society, 2011), 142, my emphasis.
42 Ibid., 133. More passages mention the Sufi heart (qalb) in relation to Jesus; see 159, 185, 
and 190.
43 Ibid., 37.
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the servants of God may see Him, without any object of hope or motive 
of fear.44
Unlike Ibn Ḥazm, who squarely opposed the Christian notion of Jesus’s divin-
ity, al-Ghazzālī teases out a ‘meaning’ that keeps the communication lines 
open between Islam and Christianity. Jesus the Sufi is a judicious solution 
allowing for an allusion to the ‘divinity’ of Christ in terms that are agreeable if 
not to all Muslims, at least to those receptive to mysticism. However, an oblique 
comment inserted in Love, Longing Intimacy and Contentment in reference to a 
statement made by the crucified Muslim mystic al-Ḥallāj (d. 309/922) clarifies 
that the Persian philosopher was not prepared to go as far as to accept the con-
cept of incarnation.45 For al-Ghazzālī, Jesus was the intimate of God whose 
Self was possibly annihilated or absorbed into God. He may even grant Jesus 
that he experienced the “exchange of attributes” (tabaddul al-ṣifāt),46 a mysti-
cal transformation al-Ghazzālī speaks of in his autobiography and that entails 
the surrender of one’s human nature to God without entering into a full-scale 
union with the Creator. While this interpretation may not satisfy Christians, it 
nevertheless remains the expression of a Muslim scholar anxious to root 
Christianity in a religious experience common to both Christians and Muslims. 
Al-Ghazzālī achieved this by taking the subjective experience of a Sufi filled 
with the presence of God as an explanation for the Christian notion of Jesus’s 
divinity. His approach exemplifies superbly that understanding each other 
across different religions and cultures does not begin by fighting over words, 
but by attempting to agree over meanings.
44 Margaret Smith, The Way of the Mystics. The Early Christian Mystics and the Rise of the 
Sūfis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 187–188.
45 Al-Ghazālī, Love, Longing Intimacy and Contentment, 39–40. This is a view one finds 
expressed also in Al-Radd al-Jamīl lī-Ilāhiyya ʿĪsā bi-Ṣarīh al-Injīl (The Fitting Refutation of 
the Divinity of Jesus Through What Is Evident in the Gospel), a short treatise that some 
scholars take to be an authentic work by al-Ghazzālī (for more details see section on 
al-Ghazzālī in Thomas and Mallett, Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 3, 367–369). The style, 
syntax, and vocabulary used in Al-Radd al-Jamīl are very different from al-Ghazzālī’s writ-
ing in his other theological works. I, therefore, see no basis to confirm his authorship. 
Besides, since al-Ghazzālī’s interpretation of Jesus as a Sufi master is sufficiently evident 
in the IḥyāʾʿUlūm al-Dīn, the present essay has no need of Al-Radd al-Jamīl to make that 
case. 
46 Al-Ghazali, Deliverance from Error, 78.
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One may never establish with certainty whether al-Ghazzālī single-handedly 
cut the stones needed to build a bridge between Christianity and Islam, or 
whether he adapted pre-existing, possibly non-mainstream, Christological 
notions to his interpretation of Jesus the Sufi. What matters in the end is that 
the Persian philosopher successfully crossed that bridge, and that many more 
may also endeavor the passage—in both directions.
Jesus in the Muslim and Christian Mystical 
Traditions: Ibn ʿArabi and Meister Eckhart
Robert J. Dobie
The writings of the great mystical thinkers have become a common starting 
point for interreligious dialogue, no less so in Muslim-Christian dialogue. This 
is due to the reputation of mystical writers for pushing the doctrinal limits of 
their own religious traditions and of therefore ‘going beyond’ them.1 There is 
certainly something valid in this reputation, as can be exemplified by the great 
Andalusian Sufi Muhyaddin Ibn ʿ Arabi (1165–1240), who writes in his collection 
of erotic-mystical poetry, the Tarjiman al-Ashwaq or “The Interpreter of 
Desires:”
O Marvel! a garden amidst the flames
My heart has become capable of every form:
It is a pasture for gazelles and a convent for Christian monks,
And a temple for idols and the pilgrim’s Kaʾaba,
And the tables of the Torah and the book of the Qurʾan.
I follow the religion of Love: whatever way Love’s camels take,
That is my religion and my faith.2
Opened by ecstatic love, the heart of the Sufi is described as a receptacle for all 
that leads to God. What is more, for Ibn ʿArabi, as for many Sufis, Jesus is the 
model for such radical receptivity and love. Ergo, a natural place to look for 
convergence and commonality between Christians and Muslims would be to 
look at the meaning of Jesus in speculative Sufism, of which the thought of Ibn 
ʿArabi is probably the best example.
1 For a good discussion of ways in which this often has happened, even (or especially) in the 
Middle Ages, see James Heft, S. M., Reuven Firestone, & Omid Safi, eds., Learned Ignorance: 
Intellectual Humility among Jews, Christians, and Muslims (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), and Barbara Roggema, Marcel Poorthuis, & Pim Valkenberg, eds., The Three Rings: 
Textual Studies in the Historical Trialogue of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Leuven: Peters, 
2005), 141–62. 
2 R. A. Nicholson, trans., The Tarjuman al-ashwaq: a Collection of Mystical Odes by Muhyiddin 
Ibn al-ʿArabi (Ulan Press, 2011), 67.
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What we shall argue in this essay, however, is that the way a Muslim Sufi like 
Ibn ʿArabi understands the figure of Jesus opens up gaps and reinforces doctri-
nal lines between Christianity and Islam as much as it closes and blurs them.3 
The most fundamental question that Ibn ʿArabi’s work proposes to Muslim-
Christian dialogue is this: is creaturely finitude an absolute and insurmount-
able obstacle to union of the human soul with God, or is creaturely finitude in 
some way ‘redeemable’ and even a necessary instrument of such union? As we 
shall see, Ibn ʿArabi’s meditations on the meaning and significance of the 
‘prophethood’ of Jesus expose stark differences with the Christian understand-
ing of Jesus, which do not fit easily into any discourse of the universality of the 
mystical path. By way of contrast, we shall also look at the thought of a Christian 
mystic who was close in time as well as in spirit to Ibn ʿArabi—the Dominican 
friar Meister Eckhart (c. 1260–1328). Examining some key themes from Eckhart’s 
mystical writings should help us locate precisely the points of similarity and 
difference in Christian and Muslim approaches to the figure of Jesus.
 Jesus as the Essence of Prophecy in Ibn ʿArabi
In the Sufi tradition, the prophetic figure of Jesus does not merely illustrate one 
‘specific and narrowly definite moral type,’ but rather, he illustrates the fullness 
3 The same Ibn ʿArabi who wrote such beautiful and irenic poetry about how divine love can 
transcend religious boundaries also wrote a letter to the sultan of Konya exhorting him to 
apply sharia law in its full rigor to his non-Muslim subjects, restraining any public manifesta-
tions of the Christian faith lest they make “public show of their polytheism.” He adds, “The 
worst thing that Islam and Muslims suffer in your realm is the sound of bells, the manifesta-
tion of infidelity, the affirmation of an associate of God, and the disappearance of the rules 
instituted by the Prince of Believers, ʿUmar b. al-Khattab, regarding dhimmis: namely that 
neither in the city itself nor in the surrounding regions are they to build new churches, mon-
asteries or hermitages, that they are not to prevent any Muslim from being given food and 
shelter in their churches for a period of up to three days, that they are not to hide spies, 
that they are not to conspire in secret against Muslims, that they are not to teach the Qurʾan 
to their children, and that they are not to make public show of their polytheism” (Claude 
Addas, The Quest for the Red Sulphur, trans. Peter Kingsley (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 
1993), 235). This letter should disincline us against constructing a facile narrative of some sort 
of ‘mystical harmony’ of religions, which could so hastily be concluded from the passage 
cited earlier from Ibn ʿArabi’s Tarjiman. Ibn ʿArabi, of course, was not just a great Sufi thinker 
and master but also a man of his time. As a Muslim refugee from the Christian Reconquista of 
Spain, his views on practical relations between Muslims and Christians would have no doubt 
been strongly tinged by these conditions and experiences. Cf. Abdelilah Ljami, Ibn Hazm et 
la polémique Islamo-Chrétienne dans l’histoire de l’Islam (Leiden-Boston: E. J. Brill, 2003).
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of the prophetic type, combining asceticism, a warm human wisdom, and 
miraculous powers, particularly that of raising the dead.4 Indeed, Jesus 
becomes something like the ‘patron saint’5 of the Sufi tradition, and nowhere 
is this clearer than the important role he plays in the thought of the most phil-
osophically sophisticated of the Sufi mystics, Ibn ʿArabi. The significance of 
Jesus as teacher and (Muslim) prophet is key to Ibn ʿArabi’s thought, and Jesus 
as prophet is a central figure in his most famous work, The Bezels of Wisdom. In 
this work, Ibn ʿArabi regards the twenty-six prophets mentioned in the 
Qurʾan—starting from Adam and ending with Muhammad—as ‘bezels’ or 
gem-settings, into which the various ‘gems’ or facets of the divine Essence are 
set. Each facet is, in turn, a ‘word’ (kalima) that ‘breathes forth’ and ‘expresses’ 
an aspect of divine wisdom that otherwise cannot be expressed or known in 
the ineffable unity of the divine Essence, but which the prophet expresses in 
both his life and in his message. Thus, the text has headings with titles such the 
‘wisdom of divinity’ in the ‘word of Adam’ and the ‘wisdom of light’ in the 
‘word of Joseph’ (who, as interpreter of dreams, casts light on the meaning of 
creaturely significations). In this collection of Biblical and Qurʾanic prophets, 
Jesus holds a central place, for the ‘wisdom of prophecy (nabawiyya)’ resides in 
his ‘word.’ In other words, Jesus incarnates the essence of prophecy in a book 
that is about prophets, placing each in a setting (or bezel) for a divine word.
This preeminence of Jesus is due to his having incarnated the spirit (ruh) of 
God in a wholly manifest way. As the Qurʾan itself teaches, Jesus was born of 
the spirit of God blown into the Virgin Mary by the angel Gabriel. Hence, Jesus 
does not have a father made of flesh and blood, but is instead a direct creation 
of the spirit of God. It should be noted, of course, that for the Muslim Ibn 
ʿArabi, Jesus is still a creature and that the spirit is not God in any personal or 
univocal way. But Jesus does manifest in a particularly striking way how the 
divine spirit or ‘breath’ permeates, quickens, and animates the universe, for 
most prominent among Jesus’s miracles was his ability to raise the dead: “Now 
the measure of life that pervades a creature is called divine, humanity being 
[preeminently] the locus in which the Spirit inheres. Thus humanity is called a 
spirit by virtue of that which inheres in it.”6 In a special way then, Jesus as 
prophet manifests both God’s immanence in creation, as the breath or spirit 
4 Tarif Khalidi, The Muslim Jesus: Sayings and Stories in Islamic Literature (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), 29.
5 Khalidi, The Muslim Jesus, 34.
6 Ralph Austin, trans., The Bezels of Wisdom (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1980), 175. References 
to the Arabic text are from Abulailah Affifi, ed., Fusus al-hikam (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi, 
2002), 138–39.
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that animates it, as well as God’s transcendence, insofar as Jesus is a mere crea-
turely manifestation.
In order to understand how Jesus functions in Ibn ʿArabi’s mystical thought, 
we must first look at its general metaphysical/theosophical framework. 
Fundamental to Ibn ʿArabi’s thought is his assertion of the wahdat al-wujud, or 
the ’unity of being (existence).’ According to Ibn ʿArabi, existence in itself is 
one and undifferentiated. God, as one, is Existence in Itself. Creatures, insofar 
as they exist, exist in and through God; but insofar as they are not existence 
itself, and are ‘this’ existent but not ‘that’ one, they are nothing in themselves. 
Hence, creatures have a sort of intermediate being (they are the ‘isthmus’ or 
barzakh) between God’s pure, unitary existence and nothingness.
So far, we have encountered nothing unobjectionable to orthodox Islam. 
But Ibn ʿ Arabi carries the principle of wahdat al-wujud a step further than most 
Muslims and even most Sufis: he argues that insofar as we conceive of God as 
differentiated from creation, we do not conceive of God properly as God but 
only as ‘Lord’ (rabb) of creation, as the greatest being among beings, but still as 
a mere being and hence, in a sense, as a creature. The goal of Ibn ʿArabi’s mysti-
cal thought, then, is to ‘deconstruct’ this dualism inherent in traditional mono-
theism and to show how God is simultaneously immanent in, but also 
transcendent to, his creatures. In this scheme, all creatures become ‘words’ of 
God, manifesting some truth of the divine Essence. The prophets then draw 
these words together into messages accessible to mankind. Therefore, as ʿAbd 
al-Hakeem Carney puts it, the goal of the realized knower or ‘gnostic’ is not to 
theorize about the origin of creatures nor even to have an ecstatic experience 
that goes ‘beyond’ them, but rather, to listen to the creatures themselves as 
divine words:
Mysticism, then, does not consist in seeking out ecstatic experiences that 
are beyond the pale of everyday life. Rather, it is based upon a kind of 
listening, whereby the gnostic pays attention to the discourse that is all 
around him but, hitherto, he has been heedless of. It is a matter of finding 
God in His immanence to Creation, which means taking the Creation as 
nothing less than a Divine communication, a discourse between God and 
humans that demands to be heard.7
For a Muslim mystic like Ibn ʿArabi, the prophet does not “mark the entry of 
God into history” so much as overturn “human beings’ comfortable belief in 
7 ʿAbd al-Hakeem Carney, “Imamate and Love: The Discourse of the Divine in Islamic 
Mysticism,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 73/3 (2005): 707.
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the God/world dichotomy.”8 Thus, the prophet illuminates the immanence of 
God’s existence—the divine wujud—by being a living and breathing manifes-
tation of God’s word. He clarifies that God’s word is not other than the crea-
tures themselves, who exhibit the plenitude of God’s Essence. But at the same 
time, as a man limited in space and time, the prophet also points to the truth 
that no creature is God and that no one creature can express the divine Essence 
completely.
Jesus illustrates this paradox better than any other prophet in Ibn ʿArabi’s 
Bezels. In fact, Ibn ʿArabi asserts that Jesus was indeed a word of God (although 
just a word) and that, moreover, he was a word analogous to the word given 
through Muhammad to the Muslim community (umma): “Gabriel was, in fact, 
transmitting God’s word to Mary, just as an apostle transmits His word to his 
community (umma). God says, He is His word deposited with Mary, and a spirit 
from Himself. ”9 As the direct word of God’s spirit, Jesus was also able to raise or 
‘animate’ the dead: “Jesus came forth raising the dead because he was a divine 
spirit. Thus, bringing the dead to life was attributed to him both actually 
(mutahaqiq) and notionally (mutawahim).”10 The two terms, mutahaqiq and 
mutawahim, are important here because they signify the dual nature of the 
prophet in Ibn ʿArabi’s thought. Jesus raised the dead ‘actually’ (mutahaqiq) 
insofar as he was a direct manifestation of God (al-Haqq) and his power; he 
raised the dead ‘notionally’ (mutawahim), however, insofar as he and those he 
raised are all creatures analogous to a dream or a ‘presumption’ (= wahm) in 
relation to God. In this way, Jesus points to the instability of any absolute dis-
tinction between God and the world, while at the same time acknowledging 
his own creaturely nothingness.
Furthermore, Jesus’s humility is a crucial factor to this destabilization of any 
absolute difference between God and the world. In Ibn ʿArabi’s Sufi thought, 
Jesus’ humility draws our attention to the utter ‘poverty’ ( fuqura) of creatures 
in the face of the ‘richness’ (ghaniaʾ) of God’s being. Creatures are ‘poor’ in that 
they are ‘as if nothing’ or ‘having nothing’ in comparison to God’s absolute 
being. Accordingly, Ibn ʿArabi emphasizes Jesus’s own poverty and humility 
right near the beginning of his bezel on Jesus. What is at first striking here are 
the political implications he draws from it:
The humility of Jesus was such that his community was commanded that 
they should pay the poll-tax completely, humbling themselves, that if any 
8 Ibid., 714.
9 Austin, 175/Affifi, 139.
10 Austin, 176/Affifi, 139–40.
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one of them were struck on one cheek, he should offer also the other, and 
that he should not hit back or seek retribution. This aspect [of his teach-
ing] derives from his mother, since woman is lowly and humble, being 
under the man, both theoretically and physically. His powers of revival, 
on the other hand, derive from the blowing of Gabriel in human form, 
since Jesus revived the dead in human form.11
But almost immediately thereafter, Ibn ʿArabi brings the discussion of Jesus’s 
humility and asceticism back to metaphysical issues, discussing how the 
humility and poverty of Jesus allow the divine spirit to work its animating 
power on creatures. Hence, the casual observer would see him as a ‘mortal 
man performing divine acts:’
It used to be said of him, when he revived the dead, “It is he and yet not 
he (huwa la huwa).” Both the sight of the observer and the mind of the 
intelligent man were confused (wa taqaʾ al-hayra) at seeing a mortal man 
bring the dead to life, rationally as well as physically, which is a divine 
prerogative. The spectator would be utterly bewildered to see a mortal 
man performing divine acts.12
There are two terms or phrases here that are important in Sufi thought. The 
first is that Jesus manifested in a powerful way the truth that each creature is 
‘He and not He,’ in other words, that each creature is in a way God (‘He’), inso-
far as it derives all of its existence from God, but also that each creature is radi-
cally other than God, or ‘nothing’ (‘not He’), inasmuch as the creature is bound 
and limited by both its form and matter. Thus, in his poverty and humility Jesus 
demonstrates that he is a creature, as he is utterly poor with respect to being; 
but insofar as in his creaturely nothingness he reveals divine power and raises 
the dead, he is a theophany—a manifestation of the divine Essence within cre-
ated being.
11 Austin, 177/Affifi, 140. We perhaps find an echo here of the letter to the sultan of Konya 
cited earlier. At work here also may be the idea of Jesus as a model of irjaʾ in the Sufi tradi-
tion. This is a term denoting an early Muslim movement which generally avoided becom-
ing involved in civil wars and refrained from branding any Muslim an unbeliever because 
of doctrinal differences, provided faith in one God was not abandoned. Khalidi also notes 
that Ibn ʿArabi’s representation of Jesus reflects the increasing tension between Sufis and 
legal scholars in his time. Jesus was conventionally inducted into this struggle on the side 
of the Sufis because of his perceived disapproval of narrow-minded legalism. See Khalidi, 
The Muslim Jesus, 35, 202.
12 Austin, 177/Affifi, 141.
241jesus in the muslim and christian mystical traditions
For Ibn ʿArabi, those who observed the miracles of Jesus were ‘confused’ or 
‘bewildered’ by what they saw: a mere mortal performing divine acts. The term 
for ‘confused’ or ‘bewildered,’ hayra, is the second important Sufi term. Hayra 
refers to that ‘stage’ (hal) in which the dichotomy between the world and God 
as a distinct Lord collapses. It is therefore one of the highest stages in the Sufi 
quest, because it is here that the Sufi experiences God’s simultaneous imma-
nence and transcendence in himself and in all creatures. But, according to Ibn 
ʿArabi, the early Christians misinterpreted their bewilderment and mistakenly 
attributed divinity to the man Jesus, and so they speak of God’s incarnation:
This matter has led certain people to speak of incarnation and to say that, 
in reviving the dead, he is God. Therefore, they are called unbelievers 
[concealers], being a form of concealment, since they conceal God, Who 
in reality revives the dead, in the human form of Jesus. He has said, They 
are concealers [unbelievers] who say that God is the Messiah, son of Mary. 
The real error and unbelief in the full sense of the word is not in their say-
ing “He is God” nor “the son of Mary,” but in their having turned aside 
from God by including [God in human form] in the matter of reviving the 
dead, in favor of a merely mortal form in their saying [He is] the son of 
Mary, albeit that he is the son of Mary without doubt. Hearing them, one 
might think that they attributed divinity to the form, making it the form 
itself, but that is not the case, having in fact asserted that the divine 
Identity is the subject in the human form, which was the son of Mary. 
Thus they distinguished between the form and the determination, but 
did not make the form the same as the determining principle. In the 
same way, Gabriel was in mortal form [at first] without blowing [into 
Mary]; then he blew [into her]. Thus the blowing is distinguished from 
the form, since, although it derives from the form, it is not of its essence. 
So do the various sects quarrel concerning the nature of Jesus.13
I cite Ibn ʿArabi at length here because this passage is central, I believe, to his 
and the entire Sufi and Muslim understanding of Jesus. The first thing to note 
here is that Ibn ʿArabi argues that calling Jesus the ‘son of God’ is neither incor-
rect nor blasphemy. As Carney explains:
The statement that Jesus is God is not blasphemy. It is, in fact, correct. 
Al-Qaysari [a medieval Muslim commentator on Ibn ʿArabi’s Bezels] 
writes explicitly that the statement that Jesus is God is correct and true 
13 Austin, 177–78/Affifi, 141.
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insofar as Jesus is a specific epiphanic manifestation of the Divine Being 
(al-haqq). And the statement that he is the son of Mary is true without 
any doubt. The act of disbelief, according to Ibn ʿArabi, is the union of the 
two statements, that is, that Jesus the son of Mary (meaning his nasut) is 
God. It is the confusion of the human nature of Jesus (symbolized by 
referring to him as the son of Mary) and the Divine that is the source 
of the problem, not the idea that Jesus as a theophanic being is identical 
to God.14
The mistake is therefore to confuse the limits or form of the manifestation of 
God with the divine manifestation itself. Carney then continues to explain:
The problem is not that Jesus is God; this is accepted on face value. The 
problem is rather that Jesus as a physical being is also a negation of God, 
because by bringing God out in a particular form (in the case of Jesus, a 
particularly high form), Jesus qua Jesus is a negation of God, that space in 
which the Manifest God may come into being.15
All finite essences and, a fortiori, all material or physical beings are thus seen as 
negations of the plenitude of God’s Essence. Accordingly, Jesus manifests God 
and the divine Essence by his divine powers and acts made possible by his 
receptive humility, and yet he also negates that Essence by the finitude of his 
humanity and the particularity of his physicality. Ergo, Muslims properly 
understand Jesus as a mere man and prophet and not as the incarnate Son 
of God.
Moreover, as Carney points out, this tension between manifestation and 
negation in Jesus plays out in the reception of the divine word that Jesus mani-
fests. This occurs because all particularity, in effect, alters and distorts the 
divine word, such that while the divine Essence is made manifest and revealed 
in the prophetic discourse, it is also distorted and even negated by the very 
particularity of that discourse:
14 Carney, “Imamate and Love,” 716. As Mahmoud Ayoub observes in connection with this 
point: “Islam draws an absolute distinction between the creator and all created things. Yet 
ideas such as Ibn al-ʿArabi’s wahdat al-wujud, ‘unity of being’, can easily accommodate 
notions of divine sonship” (Mahmoud Ayoub, A Muslim View of Christianity: Essays on 
Dialogue (New York: Orbis Books, 2007), 128).
15 Carney, “Imamate and Love,” 717.
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It is not so much that the subject “reads” into the Divine discourse that 
which he wants to hear. It is rather the subject qua subject that causes 
this distortion. It is something implicit in the subject’s very subjectivity, 
in his existence as a being that is simultaneously a sign and manifestation 
of the Divine discourse (for everything in the universe), and at the same 
time marks the entry of a fundamental negativity within the Divine 
being, as a not-God that assures him no other role except as servant (ʿabd) 
to the Divine being. This dual situation, these “two natures” (a union that 
exists in a non-hypostatic fashion) that are united inside the servant, is 
made clear in Ibn ʿArabi’s description of the universe as Huwa/La Huwa, 
“Him, not Him.”16
Hence, Jesus’s first followers by necessity misunderstood him and attributed 
divinity to his human nature and to his individual particularity. In other words, 
the early Christians did not understand that Jesus was both ‘He’ and ‘not He.’ 
Nevertheless, this was understandable given that Jesus, according to the Qurʾan 
itself, had no human father:
Thus he is [at once] the Word of God, the Spirit of God, and the slave of 
God, and such a [triple] manifestation in sensible form belongs to no 
other. Every other man is attributed to his formal father, not to the one 
who blows His Spirit into human form. God, when He perfected the 
human body, as He says, When I perfected him, blew into him of His spirit, 
attributing all spirit in man’s being and essence to Himself. The case of 
Jesus is otherwise, since the perfection of his body and human form was 
included in the blowing of the spirit [by Gabriel into Mary], which is not 
so of other men. All creatures are indeed words of God, which are inex-
haustible, stemming as they do from [the command] Be, which is the 
Word of God. Now, can the Word be attributed to God as He is in Himself, 
so that its nature may never be known, or can God descend to the form of 
him who says Be, so that the word Be may be said to be the reality of the 
form to which He descends and in which He is manifest? Some gnostics 
support the former, some the latter, while others are confused and do not 
know what is the truth of the matter.17
In this scheme of things, any word from God both reveals God and at the same 
time (and to the same degree) conceals or even negates the divine word. 
16 Carney, “Imamate and Love,” 709.
17 Austin, 178/Affifi, 142.
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As explained above, this problem applies not just to ‘prophetic words’ but to all 
creatures, since all creatures are words of God. However, Ibn ʿArabi leaves this 
matter an open question, simply saying that it can only be resolved by ‘taste’ 
(dhawq) or ‘direct experience.’18 What might this ‘taste’ that resolves the matter 
tell us?
As Ibn ʿArabi continues to explain in his bezel on Jesus, we must conceive of 
the universe and all its forms as being received, as it were, into the Divine 
Breath as their Primordial Substance, which is Nature herself.19 This Breath 
makes manifest the divine Names, which otherwise remain hidden in the 
divine Essence, for the divine Names materialize only in their relation to 
 creatures (such as the ‘Merciful’ or the ‘Exalted’). The Essence in itself, how-
ever, is beyond these Names and their ‘conflicts’ (because the Names often 
indicate attributes that to our limited view seem to be in conflict, such as the 
‘Avenger’ and the ‘Merciful’).20 Ibn ʿArabi points this out only to make a com-
parison between the universe (the macrocosm) and the individual soul (the 
microcosm):
Whoever wishes to know the divine Breath, then let him [first] know the 
Cosmos, for “Who knows himself, knows his Lord,” Who is manifest in 
him. In other words, the Cosmos is manifested in the divine Breath by 
which God relieved the divine Names from the distress they experienced 
by the nonmanifestation of their effects. Thus He bestows favor on 
Himself by what He creates in His breath. Indeed, the first effect of the 
Breath is experienced only in the divine Presence, after which it contin-
ues its descent by a universal [process] of release, down to the last thing 
to be created.21
So in the individual human being, the divine Essence is paradoxically manifest 
in the non-manifest consciousness, or internal witness, that makes all aware-
18 Affifi, 141.
19 “The Reality describes Himself as the Merciful Breath, and that all that attaches to an 
attribute, in the case of something described, should adhere to that attribute. You know 
that the breath in one breathing is all that needs to be. Therefore, the Divine Breath is 
receptive to cosmic forms, in relation to which it is like the Primordial Substance, being 
very Nature Herself ” (Austin, 179–80/Affifi, 143–44).
20 “Indeed it is the Breath that has brought about the mutual conflict among the divine 
Names, which are relationships. Consider, however, how the divine Essence, which is 
beyond this regime [of conflict], is characterized by [utter] Self-sufficiency, beyond all 
need of the Cosmos. Because of this the Cosmos has been set forth in the form of its 
Creator, which is nothing other than the divine Breath” (Austin, 180/Affifi, 144).
21 Austin, 181/Affifi, 145.
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ness possible. This internal witness is constituted by the awareness of the unity 
of all being or existence as such, and so it is in this internal witness that being 
or existence is ‘found’ (mawjud—‘is found’ or ‘exists’) as such.22 In this way, Ibn 
ʿArabi extends his destabilization of the God/world dichotomy even further, so 
that it includes God and the human individual:
[So I said], Worship God. He uses the name Allah because of the variety of 
worshippers in their acts of worship and the different religious traditions. 
He does not use one of the particular names, but rather that Name which 
includes them all. Then he goes on to say, My Lord and your Lord, whence 
it is certain that His relationship with one creature, as Lord, is not the 
same as with another. For that reason he makes the distinction between 
My Lord and your Lord, referring separately to the speaker and the one 
spoken to.23
God is both immanent in and transcendent to the soul. Accordingly, ‘Lord’ 
(rabb) is a term that applies to God when the soul regards God as an object 
over and against itself, taken in its creaturely finitude and material particular-
ity. But insofar as the soul is conscious of the unity of being, then the boundary 
and distinction between it and God is fluid and even illusory. No other prophet 
demonstrates this fluidity for Ibn ʿArabi better than Jesus:
He continued, And when You caused me to die, that is, when You raised me 
to Yourself, hiding them from me and me from them, You were the watcher 
over them, not in my material substance, but in theirs, since You were 
their sight, which required supervision. Man’s consciousness of himself is 
indeed God’s consciousness to the name, the Watcher, referring the con-
sciousness to Him. He wishes thereby to distinguish between himself and 
his Lord, so that he may know that he is himself, a servant, that God is 
Himself as his Lord, considering himself as witness and God as the 
Watcher. Thus, in relation to himself, Jesus puts his people first, saying, 
concerning them a witness, while I am with them, preferring them out of 
courtesy. He places them last, however, when speaking of God in saying, 
the Watcher over them, since the Lord is deserving of precedence.24
22 As Peter Coates comments: “For Ibn ʿArabi consciousness of the Self, in its metaphysical 
depths, is nothing less than consciousness of the Unity of Being” (Peter Coates, Ibn ʿArabi 
and Modern Thought (Oxford: Anqa Publishing, 2002), 172).
23 Austin, 183/Affifi, 147.
24 Austin, 184/Affifi, 148.
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Thus, Jesus epitomizes the hadith that states that in the servant who loves God 
with a pure love, God becomes his ‘hearing’ and his ‘seeing’ and his ‘walking.’25 
God in such a ‘knower’ (gnostic or ʿarif ) ‘animates’ the knower’s every act and 
is, therefore, the ‘observer’ or ‘watcher’ (shahid) that grounds every act of 
awareness and knowing. Furthermore, it is in awareness of this fundamental 
awareness that the soul comes to ‘taste’ God as the Watcher (shahid) within.
Ibn ʿArabi is fond of quoting his great Sufi predecessor, Junayd, who used to 
say about knowledge (maʾarifa) and the knower (ʿarif ): “The water takes on the 
color of its cup.”26 That is, the knowledge that the Sufi has of God (the water) is 
colored by conditions of his creaturely finitude. We cannot, however, do with-
out the cup, since it is by means of the cup (the sacred text, the sacred tradi-
tion) that the water (divine knowledge) becomes accessible to the created 
intellect. We can only attain divine knowledge, therefore, by taste (dhawq), i.e., 
by drinking the water in the cup. But a pure, undistorted knowledge of the 
divine Essence as such (the water as it is devoid of color outside the cup) is 
impossible. Ibn ʿArabi extends this notion to understand religion itself: thus, 
the different religions (adyan—din, sing.) take the shape of many different 
cups, each holding the water of divine knowledge, even though Islam is the 
clearest and most capacious cup. In this analogy, every religion or din (law) is a 
‘cup’ that ‘colors’ its view or notion of God (which Ibn ʿArabi calls the ‘God of 
belief,’ as opposed to God himself in his hidden Essence). Thus, the Sufi solu-
tion to Muslim-Christian dialogue (or, more narrowly, Ibn ʿArabi’s solution) is 
to approach the two religious traditions as two cups out of which the divine 
Essence may be drunk and tasted, but in which knowledge of God as such 
eludes the soul, due to its inherent finitude and the historically limited nature 
of human tradition.
25 Austin, 184/Affifi, 148.
26 Ibn ʿArabi expands upon the saying of Junayd in Meccan Revelations: “Junayd was asked 
about knowledge (maʾarifa) and the knower (ʿarif ). He replied ‘The water takes on the 
color of its cup’. In other words, the container displays its effects in what it contains. 
Junayd said this to let you know that you will never judge your object of knowledge except 
by yourself, since you will never know anything but yourself. Whatever may be the color 
of the cup, water becomes manifest in that color. The person without knowledge judges 
that the water is like that, since sight gives that to him. Water discloses itself in the forms 
of all the cups in respect to their colors, but it does not become delimited in its essence. 
You only see it that way. In the same manner, the shapes of the containers in which water 
appears display their effects in it, but in all of them it is still water. If the container is 
square, the water becomes manifest as square” (Al-Futuhat al-Makkiyya, III, 161.24, trans-
lated by William Chittick in The Sufi Path of Knowledge (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 1989), 341).
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There is, however, a problem inherent in this solution, as attractive as it 
might be to the modern mind. Such a solution depends upon an understand-
ing of Jesus, and of divine knowledge in general, that is fundamentally gnostic 
(in the late antique Hellenistic sense of the term). Here, materiality and cre-
ated finitude are insurmountable obstacles to knowledge of the divine, and so 
we must conceive of the knower (or Knower, God) not only as pure spirit, but 
also as spirit that is purified from matter and finitude and thus totally beyond 
the human condition as such. Not only is this assertion something any knowl-
edgeable Christian cannot accept, but it also leads to a tension, maybe even a 
contradiction, internal to Ibn ʿArabi’s own speculative Sufism: it asserts a fun-
damental and insurmountable duality in a system whose entire goal is to sur-
mount or at least destabilize all dualist thinking. Material individuality and the 
finitude of the creaturely essence can therefore be recognized and relativized 
in relation to the Sufi’s awareness of the oneness of the divine Essence, but 
they can never be wholly overcome. So, while we can destabilize the God/
world and God/soul distinctions in human language, these distinctions remain 
insurmountable in reality.
 Jesus as the ‘Negation of Negation’ in Meister Eckhart
To make clearer what is at stake for Muslim-Christian dialogue, it will be help-
ful to look at the thought of a Christian mystic close to Ibn ʿArabi not only in 
time, but also in the fundamental outlines of his mystical thought. Meister 
Eckhart is such a mystic. The way he appropriates the Christian tradition in the 
service of a mystical reading of scripture is analogous to Ibn ʿArabi in striking 
ways.27 Like Ibn ʿArabi, Eckhart attempts to disrupt and go beyond any fixed 
God/world and God/soul dichotomy, thus opening up an understanding of 
God and his Word that sees their identity in difference and immanence in tran-
scendence. Eckhart himself even talks of a ‘God beyond “God,” ’ meaning not 
the remote god of ancient Gnosticism but, on the contrary, the living God who 
is the ground of our very being, knowing, and willing. Indeed, in one of his 
vernacular sermons, Eckhart asks his hearers to pray to God that we might be 
free of God, where God is understood as a being distinct and separate from us 
who is only one being among other beings (even if the greatest or first). With 
this, we find a way of thinking that is very similar to Ibn ʿArabi. Eckhart also 
27 For a much fuller comparative analysis of the mystical thought of these two thinkers, see 
my book Logos and Revelation: Ibn ʿArabi, Meister Eckhart and Mystical Hermeneutics 
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2010). 
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asserts the ‘nothingness’ of creatures in comparison to God, claiming that crea-
tures are utterly poor with respect to God, and derive all of their being, one-
ness, truth, and goodness from God. Thus, for Eckhart, Existence (esse) Itself is 
God, and creatures are but negations of that pure, unrestricted Existence.28
Eckhart, however, goes further. In his thinking, the negativity of the creature 
is not an absolute barrier between God and man. This is because we cannot 
logically stop at the mere negativity of the creature or at God’s absolute exis-
tence, since this would reinforce the duality that he strives to break. Thus, on a 
higher plane, we must also conceive of God as the negation of negation (nega-
tio negationis), which is simultaneously the purest affirmation of being or exis-
tence. Since pure existence (Existence in Itself) is God, God is also the negation 
of all that may limit or deny existence, which does not, however, deny the lim-
ited, individual existence of creatures as existents:
But to existence itself no existence is denied, just as to animal itself is not 
denied this animal, for example, “lion.” Therefore, no negation, nothing 
negative, belongs to God, except the negation of negation which is what 
the One signifies when expressed negatively. . . . The negation of negation 
is the purest and fullest affirmation—“I am who am” . . . Existence cannot 
deny that it is Existence Itself.29
What is important here is that Eckhart asserts that the negation of negation as 
found in God’s utter unity is also a pure and full affirmation. No existence—not 
even limited, finite, material existence—can be denied to God, if God is indeed 
the fullness and perfection of Existence Itself. So, just as ‘lion’ cannot be denied 
to the category of animal itself, no limited, finite creaturely existence can be 
denied to God. Of course, this does not mean that God is indistinct from all 
creatures or that creatures and God are simply one and the same; rather, crea-
tures are radically distinct from God precisely insofar as they are negations of 
pure existence, but not negations of that negation. Nevertheless, Eckhart 
argues that no negation as such is or can be absolute; it exists only to be negated 
in God’s purity of being and oneness.
28 See Eckhart’s prologues to his Opus Tripartitum, found in Meister Eckhart: Die Lateinische 
Werke, Vol. I (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1936– ), 148–84 (henceforth LW); translated 
in Armand A. Maurer, Master Eckhart: Parisian Questions and Prologues (Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1974), 77–105. 
29 In Exod., n. 74 in LW, Vol. II, 77; translated in Bernard McGinn, Meister Eckhart: Teacher 
and Preacher (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1986), 68.
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This dialectic of the ‘negation of the negation’ holds for the human being 
as well, and his or her relationship to God. Human nature does not erect an 
insurmountable barrier between man and God (as was posited by Ibn ʿArabi), 
but actually opens up the possibility of unity by the very fact that human 
nature, as both material and spiritual, as embodied yet open to the universality 
of being by virtue of its intellectual nature, is able to become a locus of the 
divine negation of negation. And, to the extent that the human soul is capable 
of freedom from the material conditions of existence by virtue of its intellec-
tual nature, human nature is capable of being assumed by the divine nature in 
such a way that human nature as such is affirmed in the hypostatic unity of 
Christ:
Man is an accident of nature. Therefore, abandon everything that is acci-
dent in you and preserve yourself as free, undivided human nature. Since 
this same nature which you possess has become the Son of the eternal 
Father through its being assumed by the eternal Word, you become the 
Son of the eternal Father with Christ because you have the same nature 
which has become God. Therefore, be careful not in the least to hold onto 
yourself as you are this person or that, but preserve yourself as a free, 
undivided human nature. And so, if you want to be one Son, separate 
yourself from all nothing because nothing causes distinction. How is 
that? Note the following. That you are not a certain person, it is the not 
which differentiates you from this person. If you want to be without dis-
tinction, rid yourself of not (nihte). There is a power in the soul which is 
separated from nothing since it has nothing in common with any things. 
Nothing is in this power but God alone. He shines naked into this 
power.30
It is not materiality or finitude that prevents the union of the human soul with 
Christ—for Christ had assumed both—but rather, it is the soul’s attachment to 
that materiality and finitude. For Eckhart, Christ points the way (through his 
Incarnation and his death on the cross) to this negation of negation, in which 
God and world, as well as God and soul, become one without becoming the 
same. Insofar as we love our neighbor in self-sacrifice, we dwell in our ‘undi-
vided’ human nature, which is nothing other than the undivided divine nature 
as well, for human nature in its purity (Christ) is nothing other than the divine 
nature itself.31 Hence, in Eckhart’s mystical thought, creaturely finitude and 
30 Predigt 46 in LW, Vol. II, 380–82; translated in McGinn, Meister Eckhart, 304–05. 
31 Dobie, Logos and Revelation, 154.
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material individuality are united to God and can be united to God insofar as 
our human nature is redeemed. Our knowledge of this redemption, further-
more, cannot come from the powers of reason alone, but can only be revealed 
in the birth, death, and resurrection of Christ.32 Nevertheless, the powers of 
human reason and human language are also redeemed, insofar as Christ is the 
incarnate Word of God. As incarnate Word, Christ not only fully manifests 
God’s presence, but he also takes up and negates the negation of finitude and 
materiality through the communication of the divine Word, thus making both 
finitude and materiality fitting vehicles for God’s full self-expression. In this 
way, the soul’s intellectual nature is also fulfilled, because it is the nature of the 
intellect to be “separated from nothing since it has nothing in common with 
anything.” Accordingly, the play of revelation and concealment that we saw 
with the divine words in Ibn ʿArabi is overcome.
We therefore go ‘beyond’ the ‘God’ of creation, to the extent that we see God 
has united himself essentially and completely to our human nature in Christ, 
so that what is fully human is also fully divine, and what is fully divine is not 
alien to anything that is fully human—materiality and finitude included.
For Eckhart, the fact of the Incarnation contains the inner truth of 
Christianity. The Incarnation tells us that God in the person of Christ did 
not think ‘divinity something to be held onto’ but that he ‘emptied him-
self ’ by becoming a human being (Phil 2:6–8). By doing so the eternal 
breaks into historical time and abiding truth into the world of shifting 
phenomena.33
Furthermore, the breaking of the eternal into the temporal, the uncreated into 
the created, and the divine into the human, are all expressed by Meister 
Eckhart in terms of birth—the birth of the Son into the soul. In this incarna-
32 As Mahmoud Ayoub points out, Islam has no conception of sin and redemption: see his 
A Muslim View of Christianity, 137. Thus, in Islam in general, and the Sufi tradition in par-
ticular, Jesus becomes only an example of piety, love, and asceticism, which is to be emu-
lated. Christ also exemplifies a fulfilled humanity, a humanity illumined by the light of 
God. This reflection of the divine light in the human heart and soul is known in the lan-
guage of Islamic mysticism as tajalli, the manifestation of divine beauty and majesty in 
and through man (Ayoub, A Muslim View of Christianity, 152). Nevertheless, according to 
Islam and even the thought of someone like Ibn ʿArabi, who was unafraid to stretch doc-
trinal points, human and divine nature always remain distinct and separate. Thus, as 
prophet, Jesus can do nothing to affect any unity between God and human beings—he 
can only be an example or point to the way, not be the way itself. 
33 Dobie, Logos and Revelation, 280.
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tional language of ‘birth,’ God becomes the lived ground for knowledge, will, 
and action in the soul where this ‘event’ has occurred. In this event, any radical 
dichotomy between word and God or soul and God is abolished; however, in 
the very act of birth, the materiality and individuality of the believer is also 
affirmed. In this sense then, it is the affective fulfillment and perfection of the 
‘negation of negation.’
 Ibn ʿArabi, Meister Eckhart, and Interreligious Dialogue
As noted above, the thought of a Christian mystic like Meister Eckhart has fea-
tures strikingly similar to that of a Muslim Sufi like Ibn ʿArabi. They both 
attempt to draw the believer into a deeper appreciation of the ‘identity in dif-
ference’ and ‘difference in identity’ between God and the world on one hand, 
and God and soul, on the other. They both do this by pointing to a conceptual 
difference between God as he is in his Essence, utterly one in himself and with 
all things (immanent in his transcendence), and God as ‘Lord’ of creation, as a 
being distinct and apart from his creation. These, of course, are not two differ-
ent ‘gods,’ but one and the same God viewed from different angles, though 
the first perspective for both our mystics is clearly more adequate and compre-
hensive than the second. Furthermore, Ibn ʿArabi and Meister Eckhart use 
similar strategies to effect this shift in perspective for their hearers and readers: 
both stretch language to the limit, engage in what appears to be blasphemy, 
and often read sacred texts against themselves. But, as we have pointed out 
above, there are limits to this convergence. The most important limit is in the 
notion of redemption, which is totally absent from Islam and thus from the 
mystical thought of Ibn ʿArabi as well. Thus, while a Christian mystic like 
Meister Eckhart might find much to appreciate in the writings of Ibn ʿArabi—
the unity and oneness of God, his immanence in transcendence, the impor-
tance of the biblical prophets—he would find it jarring that there is a lack of 
any notion of the Fall, the Incarnation, the atoning sacrifice of the Cross, and 
our redemption. For Eckhart, it is precisely this redemptive character of Christ 
that completes the dialectic of God’s immanence in transcendence, which we 
found only partially complete in Ibn ʿArabi’s thought.
If, however, a proper appreciation of difference is the foundation of genuine 
interreligious dialogue, then our two mystical thinkers have laid the ground-
work for this very well indeed. 
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